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(c) For example, a check payable to cash" or to "sundries." See Willets v. Phoenix Bank, 2 Duer, 121; Mechanics' Bank v. Stratton, 2 Keyes, 365.

(d) If the maker of a promissory note wrongfully obtains possession of it after it has been indorsed in blank by the payee, he is the bearer within the meaning of the statute. Massachusetts National Bank v. Snow, 187 Mass. 159.

§ 29. Terms when sufficient.-The instrument need not follow the language of this act, but any terms are sufficient which clearly indicate an intention to conform to the requirements hereof (a).

(a) It may be written in a foreign language as well as in English. Debebian v. Gala, 64 Md. 262, 265. The writing may be in pencil as well as in ink. Brown v. Butchers' Bank, 6 Hill, 443. As to the construction of ambiguous instruments, see section 36.

§ 30. Date, presumption as to.- Where the instrument or an acceptance or any indorsement thereon is dated, such date is deemed prima facie to be the true date of the making, drawing, acceptance or indorsement, as the case may be (a).

(a) But evidence is admissible, as between the immediate parties, to show a mistake in the date. Cowing v. Altman, 71 N. Y. 441. If the date is an impossible one, the law will adopt the nearest day. Thus, if the date is written September 31st, the true date will be deemed to be September 30th. Wagner v. Kenner, 2 Rob. (La.) 120.

§ 31. Ante-dated and post-dated. The instrument is not invalid for the reason only that it is ante-dated or postdated, provided this is not done for an illegal or fraudulent purpose. The person to whom an instrument so dated is delivered acquires the title thereto as of the date of delivery (a).

(a) A post-dated bill or check may be negotiated before the day of its date. Brewster v. McCardle, 8 Wend. 478; Pasmore v.

North, 13 East, 517. In the case last cited the payee who had negotiated a post-dated bill died the day before the day of date; but it was held that the indorsee had derived title through such payee, and could recover of the drawer. If for the purpose of evading the law, a false date is inserted in the instrument, it will be void as to all persons having notice. Serle v. Norton, 9 M. & W. 309.

§ 32. When date may be inserted.— Where an instrument expressed to be payable at a fixed period after date is issued undated, or where the acceptance of an instrument payable at a fixed period after sight is undated, any holder may insert therein the true date of issue or acceptance, and the instrument shall be payable accordingly (a). The insertion of a wrong date does not avoid the instrument in the hands of a subsequent holder in due course; but as to him, the date so inserted is to be regarded as the true date (b).

(a) See next section.

(b) Redlich v. Doll, 54 N. Y. 238; Page v. Monell, 3 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 433; Mitchell v. Culver, 7 Cow. 336.

§ 33. Blanks; when may be filled.- Where the instrument is wanting in any material particular, the person in possession thereof has a prima facie authority to complete it by filling up the blanks therein (a). And a signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making the signature in order that the paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument operates as a prima facie authority to fill it up as such for any amount (b). In order, however, that any such instrument, when completed, may be enforced against any person who became a party thereto prior to its completion, it must be filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time. But if any such instrument, after completion, is negotiated to a holder in due course (c), it is valid and effectual for all purposes

in his hands, and he may enforce it as if it had been filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time (d).

(a) The leading authority upon this point is Russell v. Langstaffe, 2 Doug. 514. In that case a person had indorsed his name on five copperplate checks, blank as to amounts, dates and times of payment, and the holder, Galley, filled them up as his own notes with different dates, amounts and times of payment. The indorser was held liable to the plaintiff, who had discounted them. Lord Mansfield said: "The indorsement on a blank note is a letter of credit for an indefinite sum. The defendant said: 'Trust Galley for any amount, and I will be his security.' It does not lie in his mouth to say the indorsement was not regular." See also Ovrick v. Colston, 7 Gratt. 189; Frank v. Lilienfeld, 33 Gratt. 377; Boyd v. McCann, 10 Md. 118; Elliot v. Chestnut, 30 Md. 562; Androscoggin Bank v. Kimball, 10 Cush. 373. If the place for the name of the payee is left blank the holder may fill it up with his own name as payee. Boyd v. McCann, 10 Md. 118. But it will be noticed that the authority is only to complete the instrument, for while there is an authority to fill up blanks in order to make the instrument complete as such, there is no authority to insert a special agreement not essential to the completeness of the instrument. Weyerhauser v. Dunn, 100 N. Y. 150. It will also be noticed that, except where the paper has been negotiated to a holder in due course, the presumption of authority is not absolute, but only prima facie. Where the amount is stated in figures in the margin, and a blank space is left for the amount in the body, of the instrument, it is not complete until the blank is filled up. Chestnut v. Chestnut, 104 Va. 539; Hallen v. Davis, 59 Iowa, 444; Norwich Bank v. Hyde, 13 Conn. 281; Schreyer v. Hawkes, 22 Ohio St., 308, 315; Garrard v. Lewis, L. R. 10 Q. B. Div. 30.

(b) It is to be observed that this rule applies only where the incomplete instrument has been delivered. See next section.

(c) As the statute applies only to a person to whom the instrument has been negotiated, a payee, to whom paper is delivered after it has been filled up without authority, is not within the protection of this clause. Vander Ploeg v. Van Zunk (Iowa) 112 N. W. Rep. 807. In the case cited the defendants placed their

signatures on a blank printed form at the request of P, who was a partner of one of them in a mercantile business, on the representation that he might find it necessary to raise $150 or $200 for temporary use in the business. Afterwards P, being indebted on his individual account to the plaintiff, filled out the form for $2,000 payable to the order of the plaintiff, and delivered the same to the plaintiff without authority from the defendants:Held, that the plaintiff could not be deemed a holder in due course, since he was a party to the original contract, and not a person to whom the paper had been negotiated. The court said: "It seems to us under these definitions and the application thereof the plaintiff was a holder of the note, but not a holder in due course. The latter term seems unquestionably to be used to indicate a person to whom after completion and delivery the instrument has been negotiated. In an ordinary case [the payee] is the person with whom the contract is made, and his rights are not in general dependent on any peculiarities in the law of negotiable instruments. The peculiarities of that law distinguishing negotiable instruments from other contracts relate to a holder who has taken by negotiation, and not as an original party." See also Guerrant v. Guerrant, 7 Va. Law Reg. 637; Herdman v. Wheeler, 1 K. B. (1902) 361.

(d) If the instrument be used, or the blanks filled up contrary to the agreement or intention of the original parties, the maker is held to any bona fide holder for value, upon the principle that where one or two innocent parties must suffer by the fraud or wrong of a third person the one who put it in the power of such third person to commit the fraud or wrong must bear the loss. The liability of the maker in such case has also, sometimes, been placed upon the principle of estoppel; he, having put his paper in circulation, and thus invited the public to receive it of any one having apparent title, is estopped to urge the actual defect of title against a bona fide holder. Redlich v. Doll, 54 N. Y. 234, 238. Where one makes and delivers a promissory note, perfect in form, except that a blank is left after the word "at" for the place of payment, there is an implied authority for any bona fide holder to fill the blank, and the insertion of a place of payment, and negotiation of the note, contrary to the agreement of the original parties, does not avoid it in the hands of a bona fide holder of value. (Id.) So, one who intrusts another with his blank acceptance is liable to a holder for value, though filled up for a sum

exceeding that limited by the acceptor. Van Duzer v. Howe, 21 N. Y. 531. But where the amount is left blank in the body of the note, and a sum is indicated in figures in the margin, the amount cannot be filled in for a larger sum than that so indicated. Norwich Bank v. Hyde, 13 Conn. 284.

34. Incomplete instrument not delivered.- Where an incomplete instrument has not been delivered it will not, if completed and negotiated, without authority, be a valid contract in the hands of any holder, as against any person whose signature was placed thereon before delivery (a).

(a) A negotiable instrument must be complete and perfect when it is issued, or there must be authority reposed in some one afterward to supply any thing needed to make it perfect. Sedgwick v. McKim, 53 N. Y. 307, 313; Davis Sewing Machine Co. v. Best, 105 N. Y. 59, 67. And mere negligence on the part of the person sought to be held liable will not be sufficient to entitle the holder to recover of him on the instrument. Baxendale v. Bennett, L. R. 3 Q. B. Div. 525. Thus, in the case cited, where a blank acceptance which had been given to one person and returned by him was afterward stolen from the acceptor and another person filled in his own name and negotiated the bill, it was held that there could be no recovery on such acceptance even by a bona fide holder for value. Barnwell, L. J., said: The defendant here has not voluntarily put into any one's hands the means, or part of the means, for committing a crime. But it is said that he had done so through negligence. I confess I think he has been negligent that is to say, I think if he had had this paper from a third person as a bailee bound to keep it with ordinary care, he would not have done so. But then this negligence is not the proximate or effective cause of the fraud. A crime was necessary for its completion."

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Where a promissory note is delivered by the maker to the payee, upon a verbal agreement that the instrument shall not take effect until other persons shall have signed, the paper will have no validity as between the original parties, unless so completed. Hodge v. Smith, 130 Wis. 326. If only part of such other signatures be obtained, the party first signing may defend on the ground that the instrument was never either completed or delivered, while the other parties may defend on the ground of fraud, even though