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I think the more we expound the philosophy of government to the people the healthier it will be.

I am not for a short presidential campaign. I think that is a mistake. Surely, there is a lot of haranguing going on, a lot of irritation, but it takes a long time to reach 155,000,000 people. Our campaign is for 60 days—September and October—or 9 weeks' time. I think it takes that much time to grass-root the campaign and educate the people to the economics and the principles of the respective parties and the candidates.

I would not like to see the period shortened. I would like to see a ceiling on the amount that can be spent. I would like to see a ceiling on the amount that a family could give to a campaign. I would like to see a limit on the amount that the unions could give to any campaign, or a ceiling upon the amount that any particular business could give to any campaign.

Now, one other thought, and that is on the contributions that can be made and the limit we have upon our senatorial races. That comes under the Hatch Act. I was called before a committee 8 years ago after we were shellacked by Fulbright and his group, and Senators Ferguson and Tunnell were the heads of that committee.

Mr. KEATING. That was in the Senate ?
Mr. SCOTT. Yes.

Imagine the Members of Congress making a law limiting the amount to $25,000 for Senator Ferguson, of Michigan, to make the race and to tell Senator Green and Senator Tunnell, of Rhode Island and Delaware, that they can spend $25,000. It is impossible; it is a strait-jacket. It forces good men like myself—and I try to be halfway decent in my politics—to make statements and do things that we do not want to do in our own hearts and minds, and which we would not do in business.

I spent $77,000 in that race.
Mr. KEATING. In the race against Fulbright?

Mr. Scott. Yes, and they did a good job in spanking us. We did not want Homer to run, but he was just like a man wanting to get married, and we had to pitch in and do our best. We took a trimming because we had Senator Fulbright and a lot of others against us. It was impossible.

My point is this: I told Senators Ferguson and Tunnell when they got through questioning me—“Can I make two or three observations?" and they said, “Yes.” I said that it is impossible for people to live within the spirit that 531 intelligent men passed into law, and that was that you could only spend $25,000 when you had 218 weekly newspapers, 60 daily newspapers in Michigan, and 6,000,000 people and 68,000 square miles to cover.

Senator Green was not present, but in Rhode Island he does not have but about 20 weekly and daily papers combined. In a small place like Delaware, big in a lot of respects but small when it comes to people and the numbers of Congressmen, and so forth, they do not have over 20 papers, but they say to Senators Tunnell and Green that they can spend $25,000 and say to men in Michigan and Illinois and Pennsylvania they can spend only $25,000. It puts each and everyone of us who are sincerely trying to assist a friend, for different reasons-selfishly or because we like them, or we are in the game and it is a part of us—it puts us in an attitude of having to be actually unfair and honestly dishonest as far as the spirit of the law itself is concerned. So I would say that that has to be given a lot of consideration. The $25,000 limitation should be swept off the books.

Mr. KEATING. Do you think the answer to all these problems is to just eliminate all limitations entirely?

Mr. Scott. No, I do not, but you have to make it more flexible. If I were you gentlemen, I would certainly get into that one. That law cannot stand on the books and be equitable.

Mr. KEATING. You would make a different limit for large States and small States?

Mr. Scott. I think that you have to do it just like you do it for the Congressmen. You have so many from New York and there are only going to be six from Arkansas.

Mr. KEATING. Let me tell you that that is very fine in theory, but when you come to working it out practically with Members of Congress—to draw a distinction between the populous States and the nonpopulous States—you are encountering some

very difficult problems.

Mr. Scott. I appreciate that.

Mr. KEATING. Because we have had the same question with regard to congressional office expenses, where obviously those in populous States or districts have greater expense than those in smaller districts. It has never been possible to work out a formula which would be acceptable in Congress which would draw a distinction between one Congressman's district and another.

Mr. Scott. You are from Buffalo, are you not?
Mr. KEATING. Not far from there, Rochester.

Mr. Scott. You are limited to one city, is that right! I mean your campaigning? Mr. KEATING. Not any longer. There was a redistricting.

Mr. Scott. Now, the other good Republican member of this committee is from Ohio.

Mr. McCULLOCH. That is right. Mr. Scott. He has about eight counties, seven or eight counties, in his district.

Mr. McCULLOCH. Seven.
Mr. Scort. It is an agricultural district, more or less.

Mr. KEATING. You have been looking into the personnel of this committee?

Mr. Scott. That is all right. There are about 277,000 or 280,000 people in your district and about 7 counties.

. Mr. MCCULLOCH. Since we are going into statistics, about 350,000, and it is the great Miami Valley.

Mr. SCOTT. My point is this: For you to get around and expose your philosophy and personality in your agricultural or in your rural district, and for me to just say that you have to limit your expense to a certain amount, it just does not make sense to me to try to put those things into a strait-jacket. You just cannot do it.

Mr. KEATING. Do you propose giving Mr. McCulloch more money than you do me? Mr SCOTT. Well-you gentlemen have been very kind. Mr. KEATING. You have been very helpful.

Mr. SCOTT. Anyone from Arkansas blows off a whole lot, so I just wanted the privilege.


Mr. KEATING. We enjoyed your presentation.

Mr. Scott. When I arrived last night I expected to have a few more inserts to put into this record, and they failed to send them to me from my home. I would like to have permission within the next 4 or 5 days to send them to you and have them inserted in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. That permission will be granted.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mills, our colleague from Arkansas, says that you are the best money raiser in the whole State of Arkansas.

Mr. Scott. We had a lot of help from Senator Robinson and men like that. You have to dignify this business, and you have to dignify it and add prestige to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Paul Walker, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission. We are glad to see you, Mr. Walker. Will you give your name?



Mr. WALKER. My name is Paul A. Walker. I am Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission. I am appearing here today at the invitation of this committee to discuss with you briefly some of the problems relating to election campaigns in general and the recent presidential campaign in particular, insofar as they affect the radio and television fields, over which the Commission exercises regulatory authority.

I am sure I don't have to underscore the importance of radio and television in modern political campaigns and the vital importance of these media in presenting the cases of competing candidates and parties. This is a matter which was recognized by Congress at the very beginning of effective radio regulations in 1927, and what was true then is obviously even more the case today. Moreover, I wish to state at the outset my firm belief that the record of radio and television over the years, and especially in the recent campaign, is, on the whole, one of which we can be proud.

It is obviously important that the full potential of these important new media of mass communications be achieved so that the people may be informed as to the issues of campaigns and the positions of competing candidates. It is essential at the same time that these valuable media do not become the monopoly of any one point of view, of any one political party, or of any one particular candidate.

The basic law under which the Commission operates in this field, which has not been changed significantly since the adoption of the Radio Iet in 1927, appears in section 315 of the Communications Act. It is not very long and because of its importance I should like to cite it in full. It reads as follows:

SEC. 315. (a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station : Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section. No obligation is hereby imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate.

(1) The charges made for the use of any broadcasting station for any of the purposes set forth in this section shall not exceed the charges made for comparable use of such station for other purposes.


(c) The Commission shall prescribe appropriate rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this section.

It is apparent from the language of this section that the basic intent of Congress was to insure that candidates for public office receive fair and equal treatment in their use of radio and television facilities. There are, however, certain basic facts relative to this provision to which I should like to refer which may merit a certain amount of more detailed discussion.

In the first place, section 315 of the Communications Act is directly applicable only to the use of broadcast facilities by the candidates themselves. It is not applicable to the use of such facilities by spokesmen for candidates even where such spokesmen have been authorized to act in this capacity by the candidates. This is made clear by the decision of the Federal courts in Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc. (186 F. 2d, cert. den., 341 U.S. 909).

Secondly, the section 'affords rights only to "legally qualified” candidates for public office. This, of course, raises the question as to who is a “legally qualified” candidate, and when does he become such a candidate? This determination must be based upon State law since, except for the minimum qualifications for elective Federal offices set out in the United States Constitution, the States have the authority for determining who may or who may not be a “legally qualified candidate for public office. But this question of who is a "legally qualified” candidate, under the law of a particular State or States, has presented some problems for the Commission which I wish to discuss briefly a little later.

Third, it should be noted that the section does not require stations to afford free time to any “legally qualified” candidate to use their facilities. All that is required is that where a station does permit one "legally qualified" candidate for any office to use its facilities, it must afford “equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office” in the use of its facilities. This means that if a station gives time free of charge to any candidate, it must give time, under comparable conditions, to all other legally qualified candidates for the same office. If, however, it sells time to a candidate, the station is under a legal obligation only to sell comparable time at comparable rates to his legally qualified opponents.

Finally, it is to be noted that the act specifically provides that the use of broadcast facilities by legally qualified candidates pursuant to the provisions of section 315 of the Communications Act is not to be subject to any censorship by the station licensee.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt you there, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. WALKER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We have had some discussion about this, and I would like to have the benefit of your thinking and your counsel. Does that mean a station has no authority whatsoever in the realm of libelous material? Candidate A goes to station B_to make a political broadcast which the station knows is libelous. The station then has no authority to edit that libelous material under the existing rules of the Federal Communications Commission?

Mr. WALKER. That is our understanding of the law.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that your understanding?




Mr. COTTONE. That is correct, and that has been stated in a decision of the Commission in the so-called Port Huron case, of which we have copies for insertion in the record if the committee so desires.

The CHAIRMAN. If the next day the station is sued for libel, may the station plead as its defense the ruling of the Federal Communications Commission?

Mr. COTTONE. Yes. It may plead that Congress having imposed a disability on the station by prohibiting the censorship of that material, it has similarly occupied the field so far as State libel laws are concerned, so that the station can have no culpability.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any decisions to that effect?

Mr. COTTONE. Yes; we cite the decision of the Federal court in Western Union v. O'Brien.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a decision on Federal preemption ?
Mr. COTTONE. Federal preemption; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any decisions involving the extent of liability of a radio station in the circumstances we are discussing?

Mr. COTTONE. I am not sure I understand your question.
The CHAIRMAN. Of State courts?

Mr. COTTONE. The answer is, there is no such decision where there has been a direct ruling by a Federal court.

Mr. WALKER. Or State court?

Mr. COTTONE. Except in Felix v. Westinghouse there is implicit in the court's decision the ruling that if the person involved there had been the candidate for public office who was speaking, rather than somebody speaking for the candidate for public office, that the censorship provision would have been applicable, and accordingly the station would not be able to censor, and it would follow from there that there would be no liability. That was the defense pleaded in the Felix v. Westinghouse case, so implicit in the decision in that case is the ruling that if it had been the candidate himself speaking, the station would not have been liable for the libelous material.

The CHAIRMAN. When did the Federal Communications Commission make this ruling?

Mr. COTTONE. The Port Huron case decision was adopted June 28, 1948, and released June 30, 1948.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a specific ruling by the Federal Communications Commission?

Mr. COTTONE. It is a specific ruling in this sense: We had a factual situation in the Port Huron case which involved the question of censorship, and the Federal Communications Commission did rule that under the conditions involved there, there had been committed an unauthorizedy act of censorship, but the factual situation was such that the Commission did not feel in that particular instance there should be a denial of rights to the station for what it did

The CHAIRMAN. What act of Congress do you rely upon for that ruling?

Mr. COTTONE. Section 315 of the Communications Act, in which it is expressly stated, as the chairman read, thatsuch licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section.


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