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It is true that a Court of Admiralty in England, merely as such, has no jurisdiction over prizes; but that to constitute such an authority in it, or to call it forth at the breaking out of hostilities, a commission under the great seal issues to the Lord High Admiral to enjoin it on the Court of Admiralty to proceed on all cases of captures, &c. and to hear and determine according to the course of the Admiralty and the law of nations. Such is undoubtedly the practice of Great Britain, introduced probably from a silence on this subject in the commission by which a Judge of the Admiralty is appointed, which enumerates particularly every object of his jurisdiction, but says nothing of prizes. It is not known that this is the practice of any other nation, but it is believed that their Courts of Admiralty, are regarded as the national and proper tribunals for taking cognizance of captures in time of war, without any special delegation from the sovereign for that purpose, on every commencement of hostilities. If so, and the District Court by its act of organization has exclusive original cognizance of "all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," why should it be restricted in its cognizance to such cases as belong to the English Courts of Admiralty as instance Courts, more than those of any other nation? Civil causes, it is said, do not embrace cases of prize, which arise out of and are determined by the jus belli, and not by the civil or municipal law.

But it cannot be necessary to pursue this inquiry farther; for as early as the year 1794, the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously decided, that every District Court of the United States possessed all the powers of a Court of Admiralty, whether considered as an instance or as a prize Court; so that, if the present case belongs to the Admiralty at all, which is not denied, it is unimportant in the present inquiry to determine under what particular branch of its jurisdiction it be

a 3 Dall. 61.

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cognizable, as it must have a right to inquire into and to ascertain the quantum of damages and costs in all cases of marine trespass or tort.

But admitting the jurisdiction of the District Court, it is denied by the appellants, that they are liable at all for the injuries enumerated in the libel.

After so many and such direct authorities on this point, it is matter of some surprise that a question of this kind should be made. It has long been regarded as a general principle of maritime law, and not resulting from any special contract, that owners of a privateer are liable for torts committed by captains whom they may employ ; and whatever doubt may have once existed as to the extent of this responsibility, it is now well settled, that it is not limited by the value of the privateer, which would often prove a very inadequate compensation, but that they are personally accountable for the whole of the injury committed. This is not only the uniform language of elementary writers, who have treated of the subject, but is one of the points decided by the Supreme Court in the case already referred to. It is there declared, "that the owners of a privateer are responsible for the conduct of their agents, the officers and crew, to all the world, and that the measure of such responsibility is the full value of the property injured or destroyed."

The only exception to this rule, or rather the only case which is supposed not to fall within it, is where the master is guilty of a tort in matters totally foreign to his authority; and this is supposed to be the case before the Court. The authority of the boarding crew extended, it is said, to the making of a search, and to capture, if circumstances should justify it, but not to rob and ill treat the crew of a friendly vessel.

Admitting this to have been their authority, if they were acting under it, as was the case when they committed the outrage,

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the owners are liable, although the outrage itself was not intended to have been sanctioned by it. "If the captain of a privateer," says Browne, "emissus ad prædandum perperam prædetur, if commissioned to cruise against an enemy, he plunders a friend, the owner is responsible ;" and assigns as a reason, that his agent was then acting within his province when the wrong was perpetrated. So the owners were held liable by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Del Col v. Arnoldb for any spoliation or damage done to the property, which was not considered as authorized or excused by a right to seize and bring in a vessel for further examination.

The Court being of opinion that the owners in this case are responsible to the libellants, will proceed to inquire to what extent the latter can ask a compensation at their hands; and whether the District Court has not erred in the principles which it adopted in fixing on this remuneration.

The Court cannot refrain from remarking, before it proceeds, that it is impossible not to be struck with the very large amount which has been assessed for damages, when compared with the actual injury sustained. The whole of the property plundered was not worth, in the opinion of the libellants themselves, who cannot be suspected of an under-valuation, more than six hundred dollars, or thereabouts, and the appellants have been decreed to pay for this outrage, connected with some personal injury, very improper indeed, but not very serious, and for which seven hundred and fifty dollars was deemed an adequate recompense, the large sum of thirteen thousand two hundred and forty-six dollars and forty-six cents; that is, more than twenty times the extent of the articles plundered, and more than four times the value of the schooner and the whole of the cargo, although the vessel remained with the owner, and no part of the cargo was

b 3 Dall. 333.

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touched. It may well, therefore, be supposed, that some mistake has been made; as such damages for such an injury are, probably, without example in any Court, of whose decisions we have any information.

The appellants say, that the respondents are entitled to nothing more than an indemnity for the property taken, and to a reasonable remuneration for personal injuries. Believing this to be the proper and only safe rule of damage, they insist that they are entitled to be relieved here against the sums allowed for redeeming the vessel at Antigua, after the condemnation, for the loss sustained on the sales of the cargo at that place; and for the loss sustained in consequence of the schooner's not completing her voyage to Bermuda, and returning from thence to Port-au-Prince. These are not exactly the terms in which this loss is expressed; but it is very clear that the report, by referring to the testimony of Dawson and Lavand, intended the allowance of three thousand five hundred dollars, as a compensation for the loss of the voyage. The interest on these items, and the commission of the supercargo, are also objected to by the appellants. These sums form an aggregate of nine thousand thirty-three dollars and sixty-seven cents. All these allowances were made on a supposition, that the losses for which they were intended as a compensation, were produced by the destruction of the schooner's papers.

It is not possible to express in language sufficiently strong, the indignant feelings which are excited by this wanton act on the part of the boarding crew; but we must not indulge these feelings so far as to prevent a dispassionate consideration of the conduct of the supercargo, and whether it has justly involved the appellants in the very extensive responsibilities which, it is alleged, have grown out of it. Without determining what consequence or liability might have. attached to the owners of the privateer, if a condemna

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tion after a full defence had been pronounced for the want of papers, the Court will inquire, whether they can be liable for any damage occasioned by the compromise that was made. To render this act of the supercargo binding on the appellants, so far as to create in them a responsibility for any of its consequences, it ought to have been made not only in good faith, but it should be one which might be fairly justified by the circumstances of the case, and above all, there should be some privity between those making and those who are to be affected by it. The bona fides of this transaction the Court is not disposed to call in question, although it would have been more satisfactorily made out, if the supercargo, instead of relying on the advice of his consignee, who was not a professional gentleman, had submitted the case to a proctor in the Island of Antigua, and had acted under his directions.

But however fair the conduct of the supercargo may have been in this transaction, this Court is of opinion, that the circumstances in which the schooner and cargo were found at Antigua, did not call for any such sacrifice, as was agreed to by the supercargo. If it be true, that the only cause alleged for proceeding against them as a prize of war, was a want of papers, it would be a libel on the Court of Vice-Admiralty of that Island, or any other Court, to entertain a moment's doubt of their acquittal and restoration, as soon as it appeared, as it would by the answers to the standing interrogatories, that such destitution was occasioned by a robbery or plunder on the high seas. Nor is it to be believed, if that fact was satisfactorily made out, that the captors would think of an appeal. The apprehensions, therefore, of great delay and a heavy expense, were altogether visionary.

But if the compromise were proper, and made in good faith, there is such a total absence of all privity between the