[1867.] LLOYD V. JACKSON. &c., is not descriptive of the quantity of estate devised, and does not necessarily carry the fee, but may confer only an estate for life; and that notwithstanding the large additional words "by her freely to be possessed and enjoyed." Therefore I should not be prepared to say that those words, either alone or even joined with the words "together with all my houses and household goods, deeds and moveables," pass the fee; though it is difficult to say to what case the maxim juncta juvant should apply if not to this will, for it begins by purporting to dispose of all the testator's worldly estate, and then to a devise of all his lands be adds a gift of all his household goods, shewing a general intention. on his part to devise and bequeath the whole of his property to his wife. But it is unnecessary to determine on the construction of the will with the aid of the maxim juncta juvant, because the above words are followed by others which leave no reasonable doubt on the question. These words are, "all my children to be educated and settled in business according to my wife's discretion." Mr. Mellish rightly admitted that the question was whether the estate, or the devisee's interest in it, was charged. And he contended that where the devise or direction in the will merely imposed a charge upon the estate, it created a trust which the trustee might execute without taking a larger estate than for life. If this rule be applicable to the present case, still there is no direct charge on the estate of the expense of the education and settling the children in business. According to the natural and reasonable interpretation to be put upon the words, it seems to us to be equivalent to a devise in these terms, "I direct my wife to take upon herself the education and superintendence of my children, and she is to do so according to her discretion." That is the duty imposed upon her, which may involve some expenditure; and the principle of the authorities cited is, that where a devisee has a duty imposed upon him to be performed at his own costs and charges, which he might not be able to repay himself unless he had an estate in fee in the property devised, it is to be construed as a devise in fee, if it may be consistently with the words, in order that he may be reimbursed the outlay, whether the words creating the duty are obligatory or not making no difference. Even if the discharge of the duty is left to her discretion it does not alter the effect of the devise as manifesting the intention of the testator; he took it for granted that his wishes would be complied with, and therefore intended to confer upon his wife an estate which would indemnify her against loss. In either case therefore the effect is to confer on the widow an estate in fee simple, and not an estate for life. WILLES and SMITH JJ., BRAMWELL, CHANNELL and PIGOTT BB., concurred. [1867.] LLOYD V. JACKSON. 2 z 2 Judgment affirmed. 1866. Wednesday, Cattle Plague. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 107. s. 4. Order of inspector. Liability of master for disobedience of servant. SEARLE, appellant, REYNOLDS, respondent. By an Order of Council made under stat. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 107. s. 4. every inspector has power to cause to be cleansed and disinfected premises in which animals labouring under the cattle plague have been or may be, and every owner or occupier of such premises is to obey any order given by the inspector for that purpose under a penalty of 201. An inspector gave an order to the foreman of the appellant, who resided at a distance to cleanse and disinfect certain premises, which order was disobeyed. Semble, that the appellant was not liable for the disobedience of the order by his foreman, per Cockburn C. J. Semble, contrà, per Mellor J. CASE stated by justices under stat. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43. On the 22nd September, 1865, the Lords of the Privy Council, by virtue and in exercise of the powers given by stat. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 107., an Act to prevent the spreading of contagious or infectious disorders among sheep, cattle, and other animals, continued by divers subsequent Acts, and lastly by stat. 28 & 29 Vict. c. 119. s. 2., made an order by which, after reciting stat. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 107. s. 4. and that a contagious or infectious disorder then prevailed among the cattle of Great Britain, which was generally designated the "Cattle Plague," it was ordered, among other things, that whenever the Local Authority as thereinafter defined should be satisfied of the existence of the disorder in, or had reason to apprehend its approach to, the district over which his or their jurisdiction extended, it should be lawful for such Local Authority from time to time to appoint one or more veterinary surgeon or surgeons, or other duly qualified person or persons, to be an inspector or inspectors for the purpose of carry ing into effect the rules and regulations made by the order within the district for which he or they should have been appointed. On the 2nd November, 1865, the respondent was, by the proper Local Authorities, (to wit) the justices for the petty sessional division of the hundred of North Witchford, in the Isle of Ely, in pursuance of the order, duly appointed an inspector for divers parishes and places within the petty sessional division, including therein the parish or hamlet of Benwick. On the 23rd November, 1865, the Lords of the Council made another order, whereby it was, among other things, ordered as follows: "10. Every inspector shall have power within his district to cause to be cleansed and disinfected in any manner which he may think proper any premises in which animals labouring under the said disorder have been or may be, and to cause to be disinfected, and if necessary destroyed, any fodder, manure, or refuse matter, which he may deem likely to propagate the said disorder. And every owner or occupier of such premises shall obey any order given by such inspector for that purpose." "22. Every person offending against this order shall, in pursuance of the said Act, for every such offence forfeit any sum, not exceeding 201., which the justices before whom he or she shall be convicted of such offence may think fit to impose." On the 9th December, 1865, the appellant was summoned and charged before the justices for refusing to obey an order of the respondent, as inspector, requiring him to cleanse and disinfect a certain yard and premises of which he was the owner and occupier in Benwick. 1866. SEARLE V. REYNOLDS. 1866. SEARLE V. REYNOLDS. The respondent went between twelve and one o'clock p. m. on Saturday, December 2, to the appellant's yard where a bullock was dying of the cattle plague, and gave a written order to the appellant's foreman, who had charge of the yard, to disinfect it with certain quantities of quicklime and chloride of lime, and gave him until five o'clock that day to execute the order. The respondent went again about nine o'clock, and found the beast dead and the yard not disinfected. The respondent did not see the appellant. The appellant lived on another farm about eleven miles distant from the yard, and came to his foreman's house on the Sunday morning, when he was told of the respondent's order, on which he directed his foreman that what was ordered was to be done. Nothing, however, was done till Monday, at eleven o'clock a. m., when the order was obeyed. It was objected for the appellant:-First. That there was not any order to the appellant, and that an order directed to the servant was not an order to the master. Second. That in order to constitute wilful disobedience there must be disobedience after the order had been communicated to the master. Third. That the order was impossible of performance within the time limited. The justices were of opinion, first, that the order was communicated to the appellant; second, that it was not obeyed within a reasonable time; third, that the neglect in executing the order was by the appellant's authority; and accordingly convicted him. Douglas Brown, for the respondent.-The master must be taken to be aware of the regulations as to the cattle disease enacted by stat. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 107., and |