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sonable. Thus, while both appear to be extrav- | an insult to the sovereign ? Suppose it should agant, this difference results from their opposite appear that our ministers have shown no regard conduct": that the wild system of the one must to the advice of Parliament; that they have ex. subject the nation to a much heavier expendi- erted their endeavors, not for the preservation of ture than was ever incurred by the pusillanimity the house of Austria, but to involve that house of the other.
in dangers which otherwise it might have avoidThe honorable gentleman whe spoke last [Mr. ed, and which it is scarcely possible for r:3 now Yorke) was correct in saying, that in the begin to avert. Suppose it should appear that a body ning of the session we could know nothing, in a of Dutch troops, although they marched to the parliamentary way, of the measures that had Rhine, have never joined our army. Suppose it been pursued. I believe, sir, we shall know as should appear that the treaty with Sardinia is little, in that way, at the end of the session ; for not yet ratified by all the parties concerned, or our new minister, in this, as in every other step that it is one with whose terms it is impossible of his domestic conduct, will follow the example they should comply. If these things should apof his predecessor, and put a negative upon ev- pear on inquiry, would not the address proposed ery motion which may tend toward our acquir- be most ridiculously absurd ?. Now, what as. ing any parliamentary knowledge of our late surance have we that all these facts will not turr. proceedings. But if we possess no knowledge out as I have imagined ? of these proceedings, it is, surely, as strong an I. Upon the death of the late Emperor of Ger argument sor our not approving, as it can be for many, it was the interest of this nation, I Walpole's our not condemning them. Sir, were nothing grant, that the Queen of Hungary should policj. relating to our late measures proposed to be in- be established in her father's dominions, and that serted in our address upon this occasion, those her husband, the Duke of Lorraine, should be measures would not have been noticed by me. chosen Emperor. This was our interest, beBut when an approbation is proposed, I am com- cause it would have been the best security for pelled to employ the knowledge I possess, wheth- the preservation of the balance of power; but er parliamentary or otherwise, in order that I we had no other interest, and it was one whick. may join or not in the vote of approbation. we had in common with all the powers of EuWhat though my knowledge of our late meas- rope, excepting France. We were not, there. ures were derived from foreign and domestic fore, to take upon us the sole support of this innewspapers alone, even of that knowledge I terest. And, therefore, when the King of Prusmust avail mysell, when obliged to express my sia attacked Silesia-when the King of Spain, opinion; and when from that knowledge I ap- the King of Poland, and the Duke of Bavaria prehend them to be wrong, it is my duty, surely, laid claim to the late Emperor's succession, we to withhold my approbation. I am bound to per- might have seen that the establishment of the sist in thus withholding it, till the minister be Queen of Hungary in all her father's dominions pleased to furnish me with such parliamentary was impracticable, especially as the Dutch reknowledge as may convince me that I have been fused to interfere, excepting by good offices misinformed. This would be my proper line of What, then, ought we to have done? Since wo conduct when, from the knowledge I possess, could not preserve the whole, is it not evident instead of approving any late measures, I think that, in order to bring over some of the claimit more reasonable to condemn them. But sup- ants to our side, we ought to have advised her posing, sir, from the knowledge within my reach, to yield up part? Upon this we ought to have that I consider those measures to be sound, even insisted, and the claimant whom first we should then I ought not to approve, unless such knowl- have considered was the King of Prussia, both edge can warrant approval. Now, as no sort because he was one of the most neutral, and one of knowledge but a parliamentary knowledge of the most powerful allies with whom we could can authorize a parliamentary approbation, for treat. For this reason it was certainly incumthis reason alone I ought to refuse it. If there- bent upon us to advise the Queen of Hungary to fore, that which, is now proposed contain any accept the terms offered by the King of Prussia sort of approbation, my refusing to agree to it when he first invaded Silesia. Nay, not only contains no censure, but is a simple declaration should we have advised, we should have insisted that we possess not such knowledge of past upon this as the condition upon which we would measures as assords susicient grounds for a par. assist her against the claims of others. To this liamentary approbation. A parliamentary ap- the court of Vienna must have assented ; and, in probation, sir, extends not only to all that our this case, whatever protestations the other claim. ministers have advised, but to the acknowledg- ants might have made, I am persuaded that the ment of the truth of several facts which inquiry Queen of Hungary would to this day have remay show to be false; of facts which, at least, have been asseried without authority and proof.
1 Tbis, it is now known. was the course urged by Suppose, sir, it should appear that his Majesty advised her to give up Silesia rather than involvo
Walpole on the Queen of Hungary. He strongly was exposed to sew or no dangers' abroad, but Europe in a general war. She replied that she inose to which he is daily liable at home, such wouid sooner give up her under petticoat;" aud, as the overturning of his coach, or the stumbling as this pat an end to the argument, he could do nothei his horse, would not the address proposed, in- ing but give the aid which England had promised Szad of being a compliment, be an allront and I-See Coxe's Walpole iii.. 248.
mained tho undisturbed possessor of the rest of pose an equal resistance to the Queen of Hun. her father's dominions, and that her husband, the gary alone, much less so to that Queen when Duke of Lorraine, would have been now seated supported by Hanover and the whole power of on the imperial throne.
Great Britain. During this posture of affairs, it This salutary measure was not pursued. This was safe for us, I say, it was safe for Hanover, appears, sir, not only from the Gazettes, but from to promise assistance and to concert schemes in our parliamentary knowledge. For, from the support of the Queen of Hungary. But no soon. papers which have been either accidentally or er did France come forward than our schemes necessarúy laid before Parliament, it appears, were at an end, our promises forgotten. Tho that instead of insisting that the court of Vienna safety of Hanover was then involved; and En. should agree to the terms offered by Prussia, we gland, it seems, is not to be bound by prorcises, rather encouraged the obstinacy of that court in nor engaged in schemes, which, by possibility, rejecting them. We did this, sir, not by our may endanger or distress the Electorate! From memorials alone, but by his Majesty's speech to this time, sir, we thought no more of assisting his Parliament, by the consequent addresses of the Queen of Hungary, excepting by grants both houses, and by speeches directed by our which were made by Parliament. These, in. courtiers against the King of Prussia. I allude, deed, our ministers did not oppose, because they sir, tu his Majesty's speech on the 8th of April, contrive to make a job of every parliamentary 1741, to the celebrated addresses on that occa- grant. But from the miserable inactivity in sion fur guaranteeing the dominions of Hanover, which we allowed the Danish and Hessian troops and for granting £300,000 to enable his Maj- to remain, notwithstanding that they received esty to support the Queen of Hungary. The our pay; and from the insult tamely submitted speeches made on that occasion by several of our to by our squadron in the Mediterranean, we favorites at court, and their reflections on the must conclude that our ministers, from the time King of Prassia, must be fresh in the memory of the French interfered, resolved not to assist the all. All must remember, too, that the Queen of Queen of Hungary by land or sea. Thus, havHungary was not then, nor for some months aft- ing drawn that princess forward on the ice by er, attacked by any one prince in Europe ex- our promises, we left her to retreat as she could. cepting the King of Prussia. She must, there. Thus it was, sir, that the Duke of Bavaria before, have supposed that both the court and na- came Emperor. Thus it was that the house tion of Great Britain were resolved to support of Austria was stripped of great part of its do. her, not only against the King of Prussia, but minions, and was in the utmost danger of being against all the world. We can not, therefore, stripped of all, had France been bent on its debe surprised that the court of Vienna evinced an struction. Sir, the house of Austria was saved unwillingness to part with so plenteous a coun by the policy of France, who wished to reduce, try as that claimed by the King of Prussia—the but not absolutely to destroy it. Had Austria lordship of Silesia.
been ruined, the power of the Duke of Bavaria, Bat, sir, this was not all. Not only had we who had been elected Emperor, would have rispromised our assistance to the Queen of Hun- en higher than was consistent with the interests gary, but we had actually commenced a negoti- of France. It was the object of France to foation for a powerful alliance against the King of ment divisions among the princes of Germany, Prussia, and for dividing his dominions among to reduce them by mutual strife, and then to renthe allies. We had solicited, not only the Queen der the houses of Bavaria, Austria, and Saxony of Hungary, but also the Muscovites and the nearly equal by partitions. Dutch, to form parts of this alliance. We had
It was this policy which restrained the French taken both Danes and Hessians into our pay, in from sending so powerful an army into Germany support of this alliance. Nay, even Hanover as they might otherwise have sent. And then, had subjected herself to heavy expenses on this through the bad conduct of their generals, and occasion, by adding a force of nearly one third through the skill and bravery of the officers and to the army she had already on foot. This, sir, troops of the Queen of Hungary, a great improvewas, I believe, the first extraordinary expense ment in her affairs was effected. This occurred which Hanover bad incurred since her fortunate about the time of the late changes in our adminconjunction with England; the first, I say, not- istration; and this leads me to consider the oriwithstanding the great acquisitions she has made, gin of those measures which are now proceedand the many heavy expenses in which England ing, and the situation of Europe at that particuhas been involved upon her sole account. lar time, February, 1742. But, before I enter
If, therefore, the Queen of Hungary was ob- upon that consideration, I must lay this down as stipate in regard to the claims of Prussia, her a maxim to be ever observed by this nation, that, obstinacy must be ascribed to ourselves. To us although it be our own interest to preserve a must be impated those misfortunes which she balance of power in Europe, yet, as we are the subsequently experienced. It was easy to prom. I most remote from danger, we have the least reaise her our assistance while the French seemed son to be jealous as to the adjustment of that bal. determined not to interfere with Germany. It ance, and should be the last to take alarm on its was safe to engage in schemes for her support, and for the enlargement of the Hanoverian do- 3 The Duke of Bavaria was ele .tel Emperor op minions, because Prussia could certainly not op- the 12th of February, 1742.
Nor the balance of power may be the ambition of France. For France, although supported, either by the existence of one single she had assisted in depressing the house of Aus. potentate capable of opposing and defeating the tria, had shown no design of increasing her own ambitious designs of France, or by a well-con- dominions. On the other hand, the haughty de. nected confederacy adequate to the same intent. meanor of the court of Vienna, and the height to Of these two methods, the first, when practica- which that house had beer: raised, excited a spirit ble, is the most eligible, because on that method of disgust and jealousy in the princes of Ger. we may móst safely rely; but when it can not many. That spirit first manifested itsell in the be resorted to, the whole address of our ministers house of Hanover, and at this very time prevailed and plenipotentiaries should tend to establish the not only there, but in most of the German sov. second.
ereignties. Under such circumstances, however The wisdom of the maxim, sir, to which I weak and erroneous our ministers might be, they have adverted, must be acknowledged by all who could not possibly think of restoring the house of consider, that when the powers upon the Conti- Austria to its former splendor and power. They nent apply to us to join them in a war against could not possibly oppose that single house as a France, we may take what share in the war we rival to France. No power in Europe would think fit. When we, on the contrary, apply to have cordially assisted them in that scheme them, they will prescribe to us. However some They would have had to cope, not only with gentlemen may affect to alarm themselves or France and Spain, but with all the princes of others by alleging the dependency of all the Eu- Germany and Italy, to whom nustria had be ropean powers upon France, of this we may rest come obnoxious. assured, that when those powers are really threat- In these circumstances, wha was this nation ened with such dependency, they will unite among to do? It was impossible to establish the balance themselves, and call upon us also to prevent it. of power in Europe upon the single power of the Nay, sir, should even that dependence imper- house of Austria. Surely, then, sir, it prqs our ceptibly ensue; so soon as they perceived it, business to think of restoring the peace of Ger. they would unite among themselves, and call us many as soon as possible by our good offines, in to join the confederacy by which it might be order to establish a confederacy sufficient to opshaken off. Thus we can never be reduced to pose France, should she afterward discover any stand single in support of the balance of power; ambitious intentions. It was now not so much por can we be compelled to call upon our con- our business to prevent the lessening the prwer tinental neighbors for such purpose, unless when of the house of Austria, as it was to bring about our ministers have an interest in pretending and a speedy reconciliation between the prinoes of asserting imaginary dangers.
Germany; to take care that France should get The posture of Europe since the time of the as little by the treaty of peace as she said she Romans is wonderfully changed. In those times expected by the war. This, I say, should have each country was divided into many sovereign- been our chief concern; because the preserva ties. It was then impossible for the people of tion of the balance of power was now no longer any one country to unite among themselves, and to depend upon the house of Austria, but upon much more impossible for two or three large the joint power of a confederacy then to be countries to combine in a general confederacy formed; and till the princes of Germany were against the enormous power of Rome. But such reconciled among themselves, there was scarceconfederacy is very practicable now, and may ly a possibility of forming such a confederacy. always be effected whenever France, or any one If we had made this our scheme, the Dutch of the powers of Europe, shall endeavor to en- would have joined heartily in it. The Germanslave the rest. I have said, sir, that the balance ic body would have joined in it; and the peace of power in Europe may be maintained as se- of Germany might have been restored without curely by a confederacy as it can be by opposing putting this nation to any expense, or diverting any oue rival power to the power of France. us from the prosecution of our just and necesNow, let us examine to which of these two sary war against Spain, in case our differences methods we ought to have resorted in February, with that nation could not have been adjusted 1742. The imperial diadem was then fallen by the treaty for restoring the peace of Ger. from the house of Austria ; and although the many. troops of the Queen of Hungary had met with II. But our new minister, as I have said, rau some success during the winter, that sovereign into an extreme quite opposite to that of Carteret's was still stripped of great part of the Austrian the old. Our former minister thought policy. dominions. The power of that house was there- of nothing but negotiating when he ought to fore greatly inferior to what it was at the time have thought of nothing but war; the present
f the late emperor's death; and still more in- minister has thought of nothing but war, or at serior to what it had been in 1716, when we least its resemblance, when he ought to have considered it necessary to add Naples and Sar- thought of nothing but negotiation. dinia to its former acquisitions, in order to ren- A resolution was taken, and preparations were der it a match for France. Besides this, there made, for sending a body of troops to Flanders, existed in 1742 a very powerful confederacy even before we had any hopes of the King of against the house of Austria, while no jealousy Prussia's deserting his alliance with France, was harbored by the powers of Europe against and without our being called on to do so by any
one power in Europe I say, sir, by any one / pain of being entirely deserted by us. power in Europe ; for 1 defy our ministers to was offered both by the Emperor and the French, show that even the Queen of Hungary desired upon the terms of uti possidetis, with respect to any such thing before it was resolved on. I Germany; but, for what reason I can not combelieve some of her ministers were free enough prehend, we were so far from advising the Queen to declare that the money those troops cost of Hungary to accept that I believe we advised would have done her much more service; and I her to reject it. am sure we were so far from being called on This, sir, was a conduct in our ministers su by the Dutch to do so, that it was resolved on very extraordinary, so directly opposite to the without their participation, and the measures interest of this nation, and the security of the carried into execution, I believe, expressly con- balance of power, that I can suggest to myself trary to their advice.
no one reason for it, but that they were resolved This resolution, sir, was so far from having to put this nation to the expense of maintaining any influence on the King of Prussia, that he sixteen thousand Hanoverians. This I am afraid cor.tinued firm to his alliance with France, and was the true motive with our new ministers for fought the battle of Czaslau after he knew such all the warlike measures they resolved on. Notha resolution was taken. If he had continued ing would now satisfy us but a conquest of Alsace firm in the same sentiments, I am very sure our and Lorraine in order to give them to the Queen troops neither would nor could have been of the of Hungary, as an equivalent for what she had least service to the Queen of Hungary. But the lost. And this we resolved on, or at least prebattle of Czaslau fully convinced him that the tended to resolve on, at a time when France and French designed chiefly to play one German Prussia were in close conjunction; at a time prince against another, in order to weaken both; when no one of the powers of Europe could as. and perhaps he had before this discovered, that, sist us; at a time when none of them entertained according to the French scheme, his share of a jealousy of the ambitious designs of France; Silesia was not to be so considerable as he ex. and at a time when most of the princes of Gerpected. These considerations, and not the elo- many were so jealous of the power of the house quence or address of any of our ministers, in- of Austria, that we had great reason to appreclined him to come to an agreement with the hend that the most considerable of these would Queen of Hungary. As she was now convinced join against us, in case we should meet with any that she could not depend upon our promises, success. she readily agreed to his terms, though his de- Sir, if our ministers were really serious in this mands were now much more extravagant than scheme, it was one of the most romantic that they were at first; and, what is worse, they ever entered the head of an English Quixote. were now unaccompanied with any one promise But if they made it only a pretext for putting or consideration, except that of a neutrality; this nation to the expense of maintaining sixwhereas his first demands were made palatable teen thousand Hanoverians, or of acquiring some by the tender of a large sum of money, and by new territory for the Electorate of Hanover, I the promise of his utmost assistance, not only in am sure no British House of Commons can apmupporting the Pragmatic Sanction, but in rais- prove their conduct. It is absurd, sir, to say ng her husband, the Duke of Lorraine to the that we could not advise the Queen of Hungary mperial throne. Nay, originally, he even in- to accept of the terms offered by the Emperor sinuated that he would embrace the first oppor- and France, at a time when their troops were unity to assist in procuring her house an equiv- cooped up in the city of Prague, and when the ilent for whatever part of Silesia she should re- terms were offered with a view only to get their sign to him.
troops at liberty, and to take the first opportu This accommodation between the Queen of nity to attack her with more vigor. This, I say. Hangary and the King of Prussia, and that which is absurd, because, had she accepted the terms soon after followed between her and the Duke of proposed, she might have had them guaranteed šaxony, produced a very great alteration in the by the Dutch, by the German body, and by all fairs of Europe. But, as these last powers the powerful princes of Germany; which would promised nothing but a neutrality, and as the have brought all these powers into a confederacy Dutch absolutely refused to join, either with the with us against the Emperor and France, if they Queen of Hungary or with ourselves, in any of had afterward attacked her in Germany; and all ensive measures against France, it was still im- of them, but especially the Dutch, and the King possible for us to think of restoring the house of of Prussia, would have been ready to join us, had Austria to such power as to render it a match the French attacked her in Flanders. It is for the power of France. We ought, therefore, equally absurd to say that she could not accept still to have thocght only of negotiation, in order of these terms, because they contained nothing to restore the peace of Germany by an accom- for the security of her dominions in Italy. For modation between her and the Emperor. The suppose the war had continued in Italy, if the distresses to which the Bavarian and French ar- Queen of Hungary had been safe upon the side mies in Germany were driven furnished us with of Germany, she could have poured such a num. such an opportunity: this we ought by all means ber of troops into Italy as would have been sufli. to have embraced, and to have insisted on the cient to oppose and defeat all the armies that Queen of Hungary's doing the same, under the both the French and Spaniards could send to and maintain in that country; since we could, by our got the better of their discretion, as well as of superior fleets, have made it impossible for the their military discipline. This made them atFrench and Spaniards to maintain great armies tack, instead of waiting to be attacked; and then, in that country.
by the bravery of the English foot, and the cow No other reason can therefore be assigned for ardice of their own, they met with a severe rethe Queen of Hungary's refusal of the terms pulse, which put their whole army into confu. proposed to her for restoring the tranquillity of sion, and obliged them to retire with precipitaGermany than this alone, that we had promised tion across the Mayn. Our army thus escaped to assist her so effectually as to enable her to the snare into which they had been led, and was conquer a part of France, by way of equivalent enabled to pursue its retreat to Hanau. for what she had lost in Germany and Italy. This, sir, was a signal advantage ; but was is Such assistance it was neither our interest nor followed up? Did we press upon the enemy in in our power to give, considering the circum- their precipitate retreat across a great river, stances of Europe. I am really surprised that where many of them must have been lost had the Queen of Hungary came to trust a second they been closely pursued ? Did we endeavor time to our promises ; for I may venture to to take the least advantage of the confusion into prophesy that she will find herself again deceiv- which their unexpected repulse had thrown ed. We shall put ourselves to a vast unneces- them ? No, sir; the ardor of the British troops sary expense, as we did when she was first at- was restrained by the cowardice of the Hanotacked by Prussia ; and without being able to verians; and, instead of pursuing the enemy, we raise a jealousy in the other powers of Europe, ourselves ran away in the night with such haste we shall give France a pretense for conquering that we left all our wounded to the mercy and Flanders, which, otherwise, she would not have care of the enemy, who had the honor of burydone. We may bring the Queen of Hungary a ing our dead as well as their own. This action second time to the verge of destruction, and may, therefore, on our side, be calied a fortunate leave her there; for that we certainly shall do, escape ; I shall never give my consent to honor as soon as Hanover comes to be a second time it with the name of victory. in danger From all which I must conclude, After this escape, sir, our army was joined by that rur present scheme of politics is fundament- a very large re-enforcement. Did this revive ally wrong, and that the longer we continue to
our courage, or urge us on to give battle ? Not build upon sach a foundation, the more dangers in the least, sir; though the French continued ous it will be for us. The whole fabric will in- for some time upon the German side of the Rhine, volve this unfortunate nation in its ruins. we never offered to attack them, or to give them
III. But now, sir, let us see how we have the least disturbance. At last, upon Prince Conduct ar prosecuted this scheme, bad as it is, dur-Charles's approach with the Austrian army, tho
ing the last campaign. As this nation French not only repassed the Rhine, but retired must bear the chief part of the expense, it was quite out of Germany. And as the Austrian certainly our business tu prosecute the war with army and the allied army might then have joinall possible vigor; to come to action as soon as ed, and might both have passed the Rhine withpossible, and to push every advantaye to the ut- out opposition at Mentz, or almost any where
Since we soon found that we could not in the latinate, it was expected that both arattack the French upon the side of Flanders, mies would have marched together into Lor. why were our troops so long marching into raine, or in search of the French army, in order Germany ? Or, indeed, I should ask, why our to force them to a battle. Instead of this, sir, armies were not first assembled in that country? Prince Charles marched up the German side of Why did they continue so long inactive upon the the Rhine—to do what? To pass that great Mayn? If our army was not numerous enough river, in the sight of a French army equal in to attack the French, why were the Hessians number to his own, which, without some extraleft behind for some time in Flanders? Why ordinary neglect in the French, was impracticadid we not send over twenty thousand of those ble; and so it was found by experience. Thus regular troops that were lying idle here at the whole campaign upon that side was conhome? How to answer all those questions I sumed in often attempting what so often appear. can not tell; but it is certain we never thought ed to be impracticable. of attacking the French army in our neighbor- On the other side-I mean that of the allied hood, and, I believe, expected very little to be army-was there any thing of consequence perattacked ourselves. Nay, I doubt much if any formed? I know of nothing, sir, but that of action would have happened during the whole sending a party of hussars into Lorraine with a campaign, if the French had not, by the miscon- manifesto. The army, indeed, passed the Rhine duct of some one or other of our generals, caught at Mentz, and marched up to the French lines our army in a hose-net, from which it could not upon the frontier of Alsace, but never offered to have escaped, had all the French generals ob- pass those lines until the French had abandoned served the direction of their commander-in-chief; them, I believe with a design to draw our army had they thought only of guarding and fortifying into some snare; for, npon the return of the themselves in the defile [Dettingen), and not of French toward those lines, we retired with much marching up to attack our troops. Thank God, greater haste than we had advance), though the sir, the courage of some of the French generals | Dutch auxiliaries were then come up and pro