each in the company, and undertook to pay the sum of £1 per share upon allotment. The infant came of age on the 25th April, and subsequently, on the 15th May, entered into an agreement with the company identical in terms with that already made. On the same day he applied for and was allotted shares in the company in accordance with the agreement, and his name was entered on the register of members. Subsequently, he notified the company that he refused to carry out the terms of the agreement, but did not seek the rectification of the register nor otherwise challenge what had been done until the following September. In an action by the company for the purchase money on the shares, held, that the subsequent agreement was not intended to be a mere ratification of the previous agreement within s. 64 of the Supreme Court Act 1915, but was a new and independent agreement, followed by an application for and allotment of shares in pursuance of it, and that accordingly the action must succeed. Ditcham v. Worrall ([1880] 5 C.P.D. 410) considered. VICKERY'S MOTORS PTY. LTD. v. TARRANT, 1924 V.L. R. 195; 45 A.L.T. 152. [Victoria.]

Appointment by father of guardian by deed - Subsequent remarriage of father— children Whether provisions in will for

qualifying guardian's rights—Application_by guardian for habeas corpus.- Where a father after having by deed appointed his eldest son guardian of certain infant children of his second marriage, subsequently married a third time and died leaving a will which gave to his widow a life interest in all his property whilst she remained unmarried she to provide thereout "a home for such of my children as shall be under the age of twenty-one years and unmarried," and the children, aged respectively fourteen and twelve, were living and were content to remain with the widow. Held, on an application by the son for a writ of habeas corpus, that effect could be given both to the appointment of the applicant and to the provisions of the will by leaving the infants in the possession of the widow so long as she remained unmarried and continued to reside in the house provided for her and the infants by the will, this course being in the best interests of the children. Knott v. Cottee (2 Phillips, 192) applied. In re J. J. AND N. CRADDOCK; CRADDOCK v. CRADDOCK, 1924 N.Z.L.R. 1148; G.L.R. 321. [New Zealand.]

Closer Settlement Acts-Special lease— Transfer Bona fides Advancement of child. See CROWN LANDS, col. 125.

-

Child Welfare Act-Affiliation-Paternity -Corroboration.-See DESERTED WIVES AND CHILDREN, Col. 139.

Maintenance Application of_corpus of trust property-Practice.-See TRUST AND TRUSTEE, col. 465.

Will-Settled estate-Leasing-Jurisdiction of Court-Benefit of infants.-See TRUST AND TRUSTEE, col. 466.

Large pig farm-Smells arising from— Nuisance to neighbour.-See NUISANCE.

INSANITY.

Dissolution of marriage-Insanity of wife— Adultery of petitioner-Discretion of Court.See DIVORCE, col. 144.

Testator intestate as to part of estate— Lapse of part-Widow and child in mental hospital. See FAMILY PROTECTION.

INSOLVENCY.

See BANKRUPTCY.

INSURANCE.

Construction of policy-Indemnity against insured's liability to pay compensation to workmen-Industrial disease-Certificate of disablement-Date of disablement after period covered by policy-Disease contracted during period. An insurance policy provided, inter alia, that if between 1st July, 1920, and 1st July, 1921, the insured should be liable to pay to or in respect of any direct employee compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1916, then and in every such case the insurer would indemnify the assured against all such sums for which the insured should be so liable. Workmen, employed by the insured during the said period, obtained, after the expiration of such period, from a certifying surgeon appointed under the said Act, certificates of disablement certifying that they were suffering from a disease to which the said Act applied. The dates of disablement in such certificates were dates after 1st July, 1921. The insured was liable under the said Act to pay and did pay compensation to the said workman as having been the employer who last employed them at any time during the twelve months previous to the respective dates of disablement. The employment of the workmen by the insured was wholly within the period named in the policy. The insured now claimed the sums which they had paid from the insurer under the above policy. Held, that the liability cast by s. 12 of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1916 on the employer, by virtue of the employment of a man within twelve months before disability from disease is certified to, was a liability within the meaning of the policy, though the date at which it might result in a money demand against the employer might be uncertain; and that therefore the insured was entitled to recover the moneys it had paid from the insurer. JUNCTION NORTH BROKEN HILL MINE NO LIABILITY v. VICTORIA INSURANCE CO. LTD., 24 S. R. 160; 41 W. N. 36. [New South Wales.]

Employer's indemnity policy-Worker's compensation Contract to indemnify_"the insured "Firm of four partners Dissolution-Claim of employee of the one continuing partner-Liability of insurer.-In an Employers' indemnity policy " issued by

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year

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the defendant company in April, 1923, it was recited that the D. Co. (thereinafter called the insured") had made a proposal, and it was agreed by the Company (in substance) that if at any time during the ensuiug any employee in the direct service of the insured" should be injured by accident, under circumstances which rendered the insured liable to pay compensation for such injury, the company should indemnify the insured. The proposal was signed by one of four partners who were carrying on business under the name of the D. Co. Neither the proposal nor the policy contained any reference to the partners. In September. 1923, a deed of dissolution of the partnership was executed by all the partners, and three of the partners retired, G., the fourth, taking over the business, which he thereafter continued alone under the name of the D. Co. In October, 1923, the defendant company in reply to a letter from G., wrote to him noting that he had taken over the D. Co., and asking him if he was trading in his own name or as before, and saying, in effect, that if the D. Co. had been wound up it would be necessary to take out a new policy in G.'s name, and enclosed a proposal form and asked for particulars. On the 19th November, 1923, a workman in the employment of G, (carrying on business as the D. Co.), but engaged by G. subsequently to September, 1923, was injured under circumstances which rendered G. liable to pay compensation to the workman under the Workers' Com. pensation Act 1915. G., on the 20th November, 1923, made a claim upon the company, and the company on the 23rd November purported to cancel the policy. In an action on the policy by G. and the three former partners, a special case was agreed to, and the Court was asked to say whether, upon the facts stated, the defendant company was liable, under the said policy, to indemnify the plaintiffs and/or the plaintiff G. Held, 1. That inasmuch as the workman had been employed by G. acting solely on his own behalf after the dissolution, the accident occasioned no liability in the firm, and therefore no liability in the defendant company to indemnify the four plaintiffs. 2. That there was no contract by the defendant com. pany to indemnify as the insured" any person or persons who might during the currency of the policy be carrying on business under the name of the D. Co. other than the firm as existing at the date of the policy. 3. That the policy could not be construed as a contract by the defendant company not merely with the members of the firm collectively or jointly, but also with each of them individually and severally Statement in White v. Tyndall ([1888] 13 A.C. 362, at p. 277) adopted. 4. That, the defendant objecting, the Court should not on the question submitted

:

consider whether or not a new contract with G. had been constituted by the correspondence 5. That the question submitted should be answered in the negative as to the plaintiffs collectively and also as to the plaintiff G. separately. GERMANO v. GRESHAM FIRE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE SOCIETY LTD., 1924 V.L.R. 592; 30 A.L.R. 388. [Victoria.]

Motor van-Proposal-Statement by assured that paid licensed driver employedPolicy-Indemnity provided for when van driven by driver of certain qualificationsWhether terms complied with AccidentWhether assured entitled to insurance moneys. -A policy of insurance on a motor van was granted to the plaintiff on the basis of a proposal for insurance in which the answer

"

Yes, one," was given by the plaintiff to the question" Do you employ a paid licensed driver? The answer was true. The indemnity clause in the policy itself referred to all sums for which the assured should become legally liable for compensation in respect of accidental bodily injury, including loss of life," where such injury or damage is caused by, through, or in connection with such car whilst being driven by the assured or by his paid driver, provided that each holds a license to drive where such is required by law or by-law." The van was being driven by a paid driver who did not hold a license, but he was not bound to hold a license either by law or by-law. The driver had sitting beside him a paid licensed driver who was directing him as to driving and teaching him, and who had power to take command of the van from the unlicensed paid driver. Held, that the plaintiff was not prevented from recovering under the policy. INGLIS BROS. & Co. LTD. v. LIVERPOOL, LONDON & GLOBE INSURANCE CO. LTD., 1924 N.Z. L.R. 455. [New Zealand.]

Statements in proposal-Car bought on credit-Bill of sale over car-Questions in proposal-Statement in declaration of lossWhether concealment, non-disclosure, fraudulent misrepresentation, or breach of warranty. Plaintiff purchased a motor-car in March, 1922, from B., with whom he had a running account, and upon delivery the purchase price was charged against this account. In August, 1922, plaintiff executed a bill of sale over this car, inter alia, in favour of B. to secure the sum of £900 "this day lent and advanced," and all further advances. The £900 approximately represented the amounted debited against plaintiff's account. In March, 1923, the existing insurance policy was cancelled and a new one for £200 issued. The proposal form for this policy contained the question, "has all the purchase money been paid?" And was answered in the affirmative, plaintiff believing that by the execution of the bill of sale he had discharged his debt out of the borrowed money. Moreover, the proposal contained no question which, if answered correctly, would show that the car was in any way encumbered. The car was destroyed by fire, and plaintiff in claiming the insurance signed a declaration of loss which stated that no other person had an interest in the

insured property. Held, (1) that upon the execution of the bill of sale the debt for the car was extinguished and became an advance recoverable under the provisions contained in the bill of sale, and thus no concealment, non-disclosure, fraudulent misrepresentation, or breach of warranty had been made. Credit Co. v. Pott (6 Q.B.D. 299), and Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation v. Williams (34 N.Z.L.R. 924; 17 G.L.R. 641) applied; (2) plaintiff had not made a wilfully false statement in his declaration of loss. Goulstone v. Royal Insurance Co. (1 F. & F. 276); Norton v. Royal Fire and Life Assurance Co. (1 T.L.R. 460), and Chapman v. Pole (22 L.T. 306) followed. FOSTER v. STANDARD INSURANCE CO. OF NEW ZEALAND LTD., 1924 N.Z.L.R. 1093; G.L.R. 441. [New Zealand.]

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Policy in the name of the insured “as mortgagees"-Repayment of mortgage debt after fire and before action-Action by mortgagees on policy-Right to recover-14 Geo. III., c. 48 -14 Geo. III., c. 78, s. 83.—The plaintiffs were mortgagees under a mortgage from B. An insurance policy covering the property mortgaged was issued by the defendants in favour of the plaintiffs " as mortgagees, B. as owner. This was afterwards altered to read in favour of the plaintiffs as mortgagees of B." The premises insured by the policy were burnt down. After the fire B. repaid to the plaintiffs the amount due under the mortgage, the plaintiffs agreeing at the time of such repayment to prosecute on behalf of B. the plaintiffs' claim against the defendants under the policy. After such repayment the plaintiffs instituted an action against the defendants on the policy. Held, that the existence of a personal loss or damage in the plaintiffs at the time the action was begun was not essential to their right to maintain the action, if in fact other interests intended to be covered by the policy subsisted and loss had occurred in respect of them, and that the plaintiffs were therefore entitled to recover. HORDERN AND ORS. v. FEDERAL MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. OF AUSTRALIA, 24 S. R. 267; 41 W.N. 54. [New South Wales.]

Policy of life insurance Proposal form filled in by agent-Statements therein false to the agent's knowledge—Liability of insurer.— The respondent issued a policy of life assurance to one M. The policy was founded upon a proposal, declaration and personal statement which, it recited, formed the basis of the contract, and it contained the condition that the Society relies on the truth of the statements made in the proposal and declaration." The proposal and declaration contained questions as to certain particulars and the proponent's answers thereto, and he declared that, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the particulars therein given were in all respects true. The proposal and. declaration was signed by M. who could not read or write anything but his signature. The answers to the questions in the proposal were filled in by one W. who was in the employ of the respondent with authority to canvass

for insurance and obtain proposals for policies and submit them to the respondent. One of the answers was to W.'s knowledge untrue, but M. did not know that an untrue answer had been given by W. At the trial of an action by the appellant, the widow of M. upon the policy, the jury found that M. had not acted fraudulently or designedly concealed the truth; and that in filling in the answers to the questions, W. was the agent of the repsondent. Held, that the respondent was liable under the contract. Judg. ment of the Supreme Court of Queensland (Shand, J). reversed. SARAH AGNES MAYE v. THE COLONIAL MUTUAL LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY LIMITED, 30 A.L.R. 329. [High Court.]

Fire-Proposer not able to read, but able to sign his name-Misstatements by proposer written by servant of insurers from answer given by proposer Effect.-A policy of insurance of £200 on a motor car was issued by defendant on a proposal signed by the proposer, the answers in which were written by a servant of defendant from answers given by the proposer, who could not read but could sign his name. These answers contained at least three material misstatements of fact, namely, the purchase price of the car was stated to be £300, when it was only £87 10s. ; the declared cash value of the car was stated to be £500, which was greater than the stated cash value when new; and the age of the car was stated to be about six years, when the evidence tendered showed that this was far below its real age. The car was destroyed by fire, and on a claim for the amount of the insurance. Held, that as the proposer intended the proposal to be acted upon on the faith of the statements which appeared therein above his signature, and those statements were untrue, the policy was void. Rookyer v. Australian Alliance Assurance Co. (11 G.L.R. 162) referred to. ROSSE v. COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY LTD., 19 M.C.R. 3. [New Zealand.]

Fire policy-Claim Repudiation of liability -Repudiation not going to root of contract— Rights and liabilities.-It appeared in an action on a fire policy that the plaintiff had insured a motor car he had purchased for £300. The car was burnt and he sued to recover the amount of his loss. He paid for the car by giving a cheque for £165; five months later he paid £11 for painting—an obligation of the vendors and the balance, £125. Under the policy the proposal, conditions and stipulations constituted the basis of the insurance. A condition required that in the event of any difference as to the amount of any loss or damage the matter should be settled by arbitration. Under another clause "if a claim be made and rejected and an action be not commenced within three months after the rejection all benefits under the policy shall be forfeited." In answer to a question on the proposal, whether the price paid was "cash or terms" the plaintiff said it was cash. In reply to a claim made by the plaintiff the defendants on the 16th August

The

wrote: "As the conditions of the policy have not been complied with by Mr. Kennedy there is no liability attaching to this company for any loss by fire which he may have sustained." Further correspondence and negotiations ensued and as no settlement was arrived at the plaintiff wrote on the 4th December requesting the defendants to join in the appointment of an arbitrator. On the 7th December the defendants wrote acknowledging receipt of the letter of the 4th December and said: "We would refer you to our letter of the 16th August last in which we advised you of the position in regard to this matter.". The plaintiffs continued to press for the appointment of an arbitrator, and on the 2nd January the defendant's solicitors wrote that as the defendants denied liability under the policy they would not consent to go to arbitration. The action was not commenced until the 28th March. presiding judge left to the jury the question of the truth or otherwise of the statement in the proposal that it was a cash transaction, and also the further question, whether the claim had been rejected more than three months before the action was brought. The jury found for the plaintiff. Held, that the judge was right in refusing to direct the jury that the statement in the proposal was untrue and the jury were justified in the circumstances, in finding that the answer was true, and further, that the Judge should have directed the jury that the letter of the 7th December was a definite rejection of the plaintiff's claim; and, as the rejection was merely a repudiation of liability under the contract, and not a repudiation of the contract itself, the defendants were entitled to rely on the stipulation the action must be brought within three months after the rejection. Jureidini v. National British and Irish Millers Insurance Co. ([1915] A.C. 499) distinguished. KENNEDY v. QUEENSLAND INSURANCE Co. 24 S.R., 542; 41 W.N. 177, New South Wales.]

Fire-Lloyds' Underwriters-Whether a company Insurance against earthquake and fire -Whether fire insurance business.-" Lloyds' Underwriters " is a body of underwriters in London. It is not a company corporate or incorporate. They have a meeting-place and receive applications for insurance but there is no company or association liable for the insurance and those who insure insure with individuals. Certain underwriters in Lloyds' issued a policy of what is called an agreement-contract. This agreement-con. tract stated: "Direct damage by earthquake and fire caused directly or indirectly therefrom in New Zealand and Tasmania." It had signatures to it of a large number of underwriters, and each underwriter took a share of the risk, some 1-68th of the risk, and some 2-68ths of the risk, some 1-20th, some 1-12th, and so on, various risks, the quotas mentioned being opposite certain amounts. Held, (1)

that the underwriters of Lloyds were not an

"association of persons " within the meaning of s. 2 of the Insurance Companies Deposits Act 1921-22 (Dalgety & Co. v. The Solicitor

General (14 G.L.R. 452; 31 N.Z.L.R. 632 distinguished); (2) that the contract was an insurance against earthquakes and their incidental effects and one of their incidental effects, namely, fire, and was not, strictly speaking, fire insurance business, That, therefore there was no carrying on by Lloyds' or Lloyds' Underwriters as a company or association of any class of insurance within the said Acts, that Lloyds or Lloyds' Underwriters was not a company within the Act, and were not liable to deposit money under the Act. G. H. SCALES LTD. v. PUBLIC TRUSTEE AND ATTORNEY-GENERAL, 1924 G.L.R. 385. [New Zealand.]

Fire-policy-Condition precedent as to commencing action — Arbitration — Disputed claim-Stay of proceedings.-The plaintiff's furniture was insured in the office of the defendant against loss by fire. It was a condition of the policy that if any disagreement arose in the adjustment of any claim the amount to be paid should, if the defendant so desired whether the right to recover on the policy was disputed or not and independently of all other questions, be submitted to arbitration and the award be conclusive and that the insured should not be entitled to commence or maintain any action upon the policy until the amount of the loss had been referred to arbitration and then only for the amount awarded, and this should be a condition precedent to any right of action under the policy. There was a disagreement as to whether the total amount should be allowed, and the only question was a pure question of fact as to the value of the furniture. The plaintiff issued a writ to recover as for a total loss. On motion for an order staying proceedings under s. 5 of the Arbitration Act, 1908, held, that the defendant was entitled to an order for stay of proceedings till an award was given. Jones v. Eagle Star Insurance Co. (1922 G.L.R. 587) distinguished. HEMPTON v. NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT STATE FIRE INSURANCE OFFICE, 1924 G.L.R. 560. [New Zealand.]

Fire Proposal Untrue statement Concealment of material fact.-HARDING v. VICTORIA INSURANCE CO. LTD., 1924 N.Z. L.R 267. [New Zealand.]

Same case: 1923 G. L. R. 565; 1923 Digest, col. 221.

Lease-Covenant to pay insurance-Increase of insurance by lessor.-See LANDLORD AND TENANT, col. 258.

Trust for use of residence for limited period -Power of trustees to insure.-See STAMP DUTY, col. 418.

Stamp Duties Act 1920, s. 120 (1)—Application to premiums on life policies.-See STAMP DUTY, col. 417.

Marine insurance-Sea worthiness of ship. -See SHIPPING, col. 408,

Dispute between employer carrying on business of insurance and employees

Special or common jury of twelve-Discretion of Court-Long established practice— Procedure-Jury Act, 1912 No. 31, ss. 29, 30.— The Court has the same discretion to grant or refuse applications for a common jury of twelve, as it had in the case of applications for a special jury of twelve. The rule that a long established practice should be followed by the Court is not applicable in matters of procedure. MYERSON v. SMITH'S WEEKLY PUBLISHING Co.; BISHOP v. SAME, 41 W.N. 58. [New South Wales.]