8. A judgment or decree of a court can be used as evidence in another suit only as against parties and privies; and if in the second suit there are new parties, against whom the judg- ment could not have been used, had it been adverse, they can- not introduce it in their fa- vour. Baring v. Fanning. 549 9. And it makes no difference
that the new parties, as assig- nees of a chose in action are endeavouring, together with the assignor, to enforce the same right that was establish- ed in the former suit in favour of the assignor. ib. 10. And in such a case, where a Court of Chancery had order- ed an account, and made a de- cree thereupon in favour of the assignor, it was held not to be a matter decided ex di- recto, by a court of competent jurisdiction, so as to bring it within the exception to the ge- neral rule.
1. Whether an execution for the sole benefit of an individual, on a judgment of the United States, can be issued into any district of the United States as it might be if it were for their use? Quere. United States v. Thomas Morris. 209
The Collector having been clothed with a discretion, un- der the embargo laws, to grant permits to such foreign vessels as were allowed to depart with their cargoes, to take on board necessary sea stores and pro- visions; the Court refused to decide, in a case where a per- mit had been granted, that the sea stores taken on board were more than were necessary, it not appearing that there was any fraud. The Brig Isabella. 1 2. And where it had been the practice at the custom-house, in such cases, to consider arms and ammunition for the de- fence of the vessel as sea stores, the court refused to adopt a different construction.
3. A vessel which during the ex- istence of our embargo laws, departed from one port in the United States on a voyage to another, but was obliged from irresistible necessity to put into a foreign port, and sell her cargo, was not guilty of a
violation of those laws. The Brig William Gray. 16 4. From a fair comparison of the different embargo acts with each other, it may be collected that Congress meant express- ly to make such an instance of necessity an exception to the penal operation of those acts. ib. 5. But if Congress have neglect- ed to provide for such an ex- ception, it is the duty of the Courts to interpret those laws, as they do all penal statutes, by considering the exception as implied. Consent is essen- tial to guilt; and the legisla ture is supposed to pass all pe- nal laws with the understand- ing that Courts will not inflict the penalties for such viola- *tions as are unintentional. ib. 6. This is not, therefore, one of those cases which are refer- red for mitigation to the Se- cretary of the Treasury. ib. 7. The rule that penal statutes are to be construed strictly, means that they ought not to be extended by their spirit or equity to other offences than those which are clearly de- scribed and provided for. But Courts are not prevented by this rule from inquiring into the intention of the legislature. The Schooner Enterprise. 8. Where there is such an ambi- guity in a penal statute, as to leave reasonable doubts of its meaning, it is the duty of a Court not to inflict the penal- ty. ib. 9. The language of the 2d sec- tion of the embargo law of the
25th of April, 1808, is so loose that it is impossible to deter- mine whether any offence and forfeiture were intended to be created. At any rate the re- ference as to the penalty to the collection law is not to the 50th section of that law which pro- vides against unloading goods in the night. ib. 10. The promulgation of laws should be such as to afford every person who is to be af- fected by them a reasonable opportunity of being as early as possible acquainted with them. The Ship Cotton Plan-
Having been seized for a vio- lation of the law, the Court decreed her restoration. ib. 14. Where goods are libelled under the 67th section of the law for the collection of duties for disagreeing with the en- tries, and the claimant sets up mistake as an excuse,-the circumstance that probable cause of seizure has been made out, does not impose on the claimant the necessity of making out an unusually clear case of mistake. All he has to do is to produce ordinary proof. United States v. 9 Packages of Linen. 129
15. It was holden a sufficient and legal excuse for an incor- rect entry of goods, that they were entered from an invoice made out in great hurry and agitation, while the goods were packed at Caen, in the absence of the owner, in order to se- cure them by removal from an apprehended pillage by the Prussian soldiery, who occu- pied the place. ib. 16. How far a Court can regard the innocence of a party when the facts of a case subject it to the penalties of a statute, and especially of the collection law? Quere. United States v. Thomas Morris. 209
17. A vessel licensed for the cod-fishery under the 32d sec- tion of the act for enrolling and licensing vessels, during the embargo law, took on board a quantity of goods with- out inspection at a wharf in New-London, to transport about five miles to Mistic ri-
ver, in the same district, but was seized when a mile and a half on her way: Holden, that although she had not vio- lated any of the provisions of the embargo laws, she was forfeited for being employed in another trade than that for which she was licensed. The Sloop Active.
247 18. It seems, that no penalty was intended to be inflicted by the 2d section of the additional embargo law of the 25th of April, 1808, for loading a ves- sel without inspection, but that the penalty for leaving the district without a clearance, which could be obtained only on inspection, was thought by the legislature to be alone a sufficient sanction to secure an inspection.
ib. 19. It seems, that the penalties there mentioned were intend- ed to apply to the inspecting officers.
ib. 20. A vessel which, during the non-intercourse law, took a cargo at St. Croix for Cadiz, with the intention of touching off New-Haven on her way thither, for a supply of provi- sions, and of terminating her voyage in the United States, if by law it could be done, was held not to be forfeited under the 6th section of that law, which provides against the putting goods on board a ves- sel with the intention of im- porting them into the United States. The ship Ann Maria.
256 21. Where goods are seized as forfeited, under the act of the
20th of April, 1818, for being entered at the custom-house differently from the invoice, the inquiry cannot be made at the trial, whether such differ- ence proceeded from accident or mistake, the question being referred exclusively to the Secretary of the Treasury. United States v. One Case Hair Pencils. 400 22. Nor has the Collector a right to make such inquiry on the seizure of goods under this ib. 23. The provision in the act of the 2d of March, 1799, allow- ing such inquiry to be made by the Court or Collector, is impliedly repealed by the act of 1818. Rules of construc- tion as to the repeal of sta- tutes by implication. ib. 24. The spirit of the revenue laws is not to create a forfei- ture of property, except for acts of the owner attended with fraud, misconduct, or ne- gligence. United States v. 651 Chests of Tea. 499 25. He is not to suffer for the fraud, misconduct, or negli- gence of the revenue officers, in which he does not partici- pate. ib. 26. Spirits, wines, and teas are not subject to seizure, under the 43d section of the collec- tion law, which declares, that "if any chest, &c. shall be found in the possession of any person, unaccompanied with the marks and certificates, it shall be presumptive evidence that the same is liable to for- feiture," unless the certifi-
27. "Possession of any person,' as used in this section, means the possession of the purcha- ser, to whom the certificates are required to be delivered on a sale, and not the posses- sion of a wrong doer. ib. 28. The collection law is adap- ted to a regular and usual course of business, and ex- traordinary cases where a compliance with its letter is impracticable, do not come within its sense and meaning. ib.
29. The information alleged, that the teas were unaccom- panied by marks and certifi- cates; but the proof was, that the certificates only were wanting Held, that the aver- ment was unsupported by proof. ib. 30. And the necessity of this allegation, shows that the true construction of the act is, that both must be wanting. ib. 31. The want of marks and cer- tificates, and not the illegal importation or non-payment of duties, is the specific cause of forfeiture under this sec- tion. ib. 32. And this is evident, from its not being necessary to allege in the information, that the teas were illegally imported, or the duties unpaid, but only that they were unaccompa- nied with marks and certifi- cates.
ib. 33. So of the other provisions. of the act, their object is to guard against illegal importa-
tion and the non-payment of duties; but the forfeiture which they create is incurred only by a violation of the spe- cial regulations which the law has provided as guards and checks. ib. 34. The marks and certificates, being evidence only of a law- ful importation, the want of them affords no presumption of the non-payment of duties.
35. Impolicy of allowing a for-
feiture where it is to be the Vide BONDS, 1-4. DUTIES. Is-
officers, as might entitle them- selves to a share of it. 36. The general bond of the im- porter for duties on teas, ac- companied with a deposite of the teas, as provided for by the 624 section of the collec- tion law, is a securing of the duties, within the meaning and true interpretation of the 43d section. ib. 37. And if this were not such a securing of the duties, the teas could not have been landed. ib. 38. A deposite, in all cases un- der this act, is in effect a pledge, and in lieu of the per- sonal sureties dispensed with, unless specially declared to be otherwise. ib. 39. Whether, if government re- gain the possession of teas ir- regularly obtained from their keeping, without the payment of duties, they can enforce their lien for the duties, or how long such lien continues after the teas have got into
FORMER. JURISDICTION, 1. REMISSION OF PENALTIES. SEA STORES. SHIPS, 9-11.
1. One chartered the hold of a vessel for a voyage, covenant- ing to pay freight, the owner appointing and paying the mas- ter and crew, and fitting the vessel. A third person ship- ped goods, consigning them to the defendant, who, on re- ceiving them from the master, promised to pay the freight. Held, that the charter party did not deprive the owner of his lien for the freight, and that the defendant became lia- ble to the owner for the freight by his acceptance of the goods. Ruggles v. Bucknor. 358 2. Whether the owner has a lien
under any circumstances on a part of the cargo not deliver- ed, for the freight of the whole? Quere.
« PreviousContinue » |