Hamilton Common Pleas. 223 And it is the province of law to protect all alike-the owner, the material-man, the contractor and the laborer, be they members of socalled "unions" or not, be they skilled or unskilled. The law makes no distinction between them, because of the service or occupation of either. Every man's labor and skill are his own property; often they are his sole dependence and means of support for himself and family, and they are his only certain and satisfactory means of accumulating property. It is essential to the laborer's welfare and manhood that he and his labor shall be free- the laborer as the employer, who, very frequently, is only one step in the way of prosperity removed from the laborer for wages, has the same need for freedom for action in his field of service. Sometimes in their competition they come into conflict; but they must remember that each may, in the pursuit of his occupation, do whatsoever he will, only so long as it does not infringe on the equal freedom and right of the other. Workmen have the right to organize into unions for the common benefit of their members, for the purpose of advancing their skill, for mutual charities, and may bind themselves by rules, constitutions and by-laws within the scope of such purpose of organization. They nay, for their own interests, make reasonable regulations as to how and whom they will instruct in the skill of their trade, and they can not be compelled to teach others against their will. They may persuade others not to enter their trade; they may refuse to work with or instruct those not registered in their union; and they may, with an honest purpose, refuse to work with men obnoxious to their interests, men expelled for reasons in good faith to them, or with men who refuse to join them, or refuse to work for any particular employer or contractor; they have a right to select their employees, and they may in combination refuse in good faith to work for any man justly obnoxious to them. They may, with like honest purpose, to promote their united good, fix hours of labor per day and rate of wages, uniform or modified in rate, and they may encourage others to join their order. They may combine for the honest purpose of benefitting their order, by encouraging favorable terms to their employers in the purchase of material, and to procure contracts for such contractors as employ members of their union; but they become engaged in illegal enterprise whenever they agree to accomplish their purpose by threats, intimidation, violence or like molestation, either towards the apprentice, the expelled member, the non-union workman, the contractor and employer, the material man, or the owner who proposes to make a contract. The like rule of legality or illegality, applies to the contractor or employer, as to the purpose for which he may become and act as a member of the so called "boss contractors' union." The threat may be by word, gesture, sign or tone, and when you consider whether any particular line or force of conduct, or thing said or done has menace or threat in it, you must consider all the circumstances under which the thing is said or done, what reasonably was the intent sought to be conveyed by the person uttering the word, or doing the thing. The intent reasonably conveyed, must be to do some wrongful thing to the person or property, and in violation of the legal right of the one sought to be influenced. The intimidation meant is the effect of such things, said or done, or threat, made, as reasonably put one in fear, and control his freedom of action, or thus compel one to act out the will of another instead of his own will. 223 Parker v. Bricklayers' Union et al. One inquiry of fact at the outset is, did the plaintiffs have any con tracts with any of the men for any stipulated time or times other than by the hour or day on which any of them quit work? If so, and the defendants knew of such contracts with the apprentice or any of the men. and then induced such man or men to quit the Parkers' service, even by lawful persuasion, then all of the defendants who confederated together to accomplish that purpose would be liable for inducing such man or men to quit the Parkers; and if joining the union meant under its rules, to quit their service, then inducing them to join the union would create the same liability. But if there were no such contracts for services for a definite time, or if there were such contracts, and these defendants did not know it, then there would be no liability on the part of the defendants to pursuade such man or men by lawful means to quit the Parker Brothers. The same rule applies to the other contracts in controversy. It is claimed there was a contract between Moores & Co., lime men, and plaintifs, for their lime supply for the year. You should first determine if there were such contract, and if so, what were its terms. If, in fact, such a contract existed, and no price fixed, you would not be authorized to fix any other than the market price on delivery in this city. If there were a contract, did the defendants know it, and did they induce Moores & Co. to break the contract or fail to perform it? If there were such a contract, and the defendants knew it, and they caused any breach in its performance by Moores & Co., then they would be liable for the damages even though they caused the breach of it by lawful means. The same rule of inquiry should apply to the question if they had any contract for sand with either Howe or Drott. Likewise you come to the inquiry as to whether any contract in fact existed with the Little Sisters of the Poor. A contract to build such a structure is not required to be in writing; it may be either verbal or in writing. By the proof, without dispute, the Little Sisters of the Poor reserved in their notice to bidders the right to reject any and all bids. They were under no legal obligation to give it to the lowest bidder, and could have legally constituted their architect, Rapp, their agent to aid them in making a contract. The questions of fact are: Did they personally accept the bid of the Parker Brothers? Or, did they authorize Rapp, and did Rapp accept their bid and notify them that they had the contract? If there were a contract, did defendants know it, and did they induce or persuade a breach of the contract, either by their conference with the Little Sisters of the Poor or with their architect, Mr. Rapp? If there were a contract and they knew it, and they caused its breach even by lawful means of persuasion, they became liable for all legal compensatory damages caused to plaintiffs thereby. But even if there were a contract, and they did not know it, then they are not liable to plaintifis if they caused the breach of the contract by lawful means. I now call your attention to that status of the case existing in the event you have found that no contract was made with plaintiffs on their bid as to the building of the Little Sisters of the Poor, or with either of the material men, or with any of the workmen for any stipulated time of service. Observing the rules of law, as I have heretofore stated, pertaining to these issues, you should now determine whether the defendants, as is claimed, did maliciously, intending unlawfully combine to obstruct and interfere with the business of the plaintiffs, for the purpose of coercing them to put their business in defendants' control, and employ "union" labor according to their rules and regulations, and whether they did so combine to impoverish the plaintiffs, to ruin and break up their said business, and, by threats, intimidation, or other unlawful means, cause damage, to their business of contracting bricklayers, or if they merely lawfully entered into competition to extend their numbers and influence, and to obtain work for their members. As to any man in the employ of plaintiffs not under contract for any stipulated time, the defendants, as I before said, had a perfect legal right to solicit their membership in their Union for the honest purpose of benefit to the men or their order; but they had no right to threaten them or intimidate them, to cause them to do, from apprehension or fear, what they would not do of their own free will, or induce them by any other unlawful means. If defendants combined to do only a lawful thing, solely by lawiul means, and they in fact did nothing, either individually or in combination, but what they had a legal right to do, then the malice they had, if any, is immaterial. I have heretofore defined what I mean by threat and intimidation. It is for you to say, from all the proof which you deem casts light on this issue, whether the defendants threatened, and whether the employees were intimidated to quit the service of Parker Brothers, or not. Were there any unlawful means used to have the men quit? In this respect it is proper that I call your attention to the so-called circular describing the character of labor employed by plaintiffs. It was in violation of the rights of every competent workman in their employ to falsely charge him as an inferior workman. It is our duty towards every man who holds himself out as a skilled workman, in any trade, to adjudge him to have ordinary skill and competency as such workman until the proof show to the contrary. If, therefore, the defendants falsely charged any of such employees of plaintiffs as inferior workmen, in order to induce the men to quit them, it would be the use of unlawful means, and plaintiffs would be entitled to recover damages incurred to their business by reason of injury which is the direct result of such interference, if any, by the defendants. As to the controversy about the brickwork for the Little Sisters of the Poor: The defendants had a right to solicit, and, by all honest means, seek to obtain the work for the purpose of procuring it for some contractor who would work or employ union men, and enter into fair competition to obtain the contract for that purpose, provided they did not know of any contract given out to plaintiffs; and they would have this right, even though they knew plaintiffs were the lowest bidders just the same as for any contractor or bidder to compete honestly therefor. Upon the other hand, the law would not authorize them to prevent the plaintiffs obtaining the contract by threats or intimidation of either the sisters or the architect. Remembering the definition which I heretofore gave of the word "threat" and "intimidation"you should proceed to à full consideration of all the proof you deem to bear on this issue, and determine whether defendants have acted in good faith within their rightful competition, or, if they acted maliciously with the sole intent and purpose of obstructing the plaintiffs, by threats and acts of intimidation, to coerce them against their will to yield to their demands as to 223 Parker v. Bricklayers' Union et al. whom they should employ, or otherwise with the purpose of impoverishing and breaking up their business. If the defendants unlawfully prevented the plaintiffs from obtaining the contract, then they are liable to plaintiffs in damages for the injury caused thereby. If you have found no contract existing between the several material men and the plaintiffs, during the time in controversy, then it is necessary to consider the character of the conduct of the defendants towards these material men, and its connection with the business of the plaintiffs. If the distribution of the various circulars in proof, the various calls of certain of the defendants, and their demands, upon the material men, were a part of a combination by defendants to coerce the plaintiffs into a discharge of their apprentice, their brother, and the non-union men, against their will, or otherwise with the intent to impoverish them and break up their contracting business, and you further find that defendants did threaten the respective material men, customers and patrons of the plaintiffs, with injury to their property, by loss of a large portion of their trade if they refused to comply with defendants' demand; that such threat or threats did reasonably put said material men in fear, and you further find that by reason thereof defendants did intimidate said material men so as to cause them to refuse to trade with and sell to the plaintiffs or caused any of them to deal with plaintiffs on different conditions and terms than theretofore, to the damage of the plaintiffs, then the plaintiffs are entitled to recover such damages from the defendants. If the plaintiffs are entitled to recover, on each of the matters separately submitted to you, your verdict should be made up as follows: For inducing workmen to quit the service of plaintiffs, such damage, under all the proof, as fairly compensates them for the direct loss of such service. That loss would be the expense and value of time in procuring workmen to take their places, difference of wages, if any, shown by the proof, for the equivalent service, and any direct damage by delay of work necessary in making the exchange of hands. For injury, if any, by reason of defendants' conduct with material men, such damage as fairly compensates for loss of time, the extra cost, if any, for the lime, sand and brick and their delivery, over what they would have cost them without any interference by defendants. And, if you find for plaintiffs as to the brickwork of the Little Sisters of the Poor, the amount should be in damages such as fairly compensate for the loss of the work or contract, which should be estimated by deducting reasonable and probable cost, or what it was then worth to perform the contract from the amount of plaintiffs' bid therefor. In estimating what it was worth, or what it would then cost, you are to assume that the work would have been conducted in what you deem would have been the reasonably prudent and ordinary way. You should also take into account the services of the plaintiffs to superintend it, and the ordinary risks and conditions of such enterprises. And, by way of damages, to be included in any amount you may find, interest, at the rate of six per cent. per annum, from the time when such damages accrued, to the seventh day of January, 1889, the beginning of this term of court. If you find compensatory damages for the plaintiffs, and you further find that the defendants caused the injuries complained of, maliciously, then you may add thereto, as compensatory damages, such sum as you think just for plaintiffs' expense in employing counsel to prosecute this cause of action. No testimony is admissible to prove the value, but you have had opportunity to estimate the same by actual observation of the service rendered by their attorneys. And now, if in the just judgment of the jury, the defendants were actuated by such excessive degree of malice, that mere compensatory damages are not, in your opinion, sufficient loss to and punishment f the defendants, then the law authorizes you to include as a part of your verdict, such sum of money as you justly think ought to be recovered in the name and for the benefit of the plantiffs, as exemplary or punitive damages. The law leaves it wholly to the discretion of a jury, whether any sum whatever, and, if any, how much, should be added therefor. You will see to it that your care to administer justice in this respect, will be in proportion to the large discretion which the law imposes on you; remembering that when you take from one to give to another, as a punishment, it must only be in such sum, as is just and meets the approval of good conscience. In considering all issues of fact as to motive, you should consider all proof admitted on provocation, motive and general state of mind of defendants, their controversy with plaintiffs in August, 1886, about the order as to the hod carriers, by the bricklayers' union, the order of the "boss contractors" claimed to be in response thereto, and the notice to plaintiffs' union men to quit work, also the circumstances inducing the fine of plaintiffs' brother, David Parker, by defendant union, such information as defendants had before they issued and distributed the circular letter, as to any inferior work done by the men employed by the plaintifs, and whether they, in good faith, considered it as evidence of inferior workmanship, giving to these and other facts, such weight as you deem they reasonably had, or ought to have had, upon the minds of the defendants, in any controversy following, having a connection herewith. You will also remember not to include double damages for any injury growing out of the issuing and distribution of the circular letter. What amount, if any, you include in one count, you must not include in the other. The burden is on the plaintiff as to the issues of the second count, to establish, by a preponderance of the proof, the plaintiffs' claim. Authorities cited and considered on the second cause of action. Vol. 1, p. 144, Blackstone. Pub. Co., Oct. 1, 1887. Review of cases: Greenwood on Public Policy, 648; Wood's Master and Servant, 450 et seq; Com. v. Hunt., 4 Met., III; Benton v. Pratt, 2 Wend., 385; Corew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass., 1; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass., 555; Snow v. Wheeler, 113 Mass., ; State v. Donaldson, 32 N. J. Law. 151; Coal Co. v. Coal Co., 68 Pa. St., 173; The Phila. Boot & Shoe-makers' case; Yates' Select Cases, 144; The Phila. Jour., Tailors' case, Phil., 1827, pp. 103, 160; State v. Stewart, 59 Vt., 273; (9 Atl. Rep., 559), 1988; State v. Glidden, 55 Conn., 46; (30 Fed. Rep., 40); Crunp v. Comth. Va., 3 Ry. & Law Jour. 559; Steamship Co. v. McKenna, 30 Fed. Rep., 48; Rex v. Rowlands, 5 Cox Crim. Rep., 436: Rex v. Duffield Id., 404; Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 15 Queen's Bench. As to Threats and Intimidation: 24 Fed. Rep., 217; 27 Fed. Rep., 443; 23 Fed. Rep., 544. The jury returned a general verdict $3,700 (as compensatory damages) and various special verdicts on the causes of action and material issues of fact submitted to them. Bateman & Harper, attorneys for plaintiffs. |