by the plaintiff, and we do not, therefore, think that they apply; but still, we think, it ought to appear on the warrant, in express terms, or by reasonable intendment, that the authority, which is out of the course of the common law, has been strictly pursued. It was admitted by the counsel for the plaintiffs, that there is no case in which a mere warrant of distress has been held bad on such an objection; and as we are not bound by any express authority, and think that the same strictness ought not to prevail in them as is required in convictions, and as it does sufficiently appear on the face of this warrant that the authority of the magistrates has been carried out in a due mode of procedure, we are of opinion that this warrant is good, and that the defendants are entitled to have the verdict entered for them. The rule must therefore be made absolute. 1847. ORMEROD v. CHADWICK. VOL. II. C C C Rule absolute. N. S. C. INDEX TO THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS. 2. The stat. 8 Vict. c. 10, provides An order recited that application had 54 3. The 8 Vict. c. 10, s. 1, reciting Where an order of two justices on 5. The stat. 2 & 3 Vict. c. 85, directs that an application for an order in bastardy shall be made by the guardians of any parish, or of the union in which any parish may be situate, or, if there shall be no such guardians, then the overseers of such parish may, if they think proper, apply. On objection taken by the person against whom the order was made:-Held, that an order shewing that the application was made by the overseers of a township supporting its own poor, without stating that there were no guardians, or that the township formed part of a union, was bad. Regina v. Smith, 225 6. Where justices at petty sessions refused to hear an application for an order in bastardy under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, s. 2, unless it was shewn that a former order stated to have been made by the same justices, but of the existence of which no evidence was given, had been quashed, not on the merits-Held, that the justices were not justified in assuming the existence of the former order, and requiring proof of the grounds upon which it was quashed, before hearing this application. Regina v. E. Bridg 24th of June, was served on the 27th on the putative father, who, on the same day, gave notice of appeal. At the following sessions, an objection being taken that his notice of appeal was not in time, he tendered evidence to prove that the order appealed against was in fact signed on the 27th, but the justices refused to receive the evidence, held the notice insufficient, and dismissed the appeal:- Held, that the evidence ought to have been received, the time for notice of appeal dating from the signature, not the pronouncing of the order by the justices; and the Court granted a mandamus to the justices to hear the appeal. Regina v. Justices of Flintshire, 236 8. The 8 Vict. c. 10, s. 3, provides, that, in case of appeal against an order in bastardy, the putative father entering into a recognisance to prosecute the appeal shall forthwith give or send a notice in writing of his having so entered into such recognisance to the woman in whose favour the order shall have been made, and that the sending of such notice by the post shall be sufficient :-Held, that service of a notice seventeen days after entering into the recognisance was too late. Where personal service is not required by a statute, service at the dwelling-house is sufficient. Ex parte Lowe, 331 9. An order in bastardy under the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 10, which enables a putative father to appear by attorney or counsel, stated that the putative father appeared in person, and in a subsequent part of the order that the evidence was received in the presence and hearing of the attorney attending on his behalf, held sufficient. Regina v. Shipperbottom, 641 1. Where an order of removal stated that J. C. and her five children "have lately intruded and come into the parish of St. G., and have become actually chargeable to the same:"Held, that this was not a sufficient statement that the paupers had come to inhabit or settle in St. G., within the 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 12. A certiorari to bring up an order of removal may be issued at the instance of the parish upon which the order is made, before any appeal has been entered against such order. Regina v. Wollatts, 5 2. By a local act (6 & 7 Vict. c. lxxvi), commissioners were appointed to drain and improve certain lands. The act contains several sections relating to summary proceedings before justices, and then follows a clause, (s. 158), enacting, "that no proceedings in pursuance of the act shall be removed by certiorari." By a subsequent section an appeal to the quarter sessions is given to persons aggrieved by any decision of the commissioners under the act:-Held, that the clause as to the certiorari related as well to the proceedings at quarter sessions as to the summary proceedings before justices. Regina v. Justices of Lind sey, 56 3. An order of a court of quarter sessions, that "no officer of their court shall thereafter take or demand any fee or payment whatever from any defendant in cases of misdemeanour," may be removed by certiorari. A table of fees, duly made and sanctioned under 57 Geo. 3, c. 91, authorising fees to be taken from defendants in misdemeanours, is legal, and an order of sessions ordering officers not to take such fees is illegal. 144 Regina v. Coles, 4. Notice to justices of an intention to move for a certiorari "in six days from the giving this notice, or as soon after as counsel can be heard," sufficient. Regina v. Rose, 166 5. The Court will grant a certiorari to bring up an order of removal for defects appearing on the face of it, although the appellants, the parties making the application, did not avail themselves of their right of appeal, but allowed the time for appealing to elapse without taking any proceedings against the order. A certiorari was therefore granted to bring up an order of removal, where it did not appear that the justices who made the order were justices who had jurisdiction, or were acting within it. Regina v. Blathwayt, 240 6. This Court refused to grant a certiorari to bring up an order of sessions made subject to a case, on an application more than six months after the order was made, although the applicants had attended at the Judges' Chambers within the time, but had failed, in consequence of the nonattendance of a Judge there till after the six months had expired. Ex parte Inhabitants of Llanbeblig, 315 CHARGEABILITY. 1. The examination of a pauper contained the following statement of chargeability:-"I have lived in the township of P. for some time past, |