Page images

Coutempt of Court-Conversion.


mitting warrants for arrest to be is-
sued by the clerk of the police court,
is not unconstitutional, for the act is
a ministerial not a judicial one. 10.

13. License of vehicles re-
quired to be paid by all using them
in the strcets can be enforced against
non-residents transporting their
commodities between this and an-
other state. Bogart v. State. 365

14. Such license fees being
intended by the statute for the re-
pair of the streets, their enforced
payment must be regarded as com-
pensation for the advantages and
facilities afforded to such transpor-
tation; and the requirement of li-
cense is not a restraint or other
form of regulation of interstate com-

15. Constitutional courts are
possessed oi an inherent power at
common law to punish summarily
persons guilty of direct or construct-
ive contempts of court.

State v.

16. Section 5639, R. S., is de-
claratory of the common law on the
subject of contempts, and under its
provisions, this court has the right
to summarily punish the respondent
for contempt of which he stands
charged, whether it is direct or con-


1. An article or letter libel-
ing, defaming, the judge, clerk of
court and prosecuting attorney con-
cerning their official conduct in a
case then on trial and the same be-
ing published in a newspaper, and
circulated in the county, city and
court room where the trial is in pro-
gress is

a flagrant contempt of
court, suimarily punishable, be-
cause it tends to embarrass, obstruct
and impede the administration of
law and justice in such court. State
v. Myers.

2. The author of such a let-
ter or article is as guilty of con-
tempt as if he had been the editor
and publisher of the newspaper. Ib.

3. The common pleas court
is a constitutional court, because it
was established, created, by the con-
stitution, and it is not, therefore,
constitutionally competent for the
legislature to destroy or abridge the
inherent power of the court to pun-
ish summarily persons for contempt.


1. If cne party notifies the
other of his intention not to comply
with the contract, the other may

treat such notice as a breach and as
a waiver of conditions by him to be
performed, and sue for damages.
Elias v. Meyer & Co.

2. If such party does not rely
on such notice as a breach, etc., he
can not sue at once

without per-
forming his own conditions preced-
ent in the contract.

3. A contract to make cer-
tain improvements and then give a
lease is entire and not to be com-
pensated by damages, but is preced-
ent to any liability of the lessee for
refusal to take.

4. Technical unimportant
and inadvertent omissions and de-
fects in making the promised im-
provements will not defeat the right
of the future lessor to recover foi a
breach, but the other party may re-
coup for the same in damages. Ib.

5. Where the word "satis-
factory” is used to describe the re-
quired condition of such improve-
inents, in

connection with other
words descriptive of the degree of
excellence, the rule is that if such
improvements come up to the de-
scribed standard, the party to be
satisfied must be satisfied, and can
not base dissatisfaction on a mere

6. The breach of a contract
by which defendant agreed to ein-
ploy and pay plaintiff for certain
work is not excused by the fact that
a third person prevented defendint
from doing the work. Ross Road
Machine Co. v. Forbus.

7. In a contract signed by
more than two parties containing a
variety of conditions and covenants,
the question whether any one party
is bound by any particular covenant
is to be determired from the lan-
guage of the whole contract read in
the light of surrounding circum-
stances. Sinith v. Smith.

8. Where two persons

drawn a prize in a lottery, and by
agreement it was paid to one, the di-
vision to be made when they reached
home, the illegality of the source of
the fund, or the illegality of the
original partnership between them,
is no defense to the subsequent cun-
tract to divide. Glock v. Hartde-

9. Construction of a contract
for the sale of bonds, as provided
for and in accordance with, an act of
the general assembly authorizing

the same. State v. Metter. 309

Where a party obtains posses-






sion of goods fraudulently and then
delivers them to a bona fide pur-
chaser for value, the person from
whom they were obtained may main-
tain an action ior conversion of the
goods to his own use, against such
purchaser, if the latter resuses to de-
liver up the goods, or account for

their vaiue. Block v. Peebles. 3

1. The powers of a corpora-
tion organized under legislative stat-
utes, are such and such only as
those statutes conier, and they are
confined to the exercise of those
powers expressly granted and such
incidental powers as are necessary
for the purpose of carrying into ef.
fect powers expressly conferred.
Railroad Co. v. Burke.

2. The directors of a
poration are its agents, and their re-
iation to it is generally one of con.
fidence and trust.

in an action by a creditor of such
corporation. Raymond v. Railroad

9. Sales, by the directors, of
stock in a railroad which had been
purchased with the funds of the road
and are held in trust for it, will not
be enjoined, where the sales are to
be at public auction and to the high-
est bidder. Loomis v. Dexter. 287
10. The

presumption oi
validity, attached to a paper purport;
ing to be a certificate of stock issued
by an incorporated company, and
bearing the genuine signatures of its
president and secretary and the cor-
porate seal, is very strong, but is
may be overcome by clear and satis-
factory evidence showing the cer-
tificate to be spurious. Perin v.
Railroad Co.

A valid certificate of
stock can only be issued to an orig-
inal subscriber, or in lieu of a cer-
tificate or certificates for an equal
number or shares surrendered in
consideration of its issue.

Such certificate, duly
signed and sealed, is presumed to be
genuine until it has been shown by
clear and satisfactory evidence, that
it could have been issued neither as
an original certificate, nor in lieu of
a certificate or certificates surrend-
ered for that purpose.

13. Where a certificate is
shown to have been invalid when is-
sued, and it is claimed that it was
rendered valid by a subsequent sur-
render for that purpose, the burden
of proving such subsequent surren-
der rests upon the party asserting it.

14. Stockholders, in
tion upon their statutory liability,
can plead any defenses to judgment
claims that are personal and peculiar
to stockholders, and which the com-
pany could not plead.

3. The law does not permit
them to purchase for it, their own
property, or property in which they
are largely interested.

4. When the directors of a
railroad company have purchased.
from themselves and others, the ene
tire capital stock of a mining cor-
poration and paid for the same with
the corporate funds, the contract is
void, and an action lies against them
in favor of the company, to account
for the funds so received by thein.

5. The company is not estop-
ped from maintaining the action by
the fact that at the time of the sur-
chase of the stock and use of the
funds, the directors owned all its
capital stock, and as stockholders
unanimously ratified what they, as
directors, had done.

6. The directors having,
from the proceeds of the bonds, dis-
charged a private indebtedness due
from them to a third party who held
their stock in the plaintiff company
as collateral thereto, the company
may follow the funds so used into
the stock and claim an equity in it.

7. Such collateral stock, af-
ter redemption, was held by derend.
ants as trustees for plaintiff, and the
latter, though not empowered to
traffic in its own stock, may, as ces-
tui que trust, have an equity therein.

8. The validity of the eles-
tion of the directors of a railroad
cannot be inquired into collaterally

Hardman v.
Railroad Co.

15. In an action to assess the
stockholders' liability, creditors can
except to the allowance of any ofier
claim upon the ground that it is not
of such a nature that stockholders
are liable upon it.

16. A waiver of the double
liability in the bonds of the company
cannot be changed by directors
without the consent of the stock-

17. A receiver engaged in
winding up the affairs of a national
bank, may set off the additional li-
ability of a stockholder against a
dividend due on the deposit account
of the stockholder. Brownel! v.
27. A corporation



Creditor's Bill-Damages.

[ocr errors]



18. When the certificates of
stock of a deceased stockholder are
presented to the officers of a cor-
poration for transfer, and they are
informed of the existence of a will,
they are presumed to have knowl-
edge of its contents, so far as they
afíect the title to the stock or the
right to transier the same. Allen v.
Insurance Co.

19. A corporation is liable to
a stockholder for the value of his
stock which has been wrongfully
transferred to another by the oficers
of such company.

20. The voting power inci-
dent to ownership of shares of stock
in a corporation is not lost when
they become the property of the cor-
poration. Allen v. DeLargerberger.

21. Their

withdrawal írom
the number of voting shares is in ef-
fect an equal distribution of their
voting power among the individual

Therefore, when the di-
rectors of a corporation pledge its
own stock they may, if it will secure
additional consideration for the
benefit of the corporation in the con-
tract of loan, conter on the pledgee
the right to vote the stock. Ib.

23. An agreement between a
corporation and one of its stock-
holders whereby the latter surren-
ders his stock to the former for
valuable consideration, is illegal.
Shaw v.

Ohio Edison Instailation

24. Where a corporation has
disposed of all its property ior the
purpose of defrauding a stockholder
the latter may maintain an action to
annut such transaction.

:25. A corporation "forned
for the purpose of manufacturing,
operating, selling or renting dyna-
mos, motors and other electrical ap-
pliances for furnishing light and
power, and for other purposes,' has
no power to carry on the business of
electrical illumination. Brush El.
L. Co. v. Jones Bros. El. Co. 767

26. The knowledge of the
president of a corporation of out-
standing cquities affecting the title
of property he was selling to the
corporation, which knowledge was
not acquired by him in his official
capacity nor while transacting the
business of the corporation, cannot
be held tr. show that the corporation
had notice of such equities. Il

estopped to deny its obligation to
pay securities issued by its agents,
which it is not authorized by law to
thus issue, when the objection is,
not that there was a want of power,
but that the power was exercised
without due formality. Shoemaker's
Exr's v. Railroad Co.

28. Where various persons,
holding certificates purporting to
represent a large number of shares
of stock of a corporation, all claim
to derive title through certain gen-
uine certificates such company, way
join all holders of such certificates
as defendants in one action for the
purpose of determining which of the
certificates are valid. Railroad Co.
v. Bank.


Denial of interest or
ship by the judgment debtor in the
choses in action sought to be sub-
jected raises no issues and it is er-
ror to so find. Krebs v. Forbriger.


1. Where a person sold a lot
which would be needed to widen a
street, covenanting not to use the
strip so as to cut off grantee's access
to the street, and covenanting that
grantee should have the benefit of
grantor's interest on condemnation,
such covenant runs with the land,
and the city having appropriated the
strip to widen the street, the gran-
tee's heirs who inherited the lot are
entitled to the entire condemnation
money. Cincinnati v. Springer. 745

2. A stipulation contained in
a deed, whereby the grantee has
permission to enter upon land ad-
jacent to that conveyed and make
certain improvements there, on con-
dition that such grantee make good,
"by retaining wall otherwise,'
any damage thereby occasioned to
buildings of grantor, does not con-
stitute a covenant running with the

land. Steible y. Railroad Co. 47

Chancery powers of the court
of common pleas are merely
those expressly given, but are all
those not inconsistent with the code.

Tetterbach v. Meyer.

1. Remote consequential
damages arising from the exercise
of the paramount right of congress
to regulace navigation, are damnum
absque injunia. Harbor Co.
Bridge Co.









may be

Deeds Devise.

administration failed to produce such
fund within that tiine.

6. An adempiion is ihe pit
tial or entire fulfillment oi the pu:-
pose of a legacy by the testator in
his life time. Stichtenroth v. Toph.




2. In an action for damages
for libel if the publication be icund
true, that fact would ordinarily de-
feat a claim to exemplary damages
in toto, but it may also mitigate ihe
claim to compensatory damages to
such an extent as to leave the plain-
tiff only the right to a nominal sum.
the right to a nominal sum. Com-

mercial Gazette Co. v. Headly. 415

A deed, unaccepted by the
grantee, derives no force as it deed
from being recorded. Pierce


A party to an action through
a resident of the county in which the
action is pending and not intending
to depart therefrom nor unable to at-
tend couit by reason of sickness or
infirmity, and who expects and in-
tends to be present at the trial, may
be compelled by the adverse party
to give her deposition, and, in case
of 'refusal, may be imprisoned for
contempt. State v. Cost.


A devise of land, part of
which is valuable timberland, and
which was bequeathed to H. R, and
the heirs of her body, can not be cn-
joined by her daughter from cutting
inore timber than is needed to repair.
Halt v. Tohr.

The old doctrine of waste
is not in force in Ohio, and the de-
visee as the first donee in tail can
cut and sell.

3. The general rule is, that in
the absence of testamentary direc-
tion, a general legacy is payable one
year afte testato 's death, and will
bear interest thereafter until paid.
Krigbaum v. Southard.

4. And the general rule is,
that in absence of testamentary di-
rection, a bequest in trust, the in-
come to be paid to a legatee for life,
with gift of principal over

at his
death, entitles the legatee for life to
interest from testator's death.

5. But where such bequest in
trust is in fulfillment of an anterup-
tial contract, and both contract and
bequest by their terms contemplate
the lapse of "a reasonable time,
enable the trustee to raise, out of the
estate, such interest bearing fund:
Held, the legatee for life is entiled
to interest on the principal sum aster
one year from testator's death, not-
withstanding a diligent and faithful

7. It is not a variation of the
terms of the will but it is a prema-
ture compliance with them. Іь.

8. It is obviously a contra-
diction in terms to speak of an act
done before a will is inade, as a com-
pliance with its provisions.

9. No matter what the inten-
tion of a testator in making an ad-
vance to one of his children beiore
executing his will, it can not justity
a deduction of the advance from the
child's share under the will, unless
the will provides that such deduction
be made.

10. The doctrine of 3temp-
tion can never apply to an advance
before the will.

II. No declarations inade
subsequent to the will of the testa-
tor with respect to advances made
prior to it, can make such advances

12. An attempt to avoid the
effect of 2 will by an executory con-
tract, such as in this case, is a viola-
tion of the statute of wills. Ib.

13. No estoppel arises from
the inducernent to the testator not to
change his will by a promise from
the legatee that the same result will
follow without such change. Ib.

14. When a testator states in
his will, that ademptions of lega ies
will be made in a certain way, he is
merely furnishing for the use oi his
executors convenient evidence, be-
fore the fact, of his future interi, not
in making his will, but in paving
money or conferring oiher bounty
during his life time.

15. The sole question of in-
portance in determining whether a
benefit conferred by a testator in his
life time satisfies or adeems a legacy
in his will, is whether or not. he in-
tended such satisfaction at the time.

16. A legacy is adeemed only
when the bounty conferred was in-
tended at the time of the gift as a
satisfaction of the legacy. Ib.
17. Where

testator be-
queaths money legacies to certain
children and all his personal and real
property to his children in equalshare,
and the personal property being in-
sufficient to pay these legacies; Held,
that the real estate so devised could
not be charged with the payment of




[ocr errors]



Divorce and Alimony-Embezzlement.

[ocr errors]




the legacies. Coffey v. Bacciocco.


1. A decree in a divorce suit,
allowing the wife alimony in gross
and making the same a charge upon
the husband's lands, if not kept alive
by issuing executions proper
times, becomes dormant like an ordi-
nary judgment at law and ceases to
be a lien. Mullane v. Folger.

2. The

court in county
where suit was brought, had no juris-
diction to declare a lien for alimony
upon, and issue an order of sale of
real estate situated in another county,
to the sheriff of such other county,
and a sale made by such sheriff un-
der such order is void for that rea-
son. Wilmot v. Cole.

3. Where a wife leaves her
husband and goes into another
county and files a petition for ali-
mony, and the husband, his place of
residence not having changed, an-
swers asking for a divorce, the court
is without jurisdiction to grant it,
the cross-petition and evidence fail-
ing to show that the cause of action
arose in the county where the case

was pending. Neese v. Neese.

A wife cannot release her
contingent right of dower to anyone
except the owner of the fee or one
who by the same conveyance takes
the fee. Smith v. Flickinger. 625

A release of dower in the
husband's assignment for creditors,
and shortly afterwards the husband
was adjudicated a bankrupt, and up-
on application of the assignee in
bankruptcy, the assignee for cred-
itors was ordered by the court

bankruptcy to convey said land to
assignee in bankruptcy the wife not
being a party to such application and
order, was not barred of her dower
in said land. Dubois v. Ebersole.


1. Under a statute permitting
a certain thing to be done if a ma-
jority of the votes cast shall be in the
affirmative, means a majority of the
votes cast on the question, and the
ballots on which both yes and no are
printed, and neither word erased, are
not to be counted in determining
what is a majority. Dexter v. Raine.

2. Contestant having shown
that certain votes cast for contestee
were by persons not electors, con-
testee has the right to show that con-

testant also received votes of per-
sons not eligible to vote, although
contestee has not served notice of
intention to contest or question con-
testant's votes. Newman Mc-

3. The justices taking depo-
sitions in such contest have no right
to appoint a witness to open and ex-
amine the ballots and attach those
claimed to be marked or illegal to
their depositions, and such tickets
having been handled by many will
not be considered by the court, and
such depositions will fall with the

4. Under sec. 2926e, R. S.,
providing that the election officers
shall be appointed on or before Sept.
I, and shall not be of the same politi-
cal party, the Union Labor Party
having shown that it is entitled to
recognition as a party, must be rec-
ognized by a fairly proportionate
representation in the appointments of
election officers. State v. Ehrman.

5. Appointments made
good faith in the preceding May or
June can not be ordered to be re-

6. The law will not restore
what has been lost by the delay of
the relator.

7. The relator is entitled
mandamus, but only to secure a fair
representation in future appoint-


I. The use by a guardian of
his ward's nioney in his own busi-
ness and its loss thereby, to consti-
lute embezzlement, must be with a

.purpose although the
statute is siient as to intent. State
v. Meyer.

An expectation to repay,
or an attempt at reparation, does not
avoid the criminalty.

3. The test of criminality is
whether the primary object of such
use of the money was to benefit him-
self irrespective of the ward's inter-
ests, and such intent is a question for
the jury to be determined from con-
duct and circumstances.


I. In actions to appropriate
private property under secs. 2232-
2261, R. S., the property owners are
not entitled to separate juries or de-
mand struck juries for each separate
lot or parcel. Cincinnati v. Neff.

2. The property owners






« PreviousContinue »