acceptor cannot, when sued himself, set up his own act as invalidating the bill, although he cannot, on the other hand, by any act, vary the rights and liabilities of the other parties to the instrument.'] CONFESSION. A confession by a prisoner, made in consequence of persuasion by a clergyman, and not with the hope of any temporal advantage, is admissible in evidence. Rex v. Gilham, 1 Ry. & M. 186. EVIDENCE. Trover for goods of the plaintiff, distrained by the defendant for rent alleged to be due. The question was, whether the plaintiff was tenant to the defendant, or to J. B. The defendant, in order to show that rent paid by the plaintiff's father to J. B. was paid to the latter as the agent of the defendant, offered in evidence accounts rendered to him by J. B., in which he described himself as agent. Held, that as it did not appear that the action was brought for the benefit of J. B., nor that he was in any manner identified with the plaintiff, this evidence was not admissible. Spargo v. Brown, 9 B. & C. 935. The certificate of the officer, and the seal of the Insolvent Court, appeared on the copy of the affidavit only, and not on the copy of the order, which was annexed to the copy of the affidavit with a pin: Held, that the copy of the order was sufficiently verified by the certificate and seal on the copy of the affidavit. Jones v. Nicholls, 3 M. & P. 12. FACTOR. Where a factor, having no specific authority to sell or pledge his principal's goods, deposits them with another as a security for an antecedent debt, and he sells them, the latter is liable to the principal in trover, under 6 Geo. 4, c. 94, s. 3. He is entitled, however, to set off against the damages any balance due from the principal to the factor. Taylor v. Trueman, 1 L. & W. 184. FORGED NOTE. Giving a forged note to another person, whether an accomplice or not, in order that the latter may pass it, is a disposing of, and putting it away. Rex v. Giles, 1 Ry. & M. 166. FORGERY. On an indictment for forging a note of the Royal Bank of Scotland, it is not necessary to show by the charter of the bank, that it has power to draw or issue notes; such power is sufficiently recognised by the 48 G. 3, c. 149, s. 16., and the 55 G. 3, c. 184, s. 23. (Stamp Acts.) Rex v. M'Keay, 1 Ry. & M. 130. Where, in an indictment for forging or uttering a receipt at the foot of an account, merely the initials of the name of the person purporting to give the receipt, were used, the indictment. was held bad, as it did not show what the initials meant. Rex v. Barton, 1 Ry. & M. 142. It must appear on the indictment, that the person whose name is forged, had authority to receive the money. Id. ibid. On an indictment for forging an order, it is necessary that the order should import, that the person, in whose name it is made, has a disposing power over the subject of the order; or it should be proved, that the person, in whose name it is made, had such power. Rex v. Baker, 1 Ry. & M. 231. INDICTMENT. An indictment under a statute should follow the words of the statute; thus if a statute makes it criminal to do an act unlawfully and maliciously, it is not sufficient to state that it was done feloniously, voluntarily, and maliciously. Rex v. Turner, 1 Ry. & M. 239. Where the death is caused by falling on a stone or other substance, it must be so stated in the indictment, and it is not sufficient to allege that the prisoner struck the deceased with a stone, &c. Rex v. Kelley, 1 Ry. & M. C. C. 113. INTERESTED WITNESS. The broker who effected the policy being produced as a witness, refused to part with it, until assured by the judge that if the plaintiff recovered the court would prevent the money from being paid over till the witness's lien upon it for premiums was discharged. Held, that he was nevertheless a competent witness for the assured. In answer to a question from the defendant's counsel, he stated that the plaintiffs had become bankrupts, and that he expected a dividend. Held, that this also did not render him incompetent. Hunter v. Leathley, 1 L. & W. 125. LARCENY. Obtaining a parcel from a carrier's servant, by falsely pretending to be the person to whom it is directed, if taken animo furandi, is a larceny. Rex v. Longstreeth, 1 Ry. & M. 137. If a postman delivers a letter to the wrong person, who receives it supposing it to belong to himself, and on finding that it does not, appropriates money contained in the letter to himself, this does not amount to larceny, there being no animus furandi, when the letter was first received. Rex v. Mucklow, 1 Ry. & M. 160. Where a prisoner had prevailed on a tradesman to bring goods, which he proposed to buy, to a given place, and promised that they should then be paid for; and further prevailed on the tradesman to leave the goods with a third person, and afterwards obtained them from that third person, without paying the price: this was held to be a felonious taking, if ab initio the prisoner's intention was to get the goods into his posses sion, and not to pay for them. Rex v. Campbell, 1 Ry. & M. 179. If a person takes goods which he has agreed to buy, and which he did not intend at the time to pay for, but meant to get them into his possession, and dispose of them for his own benefit without paying for them; the taking will be deemed felonious. Rex v. Gilbert, 1 Ry. & M. 185. MAIMING CATTLĚ. Pouring acid into the eye of a mare, so as to blind her, is a maim- PILOT. A pilot (under 6 Geo. 4, c. 125, s. 66,) is bound to produce his license, whether asked for it or not; and in default of such production, a master of a vessel is not liable to a penalty for refusing him. Hammond v. Blake, 1 L. & W. 157. PROMISSORY NOTE. Parol evidence is not admissible to show that a promissory note, purporting to be payable on demand, was, in fact, by agreement between the parties when it was made, not to be paid until a certain act was done by the payees. Mosely v. Hanford, 1 L. & W. 176. If notes, in the hands of the maker and which may be re-issued, cannot properly be described as valuable securities, they may be called goods and chattels. Rex v. Vyse, 1 Ry. & M. 218. RELEASE. Debt on bond. The plea set out a deed-poll, by which the plaintiff covenanted not to sue on the bond during the lifetime of the defendant; and, if any assignee of the bond should sue on it and recover any interest, to repay such interest; if the principal, to pay interest for such principal during the defendant's lifetime. Held, that this did not amount to a release or defeasance. The Chief Justice added:-'If the defendant had reason to think that the action was brought to enable the plaintiff to recover for himself, and not on a bona fide assignment, he might have pleaded the fraud.' Morley v. Frear, 6 Bing. 547. SALE. In an action against a vendor to recover the purchase money of land (which the purchaser was to take with such title as the vendor had, with all faults and defects, if any,) on the ground of misrepresentation: Held, that it was properly left to the jury to say, whether the misrepresentation was fraudulent, the scienter or fraud being the gist of the action where there is no warranty. Early v. Garrett, 9 B. & C. 928. SHIP. In an action on the case for an injury done to the plaintiff's ship, by her striking on the anchor of the defendant's, it was held to be no ground of defence, that one of the crew of the plaintiff's ship, before she took up the position in which she received the injury, was warned by a person on board another ship, which had occupied the same position, that she was leaving it because there was an anchor somewhere near. And if the anchor was in an improper place, it was no defence that a buoy was placed above it. Venus v. Pearson, 1 L. & W. 160. VARIANCE. Declaration stated that defendant had told P. & Co. that the plaintiff had injured the sale of oranges sold by them, by circulating a report in the sale room, that he (the plaintiff) then had three or four vessels laden with oranges between Gravesend and London, by reason of which, P. & Co. has ceased to deal with the plaintiff. The language of the defendant was proved to have been "The prices would not have been so unsatisfactory if the plaintiff had not before the sale, propagated a report that there were three or four cargoes coming up from Gravesend: Held, a fatal variance. Wood v. Adam, 6 Bing. 481. SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES. This Mr. Dane's Appendix to Vol. IX. of his Abridgment. Appendix is wholly devoted to an exposition of constitutional law. The author comes out with a venerable authority in his old age, in vindication of those great and fundamental principles of a government, which he was a fellow-laborer, with his revolutionary contemporaries, to establish. The treatise, though not rigidly methodical, is rich in historical learning, and full of wisdom and deep reflection, and unanswerable in argument. The positions are indeed such as have already the assent of a great majority of the nation, but some of them have lately come into discussion, and accordingly, these expositions and elucidations are very opportunely presented to the public. In regard to the doctrine which has not, we believe, until very recently been questioned, that the states are not sovereign in the most extensive meaning of that expression, the author, with his usual sagacity, takes notice that the term is not applied to the states, excepting in two constitutions, and in these in a qualified sense only; and adds, that in its broadest sense it is not applicable to the general government, but only to the people themselves. Though this position is disputed in the political controversies, we presume that no statesman or lawyer will deliberately entertain a question respecting it. But the precise relation of the states to the Union, is a subject of very interesting inquiry, on which many things remain to be settled, and one on which Mr. Dane in this treatise, has thrown much light. His remarks upon the use of the term compact, in application to government, civil politics, or a constitution, are, we believe, original; at least they are not ordinarily met with in the popular treatises. His idea is, that a constitution, though it may originate in a compact, still, when once ordained and established, is not a compact, but strictly a law-a rule of conduct. At first view, this distinction may appear to be a matter of speculative theory, rather than of practical import; but on reflection, it will be found to be pregnant with important consequences. And if Mr. Dane is right, much of the political philosophy drawn from Rousseau's Social Compact, will prove to be more visionary than solid, and |