Insolvent and Bankrupt Laws of Foreign Countries.-Inspection Laws. 58. When a defendant in a judgment can show that he has been released under the insolvent laws of the state, and that the debt or judgment formed a part of his schedule; he cannot, under a rule of the court, be imprisoned on the judgment. Beers et al. v. Haughton, 1 M'Lean's C. C. R. 231. charge such insolvent from all debts and de- | for the legislature of Massachusetts, by the inmands due by him, or for which he was liable solvent act of 1838, to discharge the obligation at the date of the certificate, and also from all of these contracts. Ibid. contracts originating before the said date, though payable afterwards. Held, that the law of Pennsylvania is unconstitutional, because it impairs the obligation of a contract, and because congress have the exclusive right to pass a bankrupt law. Golden v. Prince, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 313. 47. A state insolvent law, which discharges the debt and the person of the insolvent, is unconstitutional as to the debt, but not as to the person. Glen v. Humphreys, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 424. 48. The United States are not affected by discharges under state insolvent laws. lbid. 49. Action on a judgment rendered in New York, and discharged under the insolvent law of that state, made prior to the contract on which the judgment was rendered; on motion, an appearance on common bail was allowed. Fairchild v. Shivers, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 443. 59. The rule of court adopted the law of the state. Ibid. INSOLVENT AND BANKRUPT LAWS OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES. 1. A discharge of the person under a foreign insolvent law, leaves the contract in full force; and whether bail shall be demanded or not, must depend on the laws of the country where the suit is brought. Webster v. Massey, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 157. 50. Action for a debt contracted in Baltimore, on a note dated in Philadelphia: a discharge of 2. A discharge by the bankrupt law of a fodefendant under the insolvent law of Pennsyl-reign country does not operate to pass the provania will not discharge his person from the perty or discharge the person of a debtor in the debt; and judgment must be entered against United States. Ogden et al. v. Gillingham et al., him generally. Riston v. Content, 4 Wash. C. Baldwin's C. C. R. 45. C. R. 476. 51. The defendant had been discharged by the insolvent laws of Pennsylvania from a debt contracted in the state: the court discharged him on common bail. Read v. Chapman, Peters' C. C. R. 404. 52. The court refused to quash a writ of capias issued against the defendant for a debt contracted in the state, he having been discharged by the insolvent law. The proper relief is to discharge the defendant on common bail. Ibid. 53. On a rule to show cause why defendant should not be discharged on common bail, he having been discharged under the insolvent laws of the state of Pennsylvania; evidence to show that the discharge had been unfairly and fraudulently obtained, cannot be given. Campbell et al. v. Claudius, Peters' C. C. R. 484. 54. Where the debt has been contracted and made payable out of the state, the circuit court will not discharge on common bail a defendant arrested for such debt, notwithstanding his discharge by the insolvent laws of the state in which such action is brought. Ibid. 55. The constitutional and legal rights of a citizen of the United States, to sue in the circuit courts of the United States, do not permit an act of insolvency, completely executed under the authority of a state, to be a good bar against the recovery upon a contract made in another state. Suydam et al. v. Broadnax, 14 Peters, 67. 56. No state insolvent laws can discharge the obligations of any other contracts made in the state, than those which are made between the citizens of that state. Springer v. Foster, 2 Story's C. C. R. 383. 57. Where certain bills of exchange were drawn in Pennsylvania on a citizen of Massachusetts, and were accepted by him in Massachusetts; it was held, that it was not competent 3. The bankrupt law of a foreign country cannot operate a legal transfer of property in this country. Harrison v. Sterry et al., 5 Cranch, 289; 2 Cond. Rep. 260. 4. A discharge under a foreign bankrupt law is no bar to an action in the courts of this coun try. M'Millan v. M'Neill, 4 Wheat. 209; 4 Cond. Rep. 424. 5. The assignees of a bankrupt in England cannot maintain an action at law in their own name, against a debtor of the bankrupt in Virginia; and the action is only maintainable in the name of the bankrupt himself. Though the right to personal property may be regulated by the laws of the domicil, as in the case of the bankrupt laws of England, and though the equi table rights of the assignees, acquired under those laws, will be respected in our courts, yet the right of action must be regulated by the law of the forum in which the suit is brought and the transfer of a bankrupt's effects in England, being an assignment merely by operation of law, and not by the act of the party, is not such an assignment of the legal title to the assignees, as will enable them to maintain an action in their own name, in the courts of Virginia. Blane v. Drummond, 1 Brockenb. C. C. R. 62. 6. A debt contracted in one country cannot be discharged by the bankrupt laws of another country. Green v. Sarmiento, Peters' C. C. R. 74. INSPECTION LAWS. The laws of the United States do not require a person, in order to entitle himself to a clearance, to produce to the collector a certificate of his having complied with the inspection laws of the state, unless the law of the state requires it. Bass et al. v. Steele, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 381. Inspector.-Instructions to the Jury on the trial of Causes. INSPECTOR. 1. An inspector is an officer of the customs, the obstruction of whom is an offence within the seventy-first section of the act of 1799, ch. 128. He has a right to go on board of any vessel to discover if any goods, &c., were laden on board contrary to the embargo acts; and if he is obstructed in so doing, an indictment will lay under that section of the act. United States v. Sears, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 215. 2. If an inspector be commissioned and sworn, and in the actual execution of the duties of his office, with the knowledge of the treasury department, it is sufficient proof of his being regularly appointed, even supposing that the approbation of the secretary of the treasury were necessary to such specific appointment. Ibid. 3. On a trial for obstructing an inspector, it is not necessary to produce the collector's commission, when he was appointed. Proof that, de facto, the collector acts in such office is sufficient. Ibid. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY ON THE TRIAL OF CAUSES. 1. Where there is no evidence tending to prove a particular fact, the court are bound so to instruct the jury when requested; but they cannot legally give any instructions, which will take from the jury the right of weighing what effect the evidence shall have. An instruction founded on part of the evidence is erroneous. Greenleaf V. Booth, 9 Peters, 292. 2. The court was requested to say to the jury, that the facts given in evidence, in the trial of the case, did not import such a lending as would support the defence of usury. By the supreme court:-The court was asked to usurp the province of the jury, and to decide on the sufficiency of the testimony, in violation of the wellestablished principle, that the law is referred to the court, the fact to the jury. Scott v. Lloyd, 9 Peters, 418. 3. An instruction to the jury which would separate the circumstances of the case from each other, and the object of which is to induce the court, after directing the jury that they ought to be considered together, to instruct them that, separately, no one in itself amounted to usury, ought not to have been given. Ibid, 4. The court ought not to instruct, and indeed cannot instruct, on the sufficiency of evidence; but no instruction to the jury should be given, except upon evidence in the case. Where there is evidence on a point, the court may be called upon to instruct the jury on the law, but it is for the jury to determine on the effect of evidence. Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company v. Knapp et al., 9 Peters, 541. 5. A direction to the jury, that the matter so produced and proved, was sufficient to prove the issue on the part of the plaintiffs, "was held, not to be an interference with the province of the jury." Mason et al. v. The United States, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 53. 6. So too, "that W. ought, by law, to be considered as the said A.'s agent, in all concerns respecting said vessel and cargo;" ought to be viewed as declaring the legal operation of acts which either were not questioned, or were left to the jury to determine. Ibid. 7. The practice of the circuit court of the United States of Massachusetts, in capital cases, is for counsel to state the points of law on which they wish instructions to the jury, at some time before the charge is given, that the court may have time to consider and examine them. United States v. Gibert, 2 Sumner's C. C. R. 19. 8. The court may give an opinion on the weight of evidence, or they may decline so to do; if the evidence is doubtful, it is most proper to leave it to the jury. Consequa v. Willings, Peter's C. C. R. 225. 9. When any instructions to the jury are asked of the court, on a trial of a cause, they should be precise and certain to a particular intent, that the point intended to be raised, may be distinctly seen by the court; and that error, if one be made, may be distinctly assigned. The United States v. The Bank of the Metropolis, 15 Peters, 577. 10. In trials at law, while it is invariably true that decisions on the weight of the evidence belongs exclusively to the jury, it is equally true that whenever instructions upon evidence are asked from the court to the jury, it is the right and duty of the former to judge of the relevancy, and, by necessary implication, to some extent upon the certainty and definiteness of the evidence proposed. Irrelevant, impertinent, or immaterial statements, a court cannot be called upon to admit as the groundwork of instructions; it is bound to take care that the evidence on which it shall be called upon to act is legal, and that it conduces to the issue on behalf of either the plaintiff or the defendant. Roach v. Hulings, 16 Peters, 319. 11. It is error in the circuit court to instruct the jury, on the prayer of the plaintiff, or on the prayer of the defendant, when either prayer seeks to withdraw from the jury the decision of the fact, and asks the court to instruct them as to a matter of law, upon the sufficiency or insufficiency of certain evidence offered to prove it. So, also, when the instruction is asked upon a part only of the testimony, leaving out of view various other portions of it, which the jury were bound to consider in forming their verdict. Smith et al. v. Condry, 17 Peters, 20. 12. The court is never bound to give an instruction to a jury on a point of law, in the precise form and manner in which it is put by counsel, but only in such a manner as comports with the real merits and justice of the case. Pitts v. Whitman, 2 Story's C. C. R. 609. 13. It is a settled rule of judicial procedure, that the courts will never lay down as instructions to a jury, general or abstract positions, such as are not immediately connected with and applicable to the facts of a cause, but require that every prayer for an instruction should be General Principles. preceded by and based upon a statement of the | to govern cases arising under policies of insufacts upon which the questions of law naturally rance. Waters v. The Merchants' Louisville Inand properly arise. It is equally certain that the surance Company, 11 Peters, 213. courts will not, upon a view of the testimony which is partial or imperfect, give an instruction which the entire evidence in a cause, when developed, would forbid. Rhett v. Poe, 2 Howard, 483. INSURANCE. 1. General principles. Page 46 2. What may be insured, and by whom insurance may be made............... 3. In what name insurance should be made........... 4. Termination of the voyage insured 5. Warranty and representation 6. Concealment... 7. Loss by barratry 8. Seaworthiness 9. Deviation.. 10. Abandonment.. 60 61 61 61 64 6. As the explosion on board the Lioness was caused by fire, the fire was the proximate cause of the loss. Ibid. 7. If taking gunpowder on board a vessel insured against fire, was not justified by the usage of the trade, and therefore was not contemplated as a risk by the policy, there might be great reason to contend that if it increased the risk, the loss was not covered by the policy. Ibid. 8. A general policy, insuring every person having an interest in the thing insured, and containing no warranty that the property is neutral, covers belligerent as well as neutral property. Hodgson v. Marine Insurance Company of Alexandria, 5 Cranch, 100; 2 Cond. Rep. 195. 9. If the insurance is against "all risks, block64 aded ports in Hispaniola excepted," a vessel 65 sailing ignorantly for a blockaded port, is covered 66 by the policy. The exception in the policy is 69 not of the port, but of the risk of capture for 76 breaking the blockade; it is not a warranty. 81 Yeaton v. Fry, 5 Cranch, 335; 2 Cond. Rep. 273. 10. A vessel sailing ignorantly to a blockaded port, is not liable to capture under the law of nations. Ibid. 82 11. Total and partial losses 12. Policies on time........ 13. Average 14. Liability of insurers for freight. 84 15. Memorandum articles........ 84 85 16. Insurance against fire 17. Remedies on policies of insurance 1. General Principles. 86 1. In an action on a valued policy, it is not competent for the underwriters to give parol evidence that the real value of the property insured is different from that stated in the policy. Marine Ins. Co. of Alexandria v. Hodgson, 6 Cranch, 206; 2 Cond. Rep. 347. 11. A vessel proceeding on a voyage not prohibited, to a port not blockaded, was arrested by a British cruiser, her papers endorsed with a warning "not to proceed to any port in possession of his majesty's enemies ;" and the captain verbally informed, by the boarding officer, that the port of destination was blockaded, the vessel would be good prize if she proceeded thither. She returned, under these circumstances, to her port of departure. The voyage being broken up 2. A policy of insurance on a vessel sailing from fear, founded on misrepresentation, the under a register which has been obtained with- vessel not being physically incapacitated from out conforming to the requisitions of the laws of proceeding, and there being no legal impedithe United States relative to the registry and en-ment, the underwriters are not liable. King v. rolling of vessels of the United States is not void; Delaware Insurance Company, 6 Cranch, 71; 2 and an action may be maintained on such a po- Cond. Rep. 303. licy to recover a loss sustained by the assured. The policy may not have been designed to aid, assist, or advance any unlawful purpose; and was a lawful contract in itself, and only remotely connected with the use of the certificate of registry. There are cases in which a contract may be valid, notwithstanding it is remotely connected with an independent illegal transaction; which, however, it is not designed to aid or promote. The Ocean Insurance Company v. Polleys, 13 Peters, 157. 3. The contract of insurance is a contract of indemnity, and therefore the assured can only recover according to the damage he has sustained. Rhinelander v. The Insurance Company of Pennsylvania, 4 Cranch, 29; 2 Cond. Rep. 13. 4. The loss of the voyage as to the cargo, is not a loss of the voyage as to the ship. Alex ander v. The Baltimore Insurance Company, 4 Cranch, 370; 2 Cond. Rep. 143. 5. It is a well established principle of the common law, that in all cases of loss we are to attribute it to the proximate cause, and not to the remote cause. This has become a maxim 12. The questions, whether the voyage was broken up, and whether the captain was justified in returning, are questions of law; and if the jury find the facts specially, and draw the legal conclusion that the facts amount to a justification, the court is not bound by that conclusion. Ibid. 13. The British orders in council, of November 11, 1807, did not prohibit a direct voyage from the United States to a colony of France. The language of the orders, the understanding of both countries, publicly and officially expressed, are conclusive upon this point. Ibid. 14. If the interest of one joint owner of a cargo be insured, and if that interest be neutral, it is no breach of the warranty of neutrality, if the other joint owner, whose interest is not insured, be a belligerent. Livingston et al. v. Maryland Insurance Company, 6 Cranch, 274; 2 Cond. Rep. 370. 15. Policies of insurance are generally the most informal instruments which are brought into courts of justice; and there are no instruments which are more liberally construed, in General Principles. order to effect the real intention of the parties, or in other words he authorizes the concealif that intention can be clearly ascertained. Ibid. 16. The assured are not understood to warrant that the whole cargo is neutral, but that the interest insured is neutral. Ibid. 17. If a vessel take on board papers which materially enhance the risk, and it be not within the regular usage of the trade insured to take such papers, the non-disclosure of the fact that they would be on board, would vitiate the policy. Ibid. 18. The length of time a vessel may wait to take in her cargo, without discharging the underwriters, does not depend on the usage of trade. Oliver v. Maryland Insurance Company, 7 Cranch, 487; 2 Cond. Rep. 580. 19. The danger which will justify a vessel remaining in port a long time, without discharging the underwriters, must be obvious, immediate, directly applied to the interruption of the voyage, and imminent; not distant, contingent and indefinite. Ibid. 20. In estimating the materiality of papers on board a vessel, in enhancing the risk, their effect taken together should be considered, and not the effect of any one of them taken by itself. Livingston v. The Maryland Insurance Company, 7 Cranch, 506; 2 Cond. Rep. 589. ment, in all cases in which it is not necessary to assume the belligerent national character for the purpose of protection. Ibid. 26. The public laws of a country, affecting the course of trade with that country, are considered to be equally within the knowledge and notice of all the parties to a policy on a voyage to such country. Ibid. 27. Where a cargo is insured by divers policies, in some of which the rate of exchange is fixed at which the prime cost of the cargo shall be valued, in ascertaining the amount of the interest of the assured, in the settlement of those policies, on which the rate of exchange is fixed, the whole cargo is to be valued at that rate of exchange, without regard to the rate of exchange by which the value may have been ascertained in other policies. Pleasants v. Maryland Insurance Company, 8 Cranch, 55; 3 Cond. Rep. 29. 28. If a policy insures against "unlawful arrests, restraints and detainment of all kings, princes, &c.," the qualification "unlawful" extends in its operation, as well to restraints and detainments, as to arrests; and in such case, a detainment by a force lawfully blockading a port, is not a peril insured against by a policy containing a warranty of neutrality. M'Call v. Marine Insurance Company, 8 Cranch, 59; 3 Cond. Rep. 32. 29. Under a policy containing the following clause, "and lastly, it is agreed that if the above vessel upon a regular survey, should be thereby 21. If the letter submitted to the underwriters, ordering the insurance, refer to another letter previously laid before them, which letter contained information that the vessel had permission to trade to the Spanish colonies, the under-declared unseaworthy, by reason of her being writers are bound to notice that fact, and to know that the vessel would take all the papers necessary to make the voyage legal. Ibid. 22. If the assured do any act which increases the risk of capture and detention, according to the common practice of the belligerent, it may avoid the policy; it is not necessary that the act done would justify condemnation, according to the law of nations. No acts, justifiable by the usage of the trade, and done by the assured to avoid confiscation, can avoid the policy. Ibid. 23. The belligerent right of search draws after it a right to the production and examination of the ship's papers. Ibid. 24. The question must always be, whether there be a concealment of papers material to the preservation of the neutral character. It is not every idle, accidental, or even meditated concealment of papers, manifestly unimportant in every view before the prize tribunal, which will dissolve the obligation of the policy. If by the usage and course of trade it be necessary or allowable, to have on board spurious papers, covered with a belligerent character, whatever effects it might have upon the rights of the searching cruiser, the concealment of such papers, which if disclosed would completely compromit or destroy the neutral character, will not amount to a breach of the warranty. Ibid. 25. Whenever the underwriter has knowledge of, and assents to the cover of neutral property under belligerent papers, as he does in all cases where the usage of the trade demands it, he necessarily waives his rights under the warranty; unsound or rotten, then the assurers shall not be bound to pay their subscriptions on this policy;" and it was found by the jury, that the vessel was seaworthy at the time of the commencement of the risk, and when she sailed on the voyage insured: Held, that proof, by a regular survey, of unsoundness at any subsequent period of the voyage, discharged the underwriters. Dorr v. Pacific Insurance Company, 7 Wheat. 581; 5 Cond. Rep. 360. 30. An exemplification of a condemnation of the vessel in a foreign court of vice admiralty, reciting the certificate of surveyors, that the vessel was unworthy of being repaired, and unsafe and unfit ever to go to sea again, and prodiced in evidence by the insured to prove the loss, is "a regular survey," in the language of the clause. But the survey must correspond with the contract; and if the vessel be declared unseaworthy, for any additional cause, besides being "unsound or rotten," it will not avail the insurers. Ibid. 31. An insurance broker has a lien on the policy, for the premium paid by him on account of his principal; and although he has parted with the possession of the policy, yet if it again comes to his hands, his lien would revive and be protected, unless the manner of his parting with it had manifested an intention altogether to abandon such lien. But liens for other advances, or on other accounts, whether by agreement of the parties, or by the operation of usage or of law, will not be revived by the return of the policy to the hands of one who has parted General Principles. with the possession. Spring et al. v. The South Carolina Insurance Company et al., 8 Wheat. 168; 5 Cond. Rep. 434. 32. If, while a policy is out of the hands of the insurance broker, it is assigned for valuable consideration, and bona fide, it would be unjust, on its returning to his possession, to revive incumbrances of which the assignee could have had no notice, nor no certain means of finding out. Ibid. ten, the insurers shall not be bound to pay the sum hereby insured, or any part thereof;" a survey by the master and wardens of the port of New Orleans, which was obtained at the instance of the master, who was also part owner, transmitted by him to the other part owner, and by the latter laid before the underwriters as proof of the loss, stated that the wardens "ordered one streak of plank fore and aft, to be taken out, about three feet below the bends on 33. Insurance of eighteen thousand dollars on the starboard side, and found the timber and a vessel valued at that sum, and two thousand bottom plank so much decayed, that we were dollars on freight valued at twelve thousand unanimously of opinion her repairs would cost dollars, on the ship Henry, "at and from Tene- more than she would be worth afterwards, and riffe, and at and from thence to New York, with that it would be for the interest of all concerned, liberty to stop at Matanzas, the property war- she should be condemned as unworthy of repair; ranted American." The policy was executed in on that ground, we did therefore condemn her 1807, and in the same year another insurance as not seaworthy, and as unworthy of repair, was effected by the same underwriters on freight and therefore, according to the power vested by for the same voyage, to the amount of ten thou- law in the master and wardens of this port, we sand dollars, and the property was also warranted do hereby order and direct the aforesaid damaged American; but the policy contained no permis-brig, to be sold at public auction for the account sion to stop at Matanzas. The following repre- of the insurers thereof, or whomsoever the same sentation was made to the underwriters on be- may concern." It was held, that under the cirhalf of the plaintiff, who was both owner and cumstances, this survey was conclusive evidence master of the ship:-"We are to clear out for to discharge the insurers, under the foregoing New Orleans; the property will be under cover clause in the policy. Janny v. Columbian Insuof Mr. John Paul, of Baltimore, who goes super-rance Company, 10 Wheat. 411; 6 Cond. Rep. cargo on board, yet Mr. P. will only have part 166. of the cargo to his consignment. There will be three other persons on board, who will have the remainder of the cargo in their care. We are to stop at Matanzas, to know if there are any menof-war off the Havana." The vessel sailed from Teneriffe, on the 17th April, 1807, with a cargo belonging to Spanish subjects, but appearing to be the property of John Paul Dumeste, a citizen of the United States, and the same person called John Paul, in the representation. The cargo was shipped under a charterparty executed by the plaintiff, and Dumeste, representing New Orleans as the place of destination. The ship arrived at the Havana, on the 7th July, having put into Matanzas to avoid British cruisers, and unladed her cargo; which was there received by the Spanish owners, and the freight, amounting to seven thousand dollars, paid to the plaintiff, who received it in full of all demands for freight or otherwise, under or by virtue of the aforesaid charterparty and cargo." At the Havana, the ship took in a new cargo, belonging to merchants in New York, and was lost, with the greater part of the cargo, on the voyage from Havana to New York. An action of debt was brought on the first policy for the value of the ship and freight. The sum demanded in the writ was twenty thousand dollars, but the plaintiff limited his demand at the trial to eighteen thousand dollars, on the ship, and four hundred and twenty dollars for the freight actually earned on the voyage from Havana to New York. Held, that he was entitled to recover. Hughes v. Union Insurance Company of Baltimore, 8 Wheat. 294; 5 Cond. Rep. 443. 34. Under a policy containing the following clause: "it is declared and understood that if the abovementioned brig, after a regular survey, should be condemned for being unsound or rot 35. A policy for ten thousand dollars, upon a voyage "at and from Alexandria to St. Thomas, and two other ports in the West Indies, and back to her port of discharge in the United States, upon all lawful goods and merchandise, laden or to be laden on board the ship, and beginning the adventure upon the said goods and merchandise, from the lading at Alexandria, and continuing the same until the said goods and merchandise shall be safely landed at St. Thomas, &c., and the United States aforesaid;" is an insurance upon every successive cargo taken on board in the course of the voyage out and home, so as to cover the risk of a return cargo, the proceeds of the sales of the outward cargo. Columbian Insurance Company v. Catlett, 12 Wheat. 383; 6 Cond. Rep. 541. 36. Such a policy covers to the amount of ten thousand dollars, during the whole voyage out and home, so long as the assured has that amount of property on board; without regard to the fact of a portion of the original cargo having been safely landed at an intermediate port before the loss. Ibid. 37. It is not necessary in the declaration to aver that any preliminary proofs of loss were offered to the underwriters, nor of any promise to pay in sixty days after such proofs, according to the terms of the policy, further than the general averment after the allegation of the loss, that the defendants on, &c., at, &c., had notice thereof, and by means thereof became liable, &c., and in consideration thereof, promised that they would pay the sum due, "according to the tenor and effect of the said policy of insurance." Nor is the averment of an abandonment, or notice to the underwriters, necessary; these are but matters of evidence. Ibid. 38. Where an insurance was effected after a |