7. Nor is the amount of the assessment in any way affected by any sum stated in the notice given under sec. 2304 of the passage of the preliminary resolution for an im- provement. Ib.
8. Failure to declare specific- ally in the improvement ordinance the damages which may be found by the jury, does not estop the city from including such damages in the amount of expenses so to be as- sessed. Ib.
9. Property owners petition- ing for an improvement, will be held to have participated in the improve- ment, so as to estop them from de- nying the validity of the assessment ordinance duly passed in accordance with the terms of such petition. Ib. IO. Where a contractor
agrees to take pay in assessments and not look to the city, the latter must give a legal assessment. Kir- schner v. Cincinnati. 288
II. A municipal corporation in widening a street need not wait until the street is graded and im- proved and assess for the entire cost, but may assess separately for the cost of appropriating the ground before the street is finished. West- wood v. Dater.
12. It is not unconstitutional to assess back on an abutter's re- maining land the cost of appropriat- ing part of it. Ib.
13. The assessment statutes are not contrary to U. S. Const., art. 14, because sec. 2304, R. S., pro- Ivides for notice to the property holder, and sec. 2316 provides for a hearing. Ib.
14. In case of two assess- ments on the same street, if it ap- pears that both were intended to make one and the same improve- ment under sec. 2284, they may be treated as one proceeding for the purpose of applying the one-fourth limit i assessment under sec. 2271. Strauss v. Cincinnati. 783 15. Improvements having been ordered by council, it is to be presumed that they are beneficial. Ib.
16. A court will not inter- fere with the assessment where the proceedings are regular, except for fraud, malice, gross mistake or abuse of corporate power.
17. Where an improvement results in damage to an abutting owner, his remedy is by an applica- tion under sec. 2315. A claim for
18. The law is settled in Ohio that where a part of one's property is taken for a street by condemnation proceedings the re- mainder is subject to assessment under the restrictions governing as- sessments. Ib.
19. Where, under sec. 2315, a return under oath has been filed in the city clerk's office showing that an abutting owner has been person- ally served with a copy of the reso- lution, the return is prima facie evi- dence of such service, and the bur- den of proof is upon the abutter who denies the service. Ib.
20. Where the council passed an ordinance condemning property to widen a street, providing that the court costs and condemnation money should be paid by an assess- ment upon abutting lot owners, to be collected in one installment; it was beyond the power of the board of public affairs to provide in the assessing ordinance, that the assess- ment should be paid in ten install- ments. Longworth V. Cincinnati. 683
21. Section 2304, has no ap- plication to appropriation of private property for public improvements, and refers only to improvements by construction. Ib.
22. It is not essential to the validity of an appropriating ordi- nance and assessment founded thereon, that the board of public affairs should have recommended the same or transmitted a prelimi- nary estimate of the expense of such appropriation. Ib.
23. Our assessment laws having been repeatedly upheld as valid by our Supreme Court, an in- ferior state court should decline to consider the question whether they violate the U. S. constitution.
24. Plaintiffs' assignors ten- dered a bond to the city conditioned that he would pay cost and expense of appropriating land for a street, the city to levy an assessment upon abutting lot owners, to pay for ap- propriation and certify the same to plaintiffs' assignors. The bond was approved by board of public works pending passage of ordinance, was 'read in council, but not in board of aldermen. The ordinance to con- demn passed all boards, and was ap- proved. Plaintiffs' assignors paid condemnation money into city treas- ury and the city used it to open the street. No assessment was yet
Assignment for Creditors-Attachment.
27. No promise either to verify assessments or to return the money is to be implied from the city's using the money. Ib. 28. The provisions of the Municipal Code regulating the mode of assessing private property for public improvements are not in con- flict with the 14th amendment of the U. S. Const. in respect to notice to property owners to be assessed, and an opportunity to be heard. Ander- son v. Cincinnati.
794 29. The opening, widening or extension of a public street by a municipality is a public improve- ment within the meaning of 2304, R. S., and a resolution declar- ing the necessity of such improve- ment, and the service of notice. etc., are jurisdictional requirements nec- essary to a valid assessment upon private property, under the munici- pal code revised in 1880. Ib.
30. An error in such a pro- ceeding which is fundamental and jurisdictional, cannot be cured un- der curative sec. 2289, R. S. Ib.
31. Assessments levied to pay the cost of improvements, of streets improved under the act of April 25. 1885, (82 L., 156), may in- clude one-half the damages paid to abutting owners, for injuries to property caused by the improve- ment. Corry v. Cincinnati. бол ASSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS
1. Property assigned for benefit of creditors and not so ap- plied, may be subjected to payment of claims of creditors when re-con- veyed to assignor, and by him trans- ferred to a purchaser with notice of trust. Alt v. Weber. 371
2. Creditors are not estop- ped by the finding of a decree to the
effect that their claims have been settled, made in an action between the assignor and assignee to deter- mine individual claims made by them to the property assigned. Ib.
3. A creditor received secur- ities from an insolvent debtor, in trust, to be sold, and out of the pro- ceeds to pay her own claim and the claims of certain other creditors; held, an assignment for the general benefit of creditors. Feed Co. v. Shute. 198 4. An assignee for creditors does not. by mere acceptance of such assignment, become liable to pay- ment under a lease which previous to such assignment belonged to his assignor, even if the leasehold is specifically mentioned in the assign- ment. Cincinnati v. Goodhue. 345
5. Such assignee has a right to decide whether the leasehold will benefit his estate, and has a reason- able time in which to elect, to accept or reject the same. Ib.
8. Mere entry upon the premises to remove the goods of the assignor is not an election to take the same. Ib.
7. If, however, the assignee enters the premises and uses the same for the benefit of the estate, this is an election to take the lease, and makes the assignee personally liable for the rent.
I. An attachment will lie against a husband defendant in a di- vorce suit, who having the means willfully and purposely refuse to comply with the order of the court. Stewart v. Stewart. 662
2. The order in such case does not create a debt within the meaning of the constitution, and de- fendant may be held to answer an attachment and be punished as for the willful refusal to comply with such order. Ib.
3. Where a creditor of a non-resident debtor, fraudulently and without the debtor's knowledge or consent, causes the debtor's prop- erty to be brought into the state and attached on the ground of non-resi- dence, such attachment is fraudu lent, and will be set aside under sec. 5562, R. S. Kizer v. George. 218 4. A valid lien upon the property of a non-resident of the
Attorney and Client-Bills, Notes and Checks.
ATTACHMENT-Continued.
state may be obtained by the levy of an attachment issued from a court of a county other than that wherein the property is situated. Refining Co. v. Smith.
5. Where defendant in at- tachment, based on her alleged con- veyance of real estate with intent to hinder and defraud creditors, admit- ted through her counsel that she was insolvent, and that the deed of the real estate complained of was "without consideration," and after- wards sought to prove considera- tion, such admissions must be con- strued to mean that no considera- tion passed, because the deed never took effect, rather than that the deed, on its face for value, was in fact voluntary. Pierce V. White. 552
6. It was competent to ask defendant whether she intended, by such conveyance, to put her prop- erty beyond the reach of her cred- itors. Ib. 7. There is no conclusive presumption of fraud arising from an intent on defendant's part to turn real estate into money. Ib. 8. That a deed, unaccepted by the grantee, derives no force as a deed from being recorded. Ib.
9. Evidence of an attempt to convey by a deed which never took effect, does not sustain an allegation in an affidavit for attachment, that defendant has disposed of and con- veyed her property, and that, in the absence of amendment, such vari- ance requires the dissolution of the attachment. Ib.
ceived for deposit from G., the agent of W., a check on another bank to G.'s account in this bank and receive in exchange therefor a draft of such insolvent bank on another bank where it had no funds: Held.
2. That W. as against the re- Iceiver of such insolvent bank was entitled to rescind the contract of deposit of the check for fraud, and on the tender of the dishonored draft was entitled to a delivery up of the check. Warner v. Armstrong.
3. W. was entitled in equity to enjoin suit against himself by the receiver in a jurisdiction where G.'s assignee in insolvency, who held the dishonored draft and refused to de- liver the same to W. or the receiver, could not be made party. Ib.
4. It was held by the court in general term, that W. was enticed in equity to set off against his liabij- ity on his unpaid check, the amount due him on the unpaid draft. strong v. Warner.
5. It was further held that W. was entitled in equity to set off G.'s deposit against his iiability on the bill of exchange. Ib.
6. A depositor in a bank is not bound to look for forged signa- tures among his checks when his book is balanced and the checks re- turned to him, and will not be pre- sumed to have acquiesced in the ac- count charging him with the pay- ment of such check, where he has failed for more than a reasonable time to examine the checks and dis- cover the forgery. Bank v. Creasy.
BILLS, NOTES AND CHECKS -
I. Possession does not prove title in an assignee of a note wher? the payee denies having assigned it and claims his signature to be a for- gery by one to whom he had in- trusted it. Martin v. Drake.
2. The holder of a negotiable promissory note (secured by mort- gage), who in good faith acquired title by payee's endorsement, for value before maturity, and who ex- ercised due care and diligence in ascertaining the facts of the mort- gage and of payee's interest therein, has an equity to the mortgage su- perior to that acquired by one to whom, prior to time of said endorse- ment, the payee had, for value, de- livered both a forgery of the note and the genuine mortgage bearing a formal assignment of the mortgage.
3. When a "stranger" to a promissory note, for a valuable con- sideration, signs the note as an ap- parent maker, and there is no inad- vertence, or mistake as to any fact relative to or connected with such signing, he is liable as a maker of such note. Wright v. Kauffman. 421
4. In such case, if the signa- ture is added with the knowledge and consent of the holder of the and consent of the holder of the note, and without the knowledge or sent of the original maker, it is a material alteration of the note which releases him from liability thereon. Ib.
5. In such case, when the person thus signing disclaims sign- ing the note as maker, and also dis- claims signing it in any other char- acter or capacity, he must be held to sustain the relation to the note which the position of his name upon it indicates. Ib.
6. Where K. held a 1 ote be- longing to C. and indorsed it in blank for safe keeping only, but having money of H. to invest, showed it to H., as an investment and kept it among H.'s papers; Held, that this gave H. no title as against C. Moore v. Curtis.
4. The income bondholder is entitled to be paid his interest, out of the surplus earnings, up to the maximum rate; and if the net earn- ings in any year, or interest period, is insufficient to pay such interest in full, he is entitled to have such de- ficiency made up from the future surplus net earnings. Ib.
5. Where the words or terms of the bond are equivocal, or not en- tirely clear, the court may consider the deed of trust in connection with the bond in order to ascertain the real contract between the corpora- tion and the incoine bondholder.
6. A court of equity, upon application of an income bondholder for himself and others, should take cognizance of the trust and restrain the corporation from diverting the funds, to which alone he and his as- sociates may look for the payment of their interest. Ib. BOYCOTT-.
A trades-union and its members are 276 liable for damages caused 7. The holder of a certified by declaring a boycott check must look for payment to the against plaintiff, and for inducing bank, to the exoneration of the their workmen under contract to drawer. Bank v. Oyster & Fish serve a certain time to break their Co. contracts, although the inducement is by peaceable_persuasion. Parker v. Bricklayers' Union.
8. Liability of drawer on a Icertified check after failure of cer- tifying bank. Bank v. Oyster & Fish Co. BONDS
I. What action of a corpora- tion may estop it to deny the valid- ity of its bonds. Shoemaker's Exrs. v. Railroad Co. 252
2. Section 3313, R. S. makes the purchase of bonds of a railroad company by a director, at less than par, null and void.
3. Where a railroad com- pany issued income bond, dated De- cember 1, 1879, payable after Dec. 1, 1910, only out of net surplus earn- ings, to bear such rate of interest not exceeding six per cent. per an- num, payable semi-annually as said net earnings will reach to pay. These bonds, as its first mortgage bonds, were secured by a bond of trust over the corporate property, etc., wherein the net income, after payment of certain charges and expenses, is pledged to the payment of the inter- 4 LB 53
2. They are also liable inducing other persons by or intimidation not to deal with or employ plaintiffs, or inducing them to break contracts already made with plaintiffs. BURGLARY-
Charge of Court-Constitutional Law.
I. A combination by a trade union and others to coerce an em- ployer to conduct his business with reference to apprentices and ployment of delinquent members of the union, etc., is an unlawful con- spiracy. Moores & Co. v. Brick- layers' Union. 665 man against
2. A material whom such threatened measures were taken because of his failure to heed the notices and whose trade was injured by further notices sent to his customers, etc., has a right of ac- tion' against the union and all its agents engaged in such unlawful conspiracy for the loss thereby oc- casioned. Ib.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—
1. The civil rights act, (81 O. L., 90), cannot be made to apply to an incorporated restaurant business, where its existence is not dependent upon obtaining a license from the authorities. Hargo v. Harf.
2. Such business is a private enterprise, and hence the owner has exclusive control as to whom he will admit and may exclude any person, whether white or colored, reason- ably or unreasonably.
3. It is not unconstitutional to assess back on an abutter's re- maining land the cost of appropriat ing part of it. Westwood v. Dater. 763 statutes
assessment 4. The are not contrary to the U. S. Const., art. 14, because sec. 2304, provides for notice to the property holder, and sec. 2316, provides for a hear- ing. Ib. 5. Section 5639, R. S., is either declaratory of the common law of contempts of courts, sum- marily punishable, or it is partly de- claratory and partly restrictive of that law, and so far as it is restrict- ive it is unconstitutional. State v. Myers.
6. An act (84 O. L., 221) au- thorizing commissioners of Hamil- ton county to erect a monument to W. H. H., if a majority of the elec- tors so vote, is constitutional. Dex- ter v. Raine. 25
7. The act of April 14, 1886, amending the act of May 11, 1878, so far as it increases or adds the penalty for missions to list property for taxation before 1886, is retro- active, and is therefore unconstitu- tional. Treasurer of Erie Co. v. Walker.
8. The act of the general as- sembly passed March 19, 1889, re- quiring all cities of the third grade of the first class, to levy the cost of the intersections in street improve- ments on the general tax duplicate, and making its provisions applicabie to improvements previously ordered for which no assessments have been made is not in conflict with sec. 23, art. 2 of the constitution of the state. Toledo v. Toledo. 574
9. The taxes provided for by the said act, are included in the ag- gregate of 14 mills to the levying of which such cities are by law re- stricted. Ib.
10. The provisions of the municipal code regulating the mole of assessing private property for public improvements are not in con- flict with the 14th amendment of the U. S. Const. in respect to notice to property owners to be assessed, and an opportunity to be heard. derson v. Cincinnati.
II. Section 1802, R. S., au- thorizing the mayor to appoint a person to act as police judge in the temporary absence of the duly elected judge, is not in contraven- tion of constitution, art. 4, secs. 10, 13. Moliter v. State. 324 12. Section 1804, R. S., per-
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