in error, has generally been regarded as unsound; and, for this reason, the decisions have not generally been followed as precedents by the courts of the other states. Osborne v. City of Detroit, 32 Fed. Rep. 36, where it is said, referring to the Massachusetts cases, the weight of authority is decidedly the other way. City of Chicago v. Powers, 42 Ill. 169, 173; Moore v. City of Burlington, 49 Iowa, 136; Walker v. Westfield, 39 Vt. 246, 251. It is here said that "a fact that illustrates, as by an experiment, the condition of the subject matter of the issue in controvery, is not collateral to that issue, but is direct evidence bearing upon it." City of Aurora v. Brown, 12 Ill. App. 122; Darling v. Westmoreland, 52 N. H. 401. Here the Massachusetts cases are considered and declared unsound. City of Delphi v. Lowery, 74 Ind. 520, contains an elaborate review of the cases. Cook v. New Durham, (N. H.) 13 Atl. Rep. 650; Kent v. Town of Lincoln, 32 Vt. 591; Piggot v. Railway Co., 3 C. B. 229. As the evidence objected to tended to prove that the lift had in it a vice, making it dangerous to operate, and that the company had notice of this from its previous behavior, there was no error in admitting the evidence, with a direction to the jury that it was to be confined to these purposes, and could not be considered on the question of the defendant's negligence in the premises. Judgment affirmed. SPEAR and BURKET, JJ., dissent. (50 Ohio St. 476) CONRAD v. EVERICH et al. (Supreme Court of Ohio. June 20, 1893.) DECREE FOR ALIMONY-LIEN ON REALTY. In an action by the wife for divorce and alimony, a decree for alimony in money payable in gross will operate, per se, as a lien upon the lands of the husband in the county where it is rendered, and may be enforced by levy of execution upon such lands, when they have been conveyed by the husband after the rendition of such decree. (Syllabus by the Court.) Error to circuit court, Muskingum county. Action by Minerva Conrad against Sarah E. Everich and W. H. Bolin for an injunetion. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff brings error. Affirmed. Charles A. Beard, for plaintiff in error. W. H. Ball, for defendants in error. DICKMAN, J. The original action was commenced in the court of common pleas of Muskingum county by the plaintiff, Minerva Conrad, against the defendants, Sarah E. Everich and W. H. Bolin, as sheriff of that county. The object of the suit was to enjoin the sale under execu. tion of certain lands and tenements in Zanesville, Ohio, described in the plaintiff's petition, which had been levied upon by the sheriff to satisfy a claim for alimony in favor of Sarah E. Everich. As disclosed by the record, the undisputed facts that give rise to the only question before us for determination are as follows: At the January term, 1889, of the court of common pleas of Muskingum county, Sarah E. Everich obtained a divorce from her husband, James S. Everich, in an action for divorce and alimony, wherein the court, having ordered the delivery to her of certain articles of personal property of which she was the owner, further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that James S. Everich pay to her additional alimony in the sum of $1,000, and, in default of such payment within five days thereafter, that execution issue therefor, and, further, that he pay the taxed costs of the action, and that execution issue therefor in default of payment. Neither the petition in the action, nor the decree for alimony, described, mentioned, or referred to any lands or tenements; and the decree for alimony was simply for the gross sum of $1,000 in money, and was not, by its terms, made a charge upon any real estate. On March 14, 1889, Mrs. Everich caused an execution to be issued against the property of James S. Everich to satisfy the judgment for alimony and costs, and the same was levied by the defendant W. H. Bolin, as sheriff, upon certain personal property, but no levy thereof was made on any lands and tenements; and the same was duly returned into the office of the clerk of the court on May 4, 1889. The personalty levied on was sold for $48.20, for which a credit was given on the execution; and on August 1, 1889, a second execution was issued, and levied on the lands and tenements described in the petition, which the sheriff caused to be appraised, and duly advertised and offered for sale. On the 10th day of July, 1889, the plaintiff, being fully informed of the decree for divorce rendered at the January term, 1889, of the court of common pleas, purchased the lands and tenements so levied on from James S. Everich, who on that day conveyed to her, in fee simple, the purchased premises. At the time of the purchase of the property, there was a mortgage thereon which had been executed by James S. Everich and Sarah E. Everich, when husband and wife, and by the terms of the contract of purchase the plaintiff was to assume the payment of that mortgage as part of the consideration of the conveyance to her. A release of the mortgage was accordingly obtained, by the plaintiff executing, with her husband, to the mortgagee, a new mortgage on the property for the amount originally secured." prayed for in the plaintiff's petition, the court of common pleas perpetually enjoined the defendants from selling or offering for sale, by virtue of the judgment for alimony, the lands and tenements levied on, and advertised for sale under execution. On petition in error by Sarah E. Everich, the circuit court reversed the judgment of the court of common pleas, and remanded the cause for a new trial. By this proceeding in error, the plaintiff, Minerva Conrad, seeks to reverse the judg ment of the circuit court. Upon the facts as thus stated, the question is presented whether the judgment in favor of Mrs. Everich for $1,000 in gross, as alimony, was, per se, a lien on the lands of James As S. Everich in Muskingum county. If such lien was thereby created, the claim for alimony must take precedence of any rights under the deed executed to the plaintiff subsequently to the rendition of the judgment. It is urged in behalf of the plaintiff that in Olin v. Hungerford, 10 Ohio, 268, (decided in 1840,) it was held that a decree for alimony to be paid in installments does not operate as a lien upon the real estate of the defendant, unless made a charge thereon by the decree itself. The decree in question in that case was rendered in 1831, and its effect was determined in accordance with the statute in force at the time of its rendition. By the act then in operation, the court, in their discretion, might grant alimony, where the evidence justified such decree. 2 Chase's St. 1409. The statute did not make the decree a lien on real estate, nor was the effect of the decree as to alimony declared, nor was the mode of enforcing its payment designated. But, the power to grant alimony having been conferred, some mode of enforcing its payment incidentally followed; and the court, while adopting the practice of enforcing collection by execution, considered it an exercise of legitimate power to make its decree a charge upon real estate, and such had been its practice in cases where it was deemed proper. It is true that by section 37 of the act of March 14, 1831, "directing the mode of proceeding in chancery," (3 Chase's St. 1699,) it was provided that "decrees in chancery shall from the time of their being pronounced, have the force, operation and effect, of a judgment at law." But the court, in the above-cited case, did not recognize a sufficient analogy to hold that a decree in a divorce case, which allows alimony to the wife, and which is a statutory proceeding throughout, is in the nature of a decree in chancery, and was of the opinion that there could be no more propriety in calling the proceedings in a divorce case proceedings in chancery than there would be in calling proceedings for the partition of real estate, under the statute regulating that subject, proceedings in chancery. By the amendatory act, however, concerning divorce and alimony, passed March 1, 1834, (32 Ohio Laws, 37,) it was enacted "that all proceedings in cases of divorce shall be as in chancery." But the court in Olin v. Hungerford, supra, did not regard this statute as fixing the force and effect of decrees in cases of divorce, but only as providing the proceedings in order to arrive at such decrees; and hence, in delivering the opinion, the court uses the language: "Even under this statute, should we hold that a decree for a gross sum to be paid the wife would operate as a lien, it does not follow that the same principle would hold where, as in the present case, it was for the payment of specified sums annually during the joint lives of the parties." It is manifest, therefore, that the court did not pass upon the question now before us,-whether a decree for alimony payable in gross operates as a lien upon the lands of the husband in the county where it is rendered,-but, as involving a difference of principle, the court signified that, in respect to being a lien upon real estate, a distinction might be drawn be. tween a decree for alimony payable in gross, and a decree puyable in installments. In Kurtz v. Kurtz, 38 Ark. 119, the court speaks of the embarrassment and inconvenience incurred by making future payments of alimony a lien upon real estate as too obvious for discussion, but remarks that "as for all sums ordered to be paid at once, and for which execution may issue, they are already general liens, without being so expressed. As, in our view, a decree for a gross sum to be paid the wife for alimony would, in itself, operate as a lien, we do not think it necessary to inquire how far a decree for alimony payable in installments is thereby obviously distinguishable in regard to its operative effect as a lien upon real estate. By the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure, the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such actions and suits, theretofore existing, were abolished; and in their place but one form of action, called a "civil action, was instituted. Prior to the adoption of the Code, judgments at law and decrees in chancery were made liens by statute on the lands of the debtor in the county. But the final determination of the rights of the parties in action is now denominated a "judgment;" and a lien of judgment attaches to the lands and tenements of the debtor, within the county where the judgment is entered, from the first day of the term at which judgment is rendered. Rev. St. §§ 5310, 5375. This definition of a judgment is broad enough to comprise all final judg. ments and all final decrees. Within the meaning of the statute, a final determination of the rights of the parties in an action for divorce and alimony, in which a sum in gross is ordered to be paid as alimony, is in its nature a judgment; and, if so, we discover no good reason why it should not become a lien upon lands, as other judgments. In section 5697 of the Revised Statutes, the award of alimony is designated a “judgment." It is enacted by section 5703 that the court shall, on petition for alimony, give judgnient in favor of the wife for such alimony out of her husband's real and personal property as is just and equitable, which may be allowed to her in real or personal property, or both, or in money, payable either in gross or in installments." The statute thus, to all intents and purposes, authorizes a money judgment as and for alimony, with the same force and effect, in itself, as any other judgment for the payment of money. It is contended in argument that alimony is not a debt, and, if not, that it is difficult to see how it is a lien, unless expressly made so by the court. But in Lockwood v. Krum, 34 Ohio St. 1, it is well said by Boynton, J., in delivering the opinion of the court: "The claim for alimony rests on the common-law obligation of the husband to support the wife in a manner suitable to his condition and station in life during the existence of the marriage relation; and this obligation is as binding after the commission by the husband of a marital offense, entitling the wife to a divorce, as before. In respect to such obligations, she may well be held to be a creditor of the husband." In Chase v. Chase, 105 Mass. 385, it was held that a judgment for alimony in the case of a divorce a vinculo, or from bed and board, creates a debt of record in favor of the wife, and that she is entitled, as a creditor, to impeach a conveyance made by him with intent to defraud her. It is said by the supreme court of the United States in Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582, 595, that when the court, having jurisdiction of her suit, allows the wife, from her husband's means, by way of alimony, a suitable maintenance and support, "it becomes a judicial debt of record against the husband, and is as much a debt of record, until the decree has been recalled, as any other judgment for money is." And if the duty of the husband to provide proper maintenance and support for his wife before and after a decree of divorce is not technically a debt, it is nevertheless a paramount obligation springing out of a sacred relation, which, when it has passed into judgment, should, as such, carry with it the well-known binding force that attaches to judgments at law. We have examined the adjudications in the several states to which our attention has been called, and we think that reason and the weight of authority favor the conclusion that a decree of divorce awarding alimony to the wife in a gross sum creates a lien on the husband's realestate. In the case of Lawton's Petition, 12 R. I. 210, it was held that an allowance of alimony in the sum of $100 per annum during the wife's natural life, or until the further order of the court, to be paid semiannually, did not constitute a lien, payment not having been secured by an express charge on the real estate. But in that state judgments are not liens upon real estate, except under levy of execution, and decrees for alimony are not an exception, unless they become so by being specially charged upon lands. In Frakes v. Brown, 2 Blackf. 295, the wife obtained a divorce, and a judgment for the sum of $550 as ali mony. By virtue of a fieri facias issued upon this judgment, the land in question was sold, and Brown, the complainant, was the purchaser. In a bill in chancery the complainant prayed that a conveyance of the land made by the husband to the defendant, Frakes, might be set aside as fraudulent and void. In the opinion, Blackford, J., says: "It is said that real estate is not liable on a decree for a divorce and alimony. The answer to this is that here is a judgment against the husband for a certain sum of money, rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the cause, and that every judgment of this kind is, by statute, a lien on real estate. It is not for this court to look beyond the judgment in the case before us. It must be considered as having the same effect as all other judgments for the payment of money, whilst it stands unreversed and remains unsatisfied." The statute by which judgments became liens on real estate was the general enactment: "Judgments in the circuit courts are hereby made liens on the real estate of the defendant or defendants, from the day of the rendition thereof, in the county where such judgment may be rendered. Rev. Laws Ind. 1824, 192. In Keyes v. Scanlan, 63 Wis. 345, 23 N. W. Rep. 570, the complaint set out that the plaintiff recovered a judg ment for divorce against ber husband, and that the sum of $300 alimony, and cost of suit, were adjudged in her favor. Section 2367 of the Annotated Statutes of Wisconsin provides that, upon the failure to pay the alimony adjudged to the wife, "the court may enforce the payment thereof by execution or otherwise, as in other cases. In construing this language, the court say: "There are very satisfactory reasons for saying that the divorce judgment stood upon the same footing as ordinary money judgments, and became a lien upon the real estate of the debtor, liable to execution, as soon as docketed." Further citations are unnecessary. These and similar cases illustrate the principle that a judgment for & gross sum should be none the less a lien on real estate because rendered for alimony in a divorce proceeding. In our opinion, the circuit court did not err in holding that the plaintiff, Minervà Conrad, could not maintain her action to restrain the sheriff from the sale of the premises acquired by her after the judgment for alimony was rendered, and that such judgment became a lien on the premises, which Mrs. Everich could enforce by a levy of execution, and a sale to satisfy it. Judgment affirmed. Where the record of confirmation of a special assessment shows that the court acted upon prima facie proof that proper notice had been given to the property owners, the judgment of confirmation is conclusive as to the fact of such notice when questioned upon application for judgment for delinquent special assessment. Schertz v. People, 105 Ill. 27, followed. Appeal from Cook county court; Frank Scales. Judge. Application by Charles Kern, county treasurer, for judgment for delinquent special assessment. Robert R. Clark, a property owner, filed objections, which were overruled, and he appeals. Affirmed. Montgomery & Montgomery, for appellant. F. W. C. Hayes, (John S. Miller, of counsel,) for appellee. BAILEY, C. J. This was an application to the county court of Cook county by the county collector for judgment against the land of the appellant for the delinquent special assessinent levied for the purpose of paying the costs of laying drains in Belmont avenue, in the city of Chicago. The appellant appeared specially 1 Reported by Louis Boisot, Jr., Esq., of the Chicago bar. 2 Rehearing denied October term, 1893, for the purpose of questioning the validity of the judgment of the county court con. firming the assessment, and interposed certain objections to the effect that the commissioners who made the assessment knew that the appellant was the owner of the premises in question, and knew his name and residence, but neglected to send to him the notice of the assessment which was required by the statute to be sent to him by mail. In support of his objections the appellant offered evidence tending to show that at the time the assessment was levied he was, and for 30 years prior thereto had been, the owner of the premises assessed; that one or more of the commissioners who made the assessment knew that he was the owner thereof, and knew his name and residence, but that the appellant received no notice of the assessment by mail, and that no notice was in fact sent to him on that matter. This evidence was excluded, and the appellant's objections were thereupon overruled, and judgment was rendered for the sale of his land for the assessment. It appears that one of the commissioners filed his affidavit of the mailing of notices of the assessment to the owners whose promises had been assessed in the statutory form, viz. “that the said commissioners did cause to be sent by mail to the owners whose premises have been assessed by said commissioners, and whose names and places of residence were known to them, or either of them, the notice required by law to be sent by mail to the owners of premises assessed,” (giving a substantial copy of the notice thus sent by mail.) With this evidence before it, the court rendered a judgment of confirmation against the appellant by default. 113 Ill. 256; Schertz v. People, 105 Ill. 27; Murphy v. People, 120 Ill. 234, 11 N. E. Rep. 202. It is true that in most of the cases here cited the question of the sufficiency of the notice is not raised, the ground upon which the judgment of confirmation is sought to be impeached being some defect in the proceedings in which the assessment was levied, not involving the question of jurisdiction in the court of the persons of the owners of the premises assessed. But that question seems to have been raised and decided in Schertz v. People, supra. That was an application for judgment for a delinquent assessment, and upon such application a property owner appeared and filed various objections, and, among others, that the court had no jurisdiction to enter the judgment of confirmation, and that he, the objector, was not notified, as required by law, of the filing of the report of the commissioners, or of the application for a confirmation thereof. These objections, on motion, were stricken from the files, on the ground that the objector was concluded by the judgment of confirmation. In discussing the propriety of disposing of the objections in that manner we said: "The record of the entire proceeeding, including the previous judgment, upon which the application is founded, was then before the court, and if it appeared from such record that the court bad jurisdiction to render the judgment of confirmation, it is clear that the objections were properly stricken from the files. On the other hand, if the proceedings anterior to the judgment confirming the assessment were so defective as not to authorize the court to act at all upon the question of confirmation, then it is equally clear that the objections in question might judgment and order of sale of the lots, as well as at any other time; and, if such was the case, the court erred in ordering them stricken from the files. * We Sufficient proof was made of the post-properly be made upon application for ing and publication of notice by the commissioners, and the only question is whether in this collateral proceeding the appellant will be permitted to impeach the judgment of confirmation by showing that in point of fact no notice was sent by mail to him. The evidence before the court at the time that judgment was rendered was sufficient, prima facie, to show compliance by the commissioners with all the provisions of the statute in relation to notice, and to establish the jurisdiction of the court to render a judgment of confirmation; and we are of the opinion that, after having acted upon such evidence, its judgment is not open to collateral attack. It is the general rule that, where the court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter in a particular case, its judgment, unless reversed or annulled in a direct proceeding, is conclusive, and is not open to collateral impeachment by the parties thereto or their privies.. 1 Black, Judgm. § 345. This rule has been applied by this court to judgments confirming special assessments so frequently that it is unnecessary for us to do more than cite the cases where such application has been made. People v. Brislin, 80 Ill. 423; Lehmer v. People, Id. 601; Prout v. People, 83 Ill. 154; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. People, Id. 467; Andrews v. People, Id. 529; Gage v. Parker, 103 Ill. 528; Blake v. People, 109 III. 504; Riverside Co. v. Howell, have examined the proceedings in the case anterior to the order of confirmation with care, and, so far as we are able to discover, they conform substantially to the requirements of the statute on the subject, and we are consequently of opinion that the order in question was and is a valid judgment, and that the defenses which appellant now seeks to make, as set forth in the written objections stricken from the files, should have been made on the application to confirm the assessment; and that, not having been so made, he is now concluded." In Murphy v. People, supra, we recognized the general rule that a judgment of confirmation is conclusive, but in that case it appeared, as had already been held in the previous case of Murphy v. City of Peoria, 119 Ill. 509, 9 N. E. Rep. 895, involving the same assessment, that the affidavit of the mailing of notices was not sufficient on its face to confer jurisdiction of the persons of those who did not appear, and therefore that the judgment of confirmation did not conclude the property owners who did not appear and contest the right of the city to have the assessment confirmed. In the present case, so far as appears, the proceedings for the confirmation of the as sessment were in all respects regular, and the proof of notice was in strict conformity to the statute, and it must therefore be held that the court had jurisdiction, and that its judgment of confirmation is conclusive. It follows that the court decided correctly in excluding the evidence offered, and in overruling the objections filed. Its judgment will therefore be affirmed. (147 Ill. 66) BRACEVILLE COAL CO. v. PEOPLE.1 (Supreme Court of Illinois. Oct. 26, 1893.) CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WEEKLY PAYMENTS BY CORPORATIONS. 1. Act April 23, 1891, declaring that certain corporations "shall pay weekly each and every employe engaged in its business the wages earned by such employe to within six days of the date of such payment," and forbidding contracts for other times of payment, is unconstitutional, within Const. art. 2, § 2, as depriving persons, without due process of law, of the property right of making contracts. Frorer v. People, 31 N. E. Rep. 395, 141 Ill. 171, followed. 2. Said act is also contrary to Const. art. 11, § 1, which declares that corporate charters shall not be amended by special laws, since it attempts to amend the charters of the kinds of corporations named in the act by imposing on them the requirement of weekly payments, while it does not affect other corporations created under the same general laws. Appeal from Grundy county court; Alva R. Jordan, Judge. Indictment of the Braceville Coal Company for violation of the "Weekly Payment Law." Defendant was convicted, and it appeals. Reversed. The other facts fully appear in the following statement by SHOPE, J.: The appellant was tried before a justice of the peace, and found guilty of violating an act of the legislature entitled "An act to provide for the weekly payment of wages by corporations," approved April 23, 1891, and the penalty of $50 imposed, for which and costs judgment was rendered accordingly. The case was taken by appeal to the county court of Grundy county, where a trial was held by the court, a jury having been waived, and appellant again found guilty, and the penalty of $50 imposed, and judgment entered for that amount and costs; and the case is brought here by further appeal. The act of the legislature above referred to provides "that every manufacturing. mining, quarrying, lumbering, mercantile, street, electric and elevated railway, steamboat, telegraph, telephone and municipal corporation and every incorporated express company and water company, shall pay weekly each and every employe engaged in its business the wages earned by such employe to within six days of the date of such payment; provided, however, that if at any time of payment any employe shall be absent from his regular place of labor he shall be entitled to said payment at any time thereafter upon demand." And, after providing a penalty Reported by Louis Boisot, Jr., Esq., of the Chicago bar. of not less than $10 nor more than $50 for each violation, that such action be commenced within 30 days after the violation, notice to the corporation that an action will be brought, defenses that may not be set up, etc., proceeds "No assignment of future wages payable weekly under the provisions of this act shall be valid if made to the corporation from whom such wages are to become due, or to any person on behalf of such corporation or if made or procured to be made to any person for the purpose of relieving such corporation from the obligations to pay weekly under the provisions of this act. Nor shall any of said corporations require any agreement from an employe to accept wages at other periods than as provided in section 1 of this act, as a condition of employment." Appellant became a corporation under the general incorporation law, in force July 1, 1872, and for several years past has been engaged in the business of coal mining, with its principal office at Braceville, Grundy county, this state. A certain contract is provided by appellant, which all persons desiring employment in its service are required to sign as a condition precedent to such employment. The complaining witness, Thomas McGuire, in November, 1891, applied to the superintendent of appellant's mines for work, and was required to sign one of its contracts, which was done, in duplicate, each party retaining a copy. Certain rules and regulations of the company on the back of its contracts are, by the terms of each contract, made a part of the same. The contract of witness McGuire, after stipulating, among other things, the wages to be paid, etc., provides: “All payments hereunder to be made on regular pay day, and in compliance with the rules and regulations above named; and pay day is hereby fixed for and on the first Saturday after the 10th of each month, when and at which time all wages or moneys that may have been earned during and in the calendar month next prior to such pay day shall be paid, less all moneys owing said party of the first part on any account whatever.” By the seventh rule, printed on the back of said contract, and made part thereof, it is provided: "Every employe will be paid once a month at regular pay day alt wages or moneys he may have earned during and in the calendar month next prior to such pay day, after deducting any indebtedness which such employe may owe to the company, or which the company, with the consent of such employe, may have assumed to pay to any other person. McGuire entered upon the employment under the contract November 3, 1891, and quit November 13, 1891, and demanded his wages. The company refused to pay him before the next pay day, when be gave the notice under the statute, and caused this suit to be brought. George S. House, for appellant. Samuel C. Stough, State's Atty., (Wm. Mooney, of counsel,) for the People. SHOPE, J., (after stating the facts.) The principles that must control the de |