1866. WOOD

V.

BowRON.

of a threat; for there cannot be a threat to any one unless something be intimated to him with the intention of forcing or unduly influencing his conduct. If indeed it had been communicated to the respondent at the time it was made, I am disposed to think that it would amount to a threat, on the authority of Walsby, appt., Anley, respt. (a). Secondly, was the communication of this resolution on the 28th October a threat? A threat must be an intimation given by a person of his own accord; and, to come within stat. 6 G. 4. c. 129. s. 3., it must be made with an intent to coerce or endeavour to force the future conduct of the person to whom it is addressed. And in considering this question we must look at the substance of the resolution. It purports, as I have already observed, to be nothing but a rule of conduct of the members of the association; moreover it was not communicated, nor does it appear to have been intended to be communicated, to the respondent at the time it was made; but was sent as information in answer to his inquiry why the men had left his employment. There is nothing to shew that it was sent as a threat in order to force the respondent to change his mode of conducting his business, and therefore is not within the statute.

that there is no After the decisions

LUSH J. I also am of opinion evidence to sustain the conviction. upon stat. 6 G. 4. c. 129. s. 3. it is too late to say that the word "threats" is limited to threats of acts of violence to the person or property with which it is connected. Therefore it must be taken in its wider sense as including a threat by act or words to do some (a) 3 E. & E. 516.

injury to a person.
But it is the essence of a threat
that it be made for the purpose of intimidating
or overcoming the will of the person to whom it is
addressed. Here a resolution was come to not to work
for a particular master until he reduced the number of
his apprentices. Whatever its quality might be at
common law, certainly this is of itself no offence against
the statute. No doubt it might be so used as to
constitute a threat within the meaning of sect. 3, but
as it was not communicated to the master except in
answer to his inquiry and by way of explanation, the
essential elements of a threat are wanting.

Conviction quashed.

1866.

WOOD

V.

Bowron.

Tuesday, November 27th.

FELTHAM against ENGLAND.

[Reported ante, p. 676.]

HUBBERSTY against MANCHESTER, SHEFFIELD and LINCOLNSHIRE Railway Company.

[Reported ante, p. 54.]

Assignment of debt before. See Equi- Of expenses. See Metropolis Manage-

table Grounds, Plea on, I.

ment.

ADJUDICATION.

APPROPRIATION.

See Bankrupt, V.

Of funds. See Turnpike.

ARBITRATOR.

ASSIGNEE.

See Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, Of copyright. See Copyright, IV., V.

IV., VII.

Stat. 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127. s. 10. pro

Of debt before action. See Equitable
Grounds, Plea on.

ASYLUM.

See Lunatic.

AUTHORITY.

BANKRUPT.

sister, occupied a dairy farm and carried I. The bankrupt and the plaintiff, his on the business of a cowkeeper; the stock on the farm was paid for by them in equal shares, but the business was to be carried on in the name of the bankrupt. The bankrupt bought and

hibits an articled clerk, during the term Of captain. See Maritime Law. of service, from holding any office or engaging in any employment whatsoever other than that of clerk to the attorney to whom he is bound, and requires that before being admitted an attorney he shall prove by affidavit that he has not held any office or engaged in any employment contrary to that enactment. The father of P., an articled clerk, was steward of the manor of H., and upon his death P. was, during his articles, appointed steward by his brother in law, who was lord of the manor, as trustee for his mother, who had a life benefit of himself and the plaintiff: the interest in the manor, which at her household and farm expenses were paid death would be divisible between him for out of the profits of the business. self, his brothers and sisters. He apA partnership account was kept bepointed a deputy, but on three occasions tween the bankrupt and the plaintiff; attended Courts with his principal's they had no joint banking account: the consent to admit tenants and take sur- bankrupt was rated to the relief of the renders. Held, that the case was within poor, &c.; all receipts for rates and the enactment, which the Court had no taxes were given, all business transdiscretion to relax, and therefore the actions were conducted, all debts in service was not good. Ex parte Pepper-contracted, and all sales and purchases respect of the farming business were

corn, 361.

ASSESSMENT.

See Highway, II. Rate, Poor.

ASSETS.

Marshalling. See Marshalling Assets.

sold the stock from time to time for the

were made in his name only. The plaintiff devoted her whole time and labour in assisting the bankrupt in the management of the joint business, but it was not generally known that she was a partner. The Court having power to draw inferences of fact: Held,

1. That the plaintiff had allowed the bankrupt to appear as sole owner of the business.