validity of the claim is generally a good ground for the personal representative to effect a settlement.2 Even though the statute provides that the personal representative may compromise or compound claims with the approval of the court, yet if he compromises or compounds a claim and such action is taken in good faith and results in benefit to the estate, there is no reason why, in passing upon the account of the representative, the court should not at such time approve the transaction and establish its validity. 3 § 1502. Right of Personal Representative to Submit Claims to Arbitration. The common law rule is that the personal representative may submit to arbitration any claim in which the estate is interested, whether alleged to be due to or against the estate. This right, however, does not extend to special administrators. In most jurisdictions the matter has been covered by statute. The English statute does not restrict the common law powers of the personal representative, but relieves him from all responsibility 2 Taylor v. Sanson, 24 Cal. App. 515, 141 Pac. 1060, 1061; Berrien's Estate, 16 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 23. 3 Moulton v. Holmes, 57 Cal. 337, 344; Maddock v. Russell, 109 Cal. 417, 422, 42 Pac. 139; Taylor v. Sanson, 24 Cal. App. 515, 141 Pac. 1060, 1061; Fletcher v. American T. & B. Co., 111 Ga. 300, 78 Am. St. Rep. 164, 36 S. E. 767. See, also, Mulville v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 19 Mont. 95, 101, 47 Pac. 650; Trotter v. Mutual Reserve Fund L. Assn., 9 S. D. 5 596, 602, 62 Am. St. Rep. 887, 70 N. W. 843. 4 Pearson v. Henry, 5 Term R. 6; Worthington v. Barlow, 7 Term Rep. 453; Lyle v. Rogers, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 394, 5 L. Ed. 117; Jones v. Blalock, 31 Ala. 180; Hutchins v. Johnson, 12 Conn. 376, 30 Am. Dec. 622; Murray v. Hawkins, 144 Ga. 613, 87 S. E. 1068; Kendall v. Bates, 35 Me. 357; Coffin v. Cottle, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 454; Wood v. Tunnicliff, 74 N. Y. 38. 5 Sullivan v. Nicoulin, 113 Iowa 76, 84 N. W. 978. 8 where he acts in good faith." The American statutes usually require that the representative must secure an order of court before.submitting a matter to arbitration." The effect of such statutes is the same as those with reference to the personal representative compromising or compounding claims, namely, that if the personal representative secure an order of court authorizing him to submit a matter to arbitration, he is relieved from any personal liability in the matter. Where the representative is authorized to submit a matter to arbitration, the award is effective and binding upon the estate.10 If the personal representative acts wrongfully in the matter and the estate is injured thereby, he may be held personally liable by those interested in the estate.1 11 §1503. As to Right or Duty of Personal Representative to Plead Statute of Limitations or of Frauds. There is a conflict of authority as to the right or duty of the personal representative to plead the statute of lim 6 Statute of 44 and 45 Vict., ch. 41. 7 Sullivan v. Nicoulin, 113 Iowa 76, 84 N. W. 978; Browne v. Preston, 38 Md. 373; McKeen v. Oliphant, 18 N. J. L. 442; Matter of Eichman, 33 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 322, 68 N. Y. Supp. 636; McLeod v. Graham, 132 N. C. 473, 43 S. E. 935; Powers v. Douglass, 53 Vt. 471, 38 Am. Rep. 699. 8 See preceding section. 9 Chadbourn v. Chadbourn, 9 Allen (Mass.) 173; Wood v. Tunnicliff, 74 N. Y. 38; Powers v. Douglass, 53 Vt. 471, 38 Am. Rep. 699. 10 Pearson v. Henry, 5 Term R. 6; Coffin v. Cottle, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 454; Crum v. Moore's Admr., 14 N. J. Eq. 436, 82 Am. Dec. 262; McLeod v. Graham, 132 N. C. 473, 43 S. E. 935; Unterrainer v. Seelig, 13 S. D. 148, 82 N. W. 394. An award duly made and published regarding matters submitted by all interested parties to arbitration, has the binding force of a judgment.-Harris v. Harris' Estate, 82 Vt. 199, 72 Atl. 912. 11 Worthington v. Barlow, 7 Term Rep. 453; Armitage v. Metcalfe, 1 Ch. Cas. 74; District of Columbia v. Bailey, 171 U. S. 161, itations against a claim for a just debt contracted by the decedent in his lifetime. The rule in England and in many jurisdictions in the United States is that the personal representative is not bound to plead the statute of limitations. The reason of the rule is that the failure to plead the statute or even an acknowledgment of the debt by partial payment or otherwise does not create a new liability, but merely continues an old one which otherwise could not be enforced. 12 On the other hand, in many jurisdictions in the United States it is held that the personal representative of a decedent has no authority to acknowledge any debt or liability so as to take it out of the statute of limitations. The executor or administrator of an estate after the death of the decedent is merely the legal representative of the estate; he is not personally liable for the debts of the decedent; he is purely a business representative and can in no wise represent the conscience or sense of equity or justice of the deceased debtor. It is therefore held that when the debtor dies, the power and authority to waive the statute of limitations dies with him, and the personal representative has no right to create a liability against the estate by making a new and independent contract to pay the alleged debt.18 And the 43 L. Ed. 118, 18 Sup. Ct. 868; Crum v. Moore's Admr., 14 N. J. Eq. 436, 82 Am. Dec. 262; Nelson's Admr. v. Cornwell, 11 Gratt. (Va.) 724. 12 Hill v. Walker, 4 Kay & J. 166; In re Rownson (Field v. White), 29 Ch. Div. 358; Midgley V. Midgley (1893), 3 Ch. 282; Friedman v. Shamblin, 117 Ala. 454, 23 So. 821; Chambers v. Fennemore's Admr., 4 Harr. (Del.) 368; Hord's Admrs. v. Lee, 4 T. B. 13 Rector v. Conway, 20 Ark. 79; Etchas v. Orena, 127 Cal. 588, 60 Pac. 45; Peck v. Botsford, 7 rule last mentioned has been applied to the statute of frauds; thus an executor or administrator is liable for devastavit if the estate suffers through his failure to plead such statute.14 § 1504. Claims Must Be Pro Rated When Estate Is Insolvent. Upon the death of an insolvent debtor the law contemplates equality in the distribution of his estate among his creditors. If a creditor seeks to recover more than his pro rata share, he seeks that which does not belong to him and which would occasion a direct loss to the other creditors. It is said that to insist upon full payment from an insolvent estate is dishonest if the party thus insisting is aware of the insolvency. If a creditor, whether under the erroneous belief that the estate is solvent or whether he is acquainted with its true condition, receives full payment from an insolvent estate, he is obliged to return the Conn. 172, 18 Am. Dec. 92; Patterson v. Cobb, 4 Fla. 481; Dern v. Olsen, 18 Ida. 358, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 1, L. R. A. 1915B, 1016, 110 Pac. 164; Marshall v. Coleman, 187 Ill. 556, 58 N. E. 628; Pole v. Simmons, 49 Md. 14; Bambrick v. Bambrick, 157 Mo. 423, 58 S. W. 8; In re Mouillerat's Estate, 14 Mont. 245, 36 Pac. 185; Fitzgerald's Estate v. Chariton First Natl. Bank, 64 Neb. 260, 89 N. W. 813; Jones v. Powning, 25 Nev. 399, 60 Pac. 833; Matter of Goss, 98 App. Div. (N. Y.) 489, 90 N. Y. Supp. 769; McLaren v. McMartin, 36 N. Y. 88; Smith v. Pattie, 81 Va. 654; Van Winkle v. Blackford, 33 W. Va. 573, 11 S. E. 26; O'Keefe v. Foster, 5 Wyo. 343, 40 Pac. 525. Compare: King's Admr, v. Cassidy's Admr., 36 Tex. 531. After reviewing the authorities, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania says: "It will be seen from these most explicit decisions that the personal representative is not answerable for a cause of action not created by the decedent; that if by a new promise he revive a debt already barred, or prolongs the life of one not yet barred, the contract is his own, and he is personally liable. In re Claghorn's Estate, 181 Pa. St. 600, 59 Am. St. Rep. 680, 37 Atl. 918. 14 In re Rownson White), 29 Ch. Div. 358. (Field V. surplus which he may have received in excess of the dividend to which he is entitled when it becomes judicially ascertained that the debts of the estate can be paid in part only. The personal representative is not justified in paying any creditors the full amount of their claims when he has knowledge that the estate is insolvent. But if, erroneously believing the estate to be solvent, he pays a creditor in full, he is entitled, either in an action at law or a suit in equity, to compel the creditor to return the amount which he has received in excess of that to which he is entitled.15 §1505. Duty of Personal Representative Regarding Uncompleted Contracts of Decedent. Where parties enter a written contract, it is presumed that they intend not only to bind themselves, but their personal representatives. If a decedent in his lifetime has broken a contract, his estate is liable therefor and the personal representative, so far as he has the assets, must pay the damages occasioned. If there has been no breach of contract by the decedent, the personal representative 15 Mansfield v. Lynch, 59 Conn. 320, 12 L. R. A. 285, 22 Atl. 313; Wolf v. Beaird, 123 Ill. 585, 5 Am. St. Rep. 565, 15 N. E. 161; Morris v. Porter, 87 Me. 510, 33 Atl. 15; Walker v. Hill, 17 Mass. 380; Flint v. Valpey, 130 Mass. 385; In re Hodgman's Estate, 140 N. Y. 421, 431, 35 N. E. 660; Rogers v. Weaver, 5 Ohio 536. Where an insolvent decedent in Illinois left property also in Missouri which was administered there, creditors who have received part payment of their claims in Missouri must account for the same when presenting their claims in Illinois so that all creditors of the decedent may be paid pro rata.-Ramsay v. Ramsay, 196 Ill. 179, 63 N. E. 618. See 1380, n. 50, ancillary administration. Compare: In Beardsley v. Marsteller, 120 Ind. 319, 22 N. E. 315, it is said "that in the absence of an agreement to refund, an administrator who has paid money on account of a just debt can not recover it back on the ground that |