II. The next argument is, That endless punishment is out of all proportion to the demerit of sin, as the former is infinite, the latter finite.-As this is a matter of great importance in the present dispute, it requires our particular attention.-How then does Dr. C. make it appear, that sin is a finite evil? By these several considerations, that it is the fault of a finite creature,—during a finite life, and the effect of finite principles, passions and appetites; the sum of which is, that it is impossible for a creature, in a finite duration, to commit an infinite crime; or which is the same thing, a crime which shall deserve an endless punishment.-As to this let it be observed, * 1. That if it be impossible for a creature, in a finite duration, to commit a crime which shall deserve an endless punishment, it is as really against what Dr. C. holds, as against the opposite system. He says, "If the next is a state of punishment intended to satisfy the justice of God, 'tis impossible all men should be finally saved:" that is, if in the next state a punishment be inflicted, which satisfies justice, all men will not be saved, But a punishment, which satisfies justice is a perfectly just punishment. It is therefore just, that some men should finally not be saved; or it is just, that on account of their sins, they be without end excluded from salvation. And what is the endless exclusion of a sinner from salvation on account of his sins, but an endless punishment inflicted for the fault of a finite creature, committed in a finite life, and the effect of finite principles, passions and appetites ?-This passage of Dr. C, is a plain and full concession both of the justice of endless punishment, and of the infinite evil of sin. That sin is an infinite evil, or an evil deserving an endless punishment, is implied in all those passages also, * Page 11. in which Dr. C. asserts, that the salvation of all men, and even of the damned, after they have suffered all which they ever are to suffer, is the fruit of boundless and inexhaustible goodness, infinite indulgence and love, &c, In his argument that the punishment of the damned is disciplinary, he says, "That God must in the other world, as well as this, be disposed to make it evident, that he is a being of boundless and inexhaustible goodness." It is plain by the connexion, that the Doctor means, that the deliverance of the damned, in consequence of a punishment, which is conducive to their good, is an act of boundless and inexhaustible goodness. But that the goodness of that act of deliverance is not greater than the evil or punishment from which it deliv ers, will be conceded by all. There is goodness in delivering a man from the toothach; but no man will pretend, that this is an act of boundless and inexhaustible goodness. To deliver from the misery of a thousand years torment in hell, is an act of far greater goodness, But this is not an act of boundless and inexhaustible goodness. Nor is any act of deliverance worthy of these epithets, unless it deliver from an evil, which is boundless and inexhaustible. Doubtless the act of God in delivering a sinner from the punishment of hell is called an act of boundless and inexhaustible goodness with respect to the greatness of the benefit conferred by that deliverance, and not with respect to the inherent and essential goodness of God. If the latter be Doctor C's meaning, what he says is no illustration of the divine goodness in delivering a sinner from the pains of hell: he might have said the same concerning the deliverance of any person guilty or innocent, from the toothach, or from the prick of a pin. He says, that God in the other world, as well as this, must be disposed to Page 326. make it evident, that he is a being of boundless and inexhaustible goodness. But if the deliverance of a sinner from the pains of hell be not a boundless benefit, it does not make it evident, that God is a being of boundless goodness. If it be a boundless benefit, the evil delivered from is boundless. If therefore the deliverance of the damned from the torments of hell, be an act and a proof of boundless and inexhaustible goodness, as the Doctor holds, the evil from which they are delivered, and to which they are exposed by the divine law, is boundless and inexhaustible. But they are not by the divine law exposed to a greater punishment than they justly deserve therefore they justly deserve a boundless or inexhaustible punishment of consequence sin, by which they deserve this punishment, is a boundless and inexhaustible or an infinite evil. : Again, Dr. C. in the words of Mr. Whiston, says,* "Many, or all of them," [the damned] "may possibly be recovered and saved at last, by the infinite indulgence and love of their Creator." The same observations, which were made in the preceding paragraph, are applicable here. It cannot be the meaning of Dr. C. that the recovery of the damned is in no other sense a fruit or proof of the infinite indulgence and love of their Creator, than the recovery of a person in this life from the smallest disease, or calamity; or the deliverance of even an innocent being from some slight evil. A less degree of indulgence and love, than that which is infinite, would be sufficient for these recoveries, or deliverances. if nothing short of infinite indulgence and love can recover the damned, then their recovery is a proof of infinite love Now what can be a proof of infinite love, but the bestowment of an infinite benefit? And no benefit consisting in recovery from evil is infinite, unless the * Page 405. And evil, from which the recovery is made, be infinite. But if the evil from which the damned are supposed to be recovered, be infinite, sin, by which they are exposed to that evil, must itself be an infinite evil. If here it should be objected, that the damned are not indeed delivered from wrath, by boundless goodness and infinite love; but that boundless goodness and infinite love are exercised in their admission to the positive happiness of heaven only: I entreat the reader to observe, that in the former of the two passages last quoted, Dr. C. is speaking of God's making evident his boundless and inexhaustible goodness, by pitying sinners, and punishing them in order to their benefit, or by the deliverance of the damned, in consequence of a disciplinary punishment. In the other, he is speaking in the words of Mr. Whiston, concerning the recovery of the damned-But for a more full answer I beg leave to refer the reader to page 24, where this same objection has been stated and considered. That sin is an infinite evil, is implied in what Dr. C. holds concerning annihilation; he says, "If the foregoing scheme should be found to have no truth in it—the second death ought to be considered as that which will put an end to their existence both in soul and body, so that they shall be no more in the creation of God." By this it appears that the Doctor held, that endless annihilation would be no unjust punishment of sin. But endless annihilation is an endless or infinite punishment. It is an endless loss of not only all the good which the man at present enjoys; but of all that good which he would have enjoyed throughout eternity, in the state of bliss to which he would have been admitted, if he had never sinned. This in an endless duration would amount to an infinite quantity of good. Annihilation therefore is an infinite punishment both as it is endless, and as the quan tity of good lost is infinite and Dr. C. in allowing that endless annihilation would be no more than a just punishment of sin, allows, that sin deserves an infinite punishment, or that it is an infinite evil, though it is the fault of a finite creature, in a finite life, and the effect of finite principles, passions and appetites. If therefore it be a difficulty hard to be solved, that a finite creature, in a finite life, should commit an infinite evil, meaning a crime which may be justly punished with an endless punishment; it is a difficulty that equally concerned Dr. C. as myself; and it was absurd for him to object that to others, which lay equally in his own way. It may be objected to these observations, that endless annihilation is not an infinite punishment, because it may be inflicted on even an innocent person. God having once communicated existence is under no obligation to perpetuate it; but for wise ends may without injury suffer even the most holy of his creatures, after the enjoyment of existence and of good for a season, to drop into their original nothing. To this it may be answered; that this objection equally proves, that annihilation is no punishment at all, as that it is not an infinite punishment. When an innocent creature is suffered in sovereign wisdom to drop into non-existence, this is not only not an infinite punishment, but is no punishment at all A punishment is some evil brought on a person, in testimony that his conduct is disapproved by the author of that evil. This is not the casc in the annihilation of the innoceat person now supposed. Therefore it equally follows from the possible annihilation of an innocent creature, that the annihilation of the wicked would be nounishment at all, as that it would not be an infinite panishment. Annihilation is an infinite loss, and in that code, an infinite evil, to an innocent person, as well as er so guilty. But as it is not inflicted on the |