not possible for him to retain it in memory: for though a man can tell the law, yet if he know not the reason thereof, he will soon forget his superficial knowledge; but when he findeth the right reason of the law, and so bringeth it to his natural reason, that he comprehendeth it as his own, this will not only serve him for the understanding of the particular case, but of many others: for cognitio legis est copulata et complicata; this knowledge will long remain with him." *-Let the student, on discovering any leading case, devote his utmost efforts to the mastery of it, in all its particulars-and make frequent reference to it, in order to test the accuracy of his recollection of it. Let him keep a list of such cases always beside him, and frequently inquire of himself thus: 'Saunders v. Wakefield, 4 B. & Ald.-what did that decide?-Guarantee must contain consideration for promise.' 'Dawes v. Peck, 8 T. R.-Carrier, consignor and consignee general principle that the latter must sue carrier for loss.' 'Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T. R.-No right of stoppage in transitu as against bond fide assignee of consignee,' &c. &c. The great advantage of this will be very soon discovered by the student. If he know a leading case well, all he has to do, on an emergency, is to turn to it in the list of cases in some approved treatise or digest, and he will find it surrounded by all its kindred and more recent cases. Pursue a similar course with reference to statutes. Select those which are of leading practical importance, such as the statute of Wills-of Uses of Entails-of Frauds; and having carefully weighed all the most material parts of them, and considered the questions which have been raised, and interpretations

* 1 Inst. 394 b.-183 b.

which have been put upon them, minute down in a note-book, the substance of each section, as nearly as possible in the words of the act. This will require, however, the greatest care. Very serious omissions have been made even by those most skilled in abridging and condensing statutes.*

If any young reader should consider such labours as these excessive and unnecessary, let him try to state accurately the substance of some of those cases and statutes with the names and titles of which he is most familiar and he may be less disposed to undervalue the importance of the hints here offered for his guidance. Again and again would we call the student's attention to

* A remarkable instance of the necessity of using caution in abridging statutes, occurs in the abridgment of the Factor's Act, 6 Geo. IV. c. 94, in Abbot on Shipping, p. 381 (5th ed. 1827). This abridgment has always been considered so well executed, that it has been adopted, with but little variation, in every succeeding treatise; and yet one short phrase is omitted, which materially alters the sense of the entire enactment. Lord Tenterden's abridgment, in the work in question, is as follows:-"A person entrusted with and in possession of a bill of lading, or any of the warrants, certificates, or orders mentioned in the Act, is to be deemed the true owner of the goods described therein, so far as to give validity to any contract or agreement made by him for the sale or disposition of the goods, or the deposit or pledge thereof [AS A SECURITY FOR ANY MONEY OR NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT―omitted] if the buyer, disponee, or pawnee, has not notice by the document or otherwise, that such person is not the actual and bonâ fide owner of the goods." The reader would imagine, from Lord Tenterden's abridgment (which is adopted in the sixth edition, that of Mr. Serjeant Shee, 1840), that the enactment was meant to give validity to any bond fide deposit, or pledge of goods by any person possessing those indicia of property enumerated at the commencement of the section. He will therefore be not a little surprised at finding that in Taylor v. Kymer, 3 B. & Adol. 337, it was held by Lord Tenterden himself, in delivering the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, that a person with whom goods had been pledged as a security for India warrants, which he had entrusted to the factor who pledged them with him, was held not to be protected by them !-See now, however, stat. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 39, by which this branch of law has been most beneficially altered.

the necessity of uniform vigilance and circumspection, in order that he may early acquire the habit of reading, and thinking, with calmness and deliberation. "This study being built upon the perfection of reason, requires a constant and serious meditation; and what we apprehend altius quotidiana meditatione figendum est, that being fastened in our minds, and the reason thereof fully considered, habitus fiat, quod est impetus-that bringing it within the verge of his own reason, he may, upon the least summons, find the result thereof." *

SECTION VI.

IMPORTANCE OF RETAINING THE NAMES OF LEADING

CASES.†

A READY recollection of the names of cases is a great object with the practical lawyer. What is meant by this is, not the recollection of the name, only, of an important case, and the volume of the Reports where it is to be found, but of the substance of the decision; so that one may be able, at a moment's notice, aptly to cite it in court, or elsewhere. The name of the case and the number of the volume will suffice-as the page can of course be easily found without burthening the memory with it. Suppose the question under consideration is one concerning the distinction between a penalty, or liquidated damages—the experienced lawyer instantly thinks of Kemble v. Farren, 6 Bingham-a recent decision, in which all the older ones are discussed, and on the margin of which, perhaps, he + Vide ante, p. 773.

* Stu. Leg. Ra. pp. 53-4.

discovers his own мs. notes of several approximating and later cases. He thus gets at once to the heart of his subject-le siège des difficultés—and speedily and satisfactorily disposes of it.

Readiness in thus recollecting and quoting cases, is not a less showy than valuable accomplishment-and is, therefore, sometimes attempted by those who are quite unequal to the task. They can sport, perhaps, the name of the case, and the right volume of the Report; but either wholly forget, or recollect indistinctly, or misunderstand, and consequently misrepresent, the point of the decision. An instance of this, equally painful and ludicrous, was given in a previous page. "And here," says Mr. Raithby, "it must be obvious, that the exercise just now recommended, will be particularly necessary to the legal student, who, in the course of his future practice, cannot but have frequent occasions for the use of his memory in the statement of some case or opinion, recollected at the moment, by which his argument may be supported, or his positions enforced, with a peculiar brilliancy of effect and illustration. No after-labour can supply adequately the want of this particular power of memory. A man may fill the back of his brief with extracts, quotations, and cases, and yet omit one which would be more serviceable than all the rest: could he but recollect this at the very moment, it would serve him in a most essential manner-but it is entirely forgotten, or remembered so imperfectly, that the recital of it, should it be attempted, would most probably do his argument mischief, rather than good." An early and persevering attempt to form this habit will soon repay the young lawyer, by its prodigiously abridging labour and

*Ante, p. 829.

preventing loss of time in subsequent researches. Fifty or sixty leading cases, thoroughly understood and distinctly recollected, will be found of incalculable value in practice -serving as so many sure landmarks placed upon the trackless wilds of law :-and why should not the number be doubled, or even trebled? What pains can be too great, to secure such a result?

SECTION VII.

HOW TO ACQUIRE THE ART OF EFFECTIVELY STATING, VIVA VOCE, FACTS AND ARGUMENTS.

ACQUIRE this habit, good student, if you have it notanxiously cultivate it if you have,-or save the stamps and other expenses of a call to the Bar-or make a present of your wig and gown, if you have precipitately purchased them, to some one who may make a better use of them. How lamentable is it to see a man of talent and learning, unable to acquit himself even creditably in this respect -possibly on the most trivial occasions rising embarrassed-confused-stuttering and stammering, uttering "vain and idle repetitions," with the agonising accompaniments of "a-a-a," and sitting down, overwhelmed with vexation and disappointment! However clear may be a man's conceptions, however consecutive his thoughts, however thorough and extensive his knowledge, he may yet exhibit this sorry spectacle, unless he be either naturally gifted with powers of eloquence, or have struggled early, and successfully, to supply his natural deficiencies.

"There is an important distinction," remarks