§ 117. Liability of indorser where paper negotiable by delivery. Where a person places his indorsement on an instrument negotiable by delivery he incurs all the liabilities of an indorser (a). (a) Cover v. Meyers, 75 Md. 406. The holder of paper payable to bearer and indorsed may sue upon it as bearer or indorsee at his election. Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, section 663a; 3 Kent's Comm. 44. Formerly in some States a note payable to a designated payee or bearer could not be negotiated except by the indorsement of such person. See Garvin v. Wiswell, 83 Ill. 218; Blackman v. Lehman, 63 Ala. 547. § 118. Order in which indorsers are liable.-As respects one another, indorsers are liable prima facie in the order in which they indorse (a); but evidence is admissible to show that as between or among themselves they have agreed otherwise (b). Joint payees or joint indorsees who indorse are deemed to indorse jointly and severally (c). (a) This rule is general, and applies to accommodation indorsers as well as to others. Such indorsements import, not a joint but a several and successive, liability, each indorser being responsible to all who succeed him. Easterly v. Barber, 66 N. Y. 433; Kelly v. Burroughs, 102 N. Y. 93; Egbert v. Hanson, 34 Misc. 597; McCarty v. Roots, 21 How. (U. S.) 432; Bank of U. S. v. Beirne, 1 Gratt. 234; Hague v. Davis, 8 Gratt. 4; Shaw v. Knox, 98 Mass. 214; McDonald v. Magruder, 3 Peters, 470; Wood v. Repold, 3 Harris & J. 125; Clapp v. Rice, 13 Gray, 403; Howe v. Merrill, 15 Cush. 88; Talcott v. Cogswell, 3 Day, 512; Kirschner v. Conklin, 40 Conn. 77, 81; Wolf v. Hostetter, 182 Pa. St. 292; Russ v. Sadler, 197 Pa. St. 51. (b) Morrison Lumber Co. v. Lookout Mt. Hotel Co., 92 Tenn. 6; Bank of Jamaica v. Jefferson, 92 Tenn. 537; Reinhart v. Schall, 69 Md. 352; Hale v. Danforth, 46 Wis. 554; Witherow v. Slaybach, 158 N. Y. 649; Patch v. Washburn, 82 Mass. 82; Breneman v. Furniss, 90 Pa. St. 186. Evidence to show an agreement for a joint liability; Easterly v. Barber, 66 N. Y. 433; Phillips v. Preston, 5 How. (U. S.) 278; Edelen v. White, 6 Bush. 408; contra, Johnson v. Ramsay, 43 N. J. Law, 279. Evidence to show contract that one was to be prior indorser: Slack v. Kirk, 67 Pa. St. 380; Reinhart v. Schall, 69 Md. 352; Slagel v. Rust, 4 Gratt. 274. The agreement may be evidenced by the circumstances of the case. Macdonald v. Whitfield, L. R. 8 App. Cas. 733; Hagerthy v. Phillips, 83 Me. 336; Clapp v. Rice, 13 Gray, 403. For a case where relief given in equity where order of indorsers changed on renewal of note without consent of one; see Slagel v. Rusts' Admr., 4 Gratt. 274. The statute has changed the law in New Jersey. Morgan v. Thompson, 72 N. J. Law, 244 246. (e) This provision changes the law. Prior to the statute joint payees who indorsed were liable only jointly. Lane v. Stacy, 8 Allen, 41; Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, section 704. § 119. Liability of agent or broker. Where a broker or other agent negotiates an instrument without indorsement, he incurs all the liabilities prescribed by section one hundred and fifteen of this act, unless he discloses the name of his principal, and the fact that he is acting only as agent (a). (a) Meriden National Bank v. Gallaudet, 120 N. Y. 289; Cabot Bank v. Morton, 4 Gray, 156; Worthington v. Cowles, 12 Mass. 30. ARTICLE VII. PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT. Section 130. Effect of want of demand on principal debtor. 131. Presentment where instrument is not payable on demand. 132. What constitutes a sufficient presentment. 134. Instrument must be exhibited. 135. Presentment where instrument payable at bank. 136. Presentment where principal debtor is dead. 137. Presentment to persons liable as partners. 138. Presentment to joint debtors. 139. When presentment not required to charge the drawer. 140. When presentment not required to charge the indorser. 141. When delay in making presentment is excused. 142. When presentment may be dispensed with. 143. When instrument dishonored by non-payment. 144. Liability of person secondarily liable, when instrument dishonored. 145. Time of maturity. 146. Time; how computed. 147. Rule where instrument payable at bank. 148. What constitutes payment in due course. § 130. Effect of want of demand on principal debtor.Presentment for payment is not necessary in order to charge the person primarily liable on the instrument (a); but if the instrument is, by its terms, payable at a special place, and he is able and willing to pay it there at maturity and has funds there available for that purpose (b), such ability and willingness are equivalent to a tender of payment upon his part (c). But except as herein otherwise provided, presentment for payment is necessary in order to charge the drawer and indorsers (d). (a) Statute applied in Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Venner, 192 Mass. 531, 534; Florence Oil Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 38 Colo. 119. For the rule of the common law see Wright v. Vermont Ins. Co., 164 Mass. 302; Payson v. Whitcomb, 15 Pick. 212; Howard v. Boorman, 17 Wis. 459; Rumball v. Ball, 10 Md. 38; Frampton v. Coulson, 1 Wils. 33; Norton v. Ellam, 2 M. & W. 461; Hills v. Place, 48 N. Y 520; Bush v. Gilmore, 45 App. Div. (N. Y.) 89 The action itself is a sufficient demand, and that though the instrument be payable on demand. The rule is general, and applies though the maker has made the note for accommodation and this is known to the holder. Hansborough v. Gray, 3 Gratt. 340. (b) The words "and has funds there available for that purpose were added by Laws N. Y. 1898, ch. 336. They seem to be superfluous. It is difficult to see how a man can be able to pay unless he has the funds with which to make payment. Besides, if taken literally, they impose a condition not deemed necessary by the courts. If, for example, the "special place" where the paper is payable is the office of the maker or acceptor, this provision requires that he have the funds there, and it would not be enough that he have them in bank. The interpolation is not only at variance with the decisions on the subject, but is contrary to good sense, and to the practice of the business world. The change was made upon the suggestion of the Commissioners of Statutory Revision without the knowledge of the Commissioners on Uniformity of Laws. It affords a good illustration of the absurdities likely to result from legislative "tinkering." (c) The rule adopted generally in the United States is that where a note is made payable at a particular bank or other place, or a bill of exchange is drawn or accepted payable in like manner, it is not necessary in order to recover of the maker or acceptor to aver or prove presentment or demand of payment at such place on the day the instrument became due or afterward. The only consequence of a failure to make such presentment is that the maker or acceptor, if he was ready at the time and place to make the payment, may plead the matter in bar of damages and costs. Hills v. Place, 48 N. Y. 520, 523; Parker v. Stroud, 98 N. Y. 379, 384; Cox v. National Bank, 100 U. S. 713; Wallace v. McConnell, 13 Peters, 136; Lazier v. Horan, 55 Iowa 77; Insurance Company v. Wilson, 29 W. Va. 543; Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 Conn. 361; Bond v. Storrs, 13 Conn. 416. (d) Where, by the terms of the instrument, the holder has the option to declare the principal sum due upon default in the payment of interest he must prove presentment and notice in order to hold an indorser. Galbraith v. Shepard, 43 Wash. 698. Where a draft is drawn in another State, by one residing there, upon a person residing in New York, any legal question in reference to presentation and demand for payment is to be determined by the laws of New York. Sylvester v. Crohan, 138 N. Y. 494; Hibernia Bank v. Lacomb, 84 N. Y. 367. As to presentment of a bill drawn in New York upon a person doing business in a foreign country, see Amsinck v. Rogers, 189 N. Y. 252. The indorser is entitled to demand and notice notwithstanding he holds collateral security. Whitney v. Collins, 15 R. I. 44. § 131. Presentment where instrument is not payable on demand. Where the instrument is not payable on demand, presentment must be made on the day it falls due (a). Where it is payable on demand, presentment must be made within a reasonable time after its issue (b), except that in case of a bill of exchange, presentment for payment will be sufficient if made within a reasonable time after the last negotiation thereof (c). (a) As to date of maturity, see section 145. (b) Turner v. Iron Chief Mining Co., 74 Wis. 355; Mudds v. Harper, 1 Md. 110. This provision changed the law of New York, which prior to the statute was, that a promissory note payable on demand with interest was a continuing security, on which an indorser remained liable until an actual demand, and the holder was not chargeable with neglect for omitting to make such de |