7. Such a transaction is not void under section 8 of the act which declares that no transfer, not au- thorized by a previous resolution of the Board of Directors, shall be made by such a corporation of any of its effects exceeding in value $1,000, when it appears that a re- solution was passed authorizing the officers to give such security as they should think proper for those who should lend their notes, and the officers did in good faith, without fraud or collusion, deliver a suitable amount as such security, and it fur- ther appears, in reference to the particular notes transferred, that the Board also resolved that the officers proceed in liquidation of the liabili- ties of the Company therewith...id
8. A transfer by a moneyed corpora- tion of negotiable notes, as collateral security to secure a present loan to be used in due course of business, is not a transfer with intent to give a preference to one creditor over others, within the act forbidding such transfers by a moneyed corpo- ration when insolvent. And there- fore upon that state of facts it is not error to reject evidence that at the time of the loan the corporation was insolvent. ..id Nelson et al. v. Wellington, ....178
9. Where property of a moneyed corporation (viz., a note made by third persons) is wrongfully taken by one of its officers, and all its claims against such officer, including its claim for the taking of such note, are subsequently settled, and a re- lease given to such officer on taking his note for a balance agreed upon; although the persons acting in be- half of the Company, in making the settlement and giving the release acted without competent authority
to bind it, yet if the Company there- after, with knowledge of such set- tlement and of its terms, indorses absolutely and appropriates to its own use the note received on such settlement, it thereby ratifies the settlement and vests in such officer title to the note so wrongfully ta- ken, and he or his vendee can main- tain an action on it against the ma- kers. Houghton v. Dodge et al.,.326
3. Where, by the contract with the carpenters, (in such case,) they had agreed to construct a suitable gutter to receive the water falling upon the roof, and a leader running down to the basement, where it was to be connected with a main pipe leading into the sewer, and the carpenters had left the leader unfinished over the Sabbath, not extending within twelve or fifteen feet of the ground, and negligently omitted to provide effectual means of carrying off the water, in consequence of which, during a storm, the water flowed through the leader to the ground, and thence into the premises of the plaintiff's next adjoining, and caused injury to their goods: Held, that the owner is not liable for the dama- ges. .id
4. Held, also, by the Superior Court, that the neglect of the plumber, who was to furnish and introduce the main pipe leading to the sewer, to introduce it in due season and before the storm, was no excuse to the carpenters for not extending the leader down to the basement, and did not make the owner liable. But
held, in the Court of Appeals, that if the neglect to put in the main pipe caused the accident, it was the duty of the owner to cause it to be done, and he is not excused by rea- son of his having contracted with the plumber to do it. ...... ..id
5. Proof that a coach driven upon one of the piers owned by the cor- poration of the city of New York at the foot of one of the streets, breaks through a plank that is de- cayed, by means of which the plain- tiff's trunk is thrown into the river, and its contents damaged, is not sufficient to sustain an action against the city for the injury, nor to put the defendants to proof of reasona- ble and proper care and diligence in keeping such pier in repair. (WOODRUFF, J., dissented.) Garri- son v. The Mayor, &c., of the City of New York, .497
6. In order to establish, even prima facie, a right of action the plaintiff must show affirmatively on his part not only that the plank was decay- ed, but that the proper officers of the corporation had notice that it was decayed, or show that it was obvious to the eye without any par- ticular examination. (WOODRUFF, J., dissented.) ..id
7. In an action against a Railroad Company, to recover damages alle- ged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendants' driver in the management of his team in taking it through a public street after it had been detached from a car it had been drawing, a verdict for the plaintiff will be set aside as contrary to evidence, where the testimony is uncontradicted that the manner in which the team was managed was such as had been pursued by this and other similar Companies for years without acci- dent, and was considered, by those engaged in such business, safe and discreet, especially where it is proved that the injury was caused by an unexpected and wanton as- Bosw.-VOL. V. 94
sault by a third person upon the team, by which it was frightened and rendered unmanageable, and while frightened and unmanageable ran over the plaintiff. Weldon v. The Harlem R. R. Company,..576
8. The Company is not responsible for such act of such third person, though he may have been at the time employed by it in some capa- city, he not being at the time of such act actually attending to any busi- ness for which he had been employ- ed, or acting in any matter in behalf of the Company...
that a note of a third person for $500 was contributed by the other partner, and was credited to him as so much capital, and that only $200 of it was paid, and that $300 of its amount should be charged by the Referee to such other partner, and it is so charged, the judgment will not be reversed merely because the Referee received incompetent evi- dence tending to prove that it had been paid in full, as it is clear that receiving such evidence was not prejudicial to the defendants. Boyd v. Foot & Cole,
4. Where, on such an accounting, a referee erroneously refuses to allow to the defendants the proper credit in respect to a particular item, the judgment will not necessarily be reversed. If the plaintiff chooses to stipulate to deduct the whole amount of the defendants' claim in respect to such item, the Court will order the deduction made, and affirm the judgment as to the residue.. id
5. In an action against a common carrier to recover the value of a horse, alleged to have been fatally injured through the negligence of the carrier during its transportation by him, although the evidence in re- spect to its value be conflicting and proper to be submitted to the jury, yet their verdict will be set aside, as excessive in amount, if the verdict be for a sum which, in the opinion of the Court, is clearly much larger than is warranted by the evidence. Harris v. Panama Railroad Com- pany,..
1. The Mayor, Aldermen and Com- monalty of the city of New York, since the passage of the act entitled "An act to make permanent the grades of the streets and avenues of the city of New York," passed March 4, 1852, cannot, even under the authority of an ordinance passed by both branches of the Common Council and approved by the Mayor, change the grade of any street in said city, established by law when said act was passed, south of Sixty- third street, without becoming liable to the owner of any lot or building on the street so altered, for all damages caused to him, as such owner, by reason of the making of such change
3. Where, in consequence of the breaking through a plank in one of the piers belonging to the city, at the foot of a street, a coach was partially overturned, and the plain- tiff sustained damage, proof that the plank was decayed is not prima facie evidence of negligence; the plaintiff must show that the proper officers of the corporation had notice of the defect, or show that it was obvious to the eye without any par- ticular examination. (WOODRUFF, J., dissented.) Garrison v. The Mayor, &c., of New York,....
1. Evidence of due diligence in making presentment to makers of a note, competency of answers made to his inquiries to find makers, con- sidered. Adams v. Leland et al., 411
(Of dissolution of Partnership.)
Holdane et al. v. Butterworth,
Vide NEGLIGENCE, 1, 2, 3, 4.
OFFICERS OF CORPORATIONS.
1. Power to accept accommodation bills,.. ....275
2. Liability of corporation for their tort, ..293
1. Where a person (B.) is in part- nership with another (T.), in a business described as the business of "The Atlantic Forge Company," but in which the correspondence is conducted and all contracts made in the name of T., (the name of B. in no manner appearing in the busi- ness,) and thereafter the firm is dis- solved, and a new partnership is formed by T., the co-partner, and a third person, under a different name, to conduct the same business at the same place, and the partners in such new firm immediately send a notice of that fact signed by them, by post, to all who had dealt with the old firm, and subsequently a vendor who had never dealt with the old firm, makes a sale of goods on credit, nominally, to such former co-partner, T., in whose name the business of the old firm had been done, and takes a note signed by the new firm in its true name, he cannot charge the person, so retir- ing, as a continuing partner, al- though he knew by common noto- riety that the person so retiring
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