Hoxie v. Carr et al. Reynolds, and lives in the immediate neighbourhood of the factory; and that the other purchaser, (Jesse Carr,) is the father of Nathan Carr. In the next place, it is admitted, by their answers, that the partnership was in fact, though not formally, dissolved before the purchase, and that the plaintiff (Hoxie) in March preceding the purchase, "took exclusive possession of the company's property, and excluded Reynolds from the same, and from the mill, in which he and his family had then before labored, and has ever since retained possession of the same against the consent of said Reynolds." And in regard to debts due by the partnership, their answers farther state, that they do not know the amount of the company property or debts; but that they have understood and believe, that, if the company concerns were justly settled, the company property would be more than sufficient to pay the company debts. So that they do not assert their ignorance, that there were at the time of their purchase any debts due by the partnership. Under such circumstances the fact, that one partner was in the exclusive possession, holding out the other, was of itself calculated to awaken suspicion, and some inquiry on the part of any diligent and watchful purchaser. In the next place, it is most material, that the very title deed, under which they claim, does (as has been already stated) refer to the estate as "being the same establishment heretofore owned by West Greenwich Manufacturing Company." If owned by them, the purchasers must or ought to have known, that without a joint conveyance, or release, from all the partners, no absolute title could be acquired by their grantor, Reynolds. They were put upon inquiry to ascertain, whether any such conveyance or release had been made; and they cannot now set up their ignorance of law to excuse their want of diligence. Upon the slightest inquiry they could not but have found out, that the company was Hoxie . Carr et al. greatly in debt; and that Hoxie claimed a right in the property, not merely as partner, but under a contract of purchase previously made by him with Reynolds, for the purpose of liquidating the company debts. In the next place, I think it sufficiently appears from the testimony, and other evidence in the case, that the partnership was largely indebted at the time of the dissolution; and that it had been notoriously straitened, if not embarrassed, in its circumstances before the purchase by the Carrs. And it is incredible, that the fact should not have come to their knowledge, considering their local residence and connexion with the parties. I do not advert to the testimony respecting the supposed contract between the plaintiff (Hoxie) and the defendant (Reynolds); though if notice of that contract could be brought home to the Carrs, it would be conclusive upon the very point now under consideration. I mean, in relation to the embarrassments of the company, and the necessity of applying the real estate, as an appropriate fund, to discharge the partnership debts. But in the view, which I have taken of this case, it is wholly unnecessary to go into the consideration of the matter of the contract; since, with reference to the other point of partnership, there seems a clear ground of Equity, upon which the Court ought to retain the bill, and, if the proper parties can be brought before it, to proceed to farther inquiries, and a farther decree. CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. Fall Circuit. MASSACHUSETTS, OCTOBER TERM, 1832, AT BOSTON. BEFORE Hon. JOSEPH STORY, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. SHEFFIELD REED AND OTHERS, APPELLANTS AND RE SPONDENTS, WILLIAM CANFIELD, APPELLEE and Libellant. A seaman, whose feet are frozen while in the ship's boat in the service of the ship, before he is discharged from the ship on the return voyage, at the home port, is entitled to be cured at the ship's expense; and it is a charge on the ship. Quære, How it would be in a case of extraordinary service to the ship, in the nature of a salvage service. Would it be a general average? THIS was the case of a libel in personam, filed against the owners of the ship Albion, of New Bedford, belonging to the original respondents, (now appellants,) for compensation for expenses incurred in curing the libellant, who was a seaman on board of the ship, and severely injured, as is alleged, while in the service of the ship. The facts are, that the Albion was engaged in the whale fishery, and, being on her return from a voyage in the Pacific, came to anchor on the Reed et al. v. Canfield. 17th of February, 1831, nearly opposite the light-house on Clarke's Point, in New Bedford, the port of her destination. The master soon afterwards landed at Fairhaven, and gave permission for one of the mates also to go on shore. Both of the mates expressed a desire to avail themselves of this permission on the return of the boat from landing the master. They finally both concluded to go ashore,1 taking with them a boat's crew who were volunteers for the occasion, and on whom they could rely with confidence, that they would return on board of the ship that evening in proper season. Among the boat's crew on this occasion was the libellant, and one Winslow, a boat-steerer. They landed at New Bedford between seven and eight o'clock in the evening; and the boat's crew, after taking supper at the house of some of Winslow's friends, returned at a later hour (the precise time is a matter of considerable doubt) to the boat, and departed for the ship. Soon after they had left the shore, there was a great change in the wind and weather; the cold became intense; they were surrounded and entangled in drifting ice; and were unable to reach the ship. After many unavailing efforts for this purpose they were driven out into the bay, and remained there enclosed in ice, and suffering extremely from the cold, until the following night, (18th of February,) about midnight, when they were relieved from the shore. The libellant was the greatest sufferer; and his feet were so severely frozen, that an amputation of his toes became necessary; and he has ever since been a cripple, and for more than a year afterwards was under the care of a physician, requiring constant medical aid, diet, nursing, and other assistance. It is for the expenses so incurred, that the present libel was brought. 1 This was pronounced by the Court, a most unwarrantable departure from their duty. Reed et al. v. Canfield. Fletcher and Simmons for respondents; Dunlap, District Attorney, for libellant. STORY J. This libel presents a case somewhat novel in the annals of our maritime jurisprudence. Upon the more general question suggested upon the posture of the facts, I have no difficulty. I am clearly of opinion, that a seaman, who is taken sick, or is injured, or disabled in the service of the ship, without any fault on his own part, is by the maritime law entitled to be healed at the expense of the ship. I do not go over the authorities on this subject. They will be found in some measure collected in the opinion delivered in Harden v. Gordon, (2 Mason R. 541,) to which I deliberately adhere. So far as any Act of Congress has changed or modified the principle of the maritime law, it is to be deemed, pro tanto, repealed; so far as it stands unaffected by any such legislation, it is to be followed out to all its just results. Various objections to the claim have been made on behalf of the respondents. It has been said, that there is no case of any claim in the Admiralty for compensation after the voyage has been performed, and the party has been discharged from the ship; and in the present case, the voyage terminated, and the party was lawfully discharged in a day or two after the accident. But upon this point it is unnecessary to say more, than that, if the principle of the maritime law extends to cases circumstanced like the present, the Admiralty is perfectly competent to administer a suitable remedy; since its jurisdiction attached to it as a right, while the party was in the maritime service; and the extent of the compensation is but an incident to the possession of the principal claim. It is but an ascertainment of damages, flowing from a claim of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Another objection is, that the maritime law applies only to sickness, and accidents, and injuries occurring in the ship's |