v. Short, 7 Rob. 299; 3 Abb. N. S. 154; Manhattan Gas Co. v. Barker, 7 Rob. 523; 36 How. 233; Milhau v. Sharp, 27 N. Y. 612; Dællner v. Tynan, 38 How. 176).

a. To restore running water (Corning v. Troy Nail Factory, 40 N. Y. 191). b. To restrain a blacksmith from carrying on his trade (Dallner v. Tynan, 38 How. 176)

c. To restrain prosecution of a claim before an American consul abroad (Dainese v. Allen, 3 Abb. N. S. 212).

d. To restrain proceedings under act to abolish imprisonment for debt (Frost v. Myrick, 1 Barb. 362).

e. To restrain a divorced husband from interfering with property of the wife (Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Barb. 295).

f. To prevent waste or injury to land (Spear v. Cutter, 5 Barb. 486; Rodgers v. Rodgers, 11 Barb. 596; Johnson v. White, 11 Barb. 194; Relyea v. Beaver, 34 Barb. 547; see, however, Van Wyck v. Alliger, 6 Barb. 507).

g. To restrain a municipal corporation from improper use of the public moneys (Christopher v. Mayor of N. Y. 13 Barb. 567; Pullman v. Mayor of N. Y. 2 Abb. N. S. 291).

h. To prevent fraudulent disposition of property (Mitchell v. Bettman, 25 Barb. 408; Dillon v. Horn, 5 How. 35; see, however, Reubens v. Joel, 13 N.Y. 488).

i. By a stockholder against a company (Hamilton v. Acces'y Transit Co. 26 Barb. 46).

j. By a tax-payer to restrain a contractor with the city from violating his contract (McCafferty v. McCabe, 4 Abb. 57; Kelsey v. King, 32 Barb. 410). k. To prevent the removal of the remains of the dead (Richards v. N'west Dutch Church, 11 Abb. 30).

1. To restrain proceedings of a magistrate out of court (Mayor, &c. of N. Y. v. Conover, 5 Abb. 253; and see id. 171).

m. To restrain a creditor from proceeding at law against an insolvent corporation to obtain a preference (Galway v. U. S. Sugar Refining Co. 21 How. 313).

n. To stay proceedings on an execution (Shaw v. Dwight, 16 Barb. 536), or on a judgment (Watt v. Rogers, 2 Abb. 261; Clute v. Potter, 37 Barb. 199). 0. To restrain a railroad from removing its rails (The People v. Albany R. R. Co. 19 How. 523; 11 Abb. 136).

p. To restrain a bishop from prosecuting a sentence of an ecclesiastical tribunal (Walker v. Wainwright, 16 Barb. 486).

q. To restrain an individual from opening a road to the prejudice of a road corporation (Auburn Plank Road v. Douglass, 12 Barb. 553).

An injunction has been refused,—

r. Merely to restrain an act " dangerous to the peace, morals or welfare of the community" (Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. 49; Smith v. Lockwood, 13 Barb. 209).

8. To restrain proceedings on a judgment (Watt v. Rogers, 2 Abb. 261; Chappel v. Potter, 11 How. 365; see, however, Dobson v. Pearce, 1 Abb. 97; 12 N. Y. 166).

t. To restrain the publication of proceedings in another action (Wood v. Marvine, 3 Duer. 674).

u. To restrain the disclosure of an art or invention taught by plaintiff to defendant under an oath not to divulge it (Deming v. Chapman, 11 How. 382; Nessle v. Reese, 19 Abb. 240; 29 How. 382; Hammer v. Barne's, 26 How. 174).

v. To restrain infringment of copyright (Palmer v. Dewit, 7 Rob. 530).

w. To restrain a foreign corporation from issuing bonds (Rogers v. Michigan South R. R. Co. 28 Barb. 539; see Fisk v. Chicago & Rock Island R. R. 36 How. 20; Brien v. Rock Island R. R. 36 How. 24); or paying a dividend (Howell v. Chi. & N. W. R. R. Co. 51 Barb. 378).

r. Restraining arbitrators from making an award under the circumstances (Heath v. Pres. of Gold Board, 7 Abb. N. S. 251).

a. To restrain overseers of highways opening a road (Snyder v. Trumpbour, 7 Trans, App. 63).

b. To restrain sale by sheriff on execution against partnership assets (Turner V. Smith, 1 Abb. N. S. 304).

c. To restrain State officers proceeding under a State law (Thompson v. Commissioners of Canal Fund, 2 Abb. 248).

d. To restrain a railroad company from cutting its road (Baucus v. Albany N'ern R. R. Co. 8 How. 70; see, also, Hentz v. Long Island R. R. 13 Barb. 646). e. To restrain a receiver (Winfield v. Bacon, 24 Barb. 155).

f. To prevent the construction of a sewer in a public street by a municipal corporation (Kelsey v. King, 32 Barb. 410).

g. To restrain the exercise of a trade contrary to a covenant with a specific penalty for a breach (Vincent v. King, 13 How. 234). It would be otherwise if no penalty was specified (id.; see Howe v. Searing, 6 Bosw. 354; see Redfield v. Middleton, 7 Bosw. 649).

h. To prevent a consequential injury from a lawful exercise of a right (Williams v. Ñ. Y. Cent. R. R. Co. 18 Barb. 222).

i. To restrain the collection of a tax illegally imposed (Wilson v. Mayor of N. Y. 1 Abb. 4; Chemical Bank v. Mayor of N. Y. id. 79; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. N. Y. Supervisors, id. 250; Livingston v. Hollenbeck, 4 Barb. 10; Van Rensse laer v. Kidd, id. 17; Hasbrook v. Kingston B'd of Education, 5 Abb. N. S. 399; 3 Keyes, 480; 3 Trans. App. 106; Mut. Ben. Ins. Co. 2 Abb. N. S. 233; Messeck v. Superv. of Columbia, 50 Barb. 190; see, however, Wood v. Draper, 4 Abb. 322).

j. To restrain a foreclosure suit (Tarrant v. Quackenboss, 10 How. 244; see Grinnon v. Platt, 31 Barb. 328; Susquehanna Bank v. Supervisors of Broom, 25 N. Y. 312; Broderick v. Smith, 26 Barb. 539).

k. To protect a mere nominal interest (Wetmore v. Story, 3 Abb. 262; 281). 7. To protect a claim on an illegal contract (Bennett v. Amer. Art Union, 5 Sand. 614).

m. To restrain the continuance of the use of the signs of a dissolved firm by the firm continuing the business (Peterson v. Humphrey, 4 Abb. 394).

n. To restrain a municipal corporation from paying money under a resolution claimed to be illegal (Roberts v. Mayor of N. Y. 5 Abb. 41; see Ely v. Connolly, 7 Abb. N. S. 8; Cleveland Fire Alarm Co. v. Metrop. Fire Commr's, 7 Abb. N. S. 50).

o. To restrain a municipal corporation from selling its real estate (Roosevelt v. Draper, 7 Abb. 108; The People v. Lowber, id. 158).

p. To restrain at the instance of an individual tax-payer, an act injurious to all the tax-payers of the city (Korft v. School Trustees, 16 How. 140).

7. To restrain the imposition or collection of a tax or of an assessment (see Betts v. City of W'msburgh, 15 Barb. 255; Wood v. Draper, 24 Barb. 187; 4 Abb. 322; 14 How. 233; Mace v. Trustees of Newburgh, 15 How. 161; Blake v. City of Brooklyn, 26 Barb. 301; Beck v. Village of Rondout, 15 Abb. 48; Murray v. Jayne, 8 Barb. 612; Chemical Bank v. Mayor of N. Y. 1 Abb. 79; and see Laws 1853, p. 97, ch. 69; Mut. Ben. Ins. Co. v. Super. of N. Y. 20 How. 416; 33 Barb. 322; Mut. Ben Life Ins. Co. v. B'd of Super. 8 Bosw. 683; Magee v. Cutler, 43 Barb. 439).

r. To restrain a judgment-debtor from compromising suits brought to cancel securities as usurious (Boughton v. Smith, 26 Barb. 635).

8. When the real object of the action is to obtain a review of a previous decision (Livingston v. Hudson R. R. Co. 3 Code R. 143).

t. To restrain a defendant from obtaining payment of debts due him (Gallatin v. Oriental Bank, 16 How. 253).

u. To restrain the lessee of an inn from discontinuing to keep the inn open, as he had covenanted to do (Hooper v. Brodrick, 11 Simons, 47).

v. To prevent the publication of a libel (Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige, 24; 2 Swans, 413).

a. Generally, where the injury is such as may be amply recompensed by an action for damages (Marshall v. Peters, 12 How. 218; Townsend v. Tanner, 27 id. 384: 2 Code R. 6; Spear v. Cutter, 2 Code R. 100; 4 How. 575).

b. To restrain an apprehended trespass (Mayor of N. Y. v. Conover, 5 Abb. 171, 253; Sixth Av. R. R. Co. v. Kerr, 28 How. 382; Taylor v. Brockman, 1 Abb. N. S. 169; Gentil v. Arnaud, 38 How. 94).

c. To restrain construction of a railroad (Barnes v. So. Side R. R. Co. 2 Abb. N. S. 415).

d. To restrain expulsion of member from Board of Brokers (White v. Brownell, 3 Abb. N. S. 318).

e. To restrain interference with partnership funds, the partnership being denied (Goulding v. Bain, 4 Sand. 716; see Dunham v. Jarvis, 8 Barb. 88; Mowbray v. Lawrence, 22 How. 107; 13 Abb. 317).

f. To restrain summary proceedings by landlord to recover possession of demised premises (Aaron v. Baum, 7 Rob. 340; 37 How. 237; McIntyre v. Hernandez, 7 Abb. N. S. 214; Brown v. Metro. Gas Co. 38 How. 133; Marry v. James, 37 How. 52; Roberts v. Matthews, 18 Abb. 199; Bean v. Pettingill, 2 Abb. N. S. 58; 7 Rob. 7; Smith v. Moffat, 1 Barb. 65; Wordsworth v. Lyon, 1 Code Rep. N. S. 63; 4 How. 463; Hyatt v. Burr, 8 How. 168; Bokee v. Hammersley, 16 How. 461; Duigan v. Hogan, 1 Bosw. 645, Marks v. Wilson, 11 Abb. 87; Seeback v. McDonald, 11 Abb. 95; 21 How. 224; Mc Gune v. Palmer, 5 Rob. 607; Supp v. Keusing, id. 609; Springsteen v. Powers, 3 id. 483). Injunctions were allowed under the circumstances of the cases in Cure v. Crawford, 1 Code Rep. N. S. 63; 4 How. 463; Forrester v. Wilson, 1 Duer, 624; Capet v. Parker, 1 Code Rep. N. S. 90; Vallotin v. Seignett, 2 Abb. 121; Griffith v. Brown, 3 Rob. 627; 28 How. 4; Graham v. James, 7 Rob. 468.

g. To restrain corporate election (Hartt v. Harvey, 32 Barb. 55; 10 Abb. 322).

h. Where plaintiff had commenced an action and issued an attachment in another action (Mills v. Block, 30 Barb. 549).

i. To restrain police officers from exercising supervision of citizens within the sphere of their duty as peace officers (Sterman v. Kennedy, 15 Abb. 201). j. To try the right to office in a religious corporation (Hartt v. Harvey, 10 Abb. 322; 32 Barb. 55).

k. To test the title to a public office (The People v. Draper, 4 Abb. 333; 14 How. 233; McCafferty v. Glazier, 10 How. 475; Lewis v. Oliver, 4 Abb. 121; Mayor of N. Y. v. Conover, 5 Abb. 171; Mayor of N. Y. v. Flagg, 6 Abb. 296). 7. To restrain proceedings of commissioners of highways (Thatcher v. Dusenbury, 9 How. 32; Hyatt v. Bates, 40 N. Y. 164).

m. Where the rights of the parties were undetermined, and an injury might be occasioned to one party (Gurnee v. Odell, 13 Abb. 264).

n. To set aside a fraudulent lien on property attached by the plaintiff (Brooks v. Stone, 11 Abb. 220; 19 How. 395; Mills v. Block, 30 Barb. 549).

o. To restrain a party from giving his services to another (Fredericks v. Meyer, 13 How. 566; 1 Bosw. 227; see Sanquirico v. Benedetti, 1 Barb. 315; Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De Gex M. & G. 604; 13 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 252; Butler v. Galetti, 21 How. 465; Hamblin v. Dinneford, 2 Edw. Ch. R. 529; Kemble v. Kean, 6 Simons, 333; De Pol v. Sohlke, 7 Rob. 280).

§ 220. At what time it may be granted. Copy of affidavit to be served.

The injunction may be granted at the time of commencing the action, or at any time afterward, before judgment, upon its appearing satisfactorily to the court or judge, by the affidavit of the plaintiff, or of any other person, that sufficient grounds exist therefor. A copy of the affidavit must be served with the injunction.

a. Order may be made prior to service of summons.-The injunction order may be granted prior to the service of the summons; to be served therewith (Leffingwell v. Chave, 19 How. 54; 10 Abb. 472). It is not indispensable to the validity of an injunction order that a complaint should precede or accompany it (Mattice v. Gifford, 16 Abb. 246); in other cases it is said that an injunction order cannot be granted on affidavits without any complaint (Morgan v. Quackenbush, 22 Barb. 76; The People v. The N. Y. Common Pleas, 3 Abb. 181; see Olmstead v. Loomis, 6 Barb. 153; Badger v. Wagstaff, 11 How. 562). As an injunction can be granted only when it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, there must therefore be a complaint upon which to found the motion for an injunction (Morgan v. Quackenboss, 22 Barb. 72). But if the motion is made on an affi davit which contains all the requisites of a complaint it is sufficient (il.)

b. The ground for the injunction must be shown by affidavit (Miliken v. Carey, 5 How. 272); but a complaint in which the allegations are made unqualifiedly, i. e., not on information and belief merely, and the allegations of which are sworn to be true, will be treated as an affidavit. This seems the result of the decisions (Roome v. Webb, 1 Code Rep. 114; Benson v. Fash, ib. 58; Krom v. Hogan, 2 id. 144; Minor v. Terry, 6 How. 210; Smith v. Reno, id. 126; Penfield v. White, 8 id. 87; Woodruff v. Fisher, 17 Barb. 229; Jones v. Atterbury, 1 Code Rep. N. S. 87; Levy v. Ley, 6 Abb. 89; 15 How. 395; Badger v. Wagstaff, 11 How. 562); but the ordinary form of verification is not sufficient for the purpose (Bostwick v. Elton, 25 How. 362; Hecker v. Mayor of N. Y. 18 Abb. 369; 28 How. 211; Ramsey v. Erie R. R. Co. 7 Abb. N. S. 187). The plaintiff cannot make out the cause of action relied upon in the complaint by allegations in his affidavit (Hentz v. Long Island R. R. Co., 13 Barb. 646).

c. An injunction, as a general rule, will not be allowed on mere information and belief (Campbell v. Morrison, 7 Paige, 160; Bank of Orleans v. Skinner, 9 id. 305; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr. 617; Livingston v. Bank of N. Y. 26 Barb. 304; Roome v. Webb, 3 How. 327; Pomeroy v. Hindmarsh, 5 How. 437; Rateau v. Barnard, 12 id. 464; and authorities collected, Crocker v. Baker, 3 Abb. 183; and see Pidgeon v. Oatman, 3 Rob. 706); and where facts are stated on information and belief, the sources of information and grounds of belief should be stated (The People v. Mayor of N Y., 9 Abb. 253); but the facts may be shown by the affidavits of any person cognizant of them (Bank of Orleans v. Skinner, 9 Paige, 305).

d. An injunction will not be granted after a demurrer to the complaint for not stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, has been sustained (Mowbray v. Lawrence, 14 Abb. 160).

e. After an application for an injunction has been denied, an application to another court on the same state of facts is improper (Mayor of N. Y. v. Conover, 5 Abb. 252; 25 Barb. 514; and see Harrington v. American Insurance Co. 1 Barb. 244).

See note to section 226.

§ 221. (Am'd 1849.) Injunction after answer.

An injunction shall not be allowed, after the defendant shall have answered, unless upon notice, or upon an order to show cause; but in such case the defendant may be restrained, until the decision of the court or judge granting or refusing the injunction. See note to section 223, post.

§ 222. (Am'd 1849.) Security upon injunction. Damages, how ascertained.

Where no provision is made by statute as to security upon an

injunction, the court or judge shall require a written undertaking on the part of the plaintiff, with or without sureties, to the effect that the plaintiff will pay to the party enjoined, such damages, not exceeding an amount to be specified, as he may sustain by reason of the injunction, if the court shall finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto. The damages may be ascertained by a reference, or otherwise, as the court shall direct.

a. Staying proceedings after judgment.-Where, on a complaint to set aside a judgment and execution on the ground of fraud, the complaint prayed an injunction, and an injunction was granted er parte, on the execution merely of an undertaking as prescribed by this section without the bond or deposit required by the revised statutes in such a case-the injunction order was ordered to be set aside unless the security required by the revised statutes was given in ten days (Cook v. Dickerson, 2 Sand. 691). "The revised statutes (2 R. S. 189, 190, §§ 141 to 149) require, that before the issuing of an injunction to stay proceedings in a personal action, after judgment, a deposit shall be made of the amount of the judgment; and a bond with sureties executed for the payment of the damages and costs to the adverse party. Power was conferred on the 'chancellor' to dispense with the deposit, and receive a sufficient bond for the amount of the judgment; and when the ground of the injunction is that the judgment was obtained by actual fraud, 'the chancellor' had the power to dispense with both deposit and bond. These provisions are not repealed by the code" (ib. See Gee v. Southworth, 10 Paige, 297; Dickey v. Craig, 5 id. 283).

b. It is not necessary that a judgment creditor of an insolvent corporation who brings suit for an injunction to restrain other creditors of the corporation from proceeding at law, and for the appointment of a receiver and an equitable distribution of the corporate assets, should give the bond or make the deposit prescribed by the above provisions of the revised statutes, to entitle him to the injunction prayed (Hutchinson v. N. Y. Central Mills, 2 Abb. 394). c. Superior court practice.-The practice in the superior court with reference to security on granting an injunction was declared in a note (1 Sand. 700; to be

"1. That on an order to show cause why an injunction should not be granted with a restraint in the mean time, the judge will in general require security.

"2. The plaintiff's own undertaking will not be received, unless he will justify as being a freeholder or householder, and worth double the sum specified, over and above all his debts and liabilities and exempt property.

"3. When a surety is required, his justification must be to the same effect.

"4. When a plaintiff residing out of the State applies for an injunction, he must furnish an undertaking executed by a resident surety.

d. Security.—An undertaking with one surety would, it seems, be sufficient (Ward v. Whitney, 8 N. Y. 446). The plaintiff need not join in the undertaking (Leffingwell v. Chave, 19 How. 54; 10 Abb. 472). No particular form of security is required; any form of security as a penal bond which substantially complies with the requirements of this section, will suffice (Episcopal Church of Westchester v. Varian, 28 Barb. 644; Town of Gilford v. Cornell, 4 Abb. 220). An attorney may be a surety (Ryckman v. Coleman, 13 Abb. 398). The undertaking given on the issuing of an injunction should be approved by the judge and filed with the clerk (§ 423). An omission to file the undertaking, if done designedly, will entitle the defendant to have the injunction dissolved (Johnson v. Casey, 28 How. 492); and, even if the omis