Democracy and the Rule of LawAdam Przeworski, José María Maravall This book addresses the question of why governments sometimes follow the law and other times choose to evade the law. The traditional answer of jurists has been that laws have an autonomous causal efficacy: law rules when actions follow anterior norms; the relation between laws and actions is one of obedience, obligation, or compliance. Contrary to this conception, the authors defend a positive interpretation where the rule of law results from the strategic choices of relevant actors. Rule of law is just one possible outcome in which political actors process their conflicts using whatever resources they can muster: only when these actors seek to resolve their conflicts by recourse to law, does law rule. What distinguishes 'rule-of-law' as an institutional equilibrium from 'rule-by-law' is the distribution of power. The former emerges when no one group is strong enough to dominate the others and when the many use institutions to promote their interest. |
Contents
Lineages of the Rule of Law | 19 |
Power Rules and Compliance | 62 |
Obedience and Obligation in the Rechtsstaat | 94 |
A Postscript to Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law | 109 |
Why Do Political Parties Obey Results of Elections? | 114 |
Part III | 145 |
The Majoritarian Reading of the Rule of Law | 147 |
How Can the Rule of Law Rule? Cost Imposition through Decentralized Mechanisms | 168 |
Part III | 221 |
Courts as an Instrument of Horizontal Accountability The Case of Latin Europe | 223 |
Rule of Democracy and Rule of Law | 242 |
The Rule of Law as a Political Weapon | 261 |
The Rule of Law and the Problem of Legal Reform in Michel de Montaignes Essais | 302 |
317 | |
321 | |
Dictatorship and the Rule of Law Rules and Military Power in Pinochets Chile | 188 |
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according actions actors Adam Przeworski argued Audiencia Nacional authority behavior brute power Cambridge University Press citizens compliance conflict constitutional court constitutionalism constitutive rules constraints coordination countries create culture decentralized decisions decree law democracy democratic depends dictatorship dirty war economic elections electoral equilibrium established example executive exercise Federalist Federalist Papers Felipe González force French González groups Higher Council horizontal impose incentives income individual institutional power interests judges judicial independence judiciary junta justice legal system legislative legislature liberal limits losers Machiavelli magistrates majoritarian majority mechanisms military Montaigne Montesquieu norms obey officials organized particular party Pinochet political rulers political system politicians polyarchy possible president PRISA problem protect Przeworski PSOE reasons Rechtsstaat redistribution reform regime representatives republic role rule of law separation of powers situation social socialist society sovereign stable statutes strategy Supreme Court theory tion transgressions values vote Weingast