from that of a mere petty plodder, into that of an able and enlightened lawyer. Notwithstanding the tendency thus deprecated, the subdivision of the profession has long ago become a matter of absolute necessity, owing to the altered character of social exigencies, to which legal institutions must necessarily adapt themselves. The amazing intricacy, complexity, and artificial refinements of rights and liabilities, in respect of persons and property, in modern times, when contrasted with the comparative simplicity and uniformity of former days, have had the natural and necessary effect of classifying those general principles by which they are regulated, and thus gradually developing new distributions of jurisdiction. "In the original formation of all independent states, redress for every kind of crime or injury, has usually," as was correctly observed by the late Mr. Chitty, "been afforded in one general court, and without much regard to precise form. As population and the intricacy of transactions increased, it was found, that by a division into several different courts, and appropriating a particular description of business to each, the judges and practitioners, having more time to attend to their particular departments, necessarily became better acquainted with them; and not only decided more correctly upon the substantial questions, but also framed more appropriate rules and forms of proceedings; and, in the result, more efficiently administered justice according to the varying nature of each case."*

* Gen. Prac. Law, vol. ii. p. 304 (2d ed.). See a very interesting chapter (xix) in Mr. Babbage's "Economy of Machinery and Manufactures," on the Division of Mental Labour, as illustrated by the celebrated "Tables" of M. Prony: and also the forcible observations of the Bishop of Llandaff (Dr. Copleston) in his Reply to the Edinburgh Reviewers, pp. 107-112.

Few things are more interesting, in even an historical point of view, than the rise and progress of the different courts; their modes of acquiring jurisdiction; their desperate struggles with each other on this point; and the ludicrous and contemptible nature of the devices adopted, for this purpose, by two of our most elevated tribunals.* Some of the superior courts gradually succeeded in their efforts of encroachment and usurpation; but the struggles of the inferior courts were effectually checked and restrained by their more powerful competitors. "Now, however," to adopt the language of the late Sir John Nicholl, "times are changed. A more liberal and enlightened view of questions of jurisdiction is taken. On the one hand, the Ecclesiastical Courts have no disposition to encroach, ampliare jurisdictionem; and on the other hand, Temporal Courts have no jealousy-no wish to resort to fictions and to technicalities. They look, where not bound by former decisions in point, to the real substance and sound sense

The Court of Exchequer obtained cognizance of civil suits properly belonging to the Common Pleas, by resorting to the pure fiction of the plaintiff's being a debtor to the Crown—and that by means of the defendant's not paying what was due to the plaintiff, he could not pay what he owed to the Crown!-The Court of Queen's Bench hit upon another device to secure a similar object: it pretended that a person charged with any pecuniary liability had committed some TRESPASS bringing him within the jurisdiction, and subjecting him to the authority, of that court: and that he was then liable to be sued there for the debt claimed from him! In Lord Mansfield's time, a defendant took it into his head to challenge the existence of the right to such jurisdiction by the King's Bench! The plaintiff demurred to the plea, and got judgment in his favour, the Court declaring," that if ever such a plea should come before it again, it would inquire by whom it had been signed!" [i. e., hold the counsel guilty of contempt of court.] See Tidd's Practice, p. 102 (9th edit.) "Pleased as we are with the possession," says Blackstone [ii. Comm. p. 2] speaking of the origin and growth of property, we seem afraid to look back to the means by which it was acquired— as if fearful of some defect in our title!"

CHAPTER IX.

DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS OF THE PROFESSION—

I. CIVIL DEPARTMENT.

PART I.-EQUITY.

THE difference between Law and EQUITY, which are two distinct co-ordinate systems for administering justice, in civil cases, in this country, is one of such cardinal importance, and a clear conception of it so indispensable to any one aiming at only a moderate general acquaintance with the principles of our jurisprudence, but especially to one intending to become either an Equity or CommonLaw practitioner, that it is surprising how much misunderstanding, and consequent misrepresentation, exist upon the subject, even among professional persons. We shall endeavour to account for the prevalence of such errors; and then proceed to give a faithful but popular account of this, one of the grandest characteristics of our English system of jurisprudence. We shall content

ourselves with delineating the existing state of equity jurisdiction: it being, however interesting, beyond the scope, and inconsistent with the limits, of this work, to attempt to trace the origin and growth of such jurisdiction. "The very terms," says Blackstone,* "of a court of

3 Bla. Comm. 429.

U

of the question-to that which is really more beneficial to the suitors-the public and subjects of the country. There is quite as much business in all the courts as, under the increase of wealth and population, the institutions are able to discharge."* To enter further, however, into these subjects would be inconsistent equally with the object of this work, and its limits. We refer the student, for full information, to the elegant and interesting outline of the jurisdiction of the several courts in England, to be found in the Third Book of Blackstone's Commentaries (Chapters III.—IV.) and the more copious and recent account to be found in the second volume of Mr. Chitty's General Practice of the Law, Chapter V. In the immediately ensuing chapters will be found, it is hoped, a correct, useful, intelligible, and popular outline of all the great departments of the legal profession; such as will really assist the student in making his election at the outset. Our purpose will have been answered, if enough shall have been said in this chapter, to satisfy an intelligent student, that there is far more in common between the various courts established in this country, than of that which is peculiar to each; that it is consequently degrading, foolish, and mischievous to think of shutting his eyes to everything beyond the particular province in which he intends to practise; that a competent general knowledge on this subject can be acquired at the very outset of his career, and without much difficulty; that it will sensibly facilitate and render interesting his particular studies;

Grignion v. Grignion, 1 Hagg. Eccles. Courts, 545. The student will find many valuable observations in this judgment, with reference to the question of the different jurisdictions in England. See also 2 Chitt. Gen. Pr. 307 (2d ed.).