Williams & Co. vs. Nicholson. 67, which is the strict and full value of the whole stock of old goods at the time they went into their hands. That at the time Beall made the account with them, they knew him to be insolvent, and it was made with the understanding, that it was to be a credit on their debt to him, and that it ought to be deducted, leaving a balance against them of $1,348 00, and that between the payment of notes and accounts by them to R. S. Williams and Co., and Potter as before stated, and the sum of $1,348 71, a balance ought to be struck, leaving in favor of Nicholson & Zeigler $3,870 86, which is the sum (or very near) due, and which ought to be paid to Nicholson for Nicholson & Zeigler by said Potter, as agent for R. S. Williams & Co., in such notes and áccounts as Potter may select, or in default thereof in money; and that Nicholson has often requested said suit to be withdrawn and the note delivered up to be cancelled; and that an account of all the said matters should be had, which was refused; and that he has requested the stock book to be marked settled by said note, and to place as a credit on the note, the' amount of Beall's account and the storehouse rent, and an amount for the time and services of Nicholson & Zeigler, and an amount less the amount to be paid Williams & Potter, and Converse, Todd & Co., of the aforesaid notes and accounts paid to said Potter as agent; then to strike a balance and pay to Nicholson what was due, which was refused. The prayer of the bill was for discovery and relief, and injunction against the suits for rent, and on the note. Defendants demurred to the bill for want of equity. Because Zeigler, a partner of the complainant, was made a party defendant to the bill, and is not interested in resisting complainant's demand. Because Zeigler should have been made a party com plainant; his interest, if any, being connected with complainant. Because said bill is multifarious. Williams & Co. vs. Nicholson. Because complainant has full and adequate remedy at law. The Court overruled the demurrer, and defendants excepted. LAW & SIMS; and MCINTYRE & YOUNG, for plaintiffs in error. ONEAL & CRAWFORD, for defendant in error. By the Court.-BENNING, J. delivering the opinion. There can be no doubt, that the bill states a good case, as against the original owners of the note, Beall & Co. The question is, whether Williams & Co., the transferrees of the note, stand in no better a condition, than the original owners did. And that depends on whether, they obtained the note with notice of the equities as against those owners. [1] It is to be presumed that they obtained the note with such notice, if they obtained it when it was overdue. The note is one payable on demand, and it was insisted, for the defendants in error, that such a note is always overdue. But there is much conflict of authority on that point. See Brooks vs. Mitchell, and note, 9 M. and W., 15. We are glad not to have to decide it, for the present. For, the bill says, that Williams & Co. obtained the note "after its maturity;" and the bill was demurred to. This is enough, be the law on the other point as it may. We think, then, that there was also equity in the bill, as against Williams & Co., the transferrees. [2] It was right to make Zeigler a defendant in the bill. The bill charges him with participating in the fraud by which the note was obtained. It is to his interest, to keep Nicholson bound with himself on the note. Therefore, it is to his interest to resist the bill. Then, his place is on the defence. Judgment affirmed Gragg vs. Richardson. SAMUEL P. GRAGG, plaintiff in error, vs. JONATHAN P. RICHARDSON, defendant in error. A purchaser with warranty, finding a third person in possession of the land, sued him for the land; of that suit, his warrantor had notice; judgment went against the purchaser. Afterwards, he sued the warrantor on the warranty and relied on this judgment to show a breach of the warranty. Held, that the judgmont was prima facie evidence of such breach. Action of covenant for breach of warranty, from Twiggs. Tried before Judge LAMAR, March Term, 1858. On the trial of this case, the plaintiff read in evidence an exemplification of the record of a suit between Jonathan P. Richardson vs Joseph Hill, for lot of land No. 146 in the 7th district of Monroe county, Georgia; which showed a judg ment of the Court in favor of the defendant against the plaintiff for cost. The plaintiff also read in evidence a warranty deed from Samuel P. Gragg to Amos Lasseter, consideration $500 for lot No. 146, 7th district of Monroe county, Georgia, bearing date 22d November, 1849, recorded 26th January, 1850. Also a deed from Amos Lasseter to Carlton Wellborn for the same premises, same consideration, with warranty, dated 8th January, 1850; recorded same date with the other. Also a deed from said Wellborn to the plaintiff in this suit for same premises, dated 17th, January 1850; consideration $700, recorded 22d February, 1850. Also proved he paid the cost in the ejectment suit in Mon roe. Also proved by King's interrogatories, that Gragg was present during a term of the Court in which the action was pending. He King was employed by Richardson in the suit; filed a bill and sued a possessory warrant and received from Richardson $110, for his services, and ten dollars to have interrogatories taken, which he used for that purpose; he pros Gragg vs. Richardson. ecuted the suit to recover the premises lot No. 146, in 7th district of Monroe. Amos W. Hammond was one of the attorneys of Richardson in said ejectment cause. Gragg was present at one of the trials, and assisted in making out interrogatories for the case; he Hammond, received from Richardson $75 for his services. The suit was prosecuted vigorously. J. J. Pinckard, testified he was counsel for Hill, and read on the trial a deed from James Ades, Jr., to the lot in dispute to Thomas Harris, and one from Harris to Joseph Hill, and also several interrogatories; that Richardson read in evidence on that trial, the same deeds he has produced hereThere was no collusion between counsel, but it was a full and earnest trial on the merits of the case. Brazin, testified he saw Gragg at a term in which the ejectment cause was pending in Monroe, and Gragg told him he got his deed from J. R. Ads or Addis, and had his witnesses with him to prove the deed, if the case came up. Defendant's counsel objected to all the evidence, proving counsel fees paid by Richardson to attorneys which objection the Court overruled and defendant excepted. The counsel for defendant requested the Court to charge the jury, that an eviction by paramount title must be proved to constitute a breach of warranty of title. There is no proof that the plaintiff in this action was ever in possession of the land, nor is there any evidence, that there was a grant from the State to any one. There is no proof of paramount title in any one in the case in Monroe Superior Court, on which the case is founded, plaintiff is not therefore entitled to re cover. Which the Court refused, but charge in lieu thereof, that the verdict and judgment in Monroe Superior Court, presupposed that paramount title was proven to be in defendant in ejectment in Monroe Superior Court, and that the judgment was presumptive evidence of the fact. Gragg vs. Richardson. The balance of the request was given except the conclusion "the plaintiff is therefore not entitled to recover.” The Court was further requested to charge: That there is no proof of eviction at all of any one claiming under Gragg, the plaintiff has not proved that the party who derived title from Gragg, was ever turned out of possession under any judgment of any Court. Plaintiff is therefore not entitled to recover. Which the Court gave as requested, except as to the conclusion and declined to charge that "therefore the plaintiff is not entitled to recover." The Court then, charged the jury: 1st. If you believe from the evidence that defendant Gragg and the defendant in the action of ejectment, in Monroe, both claimed title from the same grantor, then it was not necessary for the plaintiff in said ejectment cause to introduce as evidence a grant from the State. And the verdict and judgment in Monroe, presupposes paramount title in the defendant in said ejectment suit, provided you believe from the evidence that Gragg, the defendant here had notice of the pendency of said suit in Monroe. 2d. The jury will presume that the trial in Monroe Superior Court was fair, and honestly conducted. The presumption is, that the Superior Court of Monroe did its duty, and came to a correct conclusion. If the defendant relies upon fraud or collusion in obtaining the judgment, it is for defendant to show it by proof. 3d. If you believe from the evidence that defendant Gragg was in Monroe Superior Court, during the pendency of the ejectment suit, and was there with his witnesses to prove his deed, and was aware of the pendency of the suit then, such facts, if you think such proof has been made before you, is evidence of notice to Gragg of the pendency of the ejectment suit. 4th. If you believe from the evidence, that defendant made a warantee title to the premises described in his deed, warrant |