the sphere of judicial notice which in law did not belong there.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 1; Dec. Dig. 1.]

8. EVIDENCE 4 SCOPE.

The limits of "judicial notice" cannot be
prescribed with exactness, but notoriety is,
generally speaking, the ultimate test of facts
sought to be brought within the realm of judi-
cial notice; in general, it covers matters so
notorious that a production of evidence would
be unnecessary, matters which the judicial
function supposes the judge to be acquainted
with actually or theoretically, and matters not
strictly included under either of such heads.
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Evidence,
Cent. Dig. § 2; Dec. Dig. 4.

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases,
First and Second Series, Judicial Notice.]
9. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 35 AMENDMENT
-MANDATORY PROVISIONS JUDICIAL DE-
PARTMENT.

Under Const. art. 1, § 29, declaring the provisions of the Constitution to be mandatory; unless expressly declared to be otherwise, and article 23, providing that the Legislature shall cause amendments to be submitted to the people, to be published for at least three months next preceding the election in some weekly newspaper in every county where a newspaper is published, the requirement of publication, while mandatory, is not addressed solely to the courts, but is intrusted as well to the executive and legislative branches, and does not charge the courts with the sole duty of enforcing it to the extent of declaring void a constitutional amendment voted upon without the prescribed publication, when the court cannot, by judicial notice, draw to itself facts enabling it to know that such mandate had or had not been complied with by those charged with the duty of publication.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 342; Dec. Dig. 35.1 10. EVIDENCE 29-JUDICIAL NOTICE-INITIATIVE MEASURE

it a law, it could not judicially know any facts touching the sufficiency of the publication, and hence could not determine its sufficiency.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. 88 36, 37, 39, 43-46, 18; Dec. Dig. 29.]

11. EVIDENCE 83-PRESUMPTION - PUBLICATION.

In such case it would be conclusively presumed to have been published as required by the Constitution and statutes.

83.]

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 105; Dec. Dig. 12. STATUTES 35%

- INITIATIVE-VOTE "VOTES CAST AT SUCH ELECTION." Under Const. Amend. 7, approved March 10, 1911 (Laws 1911, p. 136), providing that initiative measures should become effective if approved by a majority of votes cast, if the votes cast equaled one-third of the total votes votes cast at such election" meant the same cast at such election, held, that the term as "number of voters voting at such election," and that since the court judicially knew that the amendment voted for its adoption, it was more than one-third of the voters voting on constitutionally adopted.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, Dec. Dig. 351⁄2.]

13. EVIDENCE 12-JUDICIAL KNOWLEDGE -NUMBER OF ELECTORS.

The court judicially knows, as matter of common knowledge, that there are not 900,000 electors in the state of Washington.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 17; Dec. Dig. 12.] 14. STATUTES 64-INITIATIVE MEASUREPOSTPONEMENT OF EFFECT-PARTIAL Inva

LIDITY.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 58-66, 195; Dec. Dig. 64.] 15. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 208 - INTOXICATING LIQUORS 17 PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES LIQUOR LAW.

Under Const. Amend. 7, approved March 10, 1911 (Laws 1911, p. 136), providing for the initiative and referendum and that an initiative measure shall be in operation after the thirtieth day after the election, initiative measure No. 3 (Laws 1915, p. 2), prohibiting the manufacture, keeping, sale, etc., of intoxicating SUFFICIENCY OF PUB-liquors, before any attempt to enforce its proviLICATION-CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. sions prior to January 1, 1916, even if violative Const. Amend. 7, approved March 10, 1911 of the amendment by reason of the postpone(Laws 1911, p. 136) requires the Legislature to ment of its operation would have no effect upon provide methods of publicity of all laws and the constitutionality of other provisions thereamendments to the Constitution referred to the of, as section 26 expressly so declares. people so that each voter of the state shall receive the publication at least 50 days before the election, and that any initiative measure shall become a law if approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon. Laws 1913, p. 418, enacted pursuant thereto, provides by section 29 that not less than 55 days before any election on initiative measures the Secretary of State shall mail each voter a copy of the pamphlet containing the measure, and by section 30 that votes thereon shall be canvassed by the regular election officers, and that within 30 days after election the Secretary of State shall canvass the vote and certify the result to the Governor, who shall proclaim measures approved by a majority equal to one-third of the total vote cast to be the law of the state. In an action to enjoin the Governor and state and county officers from enforcing initiative measure No. 3 (Laws 1915, p. 2), prohibiting the manufacture, keeping, sale, and disposition of intoxicating liquors, it was contended that the measure had not been lawfully submitted or voted upon. Held, in the absence of constitutional or statutory provisions for preserving any official record evidence or facts showing sufficiency of publication, that, while the court judicially knew that the measure was submitted by the general election, that a majority of votes were for its adoption, that the Governor had proclaimed the result of the canvass, and declared an

Initiative measure No. 3 (Laws 1915, p. 2), prohibiting the manufacture, keeping, sale, and disposition of intoxicating liquors, except in certain cases, approved by popular vote at general election of 1914, does not violate the equal privileges and immunities provisions of the federal or state Constitutions.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 649-677; Dec. Dig. 208; Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. 88 2123; Dec. Dig. 17.]

EQUAL

16. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 239
PROTECTION OF LAWS-LIQUOR LAW.
Such initiative measure does not violate
the equal protection of the laws provisions of
the state and federal Constitutions.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitution-
al Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 694, 696; Dec. Dig.
239.]

17. COMMERCE 14-INTERSTATE COMMERCE -INTOXICATING LIQUORS-STATE REGULA

TION.

Such initiative measure is not invalid as interference with interstate commerce,

since the Webb-Kenyon Act (Act March 1, the seventh amendment to the Constitution 1913, c. 90, 37 Stat. 699 [U. S. Comp. St. 1913, be a valid part thereof, initiative measure § 8739]) divests intoxicating liquors of their interstate character in so far as the power of the No. 3 was not legally submitted to and adoptstate to regulate the sale and disposition there-ed by the people so as to become an existing of and the shipment into the state for that purpose is concerned.

law, aside from the constitutionality of its provisions; and (3) that initiative measure No. 3 is unconstitutional and void, especially in that it violates the equal privileges and

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Commerce, Cent. Dig. §§ 30, 92; Dec. Dig. 14.] 18. COMMERCE 5-INTOXICATING LIQUORS -REGULATION BY CONGRESS WEBB-KEN-immunities and equal protection of the laws

YON ACT-VALIDITY.

The Webb-Kenyon Law, prohibiting the transportation of liquors from one state into another, to be received, kept, or used in violation of the law of the latter state, thereby divesting intoxicating liquors of their interstate character in so far as the power of the state to regulate the sale or disposition thereof and shipments into the state for that purpose is concerned, is valid.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Commerce, Cent. Dig. §§ 3, 5; Dec. Dig.

5.]

En Banc. Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County; D. F. Wright, Judge.

Action by J. L. Gottstein and others, and by Griffin & Mork and others, interveners, joining as plaintiffs, to enjoin Ernest Lister, Governor, and others, state and county of ficials, from enforcing the provisions of an initiative measure prohibiting the manufacture, keeping, etc., of intoxicating liquors. Judgment for defendants dismissing the action, and plaintiffs and interveners appeal. Affirmed.

Preston & Thorgrimson, Dudley G. Wooten, Donworth & Todd, T. D. Rockwell, and Piles, Howe & Carey, all of Seattle, for appellants. W. V. Tanner, of Olympia, John H. Powell, of Seattle, and L. L. Thompson, of Olympia, for respondents.

guaranties of the state and federal Constitutions, and also in that it interferes with interstate commerce.

Appellants Gottstein and others are now, and for many years past have been, lawfully engaged in the wholesale liquor business in Seattle, and have a large stock of goods on hand and a large amount of capital invested in their business. If enforced, the provisions of initiative measure No. 3 will compel the discontinuance of their business in this state and result in large financial loss to them. They prosecute this action in behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated who may desire to join as plaintiffs therein. Appellants Griffin & Mork and others are severally the owners of and engaged in operating hotels in several of the cities of this state, being members of a voluntary organization known as the "Washington State Hotel Association." They come into the cause by complaint in intervention, in which they all join as plaintiffs, alleging facts relative to their business, their investments therein, their lawfully dealing in intoxicating liquors as a part thereof, and the compelling of the discontinuance of that portion of their business, resulting in their large financial loss if the provisions of initiative measure No. 3 be enforced, 'substantially as alleged by the original plaintiffs and appellants, J. L. Gottstein and others. No contention is made by counsel for respondents that the existing business and property interests of appellants here involved and the threatened financial loss to them by the enforcement of initiative measure No. 3 is not such as entitles them to the relief prayed for in this form of action if their contentions touching the merits of the controversy be well founded.

PARKER, J. The plaintiffs, J. L. Gottsteln and others, and the interveners, Griffin & Mork and others, seek to have the state and county officials enjoined from enforcing the provisions of initiative measure No. 3, prohibiting the manufacture, keeping, sale, and disposition of intoxicating liquors, except in certain cases, approved by vote of the people at the general election of November 3, 1914. The cause was submitted to the superior court upon the pleadings and a statement of facts agreed upon by counsel [1] The contention of counsel for appelfor the respective parties. After hearing lants first in natural order is that the proargument of counsel upon the record so made, the superior court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants, dismissing the complaints of the plaintiffs and interveners, from which they have appealed to this court.

posal by the Legislature of the seventh amendment to the Constitution, providing for the initiative and referendum, was not lawfully evidenced by proper entries on the journals of the senate and house of represenThe contentions made in the superior court tatives as provided by article 23 of the Conby counsel for appellants, as they are also stitution, relating to amendments thereto. made here, are in substance: (1) That the This contention, we think, requires but little seventh amendment to our state Constitu- notice here, since the entries made on the tion, providing for the initiative and referen- senate and house journals of the proposal dum, was not legally submitted to and adopt of this amendment were substantially the ed by the people, and is therefore not a valid same as those made in the proposal of the part of the Constitution so as to furnish any eighth amendment to the Constitution, proauthority for the adoption of initiative meas-viding for the recall, which was held by us ure No. 3 by vote of the people; (2) that, if in Cudihee v. Phelps, 76 Wash. 314, 136 Pac.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

367, to comply with the requirements of ar- vote thereon separately, the question is maniticle 23 of the Constitution. The question festly to be answered by a consideration of was reviewed at length in that decision, and the inherent nature of any given proposed we adhere to the conclusion there reached amendment. The logic of counsel's contenthat entries made on the journals, referring tions would seem to lead to such a minute to a proposed amendment in the language of subdivision of matters liable to become the the title to the proposing act, the title being subject of constitutional amendment as to sufficient as such, satisfies the requirements practically refine out of existence the power of article 23 of the Constitution, without of the people to amend the Constitution. Alcopying in the journals such proposed amend-most any conceivable amendment to the Conment in full. We conclude that the seventh amendment did not fail of lawful adoption for want of proper entries on the senate and house journals.

amendments which have different objects and, reason that two distinct objects were intended, purposes in view. In order to constitute more than one amendment, the propositions submitted must relate to more than one subject, and have at least two distinct and separate purposes not dependent upon or connected with each other. Tested by this rule, the propositions submitted to the electors contained but one amendment. It is clear that the whole scope and purpose of the matter submitted to the electors for their ratification was the change from annual to biennial sessions of the Legislature. * The question of compensation was, perhaps, less intimately and necessarily connected with the change to biennial sessions; yet it was clearly connected with it. The duties and service having been somewhat enlarged, it was proper that the compensation should be increased. We do not contend that the Legislature, if it had seen fit, might not have adopted these changes as separate amendments, and have submitted them to the people as such; but we think, under the Constitution, the Legislature has a discretion, within the limits above suggested, of determining what shall be submitted as a single amendment, and they are not compelled to submit as separate amendments the separate propositions necessary to accomplish a single purpose."

In State ex rel. Morris v. Mason, 43 La. Ann. 590, 9 South. 776, there was drawn in question a constitutional amendment relating to lotteries and the distribution of revenues derived therefrom in fixed proportions, to the public schools, to levees, to charities, to pensions, to sanitary purposes, and to the general fund of the state. Contention was made against the amendment the same, in substance, as is here made; the constitutional provision invoked being, in substance, the The amendment was held to have been constitutionally submitted as one proposition, in that it related to one general subject, to wit, lotteries. The court reached its conclusion evidently upon the authority of the Wisconsin case above noticed, quoting in part with approval from that portion of the decision above quoted by us.

same.

In State ex rel. Adams v. Herried, 10 S. D. 109, 72 N. W. 93, the question was presented by the challenging of a constitutional amendment which provided for a change in the administration of the several educational institutions of the state, concentrating their administration into a central board from that of local boards. The constitutional provision involved was in the exact words of our own. Answering the contention that there was, in substance, more than one amendment, and that the submission to the people should have been as separate propositions, Judge Haney, speaking for the court, said:

namely, the abolition of the trustees, and a change in the number and powers of the regents; that these objects are independent of each other; that either might have been adopted without adopting the other; and that there are numerous reasons why an elector might have desired one change, and not the other. The defect in this argument consists in substituting for the real object or purpose one of its incidents. Control of the state educational institutions is the subject to which the proposed amendment relates. Its purpose or object is to place such institutions under the control of a single board. The membership of such board, its powers, and the abolition of the local boards, are but incidental to and necessarily connected with the object intended. Hence we conclude that only one amendment was submitted. It must be conceded that courts and lawyers may easily differ regarding the result reached herein. The question is involved in serious doubt. Such being the situation, the court invokes the wellrecognized rule, applicable here, as in cases where the constitutionality of statutes is brought in question, and sustains the amendment, because it does not plainly and palpably appear to be invalid."

The question was similarly presented to the Supreme Court of Georgia in Hammond v. Clark, 136 Ga. 313, 324, 71 S. E. 479, 484, (38 L. R. A. [N. S.] 77), wherein it was disposed of by Justice Lumpkin, speaking for the court, in part as follows:

"It was contended that the proposed amendment which was submitted to the people for ratification contained several distinct propositions, and that each of these constituted in effect a separate amendment, and should have been The Constitution proseparately submitted. vides that: 'When more than one amendment is submitted at the same time, they shall be so submitted as to enable the electors to vote on each amendment separately.' This amendment was to a single paragraph of the Constitution. While the amendment included more propositions than one, they were not wholly distinct and separate, or in regard to different subject-matters, but all tended to carry out one general purpose, and dealt with a single subject-matter-the salaries of judges in certain judicial circuits. It is true that it dealt with those salaries both in the past and in the future, but that is not a sufficient basis for a court to hold that it was necessary for the Legislature to have proposed two distinct amendments on that subject, instead of one. It was argued that some of the voters might have been willing to increase the ment in the past (this court having held that salary for the future, but not to ratify its paythe legislative provision for payment of the increase of salaries from the county treasuries should have been separated. Had the Legislawas unconstitutional), and that the two things ture seen fit to divide the two propositions in regard to the salaries of such judges, and to have submitted them separately, we do not say that they might not have done so. But we cannot hold that they were obliged to do so. Almost every amendment to the Constitution or to a legislative act involves more than a single simple proposition."

"A glance at the official ballot shows that each elector was compelled to vote for or against all of the proposed changes. If any effect be given to the title of the joint resolution, it would seem In Jones v. McClaughry (Iowa) 151 N. W. to indicate that the Legislature regarded it as embracing more than one amendment, and the 210, there was drawn in question a constiinference arises that those who prepared the tutional amendment providing for the orballots failed to carry out the legislative intent. ganization of grand juries, and also providBut, conceding this to be so, if, as a matter of ing that the General Assembly might provide law, but one amendment is included in the resolution, the error of those who prepared the bal- for holding persons to answer any criminal lots should not be permitted to defeat the pro- offense without the aid of a grand jury. posed change. Then the question is presented: Answering the contention that this was the Does the resolution contain more than one amendment, within the meaning of the Consti- submission of two amendments as one, Justution? It is contended with much apparent tice Ladd, speaking for the court said: