species of information: the consequences of error in such matters being sometimes very painful, and serious. "Dates," says Sir Harris Nicolas, in a paragraph already quoted, "are to history, what the latitude and longitude are to navigation-fixing the exact position of, and serving as unerring guides to, the object to which they are applied." Without this knowledge, the student will be—as it were always in a fog: perpetually confounding cause and effect: the history of his country being to him, in fact, a dead letter-a mere old Almanack.' In Sir Harris Nicolas's valuable work on Chronology, from which the above quotation has been made, will be found much important information on this subject: and one fact established by that accurate and learned writer is so important as to warrant us in here calling special attention to it. "It is a remarkable and discreditable fact," says he, "that every table of the regnal Tables of our Sovereigns before printed, is erroneous,-not in one or two reigns only, but in every reign from the time of William the Conqueror to that of Edward IV. These errors have caused every document dated, and every event which took place, on any day in the regnal year included in the period in which these errors occur, to be assigned to one year of our Lord earlier than that to which they actually belong! That errors so destructive to truth, whence history, like philosophy, derives all its usefulness and importance, should have been so long allowed to pass without correction, must surprise those labouring in the exact sciences, whose tables include the smallest fractions of time, and wherein an error of a few seconds would be fatal to the calculations of the astronomer and mathematician."+ Ante, p. 145. + Chronology of History, Pref. p. xiv. Such are the observations which the author offers, with great diffidence-after some experience, and much inquiry -upon this most important subject, the young lawyer's study of English history. Happy will the author esteem himself, if any suggestion of his should prove the means of stimulating a single student to exertion, and facilitating the acquisition of that species of knowledge with which, in these stirring times, no man can safely or creditably dispense. Without a fair measure of it, how uninteresting and even incomprehensible must be three-fourths of the debates in Parliament-how dull and disheartening our Statute-book! With it, both of them will be unfailing sources of interest and instruction.-How totally different an aspect does a volume of English history present to two persons, one of whom is possessed, and the other destitute, of such knowledge! It is in the case of the former only, that can be verified the beautiful observation, that History is PHILOSOPHY TEACHING BY EXAMPLES!* *This saying is generally attributed to Lord Bolingbroke; but, from the following passage in his writings, it would seem that he only quoted it from some one else :-"What, then, is the true use of history? * * I will answer you by quoting what I have read somewhere or other in Dionysius Halicarnassensis, I think,-that 'history is philosophy teaching by examples'."— Works, vol. iii. p. 323. CHAPTER VIII. DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS OF THE PROFESSION CIVIL, CRIMINAL, ECCLESIASTICAL. HAVING prudently determined upon adopting the legal profession, the next question, and one requiring deliberate consideration, is-which of its departments should be selected? Let us endeavour to continue our assistance to the student, by exhibiting to him a correct outline of the country before him—of the entire legal profession, in its existing state, and as he will find it, upon adopting that branch of it which he may have deemed most eligible. Nor let him imagine, as is too generally the case, that correct and distinct notions upon this subject are requisite merely for the purpose of guiding him in the selection of a particular province of the profession. He must, on the contrary, if anxious to become a creditable, enlightened, and completely successful practitioner, continually bear in mind, that however intricate may be the boundaries of jurisdictions, however numerous the courts, however varied their modes of procedure,—they have all, whether civil, criminal, or ecclesiastical, one and the same object in view-the discovery of truth, and the administration of justice. They have different methods of doing this, according to the different natures of the rights, duties, liabilities, and injuries with which they have to deal, and upon which they adjudicate sometimes exclusively, sometimes concurrently, and at other times in aid of one another and the distinction between their respective provinces, though sometimes very refined and difficult to be perceived, it is of essential importance to be apprised of; for very perplexing questions are often and suddenly arising, in the course of litigation, as to whether the subject-matter of it falls properly within the jurisdiction which has been selected, or at all events might not have been far more speedily and advantageously dealt with, in another. The consequences of error in such cases are often very serious-sometimes ruinous. Out of many illustrations occurring to us, let us take the single instance of a LEGACY. According to circumstances, it either may, or must be, sued for in a court of Common Law, or a court of Equity, or an Ecclesiastical court and an injudicious or erroneous selection of one of these courts, may quickly entail fruitless expenses, trebling the amount of the legacy itself!* Again. An extensive knowledge of the different departments of the profession, will often suggest to the practitioner in any of them, most important collateral and subsidiary movements in aid of the principal proceeding which has been adopted; of which a little illustration occurred, only a day or two ago, in the course of the author's own practice. An action was pending If the executor have clearly assented to the bequest of a specific legacy; or (for good consideration) expressly promised the legatee to pay it, he may sue for it at law. If charged on personal estate, the legacy may be sued for in either the ecclesiastical court, or a court of equity: but if charged on real estate, or, though charged on personal estate, if involved in a trust which has not been completely fulfilled, so as to leave nothing for the executor-trustee to do, but pay the legacy (Grignion v. Grignion, 1 Hagg. Consist. Rep. 545; and post, chap. ix.), then the ecclesiastical court has no jurisdiction, and the suit must be instituted in a court of equity. upon a promissory note for a large amount, which had been given to the lender, by the principal debtor, and the defendant (his aunt) as his surety. The former became insolvent; and the payee of the note immediately sued the surety, who was a responsible person. The plaintiff, however, found himself suddenly encountered by a serious difficulty, in showing the signature to be that of the defendant; whose niece, it seemed, had signed it, in her aunt's name, and by her express direction. The former was now, however, disposed to deny having had authority for doing so; and no one else was present at the time of the signature, but the insolvent principal debtor -whose evidence was expected to be also hostile. It suddenly occurred to the plaintiff's attorney, in this dilemma, to go to the Insolvent Court, and oppose the insolvent's discharge, in order to have the opportunity of examining him quietly upon the matter, without his being aware of the true object of the examination. This was done; and there was adroitly extracted from the unsuspecting insolvent, upon oath, a clear acknowledgment that he had heard the defendant authorise her niece to affix her aunt's signature to the note, and had seen the signature affixed accordingly. A day or two afterwards, the insolvent was served with a subpoena to prove this fact, on the trial of the cause and the instant that the defendant's advisers heard of that fact, they struck,'—on the very day of the trial, when the cause was on the eve of being called on; and the defendant most unexpectedly submitted to a verdict by consent for the full amount, which was duly paid. But for this ingenious manœuvre, the plaintiff would in all human probability have been defeated. The author could have cited many similar instances of the signal advantage derived from a knowledge of the prin |