1847. V. all remuneration for his own trouble, but to be out of The QUEEN pocket for the payment of those whom he has sumThe Justices of moned to attend him, and for those other expenses CARMARTHEN- which are necessarily and unavoidably incurred in such a case. The rule as to the allowance of his own fees will be discharged; as to the other part, it will be absolute. SHIRE. Rule accordingly. END OF TRINITY TERM. 1847. Court of Exchequer. HILARY TERM, 1847. The QUEEN v. Samuel Gaunt Gamble. ON appeal against a conviction by three of her Majesty's justices of the peace for the borough of Leeds, in the county of York, which came on to be tried at the quarter sessions of the peace for the said borough held on the 31st of December, 1845, before Thomas Flower Ellis, Esquire, recorder of the said borough, the said recorder quashed the conviction, and reversed the judgment of the justices, subject to the opinion and direction of the Court of Exchequer on a case embodying the following facts: On the 26th of September in the year 1845, Joseph Bedford, one of her Majesty's officers of excise, exhibited an information against Samuel Gaunt Gamble before a justice of the peace for the said borough of Leeds. The information contained four counts. The first charged, that the defendant, being a maltster, did give to one A. B., then being an officer of excise, two securities for sums of money, amounting together to the sum of £20, in order to corrupt and prevail upon the Stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 53, s. 82, (Excise), gives to the party aggrieved by the decision of justices as to any breach of the Excise laws, a right of appeal to the quarter ses sions, provided certain notices be given. By section 84, the justices at quarter sessions are required to re-hear upon re-examine the oath and to same witnesses, and no others, on which the original judgment was given; and they are empowered, on such appeal, to reverse or confirm, in the whole or in part, the judg.. ment appealed against, or to give such new or different judgment as they in their discre tion shall think fit. On an information containing four counts the justices acquitted the defendant on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd counts, but convicted him on the 4th, whereon he gave notice of appeal against the said judgment :-Held, that the notice was limited to the judgment on the fourth count, and that, as the informant had not given notice of appeal from the rest of the judgment, the evidence before the Court of Appeal must be confined to the fourth count. When a case is stated for the opinion of the Court of Exchequer, under the provisions of sect. 84, it is not necessary that the record should be brought before this Court by certiorari; it is enough if all the facts are made to appear on affidavit. 1847. The QUEEN v. GAMBLE. said A. B., so being such officer of excise as aforesaid, to neglect and forbear and omit to do his duty, &c. The second charged, that the defendant offered to give the same securities to the said A. B. with the like object. The third charged, that the defendant did give two bank notes for the payment of divers sums of money, amounting in the whole to £20, to the said A. B., with the like object. The fourth charged, that the defendant offered to give two bank notes to the said A. B. with the like object. On the 13th of October, 1845, three justices of the peace for the said borough convicted Gamble of the offence charged in the fourth count, and adjudged that he had forfeited for his said offence the sum of £500, which they then mitigated to the sum of £152. They also adjudged, that he was not guilty of the several offences charged upon him in and by the first, second, and third counts of the information, and acquitted him thereof accordingly. At and immediately upon the giving of the said judgment, Gamble gave notice in writing of appeal from the said judgment to the general quarter sessions for the said borough next after the expiration of twenty days from the giving of such judgment, which notice was in the following form: "Take notice, that I shall appeal to the general quarter sessions of the peace, to be holden next after twenty days from the date hereof in and for the borough of Leeds in the county of York, from the judgment given this day by Darnton Lupton, Joseph Robert Atkinson, and William Pawson, Esquires, being three of her Majesty's justices of the peace, in the matter of an information exhibited by you on behalf of her Majesty, as well as for yourself against me for recovery of the penalty of £500 for breach of the excise laws, and 1847. The QUEEN v. GAMBLE. At the trial of the appeal, after the case for the respondent was closed, the recorder found and adjudged that the appellant was not guilty of the charge contained in the fourth count. The counsel for the respondent thereupon submitted that the second count was proved, and that the recorder ought to give judgment upon that count, inasmuch as the appellant had given notice of appeal against the entire judgment given by the justices. The only judgment which in his discretion the recorder thought fit to give as to the fourth count, was to reverse the judgment of the justices on that count; but in order to prevent the case from being sent down to the sessions to be reheard, he found as a fact, that the appellant was guilty of the offence charged in the second count, and was not guilty of the offences charged in the first, third, and fourth counts respectively; but such finding was conditional only, and was not to be of any force or validity unless the Court of Exchequer should be of opinion that he ought to have given judgment upon the second count. The point for the opinion and direction of the Court of Exchequer on these facts, therefore, was, whether the recorder was entitled to give judgment of conviction on the second count of the information or not. Pashley, for the defendant.-Before going into the argument on the point stated for the opinion of the Court, he objected that the case was not properly brought before the Court, being on affidavit instead of by 1847. The QUEEN v. .GAMBLE. writ of certiorari, by which the record would be brought up. The Attorney-General (Sir J. Jervis).-This course was adopted in a former case under the same statute, Regina v. Woodrow (a), which came before the Court on motion by affidavit, verifying the proceedings below. There has been no decision or judgment below, so that there is no record to bring up. The recorder has given a conditional judgment, subject to the opinion of this Court, and when that is pronounced, the judgment below will be given in fact. Sir F. POLLOCK, C. B.-This case comes to us just the same as any other case would from equity, by the authority and direction of a court requiring our opinion, and having power to ask for it under the stat. 43 Geo. 3, c. 79, s. 39. We have nothing to do with the consequences, but simply to give our opinion on the facts. If the judgment in the alternative is bad, that is another thing. We will proceed with the case. J. T. Ingham, for the Crown.-The substantial point stated for the opinion of this Court is, whether the recorder was correct in refusing to go into the case for the Crown, on the second count of this information under the facts found by him. c. 53, ss. 65, 82, 83. that, for the recovery of any penalty imposed by that or any other act relating to the excise, an information may be exhibited before the commissioners of excise, if the offence is committed within the limits of the chief office of the excise in London, or if out of the limits of the chief office, the information may be exhibited This arises on the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, The 65th sect. of that act enacts, (a) Ante, p. 346. |