[spoken of as a meeting well known, and its statutes or decisions are put in a manifest contradistinction to custom, or the common law. And in Edward the third's time an act of parliament, made in the reign of William the Conqueror, was pleaded in the case of the Abbey of St. Edmund's-bury, and judicially allowed by the court (k).

Hence it indisputably appears that parliaments, or general councils, are coeval with the kingdom itself. How those parliaments were constituted and composed is another question, which has been matter of great dispute among our learned antiquaries; and particularly, whether the commons were summoned at all; or, if summoned, at what period they began to form a distinct assembly (l). But it is not intended here to enter into controversies of this sort. It is generally agreed, that in the main the constitution of parliament, as it now stands, was marked out so long ago as the seventeenth year of King John, A.D. 1215, in the great charter granted by that prince; wherein he promises to summon all archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls, and greater barons, personally; and all other tenants in chief under the crown, by the sheriff and bailiffs; to meet at a certain place, within forty days' notice, to assess aids and scutages when necessary. And this constitution has subsisted in fact at least from the year 1264, 49 Henry III.; there being still extant writs of that date, to summon knights, citizens, and burgesses, to parliament (m). We may proceed, therefore, to inquire wherein consists this constitution of parliament, as it now stands, and has stood for the space of] nearly six hundred years. [And in the prosecution of this inquiry shall be considered, first, the manner and time

[of its assembling; secondly, its constituent parts; thirdly, the laws and customs relating to parliament, considered as one aggregate body; fourthly and fifthly, the laws and customs relating to each house, separately and distinctly taken; sixthly, the methods of proceeding, and of making statutes, in both houses; and lastly, the manner of the parliament's adjournment, prorogation, and dissolution.

I. As to the manner and time of assembling. The parliament is regularly to be summoned by the sovereign's writ or letter, issued out of chancery by advice of the privy council,] at least thirty-five days before it begins to sit. By a provision of Magna Charta, this was to be forty days, "faciemus summoneri, &c. ad certum diem, scilicet ad terminum quadraginta dierum ad minus, et ad certum locum (n);" and the regulation was further enforced by 7 & 8 Will. III. c. 25, which enacted, that there should be forty days between the teste and the return of the writ of summons; but now, by 15 & 16 Vict. c. 23, the period is shortened to thirty-five days. [It is a branch of the royal prerogative, that no parliament can be convened by its own authority, or by the authority of any, except the sovereign alone. And this prerogative is founded upon very good reason. For, supposing it had a right to meet spontaneously, without being called together, it is impossible to conceive that all the members, and each of the houses, would agree unanimously upon the proper time and place of meeting; and if half of the members met, and half absented themselves, who shall determine which is really the legislative body, the part assembled, or that which stays away? It is therefore necessary that the parliament should be called together at a determinate time and place; and highly becoming its dignity and independence, that it should be called together by none but one of its own constituent parts; and of the three constituent parts, this office can only appertain to the sovereign; as this is a

(n) Black. Mag. Chart. Joh. 14.

[single person, whose will may be uniform and steady; the first person in the nation, being superior to the houses in dignity; and the only branch of the legislature that has a separate existence, and is capable of performing any act at a time when no parliament is in being. Nor is it an exception to this rule that, by some modern statutes (0), on the demise of the sovereign, if there be then no parliament in being, the last parliament revives, and is to sit again for six months, unless dissolved by the successor; for this revived parliament must have been originally summoned by the crown.

It is true, that, by a statute 16 Car. I. c. 1, it was enacted, that if the king neglected to call a parliament for three years, the peers might assemble and issue out writs for choosing one; and in case of neglect of the peers, the electors for counties and boroughs might meet and choose their own representatives. But this, if ever put in practice, would have been liable to all the inconveniences just now stated; and the act itself was esteemed so highly detrimental and injurious to the royal prerogative, that it was repealed by statute 16 Car. II. c. 1. From thence, therefore, no precedent can be drawn.

It is also true, that the convention-parliament, which restored King Charles the second, met above a month before his return the lords by their own authority; and the commons, in pursuance of writs issued in the name of the keepers of the liberty of England by authority of parliament: and that the said parliament sat till the 29th of December, full seven months after the Restoration; and enacted many laws, several of which are still in force. But this was for the necessity of the thing, which supersedes all law; for if they had not so met, it was morally impossible that the kingdom should have been settled in peace. And the first thing done after the king's return was to pass an act declaring this to be a good parliament, notwithstanding the defect of the king's writs (p). So that, as the royal pre

(o) See 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 15; 6 Anne, c. 7, s. 6; 37 Geo. 3, c. 127.

(p) Stat. 12 Car. 2, c. 1.

[rogative was chiefly wounded by their so meeting, and as the king himself, who alone had a right to object, consented to waive the objection, this cannot be drawn into an example in prejudice of the rights of the crown. Besides, we should also remember, that it was at that time a great doubt among the lawyers (q), whether even this healing Act made it a good parliament; and that it was held by very many in the negative; though it seems to have been too nice a scruple (r). And yet, out of abundant caution, it was thought necessary to confirm its acts in the next parliament, by statute 13 Car. II. c. 7 and c. 14.

It is likewise true, that at the time of the Revolution, A.D. 1688, the lords and commons by their own authority, and upon the summons of the Prince of Orange (afterwards King William), met in a convention, and therein disposed of the crown and kingdom. But it must be remembered, that this assembling was upon a like principle of necessity as at the Restoration; that is, upon a full conviction that King James the second had abdicated the government, and that the throne was thereby vacant; which supposition of the individual members was confirmed by their concurrent resolution, when they actually came together. And in such a case as the palpable vacancy of a crown, it follows ex necessitate rei, that the form of the royal writs must be laid aside, otherwise no parliament can ever meet again. For, let us put another possible case, and suppose, for the sake of argument, that the whole royal line should at any time. fail and become extinct, which would indisputably vacate the throne; in this situation it seems reasonable to presume, that the body of the nation, consisting of lords and commons, would have a right to meet and settle the government; otherwise there must be no government at all. And

(g) 1 Sid. 1.

(r) William Drake, a merchant of London, was impeached for writing a pamphlet, entitled The Long Purliament revived, in which he maintained that there could be no legis

lative authority till that was legally and regularly dissolved by the king and the two houses of parliament, according to 16 Car. 1, c. 7. Com. Journ. 20th Nov. 1660.

[upon this and no other principle did the convention in 1688 assemble. The vacancy of the throne was precedent to their meeting without any royal summons, not a consequence of it. They did not assemble without writ, and then make the throne vacant; but, the throne being previously vacant by the king's abdication, they assembled without writ, as they must do if they assembled at all. Had the throne been full, their meeting would not have been regular ; but, as it was really empty, such meeting became absolutely necessary. And accordingly it is declared, by statute 1 W. & M. st. 1, c. 1, that this convention was really the two houses of parliament, notwithstanding the want of writs, or other defects of form. So that, notwithstanding these two capital exceptions, which were justifiable only on a principle of necessity, (and each of which, by the way, induced a revolution in the government,) the rule laid down is in general certain, that the sovereign, only, can convoke a parliament.

And this, by the antient statutes of the realm (s), he is bound to do every year, or oftener, if need be (t).] Which last words are so loose and vague, [that such of our monarchs as were inclined to govern without parliaments neglected the convoking them sometimes for a very considerable period, under pretence that there was no need of them. But to remedy this, by the statute 16 Car. II. c. 1, it is enacted, that the sitting and holding of parliaments shall not be intermitted above three years at the most. And by the statute 1 W. & M. st. 2, c. 2, it is declared to

(s) 4 Edw. 3, c. 14; 36 Edw. 3,

c. 10.

(t) Blackstone adds here, that these statutes did not render it necessary to call a new parliament every year, but only to permit a parliament to sit annually for the redress of grievances and despatch of business, if need be. 1 Bl. Com. 153. As to the words "if need be," it has been argued (and apparently

with good reason), that they serve to qualify only the words "or oftener," and that the true signification of the enactment is, that parliament should be held once every year at all events; and if need be, then more than once; and in support of this are cited 50 Edw. 3, Rot. Parl. No. 186; 1 Rich. 2, Rot. Parl. No. 95; 2 Rich. 3, Rot. Parl. No. 4.