guarantors-Accounts-Joinder of plaintiffs. -See JUSTICES, col. 250.

See also PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.

HARBOUR.

Action against Harbour Board-Limitation -Wharf Unsafe condition Damage to vessel. An action must be brought against a Harbour Board within three months of the date of the doing of the injury and not from the time of its discovery. Where a vessel is gratuitously berthed at a wharf under s. 78 (1) (e) of the Harbours Act 1923, the Harbour Board is not liable for damage suffered by the vessel in consequence of the unsafe condition of such wharf. ANDERSON THE NAPIER HARBOUR BOARD, 19 M.C.R. 104. [New Zealand.]

v.

Scheme for improvement of Gisborne Harbour-Use of scheme and plan by board— Copyright-Infringement.-See COPYRIGHT.

HIGH COURT.

See APPEAL-FEDERAL LAW.

HIRE-PURCHASE.

Chattels held on hire-purchase agreementWhether liable to distraint. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, col. 269.

Hire-purchase agreement-Motor car-Exchange between hirer and company for another car-Sale of car by company-Possession of company. See SALE OF GOODS, col. 388.

Hire-purchase of goods-Order-Acceptance by letter or delivery at stipulated dateDelivery too early-No concluded contract.— See SALE OF GOODS, col. 389.

Motor car- -Covenant by purchaser to keep in repair-Lien by repairers against owners.— See LIEN.

HOUSING ACT (N.S.W.).

Valuation of land-Restrictions imposed by Housing Act.-See LOCAL GOVERNMENT, col. 286.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Separate estate-Woman married after Act of 1879-Vested interest in remainder before marriage-Interest falling into possession after marriage. In a petition under

the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1898, one of the petitioners was a married woman, who at the date of her marriage, which was after the Married Women's Property Act 1879, was entitled to a vested estate in remainder in real estate expectant on the death of her mother. While the petitioner was still a married woman the estate fell into possession. Held, that it was not her separate estate and that her husband was a necessary party. Lane v. Oakes (30 L.T. 726) not followed; Reid v. Reid (31 Ch. D. 402) applied. In re REYNOLDS (DECEASED), 24 S.R. 1; 40 W.N. 131. [New South Wales.]

Conveyance to single woman of land subject to mortgage-Restraint on anticipation— No intervening trust-Subsequent marriage— Sale by mortgagee-Payment into Court— Payment out.-Land subject to a mortgage was conveyed in 1910 to a single woman, to her sole and separate use, without power of anticipation. She subsequently married. Default having been made in the mortgage, the mortgagee sold the land, and, after satisfying all the moneys due under the mortgage, paid a certain sum into Court to the credit of the woman, whose husband was still alive. In an application by her for payment out of this sum, held, that once the land was converted into cash, the restraint on anticipation could only be effectually maintained by the continuing existence of a trust which would intercept the moneys, and, as such a trust was neither disclosed in the conveyance, nor could be inferred in the case of a settlement, the applicant was entitled to receive the fund in Court. In re F. J. PLOMLEY (DECEASED), 24 S.R. 115; 41 W.N. 17. [New South Wales.]

Principal and agent-House hold necessaries supplied on order of wife-Whether "otherwise than as agent "-Burden of proof.A defendant, in proceedings against her to recover the balance of the price of goods supplied on her order, proved that she was a married woman living with her husband, and that she had ordered the goods in question for the use of the common household, for the payment of which goods so far as payment was made her husband in fact found the money. Held, that it was a question of fact as to whether the defendant contracted" otherwise than as agent" for her husband within s. 4 (3) of the Married Women's Property Act 1915; and that on proof of the above facts a presumption arose that she had contracted as agent, and that it was then for the other contracting party to produce evidence to the contrary. McDOUGALL v. CARTER, 1924 V.L.R. 143; 45 A.L.T. 122. [Victoria.]

Whether wife a trustee for husband for or beneficial owner of certain moneys-Corroboration of husband's evidence. At the date of the death of plaintiff's wife there was on deposit to her credit at a certain bank the sum of £3,430. Plaintiff claimed that that sum was deposited there by her at various times as his agent for his use and he claimed that

sum from the defendant who was her executor and the sole beneficiary under her will. The plaintiff and defendant were the only witnesses. Held, (1) that the evidence of the plainitff was generally corroborated by certain facts and that he was entitled to judgment. BROWN V. O'HALLORAN, 1924 G.L.R. 263. New Zealand.]

Gift by wife to husband-Onus of disproving undue influence. In the case of an absolute gift from wife to husband, although the relationship does not of itself raise any presumption of undue influence, circumstances that the wife was bedridden, incapable either by speech or writing of directly communicating her wishes, or of sustained thought or attention; had previously, when in good health, expressed her desires with regard to the property by means of a will; and, in addition, that she had shown great mental agitation at the time of executing the document and afterwards, but had shown relief on being assured that her children would not suffer-held sufficient, in the absence of adequate advice as to her rights and powers and as to the real nature and effect of the document she was executing, to throw the onus of showing that no undue influence was exercised upon those supporting the gift. ROBERTS v. BROWN AND BEATTIE, 1924 N.Z.L.R. 851. [New Zealand.]

Local Court-Summary judgment—Husband and wife living apart-Authority of wife to pledge husband's credit-Local Courts Act 1904-1921, s. 47a.-The defendant was sued in the local Court for work done and services rendered by the plaintiff as a medical practitioner for the defendant's wife. On an application for summary judgment the defendant filed an affidavit in the course of which he said: "During and for a considerable time prior to the period covered by the claim in this action and at the present time my wife and I were and are living separate and apart, and she had and has no authority express or implied to pledge my credit in favour of any person or persons whomsoever." The magistrate granted the plaintiff's application, and judgment was entered accordingly. Held, that the facts disclosed by the defendant's affidavit entitled him to unconditional leave to defend. Where a wife is living apart from her husband, she is presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to have no authority to pledge his credit. LOVE v. PAGET, 1924 W.A.L.R. 56. [Western Australia.]

Separation by mutual consent-Voluntary agreement by wife to accept specified allowance Allowance duly paid-No implied authority to pledge husband's credit.-In May, 1920, defendant's wife, as a result of differences between herself and her husband, left his home in Wellington with her two young children for England, the intention being that she should reside there for a time in order that the differences which had arisen might have a chance, through the passing of time and absence, of being healed. It was arranged that defendant should follow within

a year or eighteen months and bring her back to New Zealand. She was given £25 in cash and defendant was to remit her £200 per year by monthly instalments while she was in England. She remained in England till August, 1922. She resided chiefly with friends and duly received the monthly instalments, and in addition, two extra payments of £20 each. While in England she borrowed from her brother, the plaintiff, £130, and on 17th March, 1922, gave him a promissory note therefor payable twelve months after date. The money was borrowed and used to purchase tickets for herself and children to New Zealand. In an action to recover on the promissory note and incidental expenses, held (1) that as husband and wife had separated by mutual consent and she had voluntarily agreed to accept a specified allowance which had been duly paid, she had no authority to pledge her husband's credit; (2) that, on the facts, credit was given to defendant's wife and not to defendant; (3) that the burden of proving that the advance was necessary was upon plaintiff and had not been discharged. SHILLSON ̊ v. Nash, 19 M.C.R. 41. [New Zealand.]

Cattle Straying in street-Information for offence-Mens rea-Absence of proof ofCase remitted.--Mens rea is an essential ingredient of an offence against s. 46 of the Impounding Act 1920, which provides that it is an offence for any person to suffer any cattle belonging to him or under his charge to stray in any street or public place, and the prosecutor must give proof of this ingredient. To constitute mems rea in this offence, there must be some circumstances from which it can be inferred that the cattle were straying on the road to the knowledge of the defendant for such an interval of time as a magistrate might think sufficient to constitute the offence, or it must be shown that the cattle were straying as the direct result of negligence or carelessness on the part of the defendant. Роcock v. ELLIOTT, 1923 S.A.S.R. 271. [South Australia.]

Cattle Straying in street-Information for offence Mens rea-Negligence-Absence of proof of. On an information for allowing cows and a bull calf to be at large in a street within a town, it was proved that the cattle were the property of the defendant and were straying in a public street in the town. Held, that in order to sustain a conviction there must be evidence in addition that either the defendant knew the cattle were at large or that their being at large was the direct result of negligence on his part. Pocock v. Elliott (1923 S.A.S.R. 271) (supra) applied. JafFREY V. SANDERS, 1923 S.A.S.R 276. [South Australia.]

Pastures Protection Acts-Camping reserve -Authority of impounding officer.-A person authorized by a Shire Council to impound within its area and by a Pastures Protection Board to impound on reserves under its control is guilty of trespass if he impounds on a camping reserve outside the Shire and which has not been placed under the control of the Pastures Protection Board under s. 26 (A) of the Pastures Protection Acts 1912-1920. Semble, a person appointed to impound stock trespassing on a travelling stock route or camping reserve has no power to delegate such authority. PETRIE V. LOVELEE, 7 L.G.R. 44 (T. W. Cohen, P.M.). [New South Wales.]

INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION.

Agreement between parties to industrial dispute Binding effect of agreement-Extended period of operation-Rights of members of organization under agreement made with organization-One award-One dispute.Held, that it follows as a consequence of the provision of s. 24 (1) of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1921, which gives to an agreement between parties to an industrial dispute the effect of an award (1) that the provision in s. 28 (2) that after the expiration of the period specified in an award for its operation the award shall continue in force until a new award is made applies to an agreement made and filed pursuant to s. 24 (1), and (2) that, where such an agreement is made between an organization of employees and a number of employers specifying the rates of wages payable by those

employers to their employees who are members of the organization, one of those employees has a right of action against his employer for wages payable under the agreement in respect of the period during which the agreement continues to operate. Mallinson v. Scottish Australian Investment Co. ([1920] 28 C.L.R. 66) followed and applied. Carter v. E. W. Roach & J. B. Milton Pty. Ltd. ([1921] 29 C.L.R. 515) explained and distinguished. Per Isaacs, J.: There is only one award, in the relevant sense, to end one dispute. MONARD v. H. M. LEGGO & Co. LTD., 33 C.L.R. 155. [High Court.]

Agreement in settlement of dispute Successor of party to agreement-Whether agreement binding on successor-Validity of Commonwealth statute-Retrospective operation of statute Agreement made, and succession occurring before amending Act. Sect. 24 (1) of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 1920 provides that if an agreement between all or any of the parties as to the whole or any part of the dispute is arrived at, a memorandum of its terms shall be made in writing and certified by the president, and the memorandum when so certified shall be filed in the office of the Registrar, and unless otherwise ordered and subject as may be directed by the Court, shall, as between the parties to the agreement have the same effect as, and be deemed to be, an award for all purposes including the purposes of section thirty eight." By s. 3 of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1921 (which was assented to on 16th December, 1921) s. 24 (1) was amended by inserting after the words " parties to the agreement the words or any successor or any assignee or transmittee of the business of a party bound by the agreement, including any corporation which has acquired or taken over the business of such party." Held, by Isaacs, Higgins and Starke JJ., that s. 24 (1) as so amended applies as from 16th December, 1921, to an agreement made, and to a successor, etc., who has become such, prior to that date. Held, also, by Isaacs, Higgins and Starke JJ. (Knox Č.J. and Gavan Duffy, J. dissenting) that, so interpreted, s. 24 (1) as so amended is within the power conferred on the Commonwealth Parliament by s. 51 (XXXV.) and (XXXIX.) of the Constitution. Australian Boot Trade Employees' Federation v. Whybrow & Co. (1 C.L.R. 311) distinguished. GEORGE HUDSON LIMITED v. AUSTRALIAN TIMBER WORKERS UNION, 32 C.L.R. 413; 30 A.L.R. 13. [High Court.]

Same case on other points, FEDERAL L W -JUSTICES.

Application for variation of agreementOne-man cars-Application refused. The Court only interferes with the way an employer carries on his business if there is no other way to secure to the employees conditions under which they can, without injury to health or life, work; but it does fix special rates to compensate employees for extra duties imposed on them by employers or where it

is considered necessary it will reduce the hours of duty. AUSTRALIAN TRAMWAY EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION v. MELBOURNE, BRUNSWICK, AND COBURG TRAMWAYS TRUST 16 C.A.R. 333. [Commonwealth.]

Variation of agreement—Jurisdiction.— The Court has power to vary an award agreement after the date of the term fixed by the agreement filed in the Court.— AUSTRALIAN TRAMWAY EMPLOYEES' AssocIATION v. MELBOURNE, BRUNSWICK, AND COBURG TRAMWAYS TRUST 16 C.A.R. 527. [Commonwealth.]

Variation of agreement-Validity ofFower of councils to delegate authority Ratification of agreement Agreement in Intra-State dispute.-Sect. 158 (3) of the Local Government Act 1915 (Victoria) must be read subject to the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act. It is not necessary that an Inter-State dispute should be proved as the basis and foundation of an industrial agreement. Questions of power of local councils to delegate authority to make industrial agreements and necessity for ratification of agreements considered. MUNICIPAL OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF AUSTRALIA v. LORD MAYOR, ALDERMEN, COUNCILLORS' AND CITIZENS OF THE CITY OF MELBOURNE, 16 C.A.R. 800. [Commonwealth.]

Agreements between employers and employees-Production of balance-sheets of employers Interpretation—Payment for New Year's day Payment of holiday allowance to contractors-Payment for holidays-Power to compel employees to work at half time on holidays.-The Arbitration Act is one favoring collective bargaining between unions and employers, and to protect employees from being compelled to bargain individually. It is advisable to allow agreements to be made between employers and employees without the consent of the executives of the unions, provided the executives are given an opportunity of being heard first on the matter. Any order to allow inspection of balance-sheets of employers would only be made by the Court under special and reasonable conditions, and on proof that the request was reasonably necessary to protect the employees. Employees have no right to insist on all the benefits of an award, and, by direct action, insist on higher rates where work is necessary on holidays or Sundays. Employers should not give notice to employees just before the Christmas holidays so as to avoid payment of wages during the Christmas and New Year's holidays. The Court would, if necessary, vary the award to prevent such evasion of payment of the weekly rates. AUSTRALIAN WORKERS' UNION v. BENDIGO AMALGAMATED GOLDFIELDS, 16 C.A.R. 1049 [Commonwealth.]

2. APPEAL.

Appeal from Board of Reference, Rockhampton-Sleeping accomodation at Port Alma-Appeal dismissed. Decision, in Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigotion Company and Another v. Waterside Worker's Federation of Australia and Others (15 C.A.R.

15) that the Court will not, except in very special cases, disallow decisions of Boards of Reference, affirmed. Grounds on which the Court would disallow such decisions stated. DALGETY AND COMPANY LIMITED v. WATERSIDE WORKERS' FEDERATION OF AUSTRALIA, 16 C.A.R. 102. [Commonweatlh.]

Appeal under Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act s. 17-Registration of Organization.-The Court does not set aside decisions of the Registrar, where he can exercise a discretion, unless it is clear that his decisions were wrong on the facts before him. LOUISE CROCKER (SECRETARY OF THE ROYAL VICTORIAN TRAINED NURSES' ASSOCIATION) v. TRAINED NURSES' GUILD, 16 C.A.R. 221. [Commonwealth.]

Application for cancellation of registration. -An appeal against the registration of an association is a matter pending before the Court within the meaning of s. 61 of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act. COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA v. UNITED BANK OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION (COMMONWEALTH BRANCH) 16 C.A.R. 997. [Commonwealth.]

3.-AWARD.

Interpretation of award-Retrospective operation of overtime clause-Clause 22.FEDERATED CARTERS AND DRIVERS' INDUSTRIAL UNION OF AUSTRALIA v. ACLAND, 16 C.A.R. 71. [Commonwealth.]

Interpretation of award-Extra performances-Overtime.-ACTORS' FEDERATION OF AUSTRALASIA v. J. C. WILLIAMSON LIMITED, 16 C.A.R. 191. [Commonwealth.]

Interpretation of award-Adjustment of rates.-FEDERATED RUBBER WORKERS OF AUSTRALIA v. DUNLOP RUBBER COMPANY OF AUSTRALASIA LIMITED, 16 C.A.R. 224. [Commonwealth.]

Interpretation of award-Stoppage of work. -FEDERATED ENGINE-DRIVERS AND FIREMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF AUSTRALIA v. ALBANY BELL, 16 C.A.R. 351. [Commonwealth.]

Interpretation of awards-Operation of wages adjustment cla uses Strikes. FEDERATED CLOTHING TRADES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA v. J. A. ARCHER, v. ALLEY BROTHERS, v. ATTERTON, 16 C.A.R. 541. [Commonwealth.]

higher in any locality. AMALGAMATED SocIETY OF ENGINEERS v. ADELAIDE STEAMSHIP COMPANY LIMITED, 16 C.A.R. 547. [Commonwealth.]

Interpretation of award-Rates on oversea vessels-Meaning of "at sea 99 and "first port"-Overtime-Leave of absence-HoursStop-work meetings.-FEDERATED SEAMEN'S UNION OF AUSTRALASIA v. COMMONWEALTH STEAMSHIP OWNERS ASSOCIATION TREASURER FOR QUEENSLAND & WHITEHOUSE BROS., 16 C.A.R. 790. [Commonwealth.]

Interpretation of award-Cost of living adjustments.-FEDERATED STOREMEN AND PACKERS' UNION OF AUSTRALIA v. AUSTRALIAN MERCANTILE LAND AND FINANCE COMPANY LIMITED, 16 C.A.R. 953. [Commonwealth.]

Application for variation of award-Mistake in names of respondents.-When parties are bringing matters before the Court which involve claims under an award of the Court, it is essential that such claims should be brought under the notice of the persons against whom they are made without delay. AUSTRALIAN TIMBER WORKERS' UNION v. JOHN SHARP & SONS LTD., 16 C.A.R. 960. [Commonwealth.]

Interpretation of award-Jurisdiction of Court-Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1920, s. 38 (0).-The power of the Court to give an interpretation of any term of an existing award is a wide and general power given to the Court by the Legislature, and the Legislature leaves it to the Court to prescribe the procedure under which this power is to be exercised. If a union has a dispute with an employer as to the meaning of an award it can apply to the Court for an interpretation of the award in relation to that employer, but any decision given by the Court would be binding only upon that employer and would not be binding on any other employer. Semble the Court would not necessarily approve of this procedure in every case. Each case

must be considered in relation to its own facts, and if the Court had reason to believe that any other respondent ought to have notice of the application the Court would see that notice was given. Where a union was in dispute with an employer as to the interpretation of an award and elected to have the dispute tried by a Police Court, the union is bound by the decision of the Police Court so far as that employer is concerned, and the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration will not re-open the question. The union may, however, bring the dispute before the latter Court as regards other employers. AUSTRALIAN TIMBER WORKERS' UNION V. JOHN SHARP & SONS LTD., 16 C.A.R. 1042. [Commonwealth.]

Interpretation of award-Reduction for misconduct, etc.-BANK OFFICIALS' ASSOCIATION V. BANK OF AUSTRALASIA, 16 C.A.R. 1064. [Commonwealth.]