the petition being actually presented, six calendar months at least, before the expiration of the term); and if upon consideration of the whole matter, and after hearing any party who may choose to enter a caveat," the judicial committee of the privy council shall report in favour of the application, her majesty is empowered to grant to such patentee (or to his assigns, or to both conjointly, as the case may be (d),) new letters-patent, for any term not exceeding fourteen years after the expiration of the first. If a patent right be infringed (e), the inventor has his remedy, by action (ƒ), to recover damages for the injury sustained; and may in such action, by application to the superior court in which it is brought, obtain an order for restraining the wrongdoer from the further use of the invention, and compelling him to account for the profits which he may have already derived from a sale of the article (g); an order which may also be obtained without resorting to an action, by application to a court of equity (h). In addition to which, it is provided by 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 83, s. 7, that if any person shall, without licence, use the name, stamp, or mark of the patentee, he shall for every such offence forfeit the sum of 50l. A proceeding for infringement only (and not for recovery of this penalty) may be (d) 7 & 8 Vict. c. 69, s. 4; et vide Russell v. Ledsam, 14 Mee. & W. 574; Ledsam v. Russell, 16 Mee. & (e) As to what shall amount to infringement, vide Minter v. Williams, 4 Ad. & El. 251; Stead v. Anderson, 4 C. B. 806; Smith v. London and North Western Railway Company, 2 Ell. & Bl. 69. (f) See the form of the declaration in such an action, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, Sched. B, No. 33. By 15 & 16 Vict. c. 83, s. 41, the inventor must deliver with his declaration particulars of the breaches of which he complains. As to which see Talbot v. La Roche, 15 C. B. 310; Jones v. Lee, 25 L. J., Exch. 241. (g) 15 & 16 Vict. c. 83, s. 42, (as to which see Vidi v. Smith, 3 Ell. & Bl. 969; Holland v. Smith, ibid. 977); et vide 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, ss. 79-82. (h) See as to the injunction at law in such cases, Gittens v. Symes, 15 C. B. 362; as to the injunction in equity, Hill v. Thompson, 3 Mer. 622; Crossley v. Beverley, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 166; Bridson v. M'Alpine, 8 Beav. 229. successfully resisted, either on the ground that no infringement has in fact taken place, or that the patent is void (i); and such invalidity may be established either by showing that the article was not a fit subject for a patent, or that the patentee was not the first inventor, or that the specifiIcation was insufficient. Nor is this the only method of defeating claims founded on an illegal grant of patent right; for whether there be any complaint of infringement or not, it is competent to the queen (or to any subject of the realm in the queen's name, by leave of the attorney-general) to institute a proceeding called scire facias, for the formal impeachment of the patent; by the effect of which (if found open to any of the objections above enumerated, or to any other sufficient exception in point of law), it will be cancelled (j). For the protection of patentees, the acts of parliament above referred to have introduced several other provisions of great importance. First, in the case where, after a patent has been granted to a person believing himself to be the first inventor, it is discovered that some other person had in fact preceded him in the use of the invention, though the article was, at the time of the grant, not generally known to the public, the acts enable the patentee or his assigns to petition her majesty in council, for a new grant, or a confirmation of the existing one, (k)—and if the judicial committee of the privy council shall, upon investigation of the case, report in his favour, such relief may (i) By 15 & 16 Vict. c. 83, s. 41, a defendant setting up such a defence must at the same time particularize his objections to the patent. As to which, see Palmer v. Cooper, 9 Exch. 231; Honiball v. Bloomer, 10 Exch. 538. (j) As to the proceedings on writs of scire facias issuing out of the Court of Chancery, in the case of patents for inventions, see 12 & 13 Vict. c. VOL. II. 109, s. 29; 15 & 16 Vict. c. 83; Smith v. Upton, 6 Man. & Gr. 251. Et vide post, bk. v. c. xv. By 15 & 16 Vict. c. 83, s. 41, the prosecutor must deliver to the inventor particulars of the objections on which he means to rely at the trial, in support of his suggestions. (k) As to the confirmation of a patent, see Re Card's Patent, 12 Jur. (P. C.) 507. D be lawfully awarded (1). Again, if any error be discovered in the title or specification, the patentee or his assigns (or both conjointly, if part of the patent only has been assigned) are allowed by these statutes, to rectify it for the future (though not as regards any pending action or suit for an infringement), by filing in the proper office in chancery (on first obtaining leave from the proper law officer) a disclaimer (m) of any part of the title or specification, or a memorandum of any alteration therein, not operating as an extension of the patent right. II. The other species of incorporeal chattels of which we proposed to treat, is copyright (n), or the exclusive right which the law allows an author, of printing and reprinting, publishing and republishing, his own original work. The Roman law contains no recognition of the right of property as regards the productions of literature (o), [though the sale of literary copies, for the purposes of recital or multiplication, is certainly as antient as the times of Terence (p), Martial (9), and Statius (r).] Neither with us in England was the right of authors in this respect clearly ascertained, until a comparatively late period of our legal history. But in the reign of Queen Anne, it became at length the subject of positive regulation; for by 8 Anne, c. 19, (amended by 15 Geo. III. c. 53, and 41 Geo. III. (1) 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 83, s. 2. (m) As to disclaimers and memoranda of alterations, vide Perry v. Skinner, 2 Mee. & W. 471; Spilsbury v. Clough, 2 Q. B. 467; Stocker v. Warner, 1 C. B. 148; 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 83; 7 & 8 Vict. c. 69; 12 & 13 Vict. c. 109; 15 & 16 Vict. c. 83. (n) As to the right of foreigners to acquire copyright in respect of their works published in this country, see the following cases: Cocks v. Purday, 5 C. B. 860; Boosey v. Purday, 4 Exch. 145; Boosey v. Davidson, 13 Jur. 678 (Q. B.); Ollendorf v. Black, 20 L. J. (Ch.) 165. And see Jeffreys v. Boosey (in error) Dom. Proc. 1854, 24 L. J. (Exch.) 81, in which case it was decided, that where a foreigner abroad assigned his unpublished work to another foreigner abroad, by whom (while resident in England) it was assigned to, and first published in this country by, an Englishman, the publisher acquired no copyright therein. (0) 2 Bl. Com. 407. (p) Prol. in Eunuch. 20. (9) Epigr. i. 67; iv. 72; xiii. 3; xiv. 194. (r) Juv. vii. 83. c. 107,) it was enacted, that the author of any book, and his assigns, should have the sole liberty of printing and reprinting it, "for the term of fourteen years, and no longer." And his right to this extent was protected by the imposition of penalties and forfeitures on all those by whom it should be infringed, with a further direction that if, at the end of that term, the author himself should be living, the right should then return to him for another term of the same duration. All which appears [to have been suggested by the exception in the Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. I. c. 3, allowing a royal patent of privilege to be granted for fourteen years, to any inventor of a new manufacture (s).] The true nature and extent of copyright were not, however, definitely settled by the statute of Queen Anne; for it was left in uncertainty, whether at the common law, and independently of that statute, an author did not possess an exclusive privilege (and that without any limitation in point of time) of publishing and republishing his own works; and whether, supposing that he did, the statute had not permitted that privilege to remain without abridgment—the limitation which it contains, in point of time, being thought by some to apply to the new protection only, and not to the right itself. Nor were these questions set at rest, until the year 1774, when it was solemnly decided (t), that, supposing any exclusive privilege to have belonged to authors at the common law, it was at any rate taken away by the legislative enactments, which thenceforth constituted the only basis on which a claim to copyright could rest, and consequently restrained it to the period of limitation by the act provided; the opinion of a majority of the judges being at the same time incidentally declared (in conformity with a prior decision), that at common law an author did possess the sole right, not only of first publishing, but of afterwards (s) Vide sup. p. 26. (t) Donaldson v. Beckett, in Dom. Proc. 2 Bro. P. C. 145; 4 Burr. 2408; et vide Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303; Beckford v. Hood, 7 publishing his own works, and that it belonged to him and his assigns in perpetuity. แ Afterwards the period of literary proprietorship was extended by 54 Geo. III. c. 156, which conferred upon the author an exclusive right for twenty-eight years instead of fourteen, and in the event of his surviving that term, then for the residue of his natural life. The subject, however, is now mainly regulated by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, which (after repealing 8 Anne, c. 19, 41 Geo. III. c. 107, and 54 Geo. III. c. 156) provides still more amply in favour of literature, by an enactment that the copyright of every book (under which word is included, in the construction of the act, "every volume, part, or division of a volume, pamphlet, sheet of letter-press, sheet of music, map, chart, or plan, separately published (u),") which shall be published (x) in the lifetime of its author, shall endure for his natural life, and for seven years longer; or if the seven years shall expire before the end of forty-two years from the first publication, shall endure for such period of fortytwo years; and that when the work is posthumous, the copyright shall endure for forty-two years from the first publication, and shall belong to the proprietor of the author's manuscript (y). The statute also entitles the proprietor of the copyright in a book unlawfully printed within the British dominions, to a remedy by action (z), 66 (u) 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 2. By the same section the word "copyright" is, in the construction of that act, to mean "the sole and exclusive liberty of printing or otherwise multiplying copies of any subject to which the word is applied." Hence copyright may be violated even by a gratuitous distribution of the work, if unauthorized; Novello v. Sudlow, 12 C. B. 177. (x) The act contains a provision (sect. 4) as to books published before the passing of the act, and in which copyright still subsisted. They are entitled to the same extension of the period of copyright; but on condition, in the case where the copyright had been purchased, that an agree ment between the author (or his representative), and the purchaser, to accept the benefit of the act, should be made and registered; and in such case the copyright is the property of such person or persons, as in such minute shall be expressed. (y) The statute also contains an express enactment, that copyright shall be deemed personal property; vide 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 25. (z) By sect. 16, it is provided, that in any action brought within |