the allowance of bail, and which allowance was afterwards set aside, and the plaintiff, treating the render as insufficient, proceeded upon the bail bond: the court held that he had a right to do so. Brown v. Jennings, B. & A. 768.

In order to discharge the bail to the action, where an action of debt is brought upon the recognizance, the render may be "at any time within 14 days after the service of the process upon them, but not at any later period; and upon such render being duly made and notice given, the proceedings shall be stayed, upon payment of the costs of the writ and service thereof only." R. G. T. 3 W. 4. The court will not give effect to a render made after the time here mentioned, even upon terms. Bird v. Atkins, et al. 7 Dowl. 769. Intervening Sundays are reckoned. Cresswell v. Green, 15 East, 537. If the costs be not paid, the plaintiff may proceed in his action. Horne v. Whitcombe, 5 Dowl. 328.

Where the plaintiff proceeds against the bail by scire facias, formerly in the court of King's Bench the bail in actions by bill had until the return day, if summoned, or until the return day of the alias where nihil was returned, to render their principal; see Webb v. Harvey, 2 T. R. 757; and in actions by original, they had until the quarto die post of these returns respectively. Bell v. Jackson, 4 T. R. 663. In the court of Common Pleas, they had also until the quarto die post, of these returns; R. M. 1654, s. 12. Simmons v. Middleton, 1 Wils. 269; and in the Exchequer, until the return day of these writs respectively. But as now, no judgment can be signed on a sci. fa. without the leave of the court or a judge, in cases where the bail are not summoned, (and we have seen, ante, p. 204, that it is only where they reside in Middlesex that they can be summoned,) and even with such leave it cannot be signed until after eight days from the return of one scire facias, if a render be made within these eight days, the court or a judge will not give leave to sign the judgment; and upon applica tion will order an exoneretur to be entered on the bail piece. Sanderson v. Brown, 7 Ad. & El. 261.

Where one of the bail being served with a writ in an action on the recognizance, died before the appearance day, and therefore a fresh action was brought against his executor, it was holden that the executor had the same time to render the principal, as if the second action were brought against him as one of the bail. Meddowcroft v. Sutton, 1 B. & P. 61. Or if, after commencing an action on the recognizance, the plaintiff die, and his executor brings another action, the bail have the same time to render their principal in this second action, previous action had been brought. Wilkinson v. Vass, 8 T. R. 422. And the same, if the plaintiff discontinue a first action, and bring a second. Hoare v. Mingay, 1 Str. 915.

as if no

Formerly a render on the last day of the time limited for

that purpose by the practice of the court, must have been made during the sitting of the court. But now, by R. G. H. 2 W. 4, s. 22, "bail shall be at liberty to render the principal, at any time during the last day for rendering, so as they make such render before the prison doors are closed for the night."

Time enlarged.] The court will seldom enlarge the time thus allowed for rendering. Where the first render was in time, but it was to the wrong county gaol, and owing to this mistake, the render in the right county did not take place within the time limited: Coleridge J. refused to set aside the proceedings against the bail, even on payment of costs. Bird v. Atkins et al. 7 Dowl. 769. Even where it was sworn that the principal was so ill, it would endanger his life to remove him, the court refused it. Wynn v. Petty, 4 East. 102. But where he was already in custody, and such a return was made to a habeas corpus, the court gave time. Winstanley v. Gaitskell, 16 East, 389. So, where there was a commission of lunacy against the principal, and he still continued lunatic, the court held it to be no ground for giving time to render, unless there were special circumstances in the case, which might call upon them for the exercise of their discretion. Cock v. Bell, 13 East, 355. But it has been holden that a lunatic may be brought up by habeas from St. Luke's Hospital, to be rendered in discharge of his bail. Pillop v. Sexton, 3 B. & P. 550. So, it has been holden no ground for enlarging the time, that the principal had been unwarrantably arrested and detained by a foreign state. Grant v. Fagan, 4 East, 189. But if by an act of state of our own government,- -as for instance, if the principal, an alien, be in the custody of a messenger for the purpose of being sent out of the country,-the court, although they will not grant a habeas in such a case, will take care that the bail are not prejudiced. Folkein v. Critico, 13 East, 457. So where the principal was undergoing imprisonment for a misdemeanor in a county gaol, at the time when he ought to be rendered, the court of Exchequer gave the bail until a week after the term of imprisonment should expire, to render him. Ashmore v. Fletcher, 13 Price, 523. Rouch v. Boucher, 10 Price, 104. Campbell v. Ackland, 1 Cromp. & M. 73. So, where the principal became bankrupt, and was committed by the court of bankruptcy for not satisfactorily answering certain questions put to him, the Court of Common Pleas gave time until the 5th day of the following term to render him. Waugh v. Ashford, 1 Bing. N. C. 294. See Joyce v. Pratt, 6 Bing. 377. Where the principal has become bankrupt, the court, in the case of a country fiat, will in general enlarge the time for rendering him, for a certain time after his last examination. Maude v. Jowett, 3 East, 145. Glendining v. Robinson, 1 Taunt.

Gibson v. White, 2 Tyr. 162.

320. Crump v. Taylor, 1 Price, 74. Harris v. Alcock, 2 Tyr. 418. And in one instance, the court of Exchequer have done this in the case of a London fiat, and Parke, B. said that he knew no distinction between cases of town and country fiats in this respect; Ruston v. Greene, 2 Dowl. 617; but the court of Common Pleas have refused to do so. Coombs v. Dod, 2 Dowl. 766. Shaw v. Cash, 4 Bing. 80.

So if the principal have brought a writ of error, the court upon application will stay proceedings against the bail until the writ of error has been determined; Capron v. Archer, 1 Burr. 334. Bennett v. Forrester, 2 Price, 296; provided the application be made before the time for rendering has expired. R. G. H. 2 W. 4, s. 84.

By whom and how.] A defendant can only be rendered by his bail: that is to say, by bail put in to the action. Formerly he could have rendered himself to the sheriff, in discharge of his sureties to the bail bond, at any time before the return day of the writ; but as the writ is now returnable the moment it is executed, he can no longer render to the sheriff, whether the latter have been ruled to return the writ or not. Hodgson v. Mee, 5 Nev. & M. 302, 1 Har. & W. 398, overruling Turner v. Brown, 2 Dowl. 547. Bail above, therefore, must be put in, in order to render him. But it is not necessary that the bail should justify for the purpose; Hall v. Walker, 1 H. Bl. 638. Edwin v. Allen, 5 T. R. 401. R. v. Sh. of Essex, 5 T. R. 633. Moysey v. Carnill, 5 T. R. 534. Seaver v. Spraggon, 2 New Rep. 85. Gore v. Williams, Anst. 653. Mitchell v. Morris, 2 W. Bl. 1179. R. v. Sh. of Middlesex, Dowl. 673. R. T. 33 G. 3, K. B.; nor is it necessary even to give notice of their being put in; Short v. Doyle, 4 Dowl. 202. Wilson v Griffin, 2 Cromp. & J. 683; and by R. G. H. 2 W. 3, s. s. 20,"bail, though rejected, may render their principal, without entering into any fresh recognizances." Where however bail were allowed, but the rule allowance was afterwards set aside on the ground of the bail having committed perjury in justifying, it was holden that they could not afterwards render; Brown v. Jennings, 2 B. & 4. 768; but if they had been added bail, the principal might have been rendered by the bail originally put in. R. v. Sh. of Middlesex, 6 Bing. 251, and see R. v. Sh. of Essex, 5 T. R. 633. Any man therefore may be put in as bail for this purpose; Bell v. Gate, 1 Taunt. 162; even an attorney, or attorney's clerk. R. G. H. 2 W. 4, s. 13.

Bail to render, may be put in by the defendant; see Brookes v. Warren, 2 W. Bl. 1273; or by his bail to the sheriff, with or without his assent; or by his bail above; Davidson v. Fowler, H. 1820, MS. 2 Chit. 74; or by the sheriff, with or

without his assent, even although he have not taken a bail bond, R. v. Butcher, Peake, 169. Hamilton v. Jones, 6 Bing. 628, provided the defendant have then failed to put in bail in due time. Taylor v. Evans, 1 Bing. 367. And for the purpose of rendering him, the bail may take him, if he be at large; and any person may lawfully assist them in doing so. Pyewell v. Stowe, 3 Taunt. 425. Or if he be in custody, they may in most cases have a habeas corpus to bring him up, to render him. See ante, p. 208. The render must be to the prison of the court where the recognizance of the bail was taken; Fisher v. Branscombe, 7 T. R. 355; but if the record be removed from that court into another, the render may be to the prison of the latter court. Sherratt v. Floyer, 2 Bing. 18. Upon application at a judge's chambers, the judge's clerk will make out the committitur, and get it signed by the judge; but in the Queen's Bench, in order, to enable him to do so, a memorandum of the state of the cause must be delivered to him, as thus: if before declaration, the sum sworn to on the arrest, must be stated; if after declaration, add "declaration filed or delivered," "issue joined" or "interlocutory judgment signed," as the case is: if after final judgment, state the debt and damages, or damages. R. E. 8 G. 3, K. B. The defendant is then delivered to the tipstaff, together with the committitur. In the Common Pleas and Exchequer, you get the officer who has the bail book to attend at the time of the render, and an exoneretur will then be entered; but in the Queen's Bench this is done otherwise, thus: after notice of render has been served, an affidavit of service is made, and upon that being filed with the officer who has the bail piece, he will give it to you; you then take the bail piece to the master, who will enter an exoneretur upon it; you then file the bail piece with the officer who signs the writs; and lastly you make an entry of the render in the marshal's book, kept in the office of the clerk of the judgments. This affidavit of service, and the entry in the marshal's book, however, are not necessary to the validity of the render. R. v. Sh. of Middlesex, 2 B. & A. 607. And even if the exoneretur be not entered, and proceedings on that account be taken against the bail, the court will give leave to enter it nunc pro tunc. Weaver v. Chandler, Say, 7. and see Webb v. Harvey, 2 T. R. 757.

Notice of render should be given to the plaintiff's attorney or agent forthwith, R. T. 1, A. K. B., and in strictness, before the time for rendering shall have expired; for otherwise the plaintiff may proceed against the bail or the sheriff. But where the render itself is made in time, if from any neglect of the defendant in giving notice of it, the plaintiff proceed against the bail, the court will stay the proceedings on payment of costs; Lepine v. Barratt, 8 T. R. 222. Thorne v. Hutchinson, 3 B. & C. 112. and see Smith v. Lewis, 16 East,

212; and they have done this, even after execution executed in an action against the bail, Thorne v. Hutchinson, supra, and after an attachment against the sheriff, R. v. Sh. of Middlesex, 2 D. & R. 225, and even after an action for an escape was commenced. R. v. Sh. of Derbyshire, 5 B. & C. 244. As to proceedings, after notice of render, see Byrne v. Aguilar, 3 East, 306.

Render to the county goal, in what cases.] By stat. 11 G. 4, and 1 W. 4, c. 70, s, 21, a defendant, who shall have been holden to bail on any mesne process, issued out of any of the superior courts of record, may be rendered in discharge of his bail to the common gaol of the county in which he was so arrested. The palace court is not a superior court within the meaning of this section; nor can a defendant, arrested under process from it, although the cause had been removed into the court of Queen's, Bench, be rendered to the county gaol, under this statute. Scaith v. Brown, 5 Dowl 412. But Dover Castle, it seems, may be deemed a county gaol, within the meaning of the act. Stride v. Hill, 4 Dowl. 709.

And by sect. 22, a defendant, in custody of the gaoler of the county gaol of any county of England or Wales, by virtue of any proceeding out of any of the superior courts of record, may be rendered in discharge of his bail in any other action depending in any of the said courts.

When and how.] This statute makes no alteration whatever in the time for rendering; and therefore the render in this case must be made within the time already mentioned. ante, p. 209.

In order to make the render, "the defendant or his bail or one of them, shall, for the purpose of such render, obtain an order of a judge of one of the superior courts at Westminster, and shall lodge such order with the gaoler of such county gaol, [and at the same time render the defendant to his custody]; and a notice in writing of the lodgment of such order, and of the defendant's being actually in custody of such gaoler by virtue of such order, signed by the defendant or the bail or either of them, or by the attorney or agent of any or either of them, shall be delivered to the plaintiff's attorney or agent; and the sheriff, or other person responsible for the safe custody of debtors in such county gaol, shall, on such render being so perfected, be duly charged with the custody of such defendant; and the said bail shall be thereupon wholly exonerated from liability as such. 11 G. 4, & 1 W. 4, ss. 21, 22.

In applying for the judge's order, a memorandum should be furnished to the judge's clerk, of the name of the cause, the stage in which it is, the amount of the debt indorsed on the writ, or the debt or damages, &c. recovered by the verdict, in what county the defendant was arrested, whether now in cus