Jaques Rousseau, de Mademoiselle de l'Espinasse, de Madame da Deffant, &c." 130

What a fine receipt for social happiness must that be, which is composed of such ingredients!

We cannot take leave of Pascal's argument for human corruption, without adding, that his attachment to this argument seems to have made him somewhat undervalue other general proofs of the truth of religion. This, indeed, is rather a curious head of remark. In the introduction to that chapter of Pascal which constains what has been called by some of his commentators the argument of the wager, the best editions exhibit the two following paragraphs:

90 Let not this description of the “petites sociétés" of the Parisian philosophists, be deemed unjust. We have freely allowed the talents that shone forth in that singular society; let us, in our turn, be allowed to deplore their extreme want of right feeling and principle. Their character now stands recorded by themselves. The correspondence of Various and very distinguished in dividuals of the body, or memoirs of their own writings, have been of Jate years much circulated, read, and reviewed. The world has been adsmitted into the geeen-room, if we may so say, of the company; and what is the impression that results? We really doubt not that the operacorps (in whose proceedings these new, these most new philosophers took so deep an interest), were the better philosophers of the two, thonghosera entreprendre de résoudre cette quesnot the greater actors. tion? Ce n'est pas nous, qui n'avons aucun styled itself, The Holy Philosophical Church; and the irony turns out to have been far more exact than was intended; for they appear to have been precisely as philosophical as they were holy.

The sect

Parlons selon les lumières naturelles, S'il y a un Dieu, il est infiniment incompréhensible, puisque, n'ayant nî parties, ni bornes, il n'a nul rapport nous nees sommes dono incapables de connoître ni ce qu'il est, ni s'il est. Cela étant ainsi, qui

apport à lui."

Je n'entreprendrai pas ici de prouver par des raisons naturelles, ou l'existence de Dieu, au la Trinité, où l'immortalité de l'âme, ni aucune des choses de cette nature, non seulement parce que je ne me sentircis pas assez fort pour trouver dans la nature de quoi convaincre des athées endurcis, mais encore parce que cette connoissance, sans Jesus-Christ, est inutile et sterile."

It will be observed, that, in the former of these paragraphs, it seems asserted that man is incapable of knowing whether God exists;" and that, in the latter, the author declares that "he is not competent to find in nature such arguments as shall convince the hardened atheist."a szolg 7

Should this be considered as a prejudiced opinion, let us refer to that of a highly ingenious, cultiwated, and elegant country woman of the persons in question." Il est remarquable" (says Madame de GenTis) que toutes les correspondances des philosophes modernes, mises au jour depuis leur mort, soient égaleboment scandaleuses, odieuses, et déshonorantes pour eux. Fausseté, mechanceté, duplicité, inconsequence, mauvaises mœurs, ambition et vanité The enemies of Pascal, or of his > démésurées, cabales, haine, basse doctrine, have laid hold on these “envie, animosité, înjustice, extrava- expressions with avidity, ai A Jesuit segance, &c., toutes ces choses s'y has not scrupled to pronounce the etrouvent prouvées et dévoilées de writer himself an Atheist. **The leur propre main. Telles sont la commentators have sense enough correspondance de M. de la Harpe to laugh at this imputation ; yet avec le grand duc de Russie; les they affect to regard their author lettres de Voltaire, de d'Alembert, as a strange, inconsistent, unacde Madame de Châtelet, de Jean countable being. Voltaires is infi

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nitely surprised that Pascal should not have felt himself competent to prove the existence of a Deity ("assez fort pour prouver l'existence de Dieu"), and Condorcet wonders that he who could discover original sin by the light of reason, should not, by the same light, discover the being of a God.

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So it seems that Pascal, after all, is not half believer enough to satisfy the modern philosophers! Pascal not a Theist may be a sufficiently wonderful sight; but what shall we say to Voltaire teaching Pascal +theism? Even Condorcet cannot help smiling, on this occasion, at the spectacle of his "guide, philosopher, and friend" among the prophets. "Il est beau," says he, not perceiving the biting keenness of the satire which his remark implied, "de voir dans cet article M. de Voltaire prendre contre Pascal la defense de l'existence de Dieu." To do Voltaire justice, however, he "shews Pascal in this instance more civility than usual. He even says, that his author's assertion of our incapacity to know whether there is a God, could only arise from an inadvertence in that great

Even in more candid opinions than those of Jesuits and philosophers, the expressions of Pascal may seem to require some explanation; particularly that in the first of the two paragraphs referred to, where it is said, "Man is incapable of knowing whether God exists or not."

and a sceptic. Pascal, indeed, appears to have been fond of this dramatic form of writing. With this clue, if the reader will re-peruse the first of the two paragraphs, he will find, that, thus far, at least, all is clear and consistent. The supposed objector begins the dialogue by challenging his Christian antagonist to prove the existence of a Deity and the second paragraph is the Christian's reply,

But then an objection is made to this second paragraph also, which is confessedly spoken in the person of Pascal himself. For here occurs the expression to which Voltaire alludes, when he wonders that Pascal should not have found himself able to prove the being of a Deity. The short answer to Voltaire is, that he would have done better to wonder and mourn over his own powers of misrepresentation or misconception. For only compare what Pascal really says, with what Voltaire makes him say. What does Pascal say "I do not feel myself competent, by arguments of a physical nature, to prove the existence of a God, against a hardened atheist." So we understand "Je ne me sentirois pas assez fort pour trouver dans la nature de quoi convaincre des athées endurcis." And what does Voltaire make him say?" 1 do not feel myself competent to prove the existence of a God." The qualifying clauses which confine the proposition to a particular class of arguments, and to obstinate, unreasonable adversaries are left out, and one of the firmest believers, and deepest thinkers that ever lived, is represented as deliberately declaring that he cannot prove the existence of a God! Is it possible to imagine a completer misreading? The reader will now perceive who was the

And, happily, this first paragraph, in each and all of its parts, has received a conclusive explanation from the editor before us. M. Res'nouard judges that the whole para1. graph is supposed to proceed from the mouth of a sceptical objector with whom Pascal means to repre- great man" that fell into an e sent himself as arguing Nothing inadvertence" on this occasion, At can be more natural, cr more en- the same time it is some excuse for tirely satisfactory.Itowill bedre Voltaire that he might naturally collected that the argument of The construe the expressions in the seWager, which the paragraph incond of Pascal's two paragraphs by question introduces, is altogether a sort of dialogue between the author

those in the first, which certainly seem of a sceptical tendency; for

he did not observe that the first was spoken in the person of a supposed sceptical objector, varjas

But, though safe from his enemies, we are not sure that Pascal is equally secure, in this place, against the milder objections of his friends. It will be observed that he speaks rather slightingly than otherwise of what he calls des raisons naturelles, or arguments drawn from nature. What he meant by arguments <drawn from nature may be collected, though not with perfect precision, from the context, and from another chapter entitled "On ne connoit Dieu utilement que par JeBus Christ." He seems to have understood by the expression all arguments founded on the phenomena of material or physical nature, as distinct from the moral or mental nature of man. Even where the arguments themselves were of a subtle, metaphysical kind, still, if they concerned physical, not me ral, nature, he called them des raisons naturelles. Therefore, he would have included in his idea, both that method of demonstration which proceeds on the marks of design in the creation, and also such refined and scholastic deductions as that of the Cartesians: "There is no va cuum, therefore there is a God."

This latter class of proofs might perhaps be discarded without much loss. They seem to be dialectic sabilties, often more remarkable for their ingenuity than their power of producing conviction. But we But we would speak very differently of the argument from the marks of design in the creation; and it does appear to us that Pascal under-rated its effect and importance. He admitted it to be valid, but did not consider it as of very general application. He knew and felt that the works of creation "declare the glory of God," but he was of opinion, that, by the ears of the obdurate worldling, this silent utterance can be perceived but faintly, and even if distinctly, with little profit. It addresses man, but not fallen maft. It proclaims a Deity supreme in power, wisdom, and good

mess; but not a Deity offended by the rebellion of his rational creatures, and propitiated by the death of his Son. Its use, therefore, consists rather in awakening and assisting the meditations of the pious, to whose mental attention this mysterious melody of nature comes blended with the clearer sounds of Revelation, than in attracting, alarming, or convincing the sceptical.

This seems to have been Pascal's manner of considering the subject; but we cannot entirely accede to it. It is true, and a lamentable truth, that the arguments which the believer deduces from the works of nature are often heard by infidels with scorn. So are all his other arguments; but would that be a reason for using none at all? On such a principle, Pascal's "Thoughts" would never have existed to excite the derision of Voltaire and Condorcet. It surely cannot be said that the particular argument in question fails of effect oftener than all the other reasoning employed in favour of truth and right principles. Is it not, on the contrary, certain that, in all ages, the admirable mechanism of the creation has impressed men with an idea of a Divine agency? Are not the invisible things of God clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made? Or is that an "uncertain sound" which has gone forth into all lands, and its words unto the ends of the world? So far, again, as the argument produces effect, is not that effect of a most desirable kind? Has that man made no progress towards a belief in Revelation who is deeply convinced of the eter nal power and Godhead of the Most High? Is not he partly initiated in a very important lesson of Christian practice, whom a prospect of the wonders of creation and providence, the heavens, the moon, and the stars, fills with a grateful and a humiliating sense of the goodness of God, and the insignificance and unworthiness of man? Is not the transition in some sense natural," from a contemplation of that visible

nature which proclaims the Divine glory, to a reverence for that perfect law which converts the soul? Those who are acquainted with the excellent writings of Derham, Butler, and Paley, on natural theology, will surely acquiesce in the implied answer to these questions; and we think also that we have with us the Scriptures of Truth.

Our readers, we are convinced, will not understand us as meaning to place natural religion on a level with Revelation, nor within any measurable distance of it. We would only do our humble endeayour to correct the inaccurate view taken of this outwork of faith by so eminent a theological reasoner as Pascal. The subject is, however, highly curious. Perhaps, the exact extent of natural theology, and the relations between natural and revealed religion, have never been sufliciently elucidated; not even by Paley, felicitously just as he is in the conception, and inimitably interesting and masterly in the developement, of his argument. For ourselves, we feel utterly unequal to so high a theme, even had we space to enter on it. There is one living writer, a countryman of our own, by whose hand we should delight to see it treated ;--no second occurs to us, who could bring to the task an exactly adequate combination of reasoning, information, philosophy, refinement of fancy, eloquence, and piety. Could he who, in one or two published sermons, has given such fine and highly touching sketches of the moral uses of The ism, and of the essential lowness of the philosophy of expediency, find leisure for some more extended discussions on similar subjects, Eng land would no longer have reason to regret that she was not the native country of Pascal.

We have now been so long de tained on a particular branch of Pascal's reasoning, (a branch, how ever, of such importance and inte rest as might have justified a still more copious discussion,) that we

CHRIST, OBSERY. No. 155.

must proportionably compress what we have yet to offer. de

It would have gratified us to coa sider and to vindicate our author's argument, as it has been called, of The Wager; or that by which be shews that, according to the established laws of probability, it is infinitely wiser in men to believe than to disbelieve. The objects of belief to which be primarily refers, are the existence of a Providence, and the certainty of a future state of retribution; but his reasoning in fact applies to all the essential ar ticles of the Christian faith. We have before shewn that the theology of Pascal was very little tinctured by his geometrical and physiologi cal pursuits. The instance before us is rather an exception to that account. He had profoundly stu died and considerably improved the doctrine of mathematical chances; and he here evidently carries the taste imbibed from his speculations on that subject into his religious reflections. The result, however, is most happy, and shews to what sacred uses the riches of secular learning may be applied, three philosophes, indeed, who haunt our author (like the forma tricore poris umbra" in Virgil's shades), are not satisfied with his argument. His antagonist, Fontenelle, allects to confute it at great length; his commentator, Voltaire, pronounces it totally beneath the dignity of the subject-matter; and his eulogist, Condorcet, treats it as absolutely ridiculous. Yet, though to these learned persons it was foolishness, we doubt not that a very different judgment will be passed on it by every candid, reflecting, and wellintentioned mind.

The

There is, at first sight, one difficulty in the argument, even to the fair inquirer. And that is, that it apparently supposes belief or une belief to be in our own power. If belief, it may be said, is the uncou troulable impression of preponde-.. rating arguments on the mind, to what end these calculations of the