lished in the Vienna papers, which, | prior to the insurrection of the army even more than their official instru- on 5th July 1820. To carry their rements, revealed their real sentiments.* solution into effect, it was agreed that 72. The congress, to be nearer the an Austrian army should, in the name of scene of action, was soon after trans- Austria, Russia, and Prussia, be put at ferred to LAYBACH, where the Em- the disposition of the King of the Two peror of Austria arrived on the 4th Sicilies; that, from the moment of its January, and the Emperor of Russia passing the Po, its whole expenses on the 7th. The King of Prussia was should be at the charge of that kinghourly expected; and the King of dom, and that the Neapolitan dominNaples, whom the revolutionary gov- ions should be occupied by the Ausernment established in his dominions trian forces during three years, in the did not venture to detain at home, same manner, and on the same condicame on the 8th. So much had been tions, as France had been by the army done at Troppau in laying down prin- under the Duke of Wellington. Engciples, that nothing remained for Lay- land and France were no parties to bach but their practical application. this treaty, but neither did they opThe principle which Alexander adopt- pose it, or enter into any alliance with ed, and which met with the concur- the revolutionary states. They simply rence of the other sovereigns, was that remained neuter, passive spectators of the spirit of the age required Liberal a matter in which they were too reinstitutions, and a gradual admission motely interested to be called on pracof the people to a share of power; but tically to interfere, but which they that they must flow from the sover- could not theoretically approve. Lord eign's free will, not be forced upon Castlereagh contented himself with him by his subjects; and, therefore, declaring that Great Britain could that no compromise whatever could be take no part in such transactions, as admitted with revolutionists either in they were directly opposed to the funthe Italian or Spanish peninsulas. In damental laws of his country.* conformity with this determination, there was signed, on 2d February 1821, a treaty, by which it was stipulated that the allied powers should in no way recognise the revolutionary gov-ait pas, le gouvernement Britannique n'en ernment in Naples; and that the royal authority should be re-established on the footing on which it stood

*

* "Le système des mesures proposées serait, s'il était l'objet d'une réciprocité d'action, diametralement opposé aux lois fondamentales de la Grande Bretagne; mais lors même que cette objection décisive n'exister

jugerait pas moins, que les principes qui
servent de base à ces mesures ne peuvent
être admis avec quelque sûreté comme sys-

têmes de loi entre les nations.
Le gou-
vernement du roi pense que l'adoption de
ces principes sanctionnerait inévitablement,
et pourrait amener par la suite, de la part des
souverains moins bienveillants, une interven-
tion dans les affaires intérieures des états,
beaucoup plus fréquente et plus étendue que
celle dont il est persuadé que les augustes
personnages ont l'intention d'user, ou, qui
puisse se concilier avec l'intérêt général, ou
avec l'autorité réelle, et la dignité des sou-
verains indépendants. Quant à l'affaire par-
ticulière de Naples, le gouvernement Britan-

* "On a acquis la conviction que cette ré volution, produite par une secte égarée et exécutée par des soldats indisciplinés, suivie d'un renversement violent des institutions légitimes, et de leur remplacement par un système d'arbitraire et d'anarchie, est nonseulement contraire aux principes d'ordre, de droit, de morale, et de vrai bien-être des peuples, tels qu'ils sont établis par les monarques, mais de plus incompatible par ses résultats inévitables avec le repos et la sécurité des autres états Italiens, et par conséquent avec la conservation de la paix en Eu-nique n'a pas hésité, dès le commencement, rope. Pénétrés de ces vérités, les Hauts Monarques ont pris la ferme résolution d'employer tous leurs moyens afin que l'état actuel des choses dans le royaume des Deux-Siciles, produit par la révolte et la force, soit détruit, mais cependant S. M. le Roi sera mis dans une position telle qu'il pourra déterminer la constitution future de ses états d'une manière compatible avec sa dignité, les intérêts de son peuple, et le repos des états voisins."-Observateur Autrichien, Nov. 16, 1820.

à exprimer fortement son improbation de la manière dont cette Révolution s'est effectuéc, et des circonstances dont elle paraissait avoir été accompagnée; mais en niême temps, il déclara expressément aux différentes cours alliées, qu'il ne croyait pas devoir, ni même conseiller une intervention de la part de la Grande Bretagne. Il admit toujours que d'autres états Européens, et specialement l'Autriche, et les puissances Italiennes, pouvaient juger que les circonstances étaient

73. This deserves to be noted as a turning-point in the modern history of Europe. It marks the period when separate views and interests began to shake the hitherto firmly cemented fabric of the Grand Alliance; and Great Britain and France, for the first time, assumed a part together at variance with the determination of the other great powers. They had not yet come into actual collision, much less open hostility; but their views had become so different, that it required not the gift of prophecy to foresee that collision was imminent at no distant period. This was the more remarkable, as England had been, during the whole of the revolutionary war, the head and soul of the alliance against France, and strenuously contended for the principle, that though no attempt should be made to force a government against their will on the French people, yet a coalition of the adjoining powers had become indispensable to prevent them from forcing their institutions upon other states. The allied governments commented freely on this great change of policy, and observed that England was very conservative as long as the danger was at her own door, and her own institutions were threatened by the contagion of French principles; but that she became very Liberal when the danger was removed to a more distant quarter, and the countries threatened were Italy, Southern Germany, or France itself.*

74. To fix the just principles, and define the limits of the right of intervention, is unquestionably one of the most difficult problems in politics, and one fraught with the most momentous consequences. If the right is carried, out to its full extent, incessant warfare would, in civilised communities in different stages of civilisation, be the inevitable destiny of the species; for every republican state would seek to revolutionise its neighbours, and every despotic one to surround itself with a girdle of absolute monarchies. Each party loudly invokes the principle of non-intervention, when its opponents are acting on the opposite principle; and as certainly follows their example, when an opportunity occurs for establishing elsewhere a regime conformable to its own wishes or example. Perhaps it is impossible to draw the line more fairly than by saying, that no nation has a right to interfere in the internal concerns of another nation, unless that other is adopting measures which threaten its own peace and tranquillity: in a word, that intervention is only justifiable when it is done for the purposes of self-defence. Yet is this a very vague and unsatisfactory basis on which to rest the principle; for who is to judge when internal tranquillity is threatened, and exlernal intervention has become indispensable? It is much to be feared that here, as elsewhere, in the transactions of independent states, which différentes relativement à eux, et il déclara et tous les liens sociaux; exécutée par des que son intention n'était pas de préjuger la soldats traîtres à leurs serments: consomquestion en ce qui pouvait les affecter, ni mée par la violence, et les menaces dirigées d'intervenir dans la marche que tels états contre le souverain légitime, cette Révolution pourraient juger convenable d'adopter pour n'a produit que l'anarchie et la disposition leur propre sûreté; pourvu toutefois, qu'ils militaire qu'elle a renforcée, au lieu de l'affaifussent disposés à donner toutes les assur- blir, en créant un régime monstreux, incapances raisonnables que leur vues n'étaient able de servir de base à un gouvernement ni dirigées vers des objets d'agrandissement, quel qu'il soit, incompatible avec tout ordre ni vers la subversion du système territorial public, et avec les premiers besoins de la sode l'Europe, tel qu'il a été établi par les der- ciété. Les souverains alliés ne pouvant, dès niers traités."-CASTLEREAGH, Dépêche Circu-le principe, se tromper sur les effets inévitlaire adressée aux Ministres de S. M. Britan-ables de ces funestes attentats; se décidèrent nique pour les Cours Etrangères, 19 Jan. 1821. Ann. Historique, ii. 688, 689.

sur-le-champ à ne point admettre, comme légal, tout ce que la révolution et l'usurpation avaient prétendu établir dans le royaume de Naples; et cette mesure fut adoptée par la presque totalité des gouvernements de l'Europe."-LE COMTE NESSELRODE au COMTE DE STACKELBERG, Ambassadeur à Naples, Laybach, 19/31 Jan. 1821. Ann. Histor

* "La Révolution de Naples a donné au monde un exemple, aussi instructif que déplorable, de ce que les nations ont à gagner, forsqu'elles cherchent les réformes politiques dans les voies de la rébellion. Ourdie en secret par une secte, dont les maximes impies attaquent à la fois la religion, la morale, | iqué, ii. 693.

acknowledge no superior, much must | Being the representative of a country depend on the moderation of the stronger; and that "might makes right" will be the practice, whatever may be the law of nations, to the end of the world. But one thing is clear, that it is with the democratic party that the chief—indeed, of late years, the entire — blame of intervention rests. The monarchical powers have never moved since 1789 but in selfdefence. Every war which has desolated Europe and afflicted humanity since that time has been provoked by the propagandism of republican states; if left to themselves, the absolute monarchs would have been too happy to slumber on, reposing on their laurels, weighed down by their debt, recovering from their fatigues.

which had progressively extorted its liberties from its sovereigns, and at length changed the dynasty on the throne to secure them, he could not be a party to a league professing to extinguish popular resistance: placed at a distance from the theatre of danger, the plea of necessity could not be advanced to justify such a departure from principle. He took the only line which, on such an occasion, was consistent with his situation, and dictated | by a due regard to the national interest;

75. It was the circumstance of the three powers which had signed the Holy Alliance appearing banded together to crush the revolution in Italy, which caused that Alliance to be regarded as a league of sovereigns against the liberties of mankind, and to be come the object of such unmeasured obloquy to the whole Liberal party throughout the world. There never was a greater mistake. The Holy Alliance became a league, and it proved a most efficient one, against the progress of revolution; but it was not so at first. It was forced into defensive measures by the aggressions of its political antagonists in Spain and Italy. Not one shot had been fired in Europe, nor one sabre drawn, from any contest which it commenced, though many have been so from those into which it has been driven. In truth, this celebrated Alliance, which was the creation of the benevolent dreams of the Emperor Alexander, and the mystical conceptions of Madame Krudener, was, as already explained, a philanthropic effusion, amiable in design, but unwise in thought, and incapable of application in a world such as that in which we are placed.

76. It is evident, however, that it was impossible for England to have acted otherwise than she did on this occasion, and that the line which Lord Castlereagh took was such as alone befitted the minister of a free people.

he abstained from taking any part in the contest, and contented himself with protesting against any abuse of the pretension on which it was rested.

77. The contest in Italy was of very short duration. The revolutionists proved incapable of defending themselves against an Austrian army, little more than half of their own strength; they were formidable only to their own sovereign. The Minister at War announced to the parliament at Naples, on the 2d January, that the regular army amounted to fifty-four thousand men, and the national guards to a hundred and fifty thousand more; that the fortresses were fully armed and provisioned, and in the best possible state of defence; and that everything was prepared for the most vigorous resistance. But already serious divisions had broken out in the army, especially between the guards and the troops of the line; and dissensions of the most violent kind had arisen between the leaders of the revolt, especially the Cardinal Ruffo and the chiefs of the Carbonari. quence was, that when the moment of action arrived, scarce any resistance was made. On 8th February a courier from Laybach announced at Naples that all hope of accommodation was at an end, and that the sovereigns assembled there would in no shape recognise the revolutionary authorities at Naples. The effect of this announcement was terrible; it did not rouse resistance-it overpowered it by fear. In vain the assembly ordered fifty thousand of the national guards to be called out, and moved to the frontier; nothing efficient was done-terror froze every

The conse

heart. The ministers of Russia, Aus- | outrun his neighbour. Cannon, ammunition, standards, were alike abandoned. Pepe himself was carried away by the torrent, and the Abruzzi were left without any defence but the impediments arising from the wreck of the army, whose implements of war strewed the roads over which it had fled.*

tria, and Prussia left Naples; the presence of ten French and eight English sail of the line in the bay rather ex cited alarm than inspired confidence. On the 4th February, General Frimont published from his headquarters at Padua a proclamation, announcing that his army was about to cross the Po, to assist in the pacification of Italy; and on the following day the troops, nearly fifty thousand strong, commenced the passage of that river at five points between Cremona and St Benedetto.

78. The march of the Austrian army met with so little opposition that the events which followed could not be called a campaign. When they arrived at Bologna, the troops were separated into two divisions; one of which, under the command of Count Walmoden, crossed the Apennines, and advanced, by Florence and Rome, by the great road to Naples; while the other moved by the left to the sea-side, and reached Ancona. The first corps passed Rome, without entering it, on February 28th; the second occupied Ancona on the 19th. Meanwhile the preparations of the Neapolitans were very extensive, and seemed to presage a serious resistance. Their forces, too, were divided into two corps; the first of which, forty thousand strong, under General Carascosa, occupied the strong position of St Germano, with its left on the fortress of Gaeta, within the Neapolitan territory; while the second, under General Pepe, of thirty thousand, chiefly militia, was opposed to the corps advancing along the Adriatic, and charged with the defence of the Abruzzi. But it was all ini vain. Pepe, finding that his battalions were disbanding, and his troops melting away before they had ever seen the enemy, resolved to hazard an attack on the Austrians at Rieti. But no sooner did they come in sight of the German vanguard, consisting of a splendid regiment of Hungarian cavalry, than a sudden panic seized them. The new levies disbanded and fled, with the cry of "Tradimento; salvarsi chi può!' The contagion spread to the old troops. Soon the whole army was a mere mob, every one trying to

79. This catastrophe was a mortal stroke to the insurrection; for, independent of the moral influence of such a discreditable scene succeeding the warm appeals and confident predictions of the revolutionists, the position of their main army, and on which alone they could rely for the defence of Naples at St Germano, under Carascosa, was liable to be turned by the Abruzzi, and was no longer tenable. The broken remains of Pepe's army dispersed in the Apennines, and sought shelter in its fastnesses; some made their appearance in Naples, where they excited universal consternation. In this extremity the parliament, assembled in select committee, supplicated the Prince Vicar to mediate between them and the king; and, above all, to arrest the march of the Austrian troops. But it was all in vain. The Imperial generals, seeing their advantage, only pressed on with the more vigour on the disorderly array of their opponents. Walmoden advanced without opposition through the Abruzzi. Aquila opened its gates on the 10th March, its castle on the 12th; and Carascosa,

"Vacillarono le nostre giovani bande,

si ritirarono le prime, non procederono le seconde, si confusero le ordinanze. Ed allora avanzò prima lentamente, poscia incalzando passi, ed alfine in corsa un superbo reggimento di cavalleria Ungherese, sì che nell' aspetto del crescente pericolo le milizie civili, nuove alla guerra, trepidarono, fuggirono, strascinarono coll' impeto e coll' esempio qualche compagnia di più vecchi soldati, si ruppero gli ordini, si udirono le voci di tradimento, e salvarsi chi può: scomparve il campo. Proseguirono nella succedente notte i disordini dell' esercito: Antrodoco fu abbandonata; il General Pepe seguiva i fuggitivi.— Miserando spettacolo! gettate le armi e le insegne; le macchine di guerra, fatte inciampo al fuggire, rovesciate, spezzate; gli argini, le trincere, opere di molte menti e di molte braccia, aperte, abbandonate; ogni ordine scomposto: esercito poco innanzi spaventoso al nemico, oggi volto in ludibrio."—COLLETTA (a Liberal historian), ii. 437, 438.