exist in law, and as they will revive when the infamy of that occupation has been terminated. The controversial part of this work rests, of course, on the original authorities, to which I have given full references throughout. In the historical portions I would make special acknowledgement to Dr. Scott Keltie's Partition of Africa and to that storehouse of invaluable information on the Congo, Sir Harry Johnston's George Grenfell and the Congo. Of Belgian writers on the Congo I have selected for citation M. Fritz Masoin's Histoire de l'État indépendant du Congo, for, uncritical as it is, the author's deep devotion to the Roman Catholic Church and his ardent admiration for Leopold II render his statements as to the administration free from all suspicion of bias against the State. The constitutional history of the Congo has had the good fortune to be illumined by the writings of MM. F. Cattier and Charles de Lannoy, and we owe to the care of Dr. Camille Janssen, the first Governor-General of the Congo and SecretaryGeneral of the Institut colonial international, an admirable selection of the reform legislation of the period 1908-13, inserted in the three volumes of the Recueil international de Législation coloniale. The recommendations made in Chapter XIX appeared in a summary form in the July number of the Journal of the African Society. The work has been read in manuscript by my wife, to whom I am much indebted for criticism and other help. EDINBURGH, A. BERRIEDALE KEITH. CONTENTS THE ANNEXATION OF THE CONGO TO BELGIUM THE BRITISH CASE AGAINST THE CONGO AND INTRODUCTION WHATEVER be the final verdict of history on the part played by the question of colonial expansion among the causes of the European War, two features have emerged in the course of the conflict which render the problem of the future of Central Africa of vital importance to the United Kingdom and its allies. It is true that the submarine has failed to satisfy the high hopes reposed in its efficacy by Germany, but it has achieved remarkable results, and is undeniably a dangerous weapon, greatly diminishing the advantages which else would be derived from British seapower. Happily for the allies, the German fleet during this war has not possessed oversea bases, strong enough to resist attack by sea or land, and equipped to repair and produce submarines to prey on ocean-borne commerce, but it would be idle folly to ignore the grave menace to the liberties of the world, should Germany emerge from the war with the power to create such bases in preparation for a war of revenge, and neglect worse than criminal to fail to consider the provision of whatever measures may be possible to avert this calamity. The aims of Germany in regard to Africa are notorious: Without colonies', Marshal von Hindenburg is reported to have said, 'there can be no industry, and without industry there can be no adequate prosperity. Therefore we must have colonies', and General Ludendorff has given his imprimatur to the views of his titular chief by the declaration that 'Colonies are inseparably connected with Germany's future, for which we must fight and conquer'.1 To the German claim for colonial possessions full sympathy was extended in the past by successive British governments, as 1 Cf. the views of Dr. Solf and Professor Delbrück cited in J. A. S. xvi. 336-8, and A. Bernard's article, ibid. 306-13. Prince Lichnowsky has frankly admitted in his record of his dealings with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,1 and the events of the war have still left not a few 2 who admit the justice of the claim and regard as necessary the recovery by Germany of the territories which she held before August, 1914. To the colonial party in Germany, . however, such a prospect seems meagre and unsatisfactory, and the demand is made that not only shall the former territories be restored, but that they shall be increased at the expense of France, Portugal, and Belgium so that all Central Africa from sea to sea shall be in the hands of Germany, which then by means of submarine bases on either coast will effectively menace the ocean trade of the allies.3 The demand for so large accessions of territory, though justified also on commercial grounds, rests essentially on the second factor which has emerged in the course of the war, the realization of the military potentialities in the training under modern conditions of the natives of Africa. Though France has long made effective use of Senegalese, and though her native troops have rendered admirable service in Europe, the British in Africa have ever made but restricted use of native forces. The causes of this are complex: reminiscences of the Indian Mutiny, confirmed by the unhappy rising in Uganda in 1897, have rendered governments reluctant to raise more troops than were actually necessary for local defence; there have been difficulties in supplying the necessary instructors and in finding officers with the taste and ability to command native Africans, but the chief cause why so little use has been made of African forces in the present war is doubtless that a policy of conciliation and peace seemed to render African armies needless and superfluous. The outbreak of hostilities, therefore, 1 2 My Mission to London (Cassell & Co.), pp. 14–19. e. g., the Independent Labour Party's manifesto in The Times, August 29, 1917. 3 Cf. Dr. Solf's claims, The Times, August 21, 1918, and Lord R. Cecil's reply, ibid., August 24, General Smuts, ibid., Sept. 13, 1918. |