V.L.R. 460) applied. In re BARBER, 1924 V.L.R. 123; 30 A.L.R. 71; 45 A.L.T. 115. [Victoria.]

Insolvent estate administered under Part IV. of the Administration Act 1908-Incidence of funeral and testamentary expenses--Protected life-insurance moneys-Marshalling— Right of widow of deceased insolvent to retain furniture and effects.-Where the insolvent estate of a deceased person is administered under Part IV. of the Administration Act 1908, and that estate includes the proceeds of an insurance policy protected from the debts of the deceased by s. 65 of the Life Insurance Act 1908, the policy-moneys bear and are liable for all testamentary expenses exclusively arising in the administration and realization thereof. The funeral expenses and the remaining testamentary expenses are borne by the protected policy moneys and the remainder of the general estate in proportion to their respective values. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald (10 S.R. (N.S.W.) 666) followed; Wright v. Roach (30 N.Z.L.R. 456; 13 G.L.R. 497) not followed. The widow of the deceased insolvent is not entitled to select and retain by virtue of s. 121 of the Bankruptcy Act 1908, furniture and household effects to the value of £25 out of the estate of the deceased. MAITLAND V. PUBLIC TRUSTEE, 1924 N.Z.L.R. 840; G.L.R. 317. [New Zealand.]

Deficiency of security-Life tenant and remaindermen-Time and method of appointment.-Trustees of an estate lent various sums amounting to about £7,000 principal on the security of freehold land and chattels at various dates between the years 1913 and 1915. In the year 1917 the interest was £796 in arrear, and in the year 1918 only £5 was paid towards arrears o interest. The life tenant died in 1917. After the death £385 was received in various instalments as interest. The security was realised in 1917, and produced considerably less than the sum lent. Held, that in 1918 the probable loss on the security ripened into a business certainty; and that the interest received after the death of the life tenant should be brought into hotchpot and the aggregate of the arrears of interest and the purchase price should be divided on the principle laid down in In re Atkinson ([1904] 2 Ch. 160). In re GEORGE SCARFE, 1923 S. A. S. R. 459. [South Australia.]

Capital and income-Tenant for life and remaindermen-Will-Trusts for realisation and investment-Payment of debts-Excess income.-S., a testator, devised and bequeathed his real and personal estate to trustees upon trust to realise the same, and after the payment out of the proceeds of his debts and funeral and testamentary expenses to invest the residue in Government securities and pay the income to his wife during widowhood, and thereafter upon trust for his two children. The realisation of the estate was deferred under an order of the Court for several months; in the meantime the trustees successfully carried on the

testator's farming business and ultimately effected an advantageous sale. The profits of the business largely exceeded the income which would have been derived, at the current rate, from an investment of the capital in Government securities. An originating summons was taken out by the trustees to determine, substantially, how the profits should be applied and to what portion thereof the widow was entitled. Held that the testator had created a mixed fund of realty and personalty; that the debts were payable rateably out of the realty and the personalty and the profits thereof to the date of realisation; that the widow was entitled to the balance of the profits of the realty and not applied in payment of debts and to the equivalent of interest at the current rate for Government securities on the balance of the personalty, and that the excess of income on such personalty should be capitalised. In re SPURR, 1922 Tas. L. R. 44. [Tasmania.]

Statement of assets and liabilities-Interest of testator under another will-Subject to life interest of third party-Valuation of life interest-Administration and Probate Act 1915, s. 122.-At the time of her death, A. was entitled to a share in certain real estate which had been devised by B., subject to payment of an annuity to the widow of B. The annuitant died twelve weeks after A. and before the final assessment of A.'s estate for duty under the Administration and Probate Act had been made. Held, that for the purpose of the valuation of the interest of A. in the estate of B., the annuity to the widow of B. should be valued upon an actuarial calculation of the probable duration at the time of A.'s death, of the life of the annuitant, and not on the basis that the annuitant actually died twelve months after A. In re MARGARET MARY JAMESON (DECEASED), 30 A.L.R. 444. [Victoria.]

Marshalling assets-Life assurance policies -Funeral and testamentary expenses or probate duty-Residuary estate insufficient -Recourse to specific legacy.-See WILL, col. 494.

Right of Curator to apply for revocation of probate and for administration pendente lite. -See PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION, col. 370.

Life tenant and remainder man-Capital or income Company Conversion of undistributed profits-New shares-Powers of trustees. See TRUST AND TRUSTEE, col. 467.

Bequests of annuities and other bequests— Whether subject to probate duty and estate duty. See STAMP DUTY, col. 418.

Death duty-Estate duty--Right of executors to recover duty or deduct from benefits under will.-See STAMP DUTY, col. 417.

Probate duty-Reduction in favour of children-Where reduction can be claimed

Administration Act (W.A.).-See STAMP DUTY, col. 418.

Power of Court in administration suit to sanction lease to bind infant remaindermen.See TRUST AND TRUSTEE, col. 460.

Partnership-Dissolution by death-Purchase of interest-Accounts-Share of profits -Rental.-See PARTNERSHIP.

House bought by father for son-Death of father-Whether a gift.-See GIFT.

Whether wife a trustee for husband or beneficial owner of certain moneys.-See HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Partial intestacy-Widow and daughter of testator in mental hospital-Application under Family Protection Act.-See FAMILY PRO

TECTION.

Administration-Proof of will-Right of executors and trustees to commission.See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, col. 164.

Liability as indorser of promissory note Action by executors.-See BILL OF EXCHANGE.

Charge on land payable on future eventInfants-Scheme for exoneration of landTrusts Act (Vic.).-See TRUST AND TRUSTEE, col. 470.

Chose in action-Parol contract to assign— Validity. See CONTRACT, col. 69.

Administration of estate-Disputed questions of facts involved-Originating summons.— See PRACTICE, col. 356.

Attempt to entail land-Tenancy entail impossible Land held under Real Property Act-Validity of gifts.-See WILL, col. 498. See also PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION.

ADMIRALTY

High Court-Jurisdiction-Commonwealth -British possession-Action for damages against ship.-See SHIPPING, col. 409.

ADULTERATION OF FOOD.

See PUBLIC HEALTH.

ADVANCES FOR HOMES ACT.

Expense of making street-Land owned by Advances for Homes Board-Agreement to sell to returned soldier-Exemption from rates taxes, etc.-See LOCAL GOVERNMENT, col. 295.

"

(inter alia) as follows:- (c) Unreasonably to cause unnecessary pain." Under s. 7 of the same Act the owner of the animal is deemed in the first instance to have committed the offence mentioned in s. 4 sub-s. (1) (h) of the Principal Act, but may have the driver of the animal brought before the Court, and after the commission of offence has been proved may prove that he has used due diligence to prevent the offence, and that it was committed without his knowledge and thereupon the driver shall be found guilty of the offence. The appellant was convicted of wilfully ill-treating a horse by working it while it had sore shoulders. The horse was one of a team engaged in carting wool, was in good condition, but had several sores on the shoulders. Evidence was given that the horse was the property not of the appellant but of a man called Schlink. Held, that the evidence did not establish any offence under s. 4, sub-s. (1) (h) of the Principal Act, as it was not shown that the horse was unfit for the use it was put to, but that there was evidence on which the justices could conclude that the defendant had unreasonably caused unnecessary pain to the animal, and, therefore, could properly convict under s. 4, sub-s. (1) (a). Ford v. Wiley ([1889] 23 Q.B.D. 203) commented on. Semble, where the evidence is such as to constitute an offence against sub-s. (1) (h) and also against sub-s. (1) (a) literally read, and the evidence supports nothing more than an offence against s. 4, sub-s. (1) (h) the proper course is to lay an information under sub-s. (1) (h) not under sub-s. (1) (a). Sub-s. (a). must in such circumstances be construed as not covering the things forbidden by sub-s. (1) (h). CUNNINGHAM . SPARROW, 1924 S.A.S. R. 17. [South Australia.]

Cruelty to animals-Information for offence —Using horse unfit for use-Owner convicted -Horse driven by son-No evidence of exemption or excuse-Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Acts-Justices Act 1921, s. 56.— On an information against the owner of a horse for knowingly using it when unfit for use, contrary to s. 4, sub-s. 1, sub-div. (h), of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Acts 1908 to 1915, it was proved that the horse was driven by the owner's son. There was no evidence that the son was in the father's employ or was under his control or direction, or that the horse was being driven for the father's benefit. The owner was convicted. Held, that the conviction was right, as the section constituted the act an offence generally, and the onus of proving any exemption or excuse was on the owner. WILSON V. HOMES, 1923 S.A.S.R. 555. [South Australia.]

Interlocutory judgment-Leave to appeal to Privy Council-Discretion of Court-Orderin-Council, rule 2 (b).-On an application by the defendant in a libel action for leave to appeal to the Privy Council from a decision of the Full Court, which ordered a verdict to be entered for the plaintiff on one plea, and ordered another plea to be struck out and a new trial to be had, the Court held that the judgment being interlocutory, the questions involved were not of such importance as to justify the Court exercising its discretion by granting leave to appeal. Doyle v. McIntosh (17 S.R. 402) and New Redhead Estate & Coal Co. v. Scottish Australian Mining Co. (18 S.R. 390) applied. MYERSON v. SMITH'S WEEKLY PUBLISHING CO., LTD. (No. 2), 24 S.R. 51; 41 W.N. 8. [New South Wales.]

High Court-Appeal from Supreme Court of State Leave to appeal.-In an action for libel in the Supreme Court of New South Wales a verdict had been given for the defendant which, on appeal by the plaintiff, had as to one count been set aside and a new trial ordered. The defendant applied to the Supreme Court, under rule 2 of the Order in Council of 2nd April, 1909, for leave to appeal to the Privy Council, but leave was refused. See Myerson v. Smith's Weekly

Publishing Co. Ltd. (No. 2) (supra). Held, that leave to appeal to the High Court from the order of the Supreme Court directing a new trial should be refused. Leave and special leave to appeal from Myerson v. Smith's Weekly Publishing Co. Ltd. (No. 2), ([1923] 24 S.R. (N.S.W.) 51), refused. SMITH'S WEEKLY PUBLISHING Co. LTD. v. MYERSON, 34 C.L.R. 141. [High Court.]

State Court action between the Commonwealth and private persons-Trespass-Breach of contract-State Full Court judgment on appeal Application for leave to appeal direct to Privy Council-Jurisdiction of State Full Court Judiciary Act, 1903 No. 6, s. 3.-An action was brought in the State Supreme Court against the Commonwealth and a private person for the alleged wrongful requisiton of the plaintiff's ships. A verdict for the plaintiff was set aside on appeal to the State Full Court. Held, on this application to the State Full Court for leave to appeal to the Privy Council against the decision of the Full Court that no question affecting the limits inter se of the constitutional powers of the Commonwealth and State arises. Further that the decision appealed against was judgment of the State Court within the Orders in Council and within the Statutes, 9 Geo. IV., c. 83 and 7 & 8 Vic., c. 69, and that leave should be granted. Leave was also granted to appeal to the Privy Council against an order of the State Full Court granting leave to enforce as a judgment an award in an arbitration between the Commonwealth and private citizens concerning the rights of the parties under a shipbuilding contract. LIMERICK STEAMSHIP Co. v. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA AND ANOR., AND COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA v. KIDMAN AND ORS., 24 S.R. 145; 41 W.N. 19. [New South Wales.]

Note: This case reversed by High Court. See infra.

a

Leave to appeal to Privy Council-Appeal to High Court from order granting leaveJurisdiction of High Court.-On appeal to the High Court from the order granting leave to appeal to the Privy Council in the above cases, held, that under s. 73 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth an appeal lay to the High Court from the orders granting leave to appeal to the Privy Council. Held, also, that those orders were made without jurisdiction, the orders from which leave to appeal was sought having been made by the Full Court in the exercise of Federal jurisdiction and being, by virtue of s. 39 of the Judiciary Act, final and conclusive except so far as appeals might be brought to the High Court. Limerick Steamship Co. v. The Commonwealth of Australia; The Commonwehlih of Australia V. Kidman, (24 S. R. 145; 41 W.N. 19, supra), reversed. LIMERICK STEAMSHIP CO. (RESPONDENTS) v. THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA AND ANOR. (APPELLANTS); THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (APPELLANT) v. KIDMAN AND

Conditional leave to appeal to Privy Council— Amount in dispute of value of £500 or upwards-Privy Council Appeal Rules.-The respondent brought an action to restrain the appellant Board from infringing his copyright in a plan of a proposed harbour for Gisborne. In the Supreme Court it was held that the details of his scheme were not protected by copyright, but that, for reasons given in the judgment, the respondent was, irrespective of copyright, entitled to an injunction to restrain the board from publishing his idea or scheme. That judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeal. The respondent then applied to the Court of Appeal for conditional leave to appeal to the Privy Council. The respondent's plan and scheme had been the subject-matter of an agreement between himself and the board, under which the latter originally agreed to pay him a percentage calculated upon the cost of the harbour-work should the board substantially adopt the scheme which the plan embodied. A claim based on that agreement had previously been considered by the Court of Appeal, and a decision given to the effect that the contract could not be enforced against the board. The board opposed the motion for conditional leave to appeal to the Privy Council in the copyright action. Held, that the effect of the injunction was to confer on the respondent a right to prevent the board from adopting and using the respondent's idea or scheme, that such monopoly if maintainable, was worth a sum of money in excess of £500, and that the respondent was therefore entitled as of right to conditional leave to appeal to the Privy Council. Macfarlane v. Leclaire (15 Moo. P.C. 181) applied. GISBORNE HARBOUR BOARD v. LYSNAR, 1924 N.Z.L.R. 827; G.L.R. 105. [New Zealand.]

Appeal-In forma pauperis-Whether reasonable ground for appeal.-Petition by the plaintiff for leave to appeal in forma pauperis from the decision of Sim, J., Eagle v. New Zealand Picture Supplies Ltd. (1924 G.L.R. 78) setting aside the jury's finding of negligence on the part of the defendant and entering judgment for the defendant refused by the Court of Appeal which was not satisfied that there was reasonable ground for the appeal. Re EAGLE; EAGLE v. NEW ZEALAND PICTURE SUPPLIES LTD., 1924 G.L.R. 223, [New Zealand.]

Appeal--In forma pauperis.-Leave granted to appeal in forma pauperis. Form of order granting leave settled by the Court. CLIFTON v. DEXTER AND CROZIER LTD., 1924 G. L. R. 1. [New Zealand.]

Financial position of appellant-Security for costs. Where the appellant would be unable through poverty to pay the costs of his appeal, if unsuccessful, he should be ordered to give security. Non-compliance by the appellant with a bankruptcy notice

is sufficient evidence to justify the Court in ordering security for the costs of an appeal by him. The Court does not order security

for the amount which would cover the whole costs of the appeal. CRACK V. EDWARDS, 1924 W.A.L.R. 85. [Western Australia.]

Notice of motion for new trial-Telegraphic notice followed by formal notice Insufficiency of notice. At the trial of an action for trespass before Ewing, J., and a jury the Judge directed a verdict to be entered for the plaintiff. Defendant's attorney telegraphed to plaintiff's attorneys notice of intention to move the Full Court for a new trial. A formal notice of appeal was served two days before the sitting of the Full Court. Held (1) that the telegraphic notice was not a sufficient notice; (2) that the formal notice was not sufficient as it did not allow the four clear days required by the Legal Procedure Act 1903, s. 3. MARRAWAH TIMBER PTY. LTD. v. JAEGER, 1922 Tas. L.R. 6. [Tasmania.]

Appeal from District Court to Court of Arbitration Power to award costs.-See INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION, col. 208.

High Court-Appellate jurisdiction_State Court with Federal jurisdiction-Court of Requests (Tas.). See FEDERAL LAW.

Decree directing inquiries-Appeal to High Court-Application to proceed-High Court rates. See PRACTICE, col. 357.

Whether appeal by case stated from finding of fact or determination as to jurisdiction by industrial magistrate.-See INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION, col. 222.

Appeal against maintenance order-Service of notice of appeal.-See SERVICE AND EXECUTION OF PROCESS.

Right of original and independent discretion in Supreme Court-Attitude of High Court in appellate jurisdiction.-See TRADE MARK.

Magistrate's Court-Cases under £10Equity and good conscience-Right to appeal.. -See SMALL DEBTS RECOVERY.

Application of club for certificate of registration-Refusal-Power of Licensing Court to state case. See LICENSING, col. 273.

Appeal against Sydney Municipal Council's assessment-Notice of appeal-Mandatory statute. See LOCAL GOVERNMENT, col. 287.

Imposition of charges for slaughtering cattle-Appeal to Minister.-See SLAUGHTERING AND INSPECTION ACT (N.Z.).

Maintenance of wife-Order of justicesAppeal Further evidence.-See DESERTED WIVES AND CHILDREN, col. 134.

Appeal from decisions of justices.-See JUSTICES.

Appeal against decisions of municipal councils. See LOCAL GOVERNMENT.

APPRENTICE.

Apprenticeship — Indenture form - Powers in conflict with Apprentices Act.-An indenture of apprenticeship contained a covenant giving the master power to declare the indenture null and void in certain cases of misconduct on the part of the apprentice. Held, that, as this covenant was in conflict in a material particular with s. 19 of the Apprentices Act 1901, whereby the master's powers were strictly limited, the indenture was not governed by the Act, and that therefore the special remedial clauses of the Act did not apply. WEST v. SIDNEY WILLIAMS & Co. LTD., 41 W.N. 43. [New South Wales.]

Contract-Indentures of apprenticeship— Effect of subsequent award. See INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION, col. 203.

Failure to pay apprentices wages for holidays. See INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION, col.

210.

Failure to pay during illness-See INDUS TRIAL ARBITRATION, col. 209.

ARBITRATION.

66

Question of law arising in course of reference Jurisdiction of Supreme Court to direct arbitrators to state special case-Question of law specifically submitted to arbitratorsDiscretion. Sect. 19 of the Arbitration Act 1915 (Vict.) provides that any referee arbitrator or umpire may at any stage of the proceedings under a reference and shall if so directed by the Court or a Judge state in the form of a special case for the opinion of the Court any question of law arising in the course of the reference." Held, that under the section the Court or a Judge has jurisdiction to direct arbitrators to state in the form of a special case for the opinion of the Court a question of law specifically submitted to them. Held, also, that, in the circumstances of the particular case, it was a proper exercise of discretion to make such an order. In re President, &c., of the Shire of Wodonga and Carr (1924 V.L.R. 56; 45 A.L.T. 89; 30 A.L.R. 5) affirmed with a variation. CARR V. PRESIDENT, COUNCILLORS AND RATEPAYERS OF THE SHIRE OF WODONGA, 34 C.L.R. 234; 1924 V.L.R. 286; 30 A.L.R. 177. [High Court.]

Mistake in law on face of award-Two submissions-One award - Evidence Telephone conversation-Postponement of performance of contract-Date of assessing damages. Two submissions to arbitration were made in respect of two separate contracts for the sale of wheat. The sub