June 7.-Colman v. Cann and others; to enter verdict for the plaintiff on all the issues on the record, according to the finding of the arbitrator. Counsel, Mr. Kelly.

Counr

June 7.-Colman v. Foster and another; to enteverdict for the plaintiff pursuant to award. sel, Mr. Kelly.

June 2.-Jones v. Rowland; to set aside or award. Counsel, Mr. R. V. Richards.

June 6.-Clutterbuk v. Thornbury; for defendant to deliver up papers to plaintiff's now attorney. Connsel, Mr. Humfrey.

June 2.-Anderson and another v. Fuller; to set aside award, unless parties will consent to refer the cause back to the same arbitrator. Counsel, Mr. Godson.

Halliday v. Best-Special case

Emanuel and others v. Rawlings-Dem. A

Doe d. Bligh, esq. v. Brent, esq.-Special case
Sewell, pub. officer, v. Barnett-Dem. A
Hextall v. Kidger, in repla.-Dem. A

Doe d. Taylor and another v. Crisp-Special case
Fieldmann v. Hollingworth-Dem. A

Doe d. Player and others v. Evans and othersSpecial case

Wheeler v. Haynes-Dem. A

Hill v. Same-Dem. A

Bingley v. Durham-Dem. A

Mattock, executors, v. Kinglake-Dem. A
Fen v. Backhouse-Dem. A

Doe d. Dolley v. Ward and others-Special case

Tyler v. Braddon-Dem. A

Tucker v. Udall, esq.-Dem. A

Thomas v. Wigley-Dem. A

Burroughs v. Hodgson-Dem. A

Pack qui tam v. Tarpley-Special case

Doe d. Kirkmann. Howell and others-Special

case

Bond v. Dunks-Dem. A

Richards v. James-Dem. A

Luch v. Beckley-Dem. A

Sirrell v. Edge-Dem. A

Rhodes and another v. Charles-Dem. A

Pickford v. Alvarez-Dem. A
Strother v. Randerson-Dem. A

Johnson v. Jones and another-Dem. A

Allason and others, trustees, &c. v. Stark, trustee, &c.-Special case

Lord Howden v. Simpson, Knight, and othersDem. A

Hogard v. Spencer-Dem. A

Neile v. W. Postlethwaite-Dem. A

Same v. J. Postlethwaite-Dem. A

Dangerfield v. Thomas Clerk-Dem.A
Horridge v. Wilson-Special case

Hall and others, assignees, v. Lear-Dem. A
Wodmore, a pauper, v. Nicholas-Dem. A
Drane v. Elmar-Dem. A

Hitchcock v. Hallett-Dem. A

Burghart v. Duncomb, esq.-Dem. A
Colman v. Bedford-Dem. A

In the case of Palmer and the Hungerford Market
Company-Award

Gompertz v. Levy-Dem. A
Pitcher v. King, esq.-Dem. A
Proctor v. Spradbury-Dem. A
Davis v. Holding-Dem. A

Doe d. Richardson, clerk, v. Thomas and another-
Special case

Talbot v. Brown-Dem. A

Batson and others v. Spearman-Dem. A

Stockdale, a pauper, v. Hansard and others-Dem. A

Burden v. Flower-Dem. A

Same v. Scorer-Dem. A

Same v. Scriven-Dem. A

Haigh and another v. Brooks-Dem. A

Pearson, assignees, v. Rogers and Penn, sued with another-Dem. A

Holford v. Latter-Dem. A
Parks v. Joseph-Dem. A

Isherwood v. Hardcastle and another-Dem. A

Doe v. Wright-Dem. A

Mills v. Wilson-Dem. A

Knight v. Applyard-Dem. A
Smith v. Tombs-Dem. A

Thorpe, reg. officer, v. Barry-Dem. A
Same v. Ramsbottom-Dem. A

Hale, reg. officer, v. Greatwood-Dem. A
Souter v. Hitchcock and another-Dem. A
Fletcher v. Marillier and another-Dem. A

Brunskile v. Robertson-Dem. A

Robinson v. Wentworth and another-Dem. A

Hersuam v. Dasent-Dem. A

Jones v. Winwood-Dem. A

Barry v. Arnard-Special case

Banas and another v. Maskell-Dem. A
Hunnard v. Ranken-Dem. A

Doe d. Tremeeven and another v. Parmetten-Special case

Wentworth and another v. Cock-Dem. A
Nickels v. Hancock-Dem. A

Mattock, executors, v. Kinglake-Dem. A

Cockshote and another v. Thomlinson and others

Dem. A

Brooks v. Stuart-Dem. A

Bowden v. Pegg-Dem. A

Ibbs v. Richardson and another-Special case
Knowles v. Seagrim-Dem. A

The New Brunswick and Nova Scotia Land Com

pany . Banbridge-Dem. A

Doe d. Evans v. Evans-Special case

The Cheltenham and Great Western Union Railway Company v. Clarke-Dem. A

Same v. Daniel-Dem. A

Collins v. Beanont-Dem. A

Culley, esq. v. Doe d. Taylerson, in error-Error A Pearce v. Eastwood-Dem. A

Jackson v. Hile-Dem. A

Heywood v. Collinge-Dem. A

Monkman v. Shepherdson-Dem. A

Lapiere v. McIntosh-Dem. A

D'Hombre-Dem. A

Davy and another v. Warburton and others-Dem.A Thurman v. Wilde and another-Dem. A

Weeding v. Aldrich-Dem. A

Wright v. Webster-Dem. A

LAWS OF REAL PROPERTY,

ESSAY I.

(Continued from p. 3.)

ON THE TITLE A PURCHASER MAY
REQUIRE.

The new Statute of Limitations, relating to
Real Property, 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27.

his succession of disabilities (now abolished) heretefore prevented the operation of the Statute of Limitations.

The new Statute, (sect. 19), also determines that no part of Great Britain and Ireland, nor the Islands of Man, Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney, or Sark, or any islands adjacent to any of them, being part of the British dominions, shall be deemed to be beyond seas, within the meaning of the act; which removes a difficulty in cases of disability that heretofore existed, as to what places within them should be considered beyond seas; as for instance, Ireland was beyond seas, while Scotland was not.

The 16th, 17th, and 18th sections of the New Statute (upon which we observed in our First Number), relate to disabilities, and in these cases, an adverse possession for the period there limited will bar either an estate for life, in fee, or in tail; and all estates to take effect after, or in defeasance of an estate tail. Sir Edward Sugden, in his excellent Work upon Vendors and Pur

VOL. I.

serves,

chasers, (last edition, Vol. I, p. 331,) ob66 - The Act allows no further time for successive disabilities, and makes the bar of the tenant in fact extend to all whom he might have barred. This will ultimately tend to shorten abstracts considerably, and in the result, 40 years will probably be considered the proper period instead of 60 for an abstract to extend over; but still cases must frequently arise, where it will be necessary to call for an earlier title. fines are abolished, a short bar as formerly cannot now be made."

As

The disabilities are also more clearly defined by the New Statute than in the second Statute of Limitations, mentioned in our First Number.-" Non compos mentis," or non sane memory, a disability so named in the latter Statute, is now distinguished by

66

Idiotcy, Lunacy, and Unsoundness of Mind," and it should be observed, that the words "imprisoned, or beyond seas," also disabilities named in the same Statute, do not occur in the 16th section of the present Statute, but only the words "absence beyond seas."

These explanations of the New Laws tend to shew, that a purchaser cannot be satisfied with a title depending solely upon an undisturbed possession of 20 years, as the person to whom such possession may have been adverse, may be only a tenant for life, or may have been at the time when the adverse possession commenced under disability. The previous title, therefore, must, in all cases, be produced, before he

C

can make such a good title as a purchaser shall be compelled to take.

We will now look to cases where there are no disabilities, and which are provided for by the 2nd, 21st, and 22nd sections of the New Statute. Sect. 2 enacts, that after the 1st of December, 1838, no person shall make an entry or distress, or bring an action to recover any land or rent, but within 20 years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress, or to bring such action, shall have first accrued to some person through whom he claims; or, if such right shall not have accrued to any person through whom he claims, then within 20 years next after the time at which the time to make such entry or distress, or to bring such action, shall have first accrued to the person making or bringing the same.

All the words and expressions made use of in the Statute are defined in the first section.

Sec. 21 also enacts, that where the right of a tenant in tail of any land or rent to make an entry or distress, or to bring an action to recover the same, shall have been barred by reason of the same not having been made or brought within the limited period before named in the statute, which shall be applicable in such case, no such entry, distress, or action shall be made or brought by any person claiming any estate, interest, or right, which such tenant in tail might lawfully have barred; and the subsequent sect. 22, enacts, that when a tenant in tail of any land or rent entitled to recover the same, shall have died before the expiration of the period before limited by the statute, which shall be applicable in such case for making an entry or distress, or bringing an action to recover such land or rent, no person claiming any estate, interest, or right which such tenant in tail might lawfully have barred, shall make an entry or distress, or bring an action to recover such land or rent, but within the period during which, if such tenant in tail had so long continued to live, he might have made such entry or distress, or brought such

action.

In these cases, then, under these sections, an adverse possession of 20 years will bar the same estates as we have before named in cases where there are disabilities. The latter section (22) is a great improvement upon the second Statute of Limitations before referred to, under which, the 20 years for entry not commencing until the right accrued, an estate might be recovered by a remainder man against an unlimited adverse possession to a tenant in tail.

We will now proceed to cases where a tenant in tail may, by some assurance, have conveyed his interest in such a way as not to have barred the remainders. The 24th sect. of the new statute applies, whereby it is enacted, that when a tenant in tail shall have made an assurance which shall not operate to bar an estate, to take effect after or in defeasance of his estate tail, and any person shall by virtue of such assurance, at the time of the execution thereof, or at any time afterwards, be in possession or receipt of the profits of the land, or in receipt of the rent, and the same person or any other (other than some person entitled to such possession or receipt in respect of an estate which shall have taken effect after or in defeasance of the estate tail,) shall continue or be in such possession or receipt for 20 years next after the commencement of the time at which such assurance, if it had then been executed by such tenant in tail, or the person who would have been entitled to his estate tail if such assurance had not been executed, would, without the consent of any other person, have operated to bar the estate or estates before-mentioned, then, at the expiration of such period of 20 years, such assurance shall be effectual as against any person claiming any right to take effect after or in defeasance of such estate tail.

By these two sections (22 & 24), a tenant in tail may, with a possession of 20 years, by a common assurance, bar all remainders, in the same manner as he might formerly have done by fine and recovery, and all the expensive trammels by which those fictions were surrounded.