Contempt of Court-Conversion.
mitting warrants for arrest to be is- sued by the clerk of the police court, is not unconstitutional, for the act is a ministerial not a judicial one. ID.
13. License of vehicles re- quired to be paid by all using them in the streets can be enforced against non-residents transporting their commodities between this and an- other state. Bogart v. State. 365
14. Such license fees being intended by the statute for the re- pair of the streets, their enforced payment must be regarded as com- pensation for the advantages and facilities afforded to such transpor- tation; and the requirement of li- cense is not a restraint or other form of regulation of interstate com- Ib. are
15. Constitutional courts possessed of an inherent power at common law to punish summarily persons guilty of direct or construct- ive contempts of court. State v. Steube. 199
16. Section 5639, R. S., is de- claratory of the common law on the subject of contempts, and under its provisions, this court has the right to summarily punish the respondent for contempt of which he stands charged, whether it is direct or con- structive.
CONTEMPT OF COURT-
I. An article or letter libel- ing, defaming, the judge, clerk of court and prosecuting attorney con- cerning their official conduct in a case then on trial and the same be- ing published in a newspaper, and circulated in the county, city and court room where the trial is in pro- gress is a flagrant contempt of court, suinmarily punishable, be- cause it tends to embarrass, obstruct and impede the administration of law and justice in such court. State v. Myers. 238
2. The author of such a let- ter or article is as guilty of con- tempt as if he had been the editor and publisher of the newspaper. Ib.
3. The common pleas court is a constitutional court, because it was established, created, by the con- stitution, and it is not, therefore, constitutionally competent for the legislature to destroy or abridge the inherent power of the court to pun- ish summarily persons for contempt. Ib. CONTRACTS-
1. If cne party notifies the other of his intention not to comply with the contract, the other may
2. If such party does not rely on such notice as a breach, etc., he can not sue at once without per- forming his own conditions preced- ent in the contract. Ib.
3. A contract to make cer- tain improvements and then give a lease is entire and not to be com- pensated by damages, but is preced- ent to any liability of the lessee for refusal to take.
4. Technical, unimportant
and inadvertent omissions and de- fects in making the promised im- provements will not defeat the right of the future lessor to recover foi a breach, but the other party may re- coup for the same in damages. Ib. 5. Where the word "satis- factory" is used to describe the re- quired condition of such improve- ments, in connection with other words descriptive of the degree of excellence, the rule is that if such improvements come up to the de- scribed standard, the party to be satisfied must be satisfied, and can not base dissatisfaction on a mere whim. Ib. 6. The breach of a contract by which defendant agreed to em- ploy and pay plaintiff for certain work is not excused by the fact that a third person prevented defend.:nt from doing the work. Ross Road Machine Co. v. Forbus.
7. In a contract signed by more than two parties containing a variety of conditions and covenants, the question whether any one party is bound by any particular covenant is to be determired from the lan- guage of the whole contract read in the light of surrounding circum- stances. Smith v. Smith. 494
8. Where two persons had drawn a prize in a lottery, and by agreement it was paid to one, the di- vision to be made when they reached home, the illegality of the source of the fund, or the illegality of the original partnership between them, is no defense to the subsequent con- tract to divide. Glock v. Hartde- gan. 760 9. Construction of a contract for the sale of bonds, as provided for and in accordance with, an act of the general assembly authorizing the same. State v. Metter. 309
CONVERSION-
Where a party obtains posses-
2. The directors of poration are its agents, and their re- lation to it is generally one of con fidence and trust.
3. The law does not permit them to purchase for it, their own property, or property in which they are largely interested. Ib.
4. When the directors of a railroad company have purchased. from themselves and others, the ene tire capital stock of a mining cor- poration and paid for the same with the corporate funds, the contract is void, and an action lies against them in favor of the company, to account for the funds so received by them. Ib.
5. The company is not estop- ped from maintaining the action by the fact that at the time of the pur- chase of the stock and use of the funds, the directors owned all its capital stock, and as stockholders unanimously ratified what they, as directors, had done.
directors 6. The from the proceeds of the bonds, dis- charged a private indebtedness due from them to a third party who held their stock in the plaintiff company as collateral thereto, the company may follow the funds so used into the stock and claim an equity in it.
7. Such collateral stock, af- ter redemption, was held by derend- ants as trustees for plaintiff, and the latter, though not empowered to traffic in its own stock, may, as ces- tui que trust, have an equity therein. lb.
8. The validity of the elec- tion of the directors of a railroad cannot be inquired into collaterally
9. Sales, by the directors, of stock in a railroad which had been purchased with the funds of the road and are held in trust for it, will not be enjoined, where the sales are to be at public auction and to the high- est bidder. Loomis v. Dexter. 287 10. The presumption of validity, attached to a paper purport- ing to be a certificate of stock issued by an incorporated company, and bearing the genuine signatures of its president and secretary and the cor- porate seal, is very strong, but it may be overcome by clear and satis- factory evidence showing the cer- tificate to be spurious. Perin v. Railroad Co.
II. A valid certificate of stock can only be issued to an orig- inal subscriber, or in lieu of a cer- tificate or certificates for an equal number of shares surrendered in consideration of its issue. Ib.
12. Such certificate, duly signed and sealed, is presumed to be genuine until it has been shown by clear and satisfactory evidence, that it could have been issued neither as an original certificate, nor in lieu of a certificate or certificates surrend- ered for that purpose. Ib.
13. Where a certificate is shown to have been invalid when is- sued, and it is claimed that it was rendered valid by a subsequent sur- render for that purpose, the burden of proving such subsequent surren- der rests upon the party asserting it. Ib.
14. Stockholders, in an ac- tion upon their statutory liability, can plead any defenses to judgment claims that are personal and peculiar to stockholders, and which the com- Hardman v. pany could not plead. Railroad Co. 67
15. In an action to assess the stockholders' liability, creditors can except to the allowance of any other claim upon the ground that it is not of such a nature that stockholders are liable upon it.
24. Where a corporation has disposed of all its property for the purpose of defrauding a stockholder the latter may maintain an action to annul such transaction. Ib.
25. A corporation "formed for the purpose of manufacturing, operating, selling or renting dyna- mos, motors and other electrical ap- pliances for furnishing light and power, and for other purposes,' has no power to carry on the business of electrical illumination. Brush El.
L. Co. v. Jones Bros. El. Co. 767 26. The knowledge of the president of a corporation of out- standing equities affecting the title of property he was selling to the corporation, which knowledge was not acquired by him in his official capacity nor while transacting the business of the corporation, cannot be held to show that the corporation had notice of such equities. Weber.
estopped to deny its obligation to pay securities issued by its agents, which it is not authorized by law to thus issue, when the objection is, not that there was a want of power, but that the power was exercised without due formality. Shoemaker's Exr's v. Railroad Co.
28. Where various persons, holding certificates purporting to represent a large number of shares of stock of a corporation, all claim to derive title through certain gen- uine certificates such company may join all holders of such certificates as defendants in one action for the purpose of determining which of the certificates are valid. Railroad Co. v. Bank.
CREDITOR'S BILL-
Denial of interest or owner- ship by the judgment debtor in the choses in action sought to be sub- jected raises no issues and it is er- ror to so find. Krebs v. Forbriger. 506
I. Where a person sold a lot which would be needed to widen a street, covenanting not to use the strip so as to cut off grantee's access to the street, and covenanting that grantee should have the benefit of grantor's interest on condemnation, such covenant runs with the land, and the city having appropriated the strip to widen the street, the gran- tee's heirs who inherited the lot are entitled to the entire condemnation money. Cincinnati v. Springer. 745
2. A stipulation contained in a deed, whereby the grantee has permission to enter upon land ad- jacent to that conveyed and make certain improvements there, on con- dition that such grantee make good, "by retaining wall or otherwise," any damage thereby occasioned to buildings of grantor, does not con- stitute a covenant running with the land. Steible v. Railroad Co. COURTS-
DAMAGES-Continued.
2. In an action for damages for libel if the publication be icund true, that fact would ordinarily de- feat a claim to exemplary damages in toto, but it may also mitigate the claim to compensatory damages to such an extent as to leave the plain- tiff only the right to a nominal sum. the right to a nominal sum. Com- mercial Gazette Co. v. Headly. 415 DEEDS-
A deed, unaccepted by the grantee, derives no force as a deed from being recorded. Pierce v. White. 552
DEPOSITIONS-
A party to an action through a resident of the county in which the action is pending and not intending to depart therefrom nor unable to at- tend court by reason of sickness or infirmity, and who expects and in- tends to be present at the trial, may be compelled by the adverse party to give her deposition, and, in case of refusal, may be imprisoned for contempt. State v. Cost.
I. A devise of land, part of which is valuable timber land, and which was bequeathed to H. R., and the heirs of her body, can not be en- joined by her daughter from cutting more timber than is needed to repair. Halt v. Rohr. 690
2. The old doctrine of waste is not in force in Ohio, and the de- visee as the first donee in tail can cut and sell. Ib.
3. The general rule is, that in the absence of testamentary rec- tion, a general legacy is payable one year after testato 's death, and will bear interest thereafter until paid. Krigbaum v. Southard. 803
4. And the general rule is, that in absence of testamentary di- rection, a bequest in trust, the in- come to be paid to a legatee for life, with gift of principal over at his death, entitles the legatee for life to interest from testator's death.
5. But where such bequest in trust is in fulfillment of an antenup- tial contract, and both contract and bequest by their terms contemplate the lapse of "a reasonable time," to enable the trustee to raise, out of the estate, such interest bearing fund: Held, the legatee for life is entitled to interest on the principal sum after one year from testator's death. not- withstanding a diligent and faithful
7. It is not a variation of the terms of the will but it is a prema- ture compliance with them. Ib.
8. It is obviously a contra- diction in terms to speak of an act done before a will is inade, as a com- pliance with its provisions. Ib.
9. No matter what the inten- tion of a testator in making an ad- vance to one of his children before executing his will, it can not justify a deduction of the advance from the child's share under the will, unless the will provides that such deduction be made. Ib.
10. The doctrine of ademp- tion can never apply to an advance before the will. Ib.
II. No declarations made subsequent to the will of the testa- tor with respect to advances made prior to it, can make such advances ademptions. Ib.
12. An attempt to avoid the effect of a will by an executory con- tract, such as in this case, is a viola- tion of the statute of wills.
13. No estoppel arises from the inducement to the testator not to change his will by a promise from the legatee that the same result will follow without such change. Ib.
14. When a testator states in his will, that ademptions of legacies will be made in a certain way, he is merely furnishing for the use of his executors convenient evidence, be- fore the fact, of his future intert, not in making his will, but in paying money or conferring other bounty during his life time. Ib.
15. The sole question of im- portance in determining whether a benefit conferred by a testator in his life time satisfies or adeems a legacy in his will, is whether or not, he in- tended such satisfaction at the time. Ib.
16. A legacy is adeemed only when the bounty conferred was in- tended at the time of the gift as a satisfaction of the legacy. Ib.
17. Where a testator be- queaths money legacies to certain children and all his personal and real property to his children in equal share, and the personal property being in- sufficient to pay these legacies; Held, that the real estate so devised could not be charged with the payment of
Divorce and Alimony-Embezzlement.
I. A decree in a divorce suit, allowing the wife alimony in gross and making the same a charge upon the husband's lands, if not kept alive by issuing executions at proper times, becomes dormant like an ordi- nary judgment at law and ceases to be a lien. Mullane v. Folger. 485
2. The court in a county where suit was brought, had no juris- diction to declare a lien for alimony upon, and issue an order of sale of real estate situated in another county, to the sheriff of such other county, and a sale made by such sheriff un- der such order is void for that rea- son. Wilmot v. Cole. 777
3. Where a wife leaves her husband and goes into another county and files a petition for ali- mony, and the husband, his place of residence not having changed, an- swers asking for a divorce, the court is without jurisdiction to grant it, the cross-petition and evidence fail- ing to show that the cause of action arose in the county where the case was pending. Neese v. Neese. DOWER-
testant also received votes of per- sons not eligible to vote, although contestee has not served notice of intention to contest or question con- testant's votes. Newman v. Mc- Manis. 730
3. The justices taking depo- sitions in such contest have no right to appoint a witness to open and ex- amine the ballots and attach those claimed to be marked or illegal to their depositions, and such tickets having been handled by many will not be considered by the court, and such depositions will fall with the ballots. Ib.
4. Under sec. 2926e, R. S., providing that the election officers shall be appointed on or before Sept. I, and shall not be of the same politi- cal party, the Union Labor Party having shown that it is entitled to recognition as a party, must be rec- ognized by a fairly proportionate representation in the appointments of election officers. State v. Ehrman.
5. Appointments made in good faith in the preceding May or June can not be ordered to be re- called. Ib. 6. The law will not restore what has been lost by the delay of the relator. Ib. 7. The relator is entitled to mandamus, but only to secure a fair representation in future
I. The use by a guardian of his ward's money in his own busi- ness and its loss thereby, to consti- tute embezzlement, must be with a fraudulent the purpose although statute is silent as to intent. State v. Meyer. 746 2. An expectation to repay, or an attempt at reparation, does not avoid the criminalty. Ib.
3. The test of criminality is whether the primary object of such use of the money was to benefit him- self irrespective of the ward's inter- ests, and such intent is a question for the jury to be determined from con- duct and circumstances.
EMINENT DOMAIN-
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