case

June 7.-Colman v. Cann and others; to enter ver- Dangerfield v. Thomas Clerk-Dem. A

dict for the plaintiff on all the issues on the record, || Horridge v. Wilson-Special case according to the finding of the arbitrator. Counsel, Hall and others, assignees, v. Lear-Dem. A Mr. Kelly.

Wodmore, a pauper, v. Nicholas-Dem. A June 7.- Colman v. Foster and another; to ente- Drane v. Elmar-Dem. A

verdict for the plaintiffpursuant to award. Counr Hitchcock v. Hallett-Dem. A
sel, Mr. Kelly.

Burghart v. Duncomb, esq.-Dem. A
June 2.-Jones v. Rowland ; to set aside or award. Colman v. Bedford-Dem. A
Counsel, Mr. R. V. Richards.

In the case of Palmer and the Hungerford Market June 6.—Clutterbuk v. Thornbury; for defendant Company-Award

to deliver up papers to plaintiff's now attorney. Gompertz v. Levy-Dem. A Connsel, Mr. Humfrey.

Pitcher v. King, esq.-Dem. A June 2.--Anderson and another v. Fuller ; to set Proctor v. Spradbury--Dem. A

aside award, unless parties will consent to refer Davis v. Holding-Dem. A
the cause back to the same arbitrator. Counsel, || Doe d. Richardson, clerk, v. Thomas and another
Mr. Godson.

Special case
Talbot v. Brown-Dem. A

Batson and others v. Spearman--Dem. A
QUEEN'S BENCH.

Stockdale, a pauper, v. Hansard and otherg-Dem.

A
Michaelmas Term, 1838.

Burden v. Flower--Dem. A

Same v. Scorer-Dem. A
SPECIAL PAPER.

Same v. Scriven-Dem. A
TRINITY TERM, 1838.

Haigh and another v. Brooks-Dem. A Archbishop of York and others r. Trafford and Pearson, assignees, v. Rogers and Penn, sued with others-Special case

another-Dem. A Groom and others, assignees, v. West-Dem. A Holford v. Latter-Dem. A Doe d. Powell, and others, v. Cowdale--Special Parks v. Joseph-Dem. A

Isherwood v. Hardcastle and another-Dem. A Halliday v. Best-Special case

Doe v. Wright-Dem. A
Emanuel and others r. Rawlings-Dem. A

Mills v. Wilson-Dem. A
Doe d. Bligh, esq. v. Brent, esq:-Special case Knight v. Applyard—Dem. A
Sewell, pub. officer, v. Barnett — Dem. A

Smith v. Tombs-Dem. A
Hextall v. Kidger, in repla.-Dem. A

Thorpe, reg. officer, v. Barry-Dem. A Doe d. Taylor and another v. Crisp-Special case Same v. Ramsbottom-Dem. A Fieldmann v. Hollingworth--Dem. A

Hale, reg. officer, v. Greatwood-Dem. A Doe d. Player and others v. Evans and others Souter v. Hitchcock and another-Dem. A Special case

Fletcher v. Marillier and another---Dem. A Wheeler v. Haynes—Dem. A

Brunskile v. Robertson-Dem. A Hill 0. Same-Dem. A

Robinson v. Wentworth and another-Dem. A Bingley v. Durham-Dem. A

Hersuam v. Dasent-Dem. A Mattock, executors, v. Kinglake-Dem. A

Jones v. Winwood-Dem. A
Fen v. Backhouse-Dem. A

Barry v. Arnard-Special case
Doe d. Dolley v. Ward and others—Special case Banas and another v. Maskell-Dem. A
Tyler v. Braddon-Dem. A

Hunnard v. Ranken-Dem. A
Tucker r. Udall, esq.—Dem. A

Doe d. Tremeeven and another o. Parmetten-SpeThomas v. Wigley-Dem. A

cial case Burroughs v. Hodgson-Dem. A

Wentworth and another v, Cock-Dem. A
Pack qui tam v. Tarpley-Special case

Nickels v. Hancock-Dem. A
Doe d. Kirkmann v. Howell and others--Special || Mattock, executors, v. Kinglake-Dem. A

Cockshote and another v. Thomlinson and others Bond v. Dunks-Dem. A

Dem. A Richards v. James-Dem. A

Brooks v, Stuart-Dem. A Luch v. Beckley-Dem. A

Bowden v. Pegg-Dem, A Sirrell v. Edge-Dem. A

Ibbs v. Richardson and another-Special case Rhodes and another v. Charles-Dem. A

Knowles v. Seagrim-Dem. A Pickford v. Alvarez-Dem. A

The New Brunswick and Nova Scotia Land Com, Strother v. Randerson-Dem. A

pany v. Banbridge-Dem. A Johnson v. Jones and another---Dem. A

Doe d. Evans v. Evans—Special case Allason and others, trustees, &c. v. Stark, trustee, The Cheltenham and Great Western Union Railway &c.--Special case

Company v. Clarke-Dem. A
Lord Howden v. Simpson, Knight, and others-Same v. Daniel--Dem. A
Dem. A

Collins v. Beanont-Dem. A
Hogard v. Spencer-Dem. A

Culley, esq. v. Doe d. Taylerson, in error-Error A Neile v. W. Postlethwaite-Dem. A

Pearce v. Eastwood-Dem. A
Same v. J. Postlethwaite-Dem. A

Jackson v. Hile-Dem. A
Isle and another v.Thompson and another, in repla- || Mitchell v. Gadsden-Dem. A
Dem. A

Monkman o. Shepherdson---Dem. A
Heywood v. Collinge-Dem. A

Lapiere v. McIntosh-Dem. A Trinquart Jacques Triston v. Guy county Cale Lane v. Chapman, esq.-Dem. A D’Hombre-Dem. A

Davy and another v. Warburton and others-Dem.A Bartruin, pub, officer, v. Caddy-Dem. A

Thurman v. Wilde and another-Dem. A Melton v. Warrand--Dem. A

Weeding v. Aldrich-Dem. A Same v. Pound--Dem. A

Wright v. Webstero-Dem. A

case

The ILegal Guide.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1838.

ESSAY I.

ON THE TITLE A

PURCHASER MAY

REQUIRE.

chasers, (last edition, Vol. I, p. 331,) obLAWS OF REAL PROPERTY, serves,—“ The Act allows no further time

for successive disabilities, and makes the bar of the tenant in fact extend to all whom

he might have barred. This will ultimately (Continued from p. 3.)

tend to shorten abstracts considerably, and in the result, 40 years will probably be considered the proper period instead of 60 for

an abstract to extend over; but still cases The new Statute of Limitations, relating to must frequently arise, where it will be ne

cessary to call for an earlier title. As Real Property, 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27.

fines are abolished, a short bar as formerly Thi his succession of disabilities (now abo- | cannot now be made.”

lished) heretefore prevented the ope- The disabilities are also more clearly deration of the Statute of Limitations.

fined by the New Statute than in the second The new Statute, (sect. 19), also deter- Statute of Limitations, mentioned in our mines that no part of Great Britain and First Number.—“ Non compos mentis,” or Ireland, nor the Islands of Man, Guernsey,

non sane memory, a disability so named in Jersey, Alderney, or Sark, or any islands ad- the latter Statute, is now distinguished by jacent to any of them, being part of the Brit

“ Idiotcy, Lunacy, and Unsoundness of ish dominions, shall be deemed to be beyond Mind,” and it should be observed, that the seas, within the meaning of the act; which words “ imprisoned, or beyond seas,” also removes a difficulty in cases of disability disabilities named in the same Statute, do that heretofore existed, as to what places not occur in the 16th section of the present within them should be considered beyond Statute, but only the words "absence beseas; as for instance, Ireland was beyond yond seas.” seas, while Scotland was not.

These explanations of the New Laws The 16th, 17th, and 18th sections of the tend to shew, that a purchaser cannot be New Statute (upon which we observed in satisfied with a title depending solely upon our First Number), relate to disabilities, and an undisturbed possession of 20 years, as in these cases, an adverse possession for the the person to whom such possession may period there limited will bar either an es- have been adverse, may be only a tenant tate for life, in fee, or in tail; and all estates for life, or may have been at the time when to take effect after, or in defeasance of an the adverse possession commenced under estate tail. Sir Edward Sugden, in his disability. The previous title, therefore, excellent Work upon Vendors and Pur- | must, in all cases, be produced, before he

VOL. I.

can make such a good title as a purchaser In these cases, then, under these secshall be compelled to take.

tions, an adverse possession of 20 years We will now look to cases where there will bar the same estates as we have before are no disabilities, and which are provided named in cases where there are disabilities. for by the 2nd, 21st, and 22nd sections of The latter section (22) is a great improvethe New Statute. Sect. 2 enacts, that after ment upon the second Statute of Limitthe 1st of December, 1838, no person shallations before referred to, under which, the make an entry or distress, or bring an ac- 20

years for entry not commencing until tion to recover any land or rent, but within the right accrued, an estate might be reco20 years next after the time at which the vered by a remainder man against an unright to make such entry or distress, or to limited adverse possession to a tenant in bring such action, shall have first accrued tail. to some person through whom he claims; We will now proceed to cases where a or, if such right shall not have accrued to tenant in tail may, by some assurance, have any person through whom he claims, then conveyed his interest in such a way as not within 20 years next after the time at which to have barred the remainders. The 24th the time to make such entry or distress, or sect. of the new statute applies, whereby to bring such action, shall have first ac- || it is enacted, that when a tenant in tail crued to the person making or bringing | shall have made an assurance which shall the same.

not operate to bar an estate, to take effect All the words and expressions made use after or in defeasance of his estate tail, of in the Statute are defined in the first and any person shall by virtue of such section.

assurance, at the time of the execution Sec. 21 also enacts, that where the right thereof, or at any time afterwards, be in of a tenant in tail of any land or rent to possession or receipt of the profits of the make an entry or distress, or to bring an land, or in receipt of the rent, and the same action to recover the same, shall have been person or any other (other than some perbarred by reason of the same not having | son entitled to such possession or receipt in been made or brought within the limited respect of an estate which shall have taken period before named in the statute, which effect after or in defeasance of the estate shall be applicable in such case, no such tail,) shall continue or be in such possesentry, distress, or action shall be made or sion or receipt for 20 years next after the brought by any person claiming any estate, commencement of the time at which such interest, or right, which such tenant in assurance, if it had then been executed by tail might lawfully have barred; and the such tenant in tail, or the person who would subsequent sect. 22, enacts, that when a have been entitled to his estate tail if such tenant in tail of any land or rent entitled assurance had not been executed, would, to recover the same, shall have died before without the consent of any other person, the expiration of the period before limited have operated to bar the estate or estates by the statute, which shall be applicable in before-mentioned, then, at the expiration of such case for making an entry or distress, such period of 20 years, such assurance or bringing an action to recover such land or shall be effectual as against any person rent, no person claiming any estate, interest, claiming any right to take effect after or in or right which such tenant in tail might defeasance of such estate tail. lawfully have barred, shall make an entry By these two sections (22 & 24), a tenant or distress, or bring an action to recover in tail may, with a possession of 20 years, such land or rent, but within the period by a common assurance, bar all remainders, during which, if such tenant in tail had so in the same manner as he might formerly long continued to live, he might have made have done by fine and recovery, and all the such entry or distress, or brought such expensive trammels by which those fictions action.