character, on the contrary, will often elevate its possessor, though enjoying a very moderate reputation for talent or learning, to high and distinguished posts, with the approbation of the profession, and of the public. No apparent popularity at the Bar can supply the want of its respect and esteem. Thus it is; thus it ever has been; thus it ever will be; thus it ever ought to be. It is, perhaps, needless to say that these observations happily receive but rare illustration by actual occurrences, extensive as is the profession of the Bar, and miscellaneous as are the characters necessarily admitted into it: but why is this so? because such considerations are ever present to an honourable mind, both before and after entering the profession of the Bar; and even to a mind of a very low tone of moral feeling, the observance of such requisitions becomes indispensable as a matter even of mere policy. Hypocrisy, it has been said, is the homage paid by vice to virtue.

Thus has it been attempted, briefly, and, it is feared, very imperfectly, to sketch a few of the principal features of what may be termed the moral portraiture of a young lawyer. Whatever may be thought of its deficiencies, it is the product of sincerity, and that conviction of its truth, which is guaranteed by many years' attentive observation of life and character. The supercilious and self-sufficient may, if they please, ridicule that which will be certainly received, however, as it is designed, by a manly, a modest, and a candid reader.

CHAPTER V.

ON THE FORMATION OF A LEGAL CHARACTER.

PART II-GENERAL KNOWLEDGE.

SECTION 1. HISTORY-POLITICAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY-METAPHYSICSPOLITICAL ECONOMY-AND LOGIC.

THE engrossing nature of legal pursuits, whether in study or practice, is too apt to render those who undertake them indifferent both to the acquisition and retention of that general knowledge, that large acquaintance with men and things, which is essential to constitute a superior member of society, especially of so important and conspicuous a profession as that of the Bar. Against this, then, let the student be ever on his guard. The considerations are numberless and most weighty by which this topic might be urged upon him. Let him assure himself, that the longer the acquisition of such knowledge is neglected, the more difficult will be the remedy, more poignant his regret, more frequent his exposure to mortification; while an early, systematic, and prudent cultivation of it, will insure him numerous and often overwhelming advantages over those who have not thought it worth their while to adopt a similar course. As far as elegant literature only is concerned-does he imagine that he is

to be for ever in chambers, or in court,-eternally writing opinions, drawing pleadings, and preparing and delivering arguments? Then we have done with him, as one of those dismal plodders who are past praying for,—mere legal beetles, ever crawling amidst the duskiest passages of an Inn of Court! How can a man of this description venture into superior society? He must there either talk the slang of his profession, or be condemned to total silence for what does he know of its topics?-of foreign or domestic political movements?-of the varied and interesting details of literature, scholarship, the fine arts, science, philosophy? Excuse may be made for him, by good natured people, on the score of an overwhelming practice, which leaves him neither time nor inclination for other pursuits; but, making the largest allowances, will they avail to ward off the contempt which must ever attach to blank ignorance of all such matters? What, however, if this lawyer be found to have, after all, but a moderate practice! Then the excuse plainly holds not; for that must be a mean and narrow mind indeed, which is choked up with so little. It is true that, as before intimated, a tolerably extensive sweep of useful practical knowledge— i. e. of the details of trade, manufactures, commerce, &c. &c. -must be possessed necessarily by even the mere lawyer, who has no chance whatever of attaining to eminence; but can an intellect of any except of the most grovelling description rest satisfied with this? What Burke said of Mr. Grenville-two men in this respect the very antipodes of each other-is worthy of being borne in mind by every young lawyer, be his pretensions at starting what they may.

"Sir, if such a man fell into errors, it must have been

from defects not intrinsical; they must be rather sought in the particular habits of his life; which, though they do not alter the ground-work of character, yet tinge it with their own hue. He was bred in a profession. He was bred to the law; which is, in my opinion, one of the first and noblest of human sciences,-a science which does more to quicken and invigorate the understanding than all the other kinds of learning put together; but it is not apt, except in persons very happily born, to open and to liberalise the mind exactly in the same proportion. Passing from that study, he did not go very largely into the world, but plunged into business,-I mean into the business of office, and the limited and fixed methods and forms established there. Much knowledge is to be had, undoubtedly, in that line; and there is no knowledge which is not valuable. But it may be truly said, that men too much conversant in office are rarely minds of remarkable enlargement. Their habits of office are apt to give them a turn to think the substance of business not to be much more important than the forms in which it is conducted. These forms are adapted to ordinary occasions; and therefore persons who are nurtured in office do admirably well, as long as things go on in their common order; but when the high roads are broken up, and the waters out, when a new and troubled scene is opened, and the file affords no precedent, then it is that a greater knowledge of mankind, and a far more extensive comprehension of things is requisite than ever office gave, or than office can ever give." *

Speech on American taxation." This is a lively picture of the insufficiency of mere experience," says Dugald Stewart, "to qualify a man for new and untried situations in the administration of government. The obser

It cannot be too frequently impressed upon those who, before embracing the legal profession, have laid the basis of extensive general knowledge, or rather, dropped the seeds of it into their minds, that it is infinitely easier to leave them to perish-to forget all, than difficult to retain, improve, and expand present knowledge. True it is, that

"Quo semel est imbuta recens, servabit odorem
Testa diu;"

but that applies chiefly, if not exclusively, to the classical and mathematical studies with which they have been occupied from their earliest years; which are intrinsically of little other use than to adorn and strengthen the mind, and therefore valuable only as means to an end, to those especially who enter the law. It may be vain to think of preserving an exact recollection of the minutiae of scholarship*-the critical niceties of grammatical construction,

vations he (Mr. Burke) makes on this subject, are expressed with his usual beauty and felicity of language; and are of so general a nature, that, with some trifling alterations, they may be extended to all the practical pursuits of life."-Philosophy of the Human Mind, chap. iv. § 7.

There are occasions, however, when such knowledge is not only highly desirable, but absolutely indispensable in the actual business of the Bar. Take for instance a case, tried at Guildhall, in which the author a few years ago was engaged as junior counsel-his leader, a gentleman now occupying a very eminent official post. It was an action by the proprietor of a classical school against a gentleman, for his son's schooling; and was resisted on the ground that the master was incompetent to teach the classics-a defence which was specially pleaded, and rendered necessary an inquiry into the manner in which Greek and Latin exercises had been corrected-in respect of prosody, syntax, and translation from the Greek, Latin, and English respectively into each other! The plaintiff came prepared to defend, and the defendant to impeach the sufficiency of the teaching, in detail. How ridiculous would have appeared, on such an occasion, an inadequate acquaintance with such matters! Nay-might not the mortifying necessity have been imposed on a leading counsel of returning the brief, on the ground that he was incompetent to hold it? What other remedy was there for it?