based upon certain errors of fact occurring before such judg- May Term, ment. So far as we are informed, no case has occurred in which either mode has heretofore been resorted to in this Court. By the statute organizing this Court, authority is given to "establish modes of practice which may be necessary in the exercise of its authority;" and further, "to establish regulations respecting proceedings which are requisite in such Court, in the exercise of its authority, not specially provided for by law." 2 R. S. p. 2. If a rule should be granted upon the appellant to show cause, if any can be shown, why the judgment and submission shall not be revoked and set aside for the error complained of, the answer might be in the form of an affidavit, and thus make an issue of fact proper, perhaps, to be tried by a jury, rather than by a contest of affidavits. If a contest of affidavits would be the necessary result of setting down a rule, we should, in consequence of our aversion to that practice, be very much inclined, if possible, to adopt a different mode of proceeding. But by statute, 2 R. S. p. 164, § 582, "All questions of fact to be determined in the Supreme Court shall be tried according to rules, to be adopted by the Court." This statute would, we are inclined to believe, authorize the submission, &c., of questions of fact thus raised, to a jury for trial (if we should determine that such was the proper mode of trial), whose decision, perhaps, either party might insist upon obtaining, under that clause of the constitution which provides that, in civil cases, the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. Art. 1, § 20. But this question, of the manner of trying an issue of fact thus presented, we need not now decide. We are strengthened in our inclination to adopt this mode of proceeding, from the fact that by the statutes regulating appeals to this Court, it is provided that "writs of error are hereby abolished." 2 R. S. pp. 158, 381.-5 Ind. R. 300. And although the statutes appear to have peculiar reference to the mode of proceeding in bringing before this Court questions determined in other Courts, yet the language is so broad that it may, perhaps, include a writ of VOL. XIV.-13 1860. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, &c., V. BROWN. May Term, error in reference to a decision in this Court, if such could 1860. at any time have been granted. PARRISH V. HEIKES. We think, therefore, that a rule should be set down on the appellant, and notice thereof given, to show cause why the judgment heretofore rendered in this Court shall not be revoked, and the submission of the case set aside. Per Curiam.-It is so ordered. J. U. Pettit and C. Cowgill, for the appellants. (1) See the case in 10 Ind. R. 259. Thursday, PARRISH and Another v. HEIKES. APPEAL from the Tippecanoe Court of Common Pleas. Per Curiam.-Suit on a promissory note, dated December 7, 1855, due in thirteen months, for 737 dollars, 29 cents. Judgment October 2, 1858, for 898 dollars, 31 cents, which was an excess of 84 dollars, 35 cents. If that sum is remitted, the judgment as to the balance will be affirmed; if not, it will be reversed; in either event at the cost of the appellee. As to all other points, this case is similar to one between the same parties at this term (1). NOTE. Afterwards defendant remitted 84 dollars and 35 cents of the judgment. J. L. Miller, for the appellants. S. A. Huff and R. Jones, for the appellee. (1) Post. THE STATE v. Bowers. The subject of the act of 1857 entitled "An act to amend the first section of an act entitled 'An act concerning licenses to vend foreign merchandize, to exhibit any caravan, menagerie, circus, rope and wire dancing, puppet-show, and legerdemain,' approved June 15, 1852, and for the encouragement of agriculture, and concerning the licensing of stock and exchange brokers," is licenses. The act is not unconstitutional for containing more than one subject. The title of that act does not embrace concerts; and an information will not lie, under the attempted provision of the act touching the exhibition of concerts without license. เ APPEAL from the Marion Court of Common Pleas. WORDEN, J.-Information against the appellee for exhibiting a concert for pay without having obtained a license, &c. On the defendant's motion, the information was quashed, on the ground that there was not "any law, valid under the constitution, authorizing or requiring a license to exhibit for pay, any concert, within the state of Indiana." The act of 1857 (Acts of 1857, p. 89), which was in force at the time of the alleged exhibition, expressly requires a license to exhibit for pay any concert. The question arises whether this act, so far as it relates to any concert, was enacted in accordance with the requirement of the constitution that "every act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title." The title of the act of 1857 is as follows, viz.: "An act to amend the first section of an act entitled 'an act concerning licenses to vend foreign merchandize, to exhibit any caravan, menagerie, circus, rope and wire dancing, puppet show, and legerdemain,' approved June 15, 1852, and for the encouragement of agriculture, and concerning the licensing of stock and exchange brokers." Is there anything in the title of the original act (thus set forth in the title to the amendatory act), or in the title to the amendatory act itself, that would authorize the May Term, 1860. THE STATE V. BOWERS. enactment of the clause requiring a license to exhibit a concert for pay? We will inquire, first, whether the title to the original act is sufficient in this respect. The subject of the original act is licenses. This is the general subject of the act, applied and limited to the matters enumerated. If the license upon each kind of business or exhibition should be considered a subject distinct and separate from the license on the others named, then, perhaps, the act would be void as embracing some seven different subjects. But, as before remarked, the subject of the act is licenses, and it seems to us that the legislature may, without violating the constitutional provision mentioned, in the same act, require a license to be paid for carrying on different kinds of business, or for making different kinds of exhibitions. Hence the act is not void as embracing more than one subject. But although the general subject of the act is licenses, and although the legislature may, in the same act, require a license for different kinds of business or exhibitions, still the title in question limits the application of the general subject to the particulars enumerated. Had the title been an act to require the payment of licenses in certain cases, a different question would have been presented. In such case, the subject would not have been limited to enumerated particulars, as is done in the title in question. The specification in the title, of the cases in which licenses are to be required, entirely negatives the idea that the act itself extends beyond the cases enumerated. Now had the clause requiring a license to be paid for exhibiting a concert for pay, been contained in the original act, it would have been void; because the title specified the particulars in which a license was to be required, and a "concert" is not amongst them. This point is illustrated by the case of The State v. Wilson, 7 Ind. R. 516. There it was held that the title "an act to revise, simplify, and abridge the rules of practice, pleadings, and forms, in civil cases, in the Courts of this state," did not authorize the enactment of forms in criminal cases, because the title did not ex press the subject of those forms. There the subject of the enactment was limited in the title to civil cases, and it was held that an enactment on the same subject, in reference to criminal cases, was void. So here the subject of the statute, as expressed in the title, is licenses in particular, specified cases; and an enactment requiring a license in other cases than those specified, would, for the same reason, be void. It is insisted, however, that the enactment requiring a license for exhibiting a concert is properly connected with the subject of the license required in the cases specified in the title of the act in question. However proper it might be, viewed merely as a legislative question, and in the absence of any constitutional restriction, to connect in the same law a provision for a license to exhibit a concert, with one to exhibit a puppet show, or anything else mentioned in the title under consideration, we think they are not properly connected in the sense meant by the constitution. Indeed, they do not seem to have any connection at all. The position assumed would virtually destroy the constitutional restriction. It would permit, under a title specifying a given subject, the enactment of laws generally, upon all subjects that might be properly legislated upon in connection with the subject specified. This was evidently not the intention of the framers of the constitution. The language employed, "matters properly connected therewith," is not to be construed as meaning "matters that may with propriety be connected therewith." The plain and obvious import is, that the matters must be, in and of themselves, properly connected with the subject, and not such merely as might with propriety be brought into connection. This point may be illustrated by reference to the case of Mewherter v. Price, 11 Ind. R. 199. Under the title of "an act concerning promissory notes and bills of exchange," the legislature had provided "that all promissory notes, bills of exchange, or other instruments of writing," signed, &c., should be negotiable by indorsement thereon. It was held that the clause concerning "other instruments of writing," was void, the subject |
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