that he left the hotel the night before and went to Baltimore where he remained for four days. In this he was corroborated by his wife, who stated that she followed him on the next morning, but it appeared that on her arrival in Baltimore the summons and complaint were found in her trunk. The person who made the service testified that on being served defendant returned apparently to his room and shortly after left the hotel. Held, that the probibilities of the case were that the papers were served, and that the motion was properly denied. Wygant v. Brown (Sup. Ct.), 243.

4.

If the person served sustains sufficient character and rank to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will be apprised of the service, the requirement of the statute is answered. Barrett v. American Telephone & Tel. Co. (Sup. Ct.), 465.

5. Service upon the general superintendent of a telephone company is sufficient. Id.

6. It is not necessary to insert the individual name of the superintendent of insurance in the appointment of said officer as attorney to receive service of papers for foreign fire, marine, life or casualty companies, under chap. 346, Laws of 1884. Lafflin v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (Ct. App.), 900.

7.

It is proper to add to his title, or his successor in office." Id.

8. There is nothing in the statute which requires that it should be authenticated in any particular manner, or so authenticated that it could be read in evidence upon the trial of an action in this state. Id.

SERVICES.

1. In an action for professional services as attorney, plaintiff testified that he was employed by defendant to collect a bill against one Robinson: that he defended a suit brought by Robinson against defendant; that afterwards he brought an action in the supreme court for defendant against Robinson; that the value of such services was fifty dollars, and judgment was given for that sum. Held, that the value of the service was predicated merely on what was done in the action which he brought, which was the service set forth in the bill of particulars, and not on what was done in the suit he defended. Wood v. Baldwin (Sup. Ct.), 207.

2. Under a contract to perform services for another as long as such service proves satisfactory to the employer, the employee must be paid for the services as long as they continue; but if he or his service is not satisfactory to the employer, the latter may at any time discharge him without subjecting himself to further claim. Johnson v. Bindseil (Ñ. Y. C. P.), 280.

See ATTORNEYS, 4, 5; EVIDENCE, 11.

SHERIFFS.

The complaint charged defendant by his deputy with seizing under an execution against others property which he knew belonged to plaintiff, and also with an excessive levy and with a sale of the property at a nominal sum. The sheriff was indemnified. Upon his application the indemnitors were substituted under Code, § 1421, as amended in 1887. The indemnitors consented and did not appeal from the order of substitution, which also required them to give security to plaintiff in excess of the amount of his claim. Code Civ. Pro., § 1423. Held, that plaintiff was protected and that the indemnitors by reason of the further security and their consent would be liable for the abuse of process and excessive levy by the sheriff, if proved. McBride v. Tappen (Sup. Ct.), 477.

See SERVICE, 1.
SLANDER.

1. In an action for slander evidence of an apology is only competent in mitigation, and to be admissible must be pleaded. Blohm v. Bamber (City Ct. B'klyn), 816.

2. It is not error to deny a request to charge that a verdict for nominal damages is a vindication. Id.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

See CONTRACT, 2, 3, 13, 14; SALE, 1.

STATUTES.

See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 23.

STOCKS.

1. Where stock brokers purchase and hold stock for a customer on margins subject to his order, the customer undertakes to make good his margin within a reasonable time after notice to do so, and if this is not done the broker can sell upon giving reasonable notice; but if the broker sells without a demand to supply additional margin or notice that a sale will be made, the sale will be wrongful and operate as a conversion of the stock.. Gillett et al v. Whiting (Ct. App.), 495.

2. The B., W. & N. R. R. Co. entered into an agreement with defendant and one Elwell as trustees of purchasers of the M. R. Co., by which the former company agreed to lease to the company to be organized by the trustees under the name of the N. S. St. & M. V. R. Co. its franchise, rights and privileges for the period of ninety-five years, and was to receive therefor $30,000 of the stock of the new company; and it was agreed if they should at any time during said period issue mortgage bonds, etc., that the holders of said stock might exchange it for a like amount of such bonds. The bonds were issued in 1875, and in 1884 plaintiff demanded the exchange of $2,000 of stock, which was worthless, for a like amount of the bonds, worth ninety cents on the dollar. Held, that he could not enforce the agreement; that owners of the stock had the right, within a reasonable time after the mortgage bonds had been issued, to present their stock at the company's office and have it exchanged for bonds, but that the holding of the stock for upwards of nine years until it had become worthless and the company insolvent amounted to gross laches, and a waiver of the right to exercise the option. Catlin v. Green (Ct. App.), 532.

3. Plaintiff authorized defendant to purchase certain mining stock for him, which stock he afterwards exchanged for stock in another company to which the assets of the mining company had been conveyed. Thereafter, claiming that defendant had delivered to him stock belonging to himself and not secured by purchase, he tendered to him mining stock borrowed from other persons for that purpose and demanded back the purchase price. In an action brought for the purchase price, Held, that whether defendant delivered stock owned by himself and not secured by bona fide purchase was immaterial, as the only right conferred in that case was to rescind and to do so he must tender back the stock he received, and that his so called tender of stock which he did not own was an idle ceremony. Mayo v. Knowlton (N. Y. C. P.), 558.

4. A purchaser of stock cannot hold on to it, presumably taking the chance of making gain thereby, and at the same time treat the wrongful act in delivering stock the agent himself owned as an independent cause of action for damages. Id.

* SUBSCRIPTION.

See LIMITATION.

SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS.
See LEASE, 11.

SUPERVISORS.

1. A board of supervisors has a two fold position; it is a tribunal for passing upon claims against the county, and it is also the representative of the county against which the claims are presented. People ex rel. Morrison v. Bard of Supervisors (Sup. Ct.), 473.

2. In the latter capacity when there is no question of fact, and when such payment is a plain matter of duty, the board may be compelled by mandamus to pay a claim, and it is not necessary to resort to certiorari. Id.

3. Where the facts are clear the board will not be allowed to audit a claim at a less amount than the facts justify, and then take the position that in making the reduction it acted judicially and therefore conclusively. Id. 4. By accepting a check for other services rendered, but which also included the amount of the item here in question, the relator did not waive his right to take legal steps to recover the amount of that item disallowed. Id.

SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEEDINGS.

Proceedings supplementary to execution may be maintained on a judgment recovered in a justice's court at any time within ten years after it was rendered. Section 382 of the Code does not apply to such proceedings, but only to an action brought upon such judgment. Green v. Hauser (Supr. Ct. Buff.), 17.

SURROGATE'S COURT.

See EXECUTORS, ETC., 3, 4.

TAXES.

1. Section 8 of chap. 68, Laws of 1880, relative to taxes in Saratoga Springs, provides that any person interested in property upon which a tax or assessment has been or may be assessed or levied, may bring an action to vacate and set aside such tax or assessment or any sale made by virtue thereof, and to enforce and restrain the sale of any real or personal property. The assessors, in 1888, placed on the roll Mary J. Jones (heirs)" as liable to taxation on certain real estate. She had died in 1882, and by her will devised the property to plaintiff's as testamentary trustees. Plaintiffs are not residents of this state. The premises were advertised for sale. Held, that an action to vacate the tax and restrain the sale could be maintained under the above clause of § 8. Coxe et al. v. Town (Sup. Ct.), 365. 2. The legislature has power to validate a void tax, as well for the amount of the tax as for interest upon it. Collins v. Long Island City et al. (Sup.

Ct.), 460.

3. The entry of the wrong name as owner in the assessment roll of lands in Long Island City will not invalidate the tax levied upon such lands. Collins v. Long Island City et al. (Sup. Ct.), 461.

4. An unpaid tax assessed on a lot prior to July 1, 1882, is the essential fact which must exist to confer jurisdiction on the board of assessors to assess a tax on the lot under chap. 114, Laws 1883, and the determination by the board that such fact existed is not conclusive. Bowns v. May (Ct. App.), 700.

5. Where it appears that such tax had been paid and extinguished, the proceedings of the board and the sale thereunder of the land are void and convey no title to the purchaser. Id.

6. The fact that the tax had been paid was not disclosed by any of the proceedings. Defendant, who was the purchaser at the sale, gave the neces sary notice to redeem and plaintiff paid to the registrar the amount necessary to redeem, which was paid to defendant. Held, that such payment was not a voluntary one and that an action for money had and received would lie for its recovery. Id.

7. Chap. 679 of the Laws of 1886, providing for the payment to the state treasurer of a tax of one-half of one per cent by fire and marine insurance companies upon the gross amount of premiums, and exempting them from all assessment or taxation, except as in the act prescribed, exempts the companies from local as well as state taxation, except as provided for in said act. People ex rel. Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Coleman et al. (Ct. App), 841.

8. Testator directed his executors, after the death of his wife, to pay to Christ Church of Poughkeepsie $10,000 towards the "building of a new church or the renovation of the present one." Held, that while the money was bequeathed for the building or renovation of a church edifice, it cannot be treated as real estate, and that the bequest was subject to the collateral inheritance tax. Sherrill v. Christ Church (Ct. App.), 896.

9. The church could not claim exemption under chapter 398, Laws 1890, as that statute was prospective in its operation, and applied only to the future and this tax became due and payable before its passage. Id.

10. An institution whose inmates are required to pay for any of the benefits received is not an almshouse, not being wholly appropriated for the poor, and a legacy to it is subject to the collateral inheritance tax. Matter of Lenox (Sur. Ct.), 959.

11. The New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor is an almshouse and exempt from the tax. While it does not furnish lodg-' ings, it provides the means therefor. Id.

12. The Lenox Library is, by its charter, exempt from taxation upon its real and personal property in the same manner as that of the other incorporated public libraries of the state, and hence is not subject to the tax. Id. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3, 4; VILLAGES.

TELEPHONE COMPANIES.
See INJUNCTION, 6.

TORT.

See JURISDICTION, 1.

TOWN BONDS.

1. The provisions of § 4 of chap. 907, Laws 1869, providing for the investment of railroad taxes as a sinking fund for the payment of town bonds, include bonds issued in renewal of those originally issued in aid of the railroad. Matter of Van Tassel v. Derrenbacher (Sup. Ct.), 312.

2. The taxes assessed and collected from the railroad are applicable to the sinking fund, although the title to it or its name has been changed. Id. 3. The security given by § 4 of the act of 1869, has not been superseded by the amendment of 1870 of § 7 of chap. 880, Laws 1866. The acts are consistent with each other and the bonds in question are included in the general act. Id.

TOWNS.
See COUNTY, 1.

TRADE-MARK.

Plaintiffs are publishers of a book called "The Good Things of Life," consisting of illustrations, etc., taken from the publication known as "Life." Defendants publish a book called "The Spice of Life," consisting of illustrations, etc., taken from a German work. The books are dissimilar in all respects except size and color of binding. The word life is in quotations on plaintiffs' book, but such marks do not attend the use of the word on defendants'. Held, that it is evident that the word is used in a different sense in the respective works, and the use of it by defendants in no respect infringes on its employment on plaintiffs' book. Stokes et al. v. Allen et al. (Sup. Ct.), 633.

See PARTNERSHIP, 6–9.

TRESPASS.

The plaintiff in an action against an elevated railroad having died, it was revived by his executors and a judgment for permanent injury recovered. Subsequently, in an action for partition of said premises, it was decreed that the will was not valid and the premises in question were sold to plaintiff. Held, that it having been decided that the executors had no title whatever to the real estate, the recovery of such judgment and the payment thereof to them in no way affected such real estate and conferred no rights to the easements to defendants which would bar an action by plaintiff for damages. Mitchell et al. v. Metropolitan El. R. R. Co. et al. (Sup. Ct.), 625.

See HIGHWAYs, 4.

1

TRIAL.

Where erroneous evidence has been admitted under objection, the error is cured by instructions to the jury to disregard it when it appears with reasonable certainty that the party has not been injured by the introduction of such evidence. Newman v. Ernst (Supr. Ct. Buff.), 1.

2, The fact that a witness upon a new trial gives new and important testimony upon matters gone into on the former trial and supplies defects, and that his explanations of the reasons why he omitted these facts before might seem unsatisfactory to a jury, does not authorize the court to refuse to submit such facts to the jury. Bickford v. Menier et al. (Sup. Ct.), 341.

3. There is no rule of law which requires a party in any action to put his adversary's pleadings in evidence before his counsel can be allowed to comment upon them in his address to the jury. Holmes v. Jones (Ct. App.), 379.

4. In an equity action where the judge determines that the plaintiff has failed to make a case it is not necessary to formulate findings of fact and conclusions of law, but his decision dismissing the complaint is such a finding of facts and law, and the signing by the clerk is a substantial compliance with § 1022 of the Code. Noyes v Morris et al. (Sup. Ct.), 608. 5. In an action for the price of goods sold, the answer set up that the goods did not correspond to sample, and counterclaimed for moneys paid on the contract. The court held that no counterclaim was proved, and, on conflicting evidence submitted to the jury the question as to what the terms of the contract were, with direction that if they were as claimed by defendant, he was entitled to a verdict. Held, that this was more favorable to him than a submission of the counterclaim would have been, and that the verdict in plaintiffs' favor would not be disturbed. Becker et al. v. Puels (City Ct. B'klyn), 814.

6. Courts should not, after final judgment, by amendment change a ruling upon the law, or alter the decision upon the merits; but where the amendment is in the line of the correction of a mistake or of an omission obviously due to the trial judge's oversight, the power to make it is a general and incidental one, and the question is not one of terms or sessions of the court. Bohlen v. Metropolitan El. R. Co. et al. (Ct. App.), 888.

7. The intention of § 723, Code Civ. Pro., was that courts should, in furtherance of justice, disregard immaterial errors, defects and mistakes in the pleadings and proceedings of an action, and the only limitation imposed as to the making of corrections is, that they shall not affect the substantial rights of the adverse par y Id.

See APPEAL, 9; DIVORCE, 2; EVIDENCE, 11; HUSBAND and Wife, 1; INSURANCE (FIRE), 14; LIBEL, 1; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 11; NEGLIGENCE, 24; RAILROADS, 25, 26; SLANDER, 2.

TRUST.
See LEASE, 2, 3

TRUSTEE.

1. Plaintiff, with others, was trustee under a deed of trust given by a railroad to secure payment of its bonds. Subsequently plaintiff took a lease of the road by which he assumed payment of the bonded debt, and released it to the Erie Railway, which also assumed such payment. Default having been made in payment of interest, plaintiff brought actions therefor against the Erie road and its receiver, in which he was successful and which produce a fund for distribution among the bondholders. Held, that such actions were brought for the benefit of the bondholders and not for the purpose of relieving plaintiff from individual liability under the lease to him; that the fund came to him as trustee and in no other capacity; that he was a mere conduit through which the road was placed in the possession of the Erie Company, and that he was entitled to an allowance for ex