Ethics and Practical ReasonGarrett Cullity, Berys Gaut Clarendon Press, Nov 20, 1997 - 430 pages These thirteen new, specially written essays by a distinguished international line-up of contributors, including some leading contemporary moral philosophers, give a rich and varied view of current work on ethics and practical reason. The three main perspectives on the topic, Kantian, Humean, and Aristotelian, are all well represented. The editors' introduction provides a valuable introductory survey of the topic, putting the individual essays in context. Ethics and Practical Reason will be essential reading for scholars, postgraduates, and upper-level undergraduates working in this area. - ;These thirteen new, specially written essays by a distinguished international line-up of contributors, including some leading contemporary moral philosophers, give a rich and varied view of current work on ethics and practical reason. The three main perspectives on the topic, Kantian, Humean, and Aristotelian, are all well represented. Issues covered include: the connection between reason and motivation; the source of moral reasons and their relation to reasons of self-interest; the relation of practical reason to value, to freedom, to responsibility, and to feelings. The editors' introduction provides a valuable introductory survey of the topic, putting the individual essays in context. Ethics and Practical Reason will be essential reading for scholars, postgraduates, and upper-level undergraduates working in this area. - |
Contents
Introduction I | 11 |
Deciding How to Decide | 29 |
On the Hypothetical and NonHypothetical in Reasoning | 53 |
Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality | 81 |
Practical Theory ΙΟΙ | 101 |
Moral Judgement and Reasons for Action | 125 |
The Structure of Practical Reason | 161 |
Aquinas and his Critics | 189 |
The Normativity of Instrumental Reason | 215 |
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Common terms and phrases
accept agency Allan Gibbard amoralist Aquinas argue argument Aristotelian Aristotle belief Bernard Williams Cambridge capacity categorical imperatives Christine Korsgaard claim commitment conception of practical concern condition considerations constitutive constructivist deliberation deliberative desire discussion distinction epistemic essay ethical theory eudaemonistic evaluative explain external fact friends Gauthier's give ground human Hume Humean hypothetical imperatives imperfect duties independent instrumental principle interests internalist interpretation intrinsic irrational justification Kant Kant's Kantian kind Korsgaard macro-prudence maxim meta-reason moral judgement moral reasons moral requirements morally wrong motivating reasons motivational internalism Nagel nature neo-Humean normative reasons notion object one's Oxford person Philosophy plausible possible practical reason Press proposition propositional attitude prudence question rational agent rational choice rationalist reasons for action recognize reflection regress argument relevant repr response seems sense simply someone sort suppose synderesis take the means things tion truth Univ University virtue virtuous Williams's