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7. Nor is the amount of the
assessment in any way affected by
any sum stated in the notice given
under scc. 2304 of the passage of the
preliminary resolution for an im-

8. Failure to declare specific-
ally in the improvement ordinance
the damages which may be found by
the jury, does not estop the city
from including such damages in the
amount of expenses so



9. Property owners petition-
ing for an improvement, will be held
to have participated in the improve-
ment, so as to estop them from de-
nying the validity of the assessment
ordinance duly passed in accordance
with the terms of such petition. Ib.
10. Where

agrees to take pay in assessments
and not look to the city, the latter
must give a legal assessment. Kir-
schner v. Cincinnati.

11. A municipal corporation
in widening a street need not wait
until the street is graded and im-
proved and assess for the entire
cost, but may assess separately for
the cost of appropriating the ground
before the street is finished. West-
wood v. Dater.

12. It is not unconstitutional
to assess back on an abutter's re-
maining land the cost of appropriat-
ing part of it.

13. The assessment statutes
are not contrary to U. S. Const.,
art. 14, because sec. 2304, R. S., pro-
vides for notice to

the property
holder, and sec. 2316 provides for a

14. In case of two assess-
ments on the same street, if it ap-
pears that both

intended to
make one and the same improve-
ment under sec. 2284, they may be
treated as one proceeding for the
purpose of applying the one-fourth
limit ri assessment under sec. 2271.
Strauss v. Cincinnati.

15. Improvements having
been ordered by council, it is to be
presumed that they are beneficial.

16. A court will not inter-
fere with the assessment where the
proceedings are regular, except for
fraud, malice,


abuse of corporate power.

17. Where

results in damage to an abutting
owner, his remedy is by an applica-
tion under sec. 2315.

A claim for

damages can not be offset against
an assessment.

18. The law is settled in
Ohio that where a part of one's
property is taken for a street by
condemnation proceedings the re-
mainder is subject to assessment
under the restrictions governing as-

19. Where, under sec. 2315, a
return under oath has been filed in
the city clerk's office showing that
an abutting owner has been person-
ally served with a copy of the reso-
lution, the return is prima facie evi-
dence of such service, and the bur-
den of proof is upon the abutter
who denies the service.

20. Where the council passed
an ordinance condenining property
to widen a street, providing that the
court costs and condemnation
money should be paid by an assess-
ment upon abutting lot owners, to
be collected in one installment; it
was beyond the power of the board
of public affairs to provide in the
assessing ordinance, that the assess-
ment should be paid in ten install-
ments. Longworth Cincinnati.

21. Section 2304, has no ap-
plication to appropriation of private
property for public improvements,
and refers only to improvements by

22. It is not essential to the
validity of an appropriating ordi-


assessment founded
thereon, that the board of public
aftairs should have recommended
the same or transmitted a prelimi-
nary estimate of the expense oi such


having been repeatedly upheld as
valid by our Supreme Court, an in-
ferior state court should decline to
consider the question whether they
violate the U. S. constitution. Ib.

24. Plaintiffs' assignors ten-
dered a bond to the city conditioned
that he would pay cost and expense
of appropriating land for street,
the city to levy an assessment upon
abutting lot owners, to pay for ap-
propriation and certify the same to
plaintiffs' assignors. The bond was
approved by board of public works
pending passage of ordinance, was
read in council, but not in board of
aldermen. The ordinance to con-
demn passed all boards, and was ap-
proved. Plaintiffs' assignors paid
condemnation money into city treas-
ury and the city used it to open the
street. No assessment was

23. Our







Assignment for Creditors-Attachment.


levied, in an action to recover the
money. Held:

That the common
council had no authority to contract
to levy an assessment and certify an
assessment, and to certify the same
to another, in cases of appropriation
of land. Inclined Ry. Co. v. Cin-

25. The city has no power to
borrow money in anticipation of as-
sessment,, except by issuing bonds
and advertising for bids for the

26. That as the bond was not
approved by the board of council,
and was not even read in board of
aldermen, there was no acceptance
of it, and therefore no contract was
entered into by the city to make and
certify assessments.

27. No promise either to
verify assessments or to return the
money is to

be implied from the
city's using the money.

28. The provisions of the
Municipal Code regulating the mode
of assessing private property for
public improvements are not in con-
Aict with the 14th amendment of the
U. S. Const. in respect to notice to
property owners to be assessed, and
an opportunity to be heard. Ander-
son v. Cincinnati.

29. The opening. widening
or extension of a public street by a
municipality is public improve-
ment within the meaning
2304, R. S., and a resolution declar-
ing the necessity of such improve-
ment, and the service of notice, etc.,
are jurisdictional requirements nec-
essary to a valid assessment upon
private property, under the munici-
pal code revised in 1880.

30. An error in such a pro-
ceeding which is fundamental and
jurisdictional, cannot be cured. un-
der curative sec. 2289, R. S. Ib.

31. Assessments levied to
pay the cost of improvenients, of
streets improved under the act of
April 25. 1885, (82 L., 156), may in-
clude one-half the damages paid to
abutting owners, for injuries to
property caused by the improve-

ment. Corry v. Cincinnati. 601

Property assigned for
benefit of creditors and not so ap-
plied, may be subjected to payment
of claims of creditors when re-con-
veyed to assignor, and by him trans-
ferred to a purchaser with notice of
trust. Alt v. Weber.

Creditors are

ped by the finding of a decree to the

effect that their claims have been
settled, made in an action between
the assignor and assignee to deter-
mine individual claims made by
them to the property assigned. Ib.

3. A creditor received secur-
ities from an insolvent debtor, in
trust, to be sold, and out of the pro-
ceeds to pay her own claim and the
claims of certain other creditors;
held, an assignment for the general
benefit of creditors. Feed Co. v.

4. An assignee for creditors
does not. by mere acceptance of such
assignment, become liable to

ment under a lease which previous
to such assignment belonged to his
assignor, even if the leasehold is
specifically mentioned in the assign-
ment. Cincinnati v. Goodhue. 345

5. Such assignee has a right
to decide whether the leasehold will
benefit his estate, and has a reason-
able time in which to elect, to accept
or reject the same.

8. Mere entry upon

premises to remove the goods of the
assignor is not an election to take
the same.

7. If, however, the assignee
enters the premises and uses

same for the benefit of the estate,
this is an election to take the lease,
and makes the assignee personally
liable for the rent.

8. Services of attorney
for the assignee are a personal claim,
although the assignee may reimburse
himself out of the estate. Kittredge
v. Miller.


I. An attachment will lie
against a husband defendant in a di-
vorce suit, who having the means
willfully and purposely refuse to
comply with the order of the court.
Stewart v. Stewart.

2. The order in such case
does not create a debt within the
meaning of the constitution, and de-
fendant may be held to answer an
attachment and be punished as for
the willful refusal to comply with
such order.

3. Where creditor of
non-resident debtor, fraudulently
and without the debtor's knowledge
or consent, causes the debtor's prop-
erty to be brought into the state and
attached on the ground of non-resi-
dence, such attachment is fraudu.
lent, and will be set aside under sec.
5562, R. S. Kizer v. George. 218
4. A valid lien

upon the
property of a non-resident of the
That a deed, unaccepted
by the grantee, derives no force as a
deed from being recorded. Ib.










Attorney and Client-Bills, Notes and Checks.





state may be obtained by the levy of
an attachment issued from a court
of a county other than that wherein
the property is situated.

Co. v. Smith.

5. Where defendant in at-
tachment, based on her alleged con-
veyance of real estate with intent to
hinder and defraud creditors, admit-
ted through her counsel that she
was insolvent, and that the deed of
the real estate complained of
"without consideration," and after-
wards sought to

prove considera-
tion, such admissions must be con-
strued to mean that no considera-
tion passed, because the deed never
took effect, rather than that the
deed, on its face for value, was in
fact voluntary. Pierce White.

6. It was competent to ask
defendant whether she intended, by
such conveyance, to put her prop-
erty beyond the reach of her cred-

7. There is

presumption of fraud arising from
an intent on defendant's part to turn
real estate into money.

ceived for deposit from G., the agent
of W., a check on another bank to
G.'s account in this bank and receive
in exchange therefor a drait of such
insolvent bank another bank
where it had no funds: Held,

2. That W. as against the re-
ceiver of such insolvent bank was
entitled to rescind the contract of
deposit of the check for fraud, and
on the tender of the dishonored
draft was entitled to a delivery up oi
the check. Warner v. Armstrong:

3. W. was entitled in equity
to enjoin suit against himself by the
receiver in a jurisdiction where Gi's
assignee in insolvency, who held the
dishonored draft and refused to de-
liver the same to W. or the receiver,
could not be made party.

4. It was held by the court in
general term, that w. was enried
in equity to set off against his liabii-
ity on his unpaid check, the amount
due him on the unpaid draft. Arm-
strong v. Warner.

5. It was further held at
W. was entitled in equity to set off
G.'s deposit against his iiability on
the bill of exchange.

6. A depositor in a bank is
not bound to look for forged signa-
tures among his checks when his
book is balanced and the checks te-
turned to him, and will not be pre-
sumed to have acquiesced in the ac-
count charging him with the piry-
ment of such check, where he has
failed for more than a reasonable
time to examine the checks and dis-
cover the forgery. Bank v. Creasy.




9. Evidence of an attempt to
convey by a deed which never took
effect, does not sustain an allegation
in an affidavit for attachment, that
defendant has disposed of and con-
veyed her property, and that, in the
absence of amendment, such vari-
ance requires the dissolution of the


1. A lawyer rendering legal
services to an assignee for benefit of
creditors can hold such assignee
personally liable therefor, but has no
right of action against the estate.
Kiltredgev. Miller.

2. It seems that if the serv-
ices are in the conduct of litigation
resulting in recovery of money or
property for the estate, and the as-
signee is insolvent, equity will
charge upon such fruits of the liti.
gation in the hands of the assignee
or his successors an equitable line
for the value of such services in
favor of the person rendering them.


I. Where the officers of a na-
tional bank, knowing of the hope-
less insolvency of such bank,

1. Possession does not prore
title in an assignee of a note wher?
the payee denies having assigned it
and clainis his signature to be a for-
gery by one to whom he had in-
trusted it. Martin v. Drake.

2. The holder of a negotiable
promissory note (secured by mort-
gage), who in good faith acquired
title by payee's endorsement, for
value before maturity, and who ex-
ercised due care and diligence in
ascertaining the facts of the mort-
gage and of payee's interest therein,
has an equity to the mortgage su-
perior to that acquired by one to
whom, prior to time of said endorse-
ment, the payee had, for value, de-
livered loth a forgery of the note
and the genuine mortgage bearing a
formal assignment of the mortgage.





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3. When a "stranger" to a
promissory note, for a valuable con-
sideration, signs the note as an ap-
parent maker, and there is no inad-
vertence, or mistake as to any fact
relative to or connected with such
signing, he is liable as a maker of
such note. Wright v. Kauffman.

4. In such case, if the signa-
ture is added with the knowledge
and consent of the holder of the
and consent of the holder of the note,
and without the knowledge or con-
sent of the original maker, it is a
material alteration of the note which
releases him from liability thereon.

5. In such case, when the
person thus signing disclaims sign-
ing the note as maker, and also dis-
claims signing it in any other char-
acter or capacity, he must be held to
sustain the relation to the note
which the position of his name upon
it indicates.

6. Where K. held a jote be-
longing to C. and indorsed it in
blank for safe keeping only, but
having money

of H. to invest,
showed it to H., as an investment
and kept it among H.'s papers;
Held, that this gave H. no title as
against C. Moore v. Curtis. 276

7. The holder of a certified
check must look for payment to the
bank, to the exoneration of the
drawer. Bank .v. Oyster & Fish

8. Liability of drawer on a
certified check after failure of
tifying bank. Bank v. Oyster &
Fish Co.


What action of a corpora-
tion may estop it to deny the valid-
ity of its bonds. Shoeniaker's Exrs.
v. Railroad Co.

2. Section 3313, R. S. makes
the purchase of bonds of a railroad
company by a director, at less than
par, null and void.

3. Where

railroad com-
pany issued income bond, dated De-
cember 1, 1879, payable after Dec. 1,
1910, only out of net surplus earn-
ings, to bear such rate of interest
not exceeding six per cent. per an-
num, payable semi-annually as said
net earnings will reach to pay. These
bonds, as its first mortgage bonds,
were secured by a bond of trust over
the corporate property, etc., wherein
the net income, after payment of
certain charges and expenses, is
pledged to the payment of the inter-

est on said income bonds to an
amount equal to six per centum per
annum semi-annually. Held, in such

the interest is cumulative
Shoemaker v. Railroad Co.
4. The

4 L B 53

is entitled to be paid his interest,
out of the surplus earnings, up to the
maximum rate; and if the net earn-
ings in any year, or interest period,
is insufficient to pay such interest in
full, he is entitled to have such de-
ficiency made up from the future
surplus net earnings.

5. Where the words or terms
of the bond are equivoca or not en-
tirely clear, the court may consider
the deed of trust in connection with
the bond in order to ascertain the
real contract between the corpora-
tion and the incoine bondholder.

6. A court of equity, upon
application of an income bondholder
for himself and others, should take
cognizance of the trust and restrain
the corporation from diverting the
funds, to which alone he and his as-
sociates may look for the paynient
of their interest.


I. A trades-union and its
members are liable for damages
caused by declaring a boycott
against plaintiff, and for inducing
their workmen under contract to
serve a certain time to break their
contracts, although the inducement
is by peaceable persuasion. Parker
v. Bricklayers' Union.

2. They are also liable for
inducing other persons by threats
or intimidation not to deal with or
employ plaintiffs, or inducing them
to break contracts already made
with plaintiffs.


Under the present law of
Ohio a dog may be stolen, and bur-
glary may be committed by breaking
and entering with intent to steal a
dog. State v. Yates.


Where the shipper knew that
the road was a local one, and that
she was to get a receipt or shipping
bill, the fact that she did not get it
until several days afterwards by rea-
son of not being willing to wait for
it at the time, and the fact that the
agent marked the goods for their
ultimate destination, are not suffici-
ent to show that the shipping bill,
which was

a contract to forward
only, and not to be responsible for




Charge of Court-Constitutional Law.


4. The






loss on connecting lines, is not the
true contract, and do not show that
the defendant agreed carry

through. King v. DeLand, etc. 8

It is not error prejudical to
the accused to charge that reason-
able doubt is not a mere captious or
ingenious or artificial doubt, but
such a doubt as would guide in busi-
ness affairs

ordinary pursuits.
Moliter v. State.


Land conveyed to a bishop
for a nominal consideration, for the
use and benefit of a particular con-
gregation who in possession,
cannot be mortgaged by such
bishop to secure his individual debt.
O'Donnell v. Holden.


Choses in action are not sub-
ject of chattel mortgages, but where
a chattel mortgage,

among other
things, included are the book ac-
counts due the mortgagor, the mort-
gage operates as an assignment so
as to give a priority as against the
mortgagor's assignment for credi-

tors. Ehler, In re Assignment. 439

1. A combination by a trade
union and others to coerce an em-
ployer to conduct his business with
reference to apprentices and
ployment of delinquent members of
the union, etc., is an unlawful con-
spiracy. Moores & Co. v. Brick-
layers' Union.

2. A material

whom such threatened measures
were taken because of his failure to
heed the notices and whose trade
was injured by further notices sent to
his customers, etc., has a right of ac-
tion' against the union and all its
agents engaged in such unlawful
conspiracy for the loss thereby oc-

3. It is not unconstitutional
to assess back on an abutter's re-
maining land the cost of appropriat-
ing part of it. Westwood v. Dater.

assessment statuites
are not contrary to the U. S. Const.,
art. 14, because sec. 2304, provides
for notice to the property holier,
and sec. 2316, provides for a hear-

5. Section 5639, R. S., is
either declaratory of the common
law of contempts of courts,
marily punishable, or it is partly de-
claratory and partly restrictive of
that law, and so far as it is restrict-
ive it is unconstitutional. State v.

6. An act (84 O. L., 221) au-
thorizing commissioners of Hamil-
ton county to erect a monument to
W. H. H., if a majority of the elec-
tors so vote, is constitutional. Dex-
ter y. Raine.

7. The act of April 14, 1886,
amending the act of May 11, 1878,
so far as it increases adds the
penalty for missions to list property
for taxation before 1886, is retro-
active, and is therefore unconstitu-
tional. Treasurer of Erie Co. v.

8. The act of the general as-
sembly passed March 19, 1889,
quiring all cities of the third grade
of the first class, to levy the cost of
the intersections in street improve-
ments on the general tax duplicate,
and making its provisions applicabie
to improvements previously ordered
for which no assessments have been
made is not in conflict with sec. 23,
art. 2 of the constitution of the staie.
Toledo v. Toledo.





1. The civil rights act, (81 0.
L., 90), cannot be made to apply to
an incorporated restaurant business,
where its existence is not dependent
upon obtaining a license from the
authorities. Hargo v. Harf. 441

2. Such business is a private
enterprise, and hence the owner has
exclusive control as to whom he will
admit and may exclude any person,
whether white or colored, reason-
ably or unreasonably.


9. The taxes provided for by
the said act, are included in the ag.
gregate of 14 mills to the levying of
which such cities are by law

10. The provisions of
municipal code regulating the mo le
of assessing private property for
public improvements are not in con-
flict with the 14th amendment of the
U. S. Const. in respect to notice to
property owners to be assessed, and
an opportunity to be heard. A-
derson v. Cincinnati.

II. Section 1802, R. S., au-
thorizing the mayor to appoint a
person to act as police judge in the
temporary absence of the duly
elected judge, is not in contraven-
tion of constitution, art. 4, secs. 10,
13. Moliter v. State.

12. Section 1804, R. S., per-



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