heard? These assessments, when made, are apportioned to the several counties, and are required to be entered upon the several county assessment rolls; they then become individual assessments to all intents and purposes. In the case of Wells, Fargo & Co. vs. The State Board of Equalization, the Court says in effect, that the power to equalize assessments is so distributed among the several Boards by the Constitution, as that the State Board has the sole and exclusive power to raise or lower the entire assessment roll, thus equalizing as between counties, while the several County Boards possess the exclusive power to raise or lower, and thus equalize individual assessments. The power to equalize is distinct from the power to assess, and is so recognized by the Constitution; these two powers are conferred upon entirely different officers and tribunals; the power to equalize any class of property, therefore, does not depend upon the officer or tribunal by whom the assessment was made. Following the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Wells, Fargo & Co. vs. The State Board of Equalization, it is, therefore, my opinion,

"First-That the assessment of all kinds of property, to whomsoever it may belong, may be equalized under section 9, Article XIII, of the Constitution.

Second-That the assessments upon railroad property, made by the State Board of Equalization, after apportionment and entry upon county assessment rolls, are individual assessments.

"Third-That under the decision above named, County Boards of Equalization possess the exclusive power to equalize all kinds of individual assessments."

III.

If the provisions of the Political Code can be construed to give to one citizen the right or privilege of an appeal to a local Board and to deny that right to another, then the provisions which deny the right or privilege are in violation of the State Constitution, and must be disregarded.

If it be true, as contended by the AttorneyGeneral in his argument here, that the provisions of the Political Code relating to revenue are to be construed to require an assessment of all property, and to confer the right or privilege of an appeal to a local Board of Equalization upon the owners of all classes of property, and to deny the right or privilege to some of the owners of property situated partly in one county and partly in another, then the provisions of the Political Code, in so far as they deny the right or privilege, are in violation of the Constitution and must be disregarded.

It is not the contention here that all railroad

property, as a class, is excepted from the jurisdiction of the local Boards of Equalization, for railroads wholly in one county are not; nor that property situated partly in one county and partly in another, as a class, is so excepted. But the contention is, that the Legislature can apply one

rule to the valuation of property for taxation when it is situated wholly within one county, and another rule to the valuation of property of the same class, when situated partly in one county and partly in another, which latter rule is not applicable to all property so situated.

a.

The provisions which deny the right or privi lege, constitute special legislation upon the subject of assessment and taxation, and is prohibited by the State Constitution.

If the Revenue Act is to be so construed, then the exception constitutes a special law. It singles out a certain class of citizens--i. e., those who own railroads operated in more than one countyand applies to them a rule which is not applied to any other class of citizens. This is "special legislation." (Ex parte Westerfield, Supreme Court of California, August 20th, 1880.) It may be true that it bears equally upon all to whom it is applicable, but this does not make it a general law; for if that was the test, there could be no special laws. (McKinstry, J., in Ex parte Westerfield, supra.)

Being clearly a special law, and relating to the assessment and collection of taxes, it is within. the constitutional inhibition that "the Legislature shall not pass

*

* *

special laws

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for the assessment or collection of taxes." (Constitution of California, Art. IV, sec. 25, subd. 10.)

b.

The construction contended for by the Attorney-General would deny to a general law uniformity of operation, and, therefore, must not be adopted.

We have seen that there can be no special laws for the assessment and collection of taxes. It follows that all such laws must be general in their nature. The Constitution, Art. I, sec. 11, is, that "all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation."

Construing a provision of the old Constitution, identical in language, Mr. Justice Sanderson, delivering the opinion of and speaking for a majority of the Supreme Court of this State, said: (Brooks vs. Hyde, 37 Cal., pp. 376, 377 and 378.)

"Whatever of difficulty there may be in comprehending, when by itself considered, the precise office which this clause of our Constitutian was designed to perform, it is removed when we read it in connection with the context of the Constitution, from which it was manifestly borrowed.

"As a matter of history, it is well known that our Constitution is in many respects copied from that of Iowa. Upon motion of Mr. Gwin, the Constitution of Iowa was adopted by the Constitutional Convention as a basis for ours, for the reason, as stated by him, that it was one of the latest and shortest. (Debates of Convention, p. 24.) The first article was reported by a committee of which Mr. Norton was chairman, and, as first reported, consisted of sixteen sections,

including the one in question, bearing the same number which it now has. Speaking of the report, Mr. Gwin said the first eight sections were from the Constitution of New York, and all the others were from the Constitution of Iowa. (Debates of Convention, 31.) So far as it goes, section eleven is a verbatim copy of section six of Article 1 of the Iowa Constitution, with the most important part left out. The latter section reads as follows:

"SECTION 6. All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen or class of citizens privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.'

"Here the meaning of the first clause of the sentence, which, by reason of the glittering generality' of the language, when by itself considered, is obscure if not unintelligible, is explained and made clear by the latter clause, which serves as a definition to the first. The first clause is the shell, and the latter is the meat; and it is a little surprising that our Constitutional Convention, if unwilling to take both, should choose the former. Viewed through the medium of the latter clause, the meaning of the first is made so obvious that they may not have detected its intrinsic obscurity, and with a view to brevity, may have concluded to take the rule without its definition. However that may be, the meaning of the clause, as used in the Iowa Constitution, is obvious,