Mr. Mercer was extremely anxious on this point. What led to the appointment of this convention! The corruption and mutability of the legislative councils of the States. If the plan does not remedy these, it will not recommend itself; and we shall not be able, in our private capacities, to support and enforce it; nor will the best part of our citi zens exert themselves for the purpose. It is a great mistake to suppose that the paper we are to propose will govern the United States. It is the men whom it will bring into the government. and interest in maintaining it, that are to govern them. The paper will only mark out the mode and the form. Men are the substance, and must do the business. All government must be by force or influence. It is not the King of France, but 200,000 janizaries of power, that govern that kingdom. There will be no such force here; influence, then, must be substituted; and he would ask whether this could be done if the members of the legislature should be ineligible to offices of state; whether such a disqualification would not determine all the most influential men to stay at home, and prefer appointments within their respective States. Mr. Wilson was by no means satisfied with the answer given by Mr. Ellsworth to the argument as to the discouragement of merit. The members must either go a second time into the legislature, and disqualify themselves, or say to their constituents, "We served you be fore only from the mercenary view of qualifying ourselves for offices, and, having answered this purpose, we do not choose to be again elected."

Mr. Gouverneur Morris put the case of a war, and the citizen most capable of conducting it happening to be a member of the legislature. What might have been the consequence of such a regulation at the commencement, or even in the course, of the late contest for our liber

ties?

On the question for postponing, in order to take up Mr. Pinckney's motion, it was lost.

New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, ay, 5; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, no, 5; Georgia, divided.

Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved to insert, after "office," "except offices in the Army or Navy; but, in that case, their offices shall be vacated."

Mr. Broome seconds him.

Mr. Randolph had been, and should continue, uniformly opposed to the striking out of the clause, as opening a door for influence and corruption. No arguments had made any impression on him bút those which related to the case of war, and a coexisting incapacity of the fittest commanders to be employed. He admitted great weight in these, and would agree to the exception proposed by Mr. Gouverneur Morris. Mr. Butler and Mr. Pinckney urged a general postponement of Article VI, section 9, till it should be seen what powers would be vested in the Senate, when it would be more easy to judge of the expediency of allowing the officers of state to be chosen out of that body. A general postponement was agreed to nem con. (207). [Section 10 of Article VI was amended and agreed to. The debate is here omitted.]

SATURDAY, September 1, 1787.

In convention. Mr. Brearly, from the committee of eleven, to which were referred yesterday the postponed part of the Constitution, and parts of reports not acted upon, made the following partial report: "That in lieu of Article VI, section 9, the words following be in

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serted, viz: "The members of each House shall be ineligible to any civil office under the authority of the United States, during the time for which they shall respectively be elected; and no person holding an office under the United States shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office.'"

MONDAY, September 3, 1787.

Mr. Pinckney moved to postpone the report of the committee of eleven (see the 1st of September), in order to take up the following: "The members of each House shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States for which they, or any other for their benefit, receive any salary, fees, or emoluments of any kind, and the acceptance of such office shall vacate their seats respectively."

He was strenuously opposed to an ineligibility of members to office, and, therefore, wished to restrain the proposition to a mere incompatibility. He considered the eligibility of members of the legislature to the honorable offices of government as resembling the policy of the Romans, in making the temple of Virtue the road to the temple of Fame. On this question

Pennsylvania, North Carolina, ay, 2; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 8.

Mr. King moved to insert the word "created" before the word “during," in the report of the committee. This, he said, would exclude the members of the first legislature under the Constitution, as most of the offices would then be created.

Mr. Williamson seconded the motion. He did not see why members of the legislature should be ineligible to vacancies happening during the term of their election.

Mr. Sherman was for entirely incapacitating members of the legislature. He thought their eligibility to offices would give too much influence to the executive. He said the incapacity ought at least to be extended to cases where salaries should be increased, as well as created, during the term of the member. He mentioned, also, the expedient by which the restriction could be evaded; to wit, an existing officer might be translated to an office created, and a member of the legislature, be then put into the office vacated.

Mr. Gouverneur Morris contended that the eligibility of members to office would lessen the influence of the executive. If they can not be appointed themselves; the executive will appoint their relations and friends, retaining the service and votes of the members for his purpose, in the legislature; whereas the appointment of the members deprives him of such an advantage.

Mr. Gerry thought the eligibility of members would have the effect of opening batteries against good officers, in order to drive them out and make way for members of the legislature.

Mr. Gorham was in favor of the amendment. Without it, we go farther than has been done in any of the States, or, indeed, any other country. The experience of the State governments, where there was no such ineligibility, proved that it was not necessary; on the contrary, that the eligibility was among the inducements for fit men to enter into the legislative service.

Mr. Randolph was inflexibly fixed against inviting men into the leg. islature by the prospect of being appointed to offices.

Mr. Baldwin remarked, that the example of the States was not applicable. The legislatures there are so numerous that an exclusion of

their members would not leave proper men for offices. The case would be otherwise in the General Government.

Colonel MASON. Instead of excluding merit, the ineligibility will keep out corruption, by excluding office-hunters.

Mr. Wilson considered the exclusion of members of the legislature as increasing the influence of the executive, as observed by Mr. Gouverneur Morris; at the same time that it would diminish the general energy of the Government. He said that the legal disqualification for office would be odious to those who did not wish for office, but did not wish either to be marked by so degrading a distinction.

Mr. PINCKNEY. The first legislature will be composed of the ablest men to be found. The States will select such to put the Government into operation. Should the report of the committee, or even the amendment, be agreed to, the great offices, even those of the judiciary department, which are to continue for life, must be filled, while those most capable of filling them will be under a disqualification.

On the question on Mr. King's motion

New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, ay, 5; Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 5.

The amendment being thus lost, by the equal division of the States, Mr. Williamson moved to insert the words "created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased," before the word "during," in the report of the committee.

Mr. King seconded the motion, and on the question

New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, ay, 5; Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, South Carolina, no, 4; Georgia, divided.

The last clause, rendering a seat in the legislature and an office incompatible, was agreed to nem. con.

The report, as amended and agreed to, is as follows:

"The members of each House shall be ineligible to any civil office under the authority of the United States, created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during the time for which they shall respectively be elected. And no person, holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of either house during his continuance in office. (251)

Adjourned.

[September 12, 1787, the Committee to Revise the Style, &c., reported the Constitution, in which the following changes were made in regard to the election and qualifications of Senators.]

FRIDAY, September 14, 1787. Article I, section 3, the words "by lot"* were struck out nem. con., on motion of Mr. Madison, that some rule might prevail in the rotation that would prevent both the members from the same State from going out at the same time.

"Ex officio" struck out of the same section, as superfluous, nem. con.; and "or affirmation," after "oath," inserted also unanimously.

Mr. Rutledge and Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved-"That persons impeached be suspended from their offices until they be tried and acquitted."

"By lot" had been reinstated from the report of the committee of five, made on the 6th of August, as a correction of the printed report by the committee of style, &c.

Mr. MADISON. The President is made too dependent already on the Legislature by the power of one branch to try him in consequence of an impeachment by the other. This intermediate suspension will put him in the power of one branch only. They can at any moment, in order to make way for the functions of another who will be more favorable to their views, vote a temporary removal of the existing magistrate.

Mr. King concurred in the opposition to the amendment.

On the question to agree to it

Connecticut, South Carolina, Georgia, ay, 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no, 8.

Article I, section 4, "except as to the places of choosing Senators," was added, nem. con., to the end of the first clause, in order to exempt the seats of government in the States from the power of Congress. Article I, section 5

"Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in their judgment, require secrecy."

Colonel Mason and Mr. Gerry moved to insert, after the word "parts," the words "of the proceedings of the Senate," so as to require publication of all the proceedings of the House of Representatives.

It was intimated, on the other side, that cases might arise where secrecy might be necessary in both Houses. Measures preparatory to a declaration of war, in which the House of Representatives was to concur, were instanced.

On the question, it passed in the negative.

Pennsylvania, Maryland, North Carolina, ay, 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, Georgia, no, 7; South Carolina, divided.

Mr. Baldwin observed that the clause, Article I, section 6, declaring that no member of Congress, "during the time for which he was elected, shall be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during such time," would not extend to offices created by the Constitution, and the salaries of which would be created, not increased, by Congress at their first session. The members of the first Congress, consequently, might evade the disqualification in this instance. He was neither seconded nor opposed, nor did anything further pass on the subject.

EXTRACTS FROM THE CONSTITUTION.

ARTICLE. I.

SECTION. 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.

Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of

the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.

No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.

The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.

The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concur rence of two thirds of the Members present.

Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of Honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.

SECTION. 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.

SECTION. 5. Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.

Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.

Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judg. ment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.

Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

SECTION. 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.

No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he