they reply first, that the law of England was not known abroad, and so could have no such influence; second, that if it had been known it would not have had any such influence, and they attribute the preference of foreigners for the British markets 'to the confidence they repose in the character of British agents, and their general ability and readiness to make advances on consignments, and to remain under those advances as long as the owner may desire, without forcing sales in overstocked markets. All the witnesses (with the exceptions already stated) agree that the alteration in the law which the committee intend to recommend, could in no way prove prejudicial to the foreign trade. On the contrary, several most intelligent foreigners who appeared before your committee, stated, that they conceived the proposed alteration 'would be beneficial to the interests of foreigners, by enabling their correspondents to whom they consigned their merchandise, and drew in anticipation for a large portion of the value, to obtain similar advances upon the same, from bankers, brokers, and others in this country.'

The committee add, that by the law of France, Portugal; Spain, Sardinia, Italy, Austria, Holland, the Hanse Towns, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, and Russia, the rule of law as applicable to movable property, is, that possession constitutes title,' and that persons making advances upon such property are not required to inquire to whom it belongs, and are fully protected for the advances they make. The law of Scotland is also in opposition to the former law of England on this subject. The committee say nothing of the law of the United States, the only one in the commercial world which agreed with that of England.

The observations of Lord Ellenborough and Mr. Justice Le Blanc on this question, are cited.

'Lord Ellenborough, in a case argued in 1812, took occasion to say, "The case of a factor not being able to pledge the goods of his principal, confided to him for sale, though clothed with apparent ownership, has been pressed upon us in the argument and considerably distressed our decision, &c. It was a hard doctrine when the pawnee was told that the pledger of the goods had no authority to pledge them, being a mere factor for sale; and yet since the case of Paterson v. Tash that doctrine has never been overturned. I remember Mr. Wallace arguing in Campbell v. Wright, that the bill of lading ought

to designate the consignee as factor, otherwise it was but just that the consignor should abide by the consequences of having misled the pawnee."

Again, in another case argued in 1813, the same eminent judge thus expressed himself:

"It is indeed much to be regretted that a bill of lading instead of being launched into the world as an instrument of equivocal import, should not have designated upon the face of it in what character the consignment is to be made, when it is intended that the consignee shall fill that of a factor only &c. But it has been decided ever since the case of Paterson v. Tash, that a factor cannot pledge. Perhaps it would have been as well if it had been originally decided that when it was equivocal whether a person was authorized to act as principal or factor, a pledge made by such person free from any circumstances of fraud, was valid. But it is idle now to speculate on this subject since a long series of cases have decided that a factor cannot pledge."

And the late Mr. Justice Le Blanc in the same case observes: "Whether it might not originally have better answered the purposes of commerce to have considered a person having the apparent symbol of property, as the true owner in respect of that person who deals with him under an ignorance of his real character, is a question upon which it is now too late to speculate, since it has been established by a series of decisions that a factor has no right to pledge whether the person to whom he pledges has or has not knowledge of his being a factor.""

In Trinity term, 1824, a short time after this report was made, the case of Quieroz and others v. Truman and another, (3 B. & C. 342) came up for argument in the king's bench.

A & Co. merchants at Rio de Janeiro, consigned cottons to B, of London, and sent bills of lading which showed that the cottons were sent on account and risk of the consignors. B employed C & D, brokers at Liverpool, to effect the sales, which they did, some on a credit of ten days, and bills at three months, others for cash in one month. C & D made large advances to B, and received the proceeds of the cotton when due. Before that time, B had become bankrupt. In an action by A & Co. against C & D for money had and received, it was held that the latter were not entitled to retain for advances made by them to B, for that he was a factor for sale

only, and had no authority to pledge the goods, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the net proceeds, deducting such sums only as B could have retained. A & Co. when they consigned the cottons to B, required him to make remittances in anticipation of sales. It was held, secondly, that this request did not give B any special authority to pledge the goods.

Campbell, for plaintiff, cited Paterson v. Tash, 2 Str. 1178; Martini v. Coles, 1 M. & S. 140; Graham v. Dyster, 2 Stark. 21; Kuskine v. Wilson, 4 B. & A. 443; Fielding v. Kymer, 2 B. & A. 639.

Jones, for the defendants, argued, that as B, if he had sold the goods himself, might have cashed the bills given in payment, and probably would have done so, the plaintiffs, though they should not recover in this case, were in no worse condition than they would have been, if B had sold the goods. He also urged, that as the consignors requested the consignee to make advances, this authorized the consignee to pledge the goods.

Abbott, C.J. The principle of the law on which this case must be decided, is not of modern introduction, but has been recognised in a variety of modern cases. Some doubts having been lately thrown on the expediency of that law, I think it right to express my opinion, that it is one of the greatest safeguards which the foreign merchant has in making consignments of goods to be sold in this country. And I should be extremely sorry, (if I may be allowed to use such an expression when sitting in this place,) if that law were to be abolished.'

Bayley, J. 'It has frequently been decided in favor of foreign merchants, that a factor cannot pledge the goods consigned to him for sale. I cannot but think that this rule has operated much to increase the foreign commerce of this kingdom, by holding out to consignors, that if the factor goes beyond his authority vested in him, it shall not work a prejudice to his principal. I entirely concur in saying, that in my judgment, this, as a measure of policy, ought not to be altered. The rule is founded upon a very plain reason, viz. that he who gives the credit should be vigilant in ascertaining whether the party pledging has, or has not, authority so to deal with the goods. That knowledge may always be obtained from the bill of lading and letters of advice. Here the advances

were made by the defendants, who either had knowledge or the means of obtaining it. The letter which has been relied on did not give any authority to pledge.'

Holroyd, J. I entirely agree with what has been said respecting the rule of law, and its policy and application to this

case.'

Such were the opinions of three of the judges of the king's bench, but they had not weight enough with parliament to prevent the passing of the law recommended by the committee. An act had been passed in July, 1823, (4 Geo. IV. c. 93,) authorizing agents to pledge goods to the amount of their own advances and lien; in 1825 and 1826 the act of 6 Geo. IV. c. 94, was passed, in pursuance of the recommendation of the committee. As the law now stands, therefore, in England, consignees of goods, which appear by the bills of lading and other documents, to belong to the consignor, have a lien on the goods for their advances to the consignor though the goods should prove in fact to belong to some other person, of whom the consignor is only the agent. A pledge of goods by a factor to a person who has no notice that they are not the property of the factor, for money advanced, liabilities incurred, &c. at the time of the pledge, is valid. Persons entrusted with India warrants, dock-warrants, warehouse keeper's certificates, wharfinger's certificates, or warrants or orders for the delivery of goods, shall be reputed to be the owners in respect to any contract in relation to them with other persons, having no notice to the contrary. Goods may be pledged by an agent as security for a preceding debt, so far as to transfer to the pledgee the agent's own lien. Agents or factors who pledge goods, without authority for so doing, and in violation of good faith, are declared to be guilty of a misdemeanor, and liable to punishment by transportation for a period not exceeding fourteen years.

The bill passed in New York in April last, contains provisions similar to those of the acts of parliament just mentioned, and also some additional ones. As this is the first, and at present the only law in the United States, of this description, (excepting probably that of Louisiana,) and as it relates to a subject which will, no doubt, come under discussion in the other States, we shall give the act entire.

An act for the amendment of the law relative to principals and factors or agents, passed April 26, 1830.

Sec. 1. After this act shall take effect, every person in

whose name any merchandise shall be shipped, shall be deemed the true owner thereof so far as to entitle the consignee of such merchandise to a lien thereon: For any money advanced or negotiable security given by such consignee, to or for the use of the person in whose name such shipment shall have been made and 2. For any money or negotiable security received by the person in whose name such shipment shall have been made, to or for the use of any such consignee.

Sec. 2. The lien provided for in the preceding section, shall not exist when such consignee shall have notice, by the bill of lading or otherwise, at or before the advancing of any money or security by him, or at or before the receiving of such money or security by the person in whose name the shipment shall have been made, that such person is not the actual bona fide holder thereof.

Sec. 3. Every factor or other agent entrusted with the possession of any bill of lading, custom-house permit, or warehouse keeper's receipt, for the delivery of any such merchandise, and every such factor or agent not having the documentary evidence of title, who shall be entrusted with the possession of any merchandise for the purpose of sale, or as a security for. any advances to be made or obtained thereon, shall be deemed to be the true owner thereof, so far as to give validity to any contract made by such agent with any other person, for the sale or disposition of the whole or any part of such merchandise, any money advanced, or negotiable instrument, or other obligation in writing, given by such person upon the faith thereof.

Sec. 4. Every person who shall hereafter accept or take any such merchandise in deposit from any such agent, as a security for any antecedent debt or demand, shall not acquire thereby, or enforce any right or interest in or to such merchandise or document, other than was possessed or might have been enforced, by such agent at the time of such deposit.*

Sec. 5. Nothing contained in the two preceding sections of this act, shall be construed to prevent the true owner of any merchandise so deposited, from demanding or receiving the same, upon repayment of the money advanced, or on restoration of the security given, on the deposit of such merchandise, and upon satisfying such lien as may exist thereon in favor of the agent who may have deposited the same, nor from recovering any balance which may remain in the hands of the