words and vauntings will not suffice to retain what we have got, to recover what we have lost. Yet perhaps the tortuous dealings of Berlin diplomacy may before long give us the opportunity of showing that Germany is not so far advanced on the road of over-sea empire as she fondly imagines.

It may be taken as certain that in the struggle with Japan, Germany is heart and soul with Russia. Whether she will openly ally herself with her eastern neighbour is a question that will depend exclusively on the action of France. Reasons have been given to show that the natural impulse of the French nation is to fly to the aid of its ally without counting the cost, or closely calculating to which side the balance of its own self-interest inclines. There are also, it must be admitted, some material considerations that exercise influence in the same direction. French opinion has been somewhat stirred by a fantastic scheme imputing to the Japanese the intention of attacking Indo-China. We might as reasonably tremble for the safety of Hong-Kong or Singapore. In the way of direct advantage Russia, too, might promise France, or encourage her to take, a large slice of Southern China, including the city of Canton, where I must record that the French have of late years been more active than we have been. No one can say that these efforts may not be crowned with success, and that before the end of the summer Japan and England may not be confronted with a triple alliance of France, Germany, and Russia. Such an alliance could not fail to attract to itself several minor members, such as Holland anxious for Java, and Belgium seizing so favourable a moment to repudiate its worn-out neutrality and to manifest its resentment for the attacks on the Congo State. Nor should we slight the value of such allies because they are small States, seeing that they would bring with them obvious strategical advantages.

That is not a confederacy of which we could prudently afford to make light, nor shall we prevent its becoming a reality by merely sitting tight and believing that, because some organs of the Paris press write civilly, the French people are going to place limitations on the force and value of their bond with Russia. What we have to accomplish, if we can, is to stop the development of the GermanRussian plans to bias France and to draw her into the field. We may try to do this by action, but we certainly shall not succeed by inaction. The chief step to be taken is to bring home to the mind of the French people, and to demonstrate in an inoffensive but effectual manner, that the proposed Triple Alliance would not be sure of success on the sea even against England alone. The French have tasted the bitterness of defeat, and they can have no desire to rush rashly on a repetition of disaster. But the difficulty will be to find a way to combat and disprove the optimistic statements of the other Powers to the effect that this new Triple Alliance need not fear any serious conse

quences in a struggle with England. No one can foresee how not the present but the next French Government will be influenced by these arguments and assurances. There is, indeed, one step-which does not, however, depend on England—that would enormously increase the weight of English influence and thus strengthen the Anglophil party in France, and, as it would be a distinctly pacific measure, President Roosevelt might be disposed to sanction it. If the United States were to send half-a-dozen battleships across the Atlantic to pass the next few months at the mouth of the Thames, the evidence thus afforded that England did not stand alone in the world would effectually baffle German machinations, and procure the interval needed for French opinion to become solid on the point that sentimental grounds are not sufficient for France to risk her whole future on behalf of Russia, and to destroy at the same time all chance of a genuine, uncostly, and disinterested accord with England.

DEMETRIUS C. BOULGER,

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS:

NEW RULES AND OLD CIRCUMSTANCES

WHAT are still called the New Rules of Procedure in the House of Commons have been in force for the full period of two Sessions. The time seems adequate and convenient to inquire how they have worked. The House, open to conviction in political matters, has always shown itself stubbornly conservative where its procedure is concerned. When twenty-two years ago Mr. Gladstone, faced by organised obstruction led by Mr. Parnell, made a deliberate and elaborate attempt to introduce reform he stirred profound resentment, not wholly confined to the Opposition benches, then peopled by the Conservatives. The closure in particular raised a storm of vehement resistance. Of thirty-three days spent in considering the New Rules brought forward in the Session of 1882, fully one-half were appropriated for debate on that particular point. Mr. Gladstone, with characteristic subtlety, declined to call the process the closure, much less to use the French term clôture. Putting the question' was the official term with which he endowed it. The phrase deceived no one and pleased few. At first there was a tendency to talk and write about clôture. Speedily the English word assumed dominancy. It is interesting to note that to this day Mr. Gladstone's phrase officially survives. A member desiring to hasten a division does not 'beg to move the closure.' He moves 'That the question be now put.'

The closure machinery organised by 'prentice hands during the height of Irish obstruction in 1882 proved hopelessly unwieldy. The initiative was entrusted to the Speaker or the Chairman of Ways and Means. When one or other considered enough had been said, he was empowered to order a division to be straightway taken. The privilege of members and the freedom of minorities were safeguarded by the stipulation that in order to carry the closure no fewer than two hundred members must take part in the division deciding the question. There followed from the rule thus framed the inevitable conclusion. The Speaker and the Chairman of Ways and Means, shrinking from the invidious position of peremptorily closing debate, the Standing Order became a dead letter. Five years later, a Conservative Government being in power, the salutary rule was made really

effective. To-day the closure may, with the consent of the Speaker or Chairman, be moved on the initiative of any member, and the presence of over a hundred members is required in the division. This allotment of initiative and confirmation works admirably. If the Speaker thinks the closure motion is an abuse of the rules of the House or an infringement of the rights of the minority, he may, and frequently does, refuse to put the question.

A Liberal Government, introduced the principle of the closure. Successive Conservative Governments have perfected it. Mr. W. H. Smith, whose name will be found in every division list in the Session of 1882 hostile to the closure, four years later becoming Leader of the House of Commons, habitually and gratefully invoked it in the interests of public business. So constant was the habit that a familiar word came to have a new parliamentary meaning. When debate had dragged itself out to undue length, Mr. W. H. Smith would be observed to gather himself up and seat himself on the extreme edge of the Treasury Bench. This attitude came to be recognised as being 'on the pounce.' It was the familiar preliminary to moving the closure.

The greatest reformer of parliamentary procedure is the present Prime Minister. Mr. Gladstone planted; Mr. W. H. Smith watered. Mr. Balfour has widely extended the range of culture. The Liberal Premier, as we have seen, hampered by prejudice, succeeded after long effort in driving through the House an unworkable machine. A Conservative Government under the leadership of Mr. W. H. Smith sharpened ends, the rough-hewing of which they had sturdily resisted. Both were content to closure by units, requiring a separate motion upon successive questions, with the inevitable division for each case. Mr. Balfour, ruthlessly going to the root of the matter, invented a system known as closure by compartments, applying it systematically and automatically to the process of Supply.

This was approached by an earlier reform, carried in 1896, that has done much to lessen the grave scandal of rushing Supply through a fagged House 'kept in' during the month of August or even September. Under the old order of things, Supply was taken at odd times when nothing else claimed precedence. The Estimates had to be agreed to before prorogation was possible. If they were not cleared off before August, then the House must sit all night if necessary till Supply was voted. Mr. Balfour's plan was as simple as it has proved effective and beneficial in the public service. In accordance with it, twenty days, being days before the 5th of August, are allotted for the consideration of the annual estimates for the Army, Navy, and Civil Services. The Minister is permitted to move the allotment of three supplementary days, a privilege, as a matter of fact, regularly claimed. As soon as the Address is got out of the way,

Supply is taken in hand, one whole sitting in every week being allotted for the purpose. The House knows precisely where it stands in respect of this important matter. It has twenty-three days wherein to discuss it, and shall have neither less nor more. On the twenty-second day the chairman will, on the stroke of ten o'clock, proceed to put the remaining votes to the question, with intent to terminate the labours of the committee at the current sitting. On the next, the twenty-third day, the report stage will be dealt with in the same fashion, and there will be an end of the business.

In the earlier Sessions of the operation of the first edition of this standing Order, the Mother of Parliaments presented a lamentable sight. The chairman was obliged to put every outstanding vote individually, his declaration that the Ayes have it' being answered by angry shouts from the Noes. Thereupon a division took place, the process lengthening out till the break of a new day gleamed on haggard faces. Two years ago Mr. Balfour boldly grappled with this absurdity. He amended the rule by directing that on the Civil Service estimates the question may be put with respect to each class of outstanding votes. With respect to the Navy, Army, and Revenue departments, the total amount of the votes outstanding on the final day is put from the chair, and only one division is possible. Thus, without varying practical effect, some hours of childish marching and counter-marching are saved, and the danger of shortening more or less valuable lives is minimised.

Like all other efforts in the same direction, these reforms were hotly denounced when first proposed. It was said that the priceless privilege of members to air grievances before voting Supply was tampered with. To-day there is no member who would uplift his voice in favour of repealing the new ordinances. As a matter of fact, the votes are more fully and sanely discussed than was the case under the old rules. The House comes to the consideration whilst its withers are yet unwrung. The fixity of the arrangement enables members concerned with particular questions so to shape their engagements as to be in their place when, on successive Thursdays, the House goes into Committee of Supply. This serves the interest of the State. The personal interest and convenience of members are accommodated by the automatic ending of the Session. Time was when neither Ministers nor unofficial members could make definite holiday arrangements in view of the long recess. The date of the prorogation was on the knees of the gods below the gangway on the Opposition side. Before 1882 they could, and did, defer it indefinitely. Up to 1896 they were, in spite of the closure, to a considerable extent masters of the situation. Now they are helpless. Whatever humour they may be in, Supply will be finally closed on the 8th of August, and the Session cannot be prolonged beyond the few days necessary for the process of carrying the Appropriation Bill