The Declara serts this, not calculated to perpetuate hostility among the French peo. ple. est difficulties, and to conclude peace on that ground, if it can now be obtained, even with this very government. the contir.aance of the war to the ambition of the conduct of its ruters, but do not go the length the enemy, he will declare a system of declaring that, after all this provocation, even tion which as of endless animosity between the na- with the present rulers, all treaty is impractications of Great Britain and France. I ble. Whether it is probable that, acting on the say directly the contrary.1 He who principles upon which they have acquired their scruples to declare that in the pres-power, and while that power continues, they will ent moment the government of France listen to any system of moderation or justice at are acting as much in contradiction to the known home or abroad, it is not now necessary to dis wishes of the French nation as to the just pre-cuss. But for one, I desire to express my cor tensions and anxious wishes of the people of dial concurrence in the sentiment, so pointedly Great Britain-he who scruples to declare them expressed in that passage of the Declaration in [the government] the authors of this calamity- which his Majesty, notwithstanding all the provdeprives us of the consolatory hope which we are ocation he has received, and even after the recent inclined to cherish of some future change of cir- successes which by the blessing of Providence cumstances more favorable to our wishes. It is have attended his arms, declares his readiness tc a melancholy spectacle, indeed, to see in any adhere to the same moderate terms and princi. country, and on the ruin of any pretense of liber-ples which he proposed at the time of our greatty, however nominal, shallow, or delusive a system of tyranny erected, the most galling, the most horrible, the most undisguised in all its parts and attributes that has stained the page of history, or I am sensible that while I am endeavoring disgraced the annals of the world. But it would to vindicate his Majesty's servants (2) Earl Tem be much more unfortunate, if, when we see that against the charges of the honorable ple's remarks. the same cause carries desolation through France baronet (which are sufficiently, however, refuted which extends disquiet and fermentation through by the early part of his own speech), I am inEurope it would be worse, indeed, if we attrib-curring, in some degree, the censure of the nouted to the nation of France that which is to be at- ble Lord to whom I before alluded. According tributed only to the unwarranted and usurped au- to his principles and opinions, and of some few thority which involves them in misery, and would, others in this country, it is matter of charge if unresisted, involve Europe with them in one against us, that we even harbor in our minds, at common ruin and destruction. Do we state this this moment, a wish to conclude peace upon the to be animosity on the part of the people of terms which we think admissible with the presFrance ? Do we state this in order to raise up ent rulers of France. I am not one However smal an implacable spirit of animosity against that of those who can or will join in that hope, England country? Where is one word to that effect in sentiment. I have no difficulty in re- og always the declaration to which the honorable gentle-peating what I stated before, that in treat when man has alluded? He complains much of this their present spirit, after what they with safety. declaration, because it tends to perpetuate ani- have said, and still more, after what they have mosity between two nations which one day or done, I can entertain little hope of so desirable an other must be at peace-God grant that day event. I have no hesitation in avowing (for it may be soon! But what does that Declaration would be idleness and hypocrisy to conceal it) express upon the subject? Does it express that that, for the sake of mankind in general, and to because the present existing government of gratify those sentiments which can never be France has acted as it has acted, we forego the eradicated from the human heart, I should see wish or renounce the hope that some new situa- with pleasure and satisfaction the termination of tion may lead to happier consequences? On the a government whose conduct and whose origin is contrary, his Majesty's language is distinctly such as we have seen that of the government of this: While this determination continues to France. But that is not the object-that ought prevail on the part of his enemies, his Majesty's not to be the principle of the war. Whatever earnest wishes and endeavors to restore peace to wish I may entertain in my own heart, and whathis subjects must be fruitless, but his sentiments ever opinion I may think it fair or manly to avow, remain unaltered. He looks with anxious ex- I have no difficulty in stating that, violent and pectation to the moment when the government odious as is the character of that government, I of France may show a temper and spirit in any verily believe, in the present state of Europe, degree corresponding with his own." I wish to that if we are not wanting to ourselves, if, by know whether words can be found in the English the blessing of Providence, our perseverance and language which more expressly state the contra- our resources should enable us to make peace ry sentiment to that which the honorable baron- with France upon terms in which we taint not et imputes. They not only disclaim animosity our character, in which we do not abandon the against the people of France in consequence of sources of our wealth, the means of our strength, the defense of what we already possess-if we maintain our equal pretentions and assert that rank which we are entitled to hold among nations-the moment peace can be obtained on such terms, be the form of government in France what it may, peace is desirable, peace is then This mode of turning an argument round and presenting it with startling force under directly the contrary aspect, has already been mentioned as a striking characteristic of Mr. Pitt. The ease and dexterity with which he does it are truly admira ble. the present to be ready to can be done anxiously to be sought. But unless it is attained on such terms, there is no extremity of war-there is no extremity of honorable contest -that is not preferable to the name and pretense of peace, which must be, in reality, a disgraceful capitulation, a base, an abject surrender of every thing that constitutes the pride, the safety, and happiness of England. charge of in drive England to the rupture. They had not strength enough to reject all negotiation, yet they had strength enough to mix in every step those degradations and insults, those inconsistent and unwarranted pretensions in points even of subordinate importance, which reduced ministers to that option which I have described; but which they decided in a way that has exposed them to the censure of the honorable baronet. We chose rather to incur the blame of sacrificing punctil ernment. than afford the enemy an opportunity the British gov clair's plan. These, sir, are the sentiments of my mind on this leading point, and with these sentiments I shape my conduct between the contending opin-ios (at some times essential) rather How met by ions of the noble Lord and of the honorable barAnswer to Sir onet. But there is one observation of John Sinclair's the honorable baronet on which I must consistency. now more particularly remark. He nas discovered that we state the Directory of France to have been all along insincere, and yet take merit for having commenced a negotiation which we ought never to have commenced without being persuaded of their sincerity. This supposed contradiction requires but a few words to explain it. I believe that those who constitute the present government of France never were sincere for a moment in the negotiation. From all the information I have obtained, and from every conjecture I could form, I, for one, never was so duped as to believe them sincere. But I did believe, and I thought I knew, that there was a prevailing wish for peace, and a predominant sense of its necessity growing and confirming itself in France, and founded on the most obvious and most pressing motives. I did see a spirit of reviving moderation gradually gaining ground, and opening a way to the hap-him that, if he was really a friend to peace, piest alterations in the general system of that there was no motion he could make so little calcountry. I did believe that the violence of that culated to promote that object; and I did prevail portion of the executive government which, by upon the honorable baronet to give up the intenthe late strange revolution of France, unhappily tion. If I am right in the supposition I have for France itself and for the world, has gained stated—if I am right in thinking that our great the ascendency, would have been restrained with- object was to press France to this point, and to in some bounds-that ambition must give way to put the question, "If you have any terms to of reason that even frenzy itself must be controlled fer, what are they?"-was there any one way and governed by necessity. These were the by which we could make it so difficult for them hopes and expectations I entertained. I did, not- to retain any pretense of a desire of peace as to withstanding, feel that even from the outset, and speak out ourselves, and call upon them either in every step of that negotiation, those who hap- for agreement, or for modification, or for some pily had not yet the full power to cut it short in other plan in their turn? By not adopting the the beginning-who dared not trust the public honorable baronet's plan, we have put the queseye with the whole of their designs-who could tion beyond dispute, whether peace was attainnot avow all their principles-unfortunately, nev-able at last, and whether our advances would or ertheless, did retain from the beginning power would not be met on the part of France. And enough to control those who had a better dispo- I shall, to the latest hour of my life, rejoice that sition, and to mix in every part of the negotiation (which they could not then abruptly break off) whatever could impede, embarrass, and perplex, in order to throw upon us, if possible, the odium of its failure. we were fortunate enough to place this question in the light which defies the powers of misrepresentation; in which no man can attempt to perplex it; and in which it presents itself this day for the decision of the House and of the nation, and calls upon every individual who has at stake the public happiness and his own, to determine for himself whether this is or is not a crisis which requires his best exertions in the de. fense of his country. II. To show which, I shall now proceed, not withstanding the reproach which has been thrown on our line of conduct, to show the system ever of obstinate forbearance, with which we endear the French government as compared the English (1.) Conduct of the French in the previous degotiation of 1796. ored to overcome preliminary difficulties-the deExposition of termined resolution on our part to overthe conduct of look all minor obstacles, and to come to the real essence of discussion upon with that of the terms of peace. To show this, it is not necessary to do more than to call to the recollection of the House the leading parts of the Declaration of his Majesty; I mean to leave that part of the subject, also, without the possibility of doubt or difference of opinion. It is certainly true that, even previous to any of the circumstances that related to the preliminary forms of the negotiation, the prior conduct of France had offered to any government that was not sincerely and most anxiously bent upon peace, sufficient ground for the continuance of hostilities. It is true that, in the former negotiation at Paris, Lord Malmesbury was finally sent away, not upon a question of terms of peace-not upon a question of the cession of European or Colonial possessions, but upon the haughty demand of a previous preliminary, which should give up every thing on the part of the allies; and which should leave them afterward every thing to ask, or rather to require. It is true, it closed in nearly the same insulting manner as the second mission. It is true, too, that subsequent to that period, in the preliminaries concluded between the Emperor and France, it was agreed to invite the allies of each party to a congress; which, however, was never carried into execution. It was under these circumstances that his Majesty, in the earnest desire of availing himself of that spirit of moderation which had begun to show itself in France, determined to renew those proposals which had been before slighted and rejected. But when this step was taken, what was the conduct of those who have gained the ascendency in France? On the first application to know (2.) The dicta on what ground they were disposed the commence to negotiate, wantonly, as will be nent, as to the shown by the sequel, and for no purnegotiation. pose but to prevent even the opening of the conferences, they insisted upon a mode of negotiation very contrary to general usage and convenience contrary to the mode in which they had terminated war with any of the belligerent powers, and directly contrary to any mode which they themselves afterward pers.sted in following in this very negotiation with us! They began by saying they would receive no proposals for preliminaries, but that conferences should be held for the purpose of concluding at once a definitive treaty.* torial tone from nature of the passport they His Majesty's answer was, that it was his desire to adopt that mode only which was most likely to accelerate the object in view; and the powers of his plenipotentiary would apply to either object, either preliminary or definitive. They appeared content with his answer, but what was the next step? In the simple form of granting a passport for the minister, (3.) Gross im at the moment they were saying they propriety in the preferred a definitive peace, because sent to the En it was the most expeditious-in that glis minister. very passport, which in all former times has only described the character of the minister, without entering into any thing relating to the terms on mode of negotiating-they insert a condition relative to his powers, and that inconsistent with what his Majesty had explained to be the nature of the powers he had intended to give, and with which they had apparently been satisfied. They made it a passport not for a minister coming to conclude peace generally, but applicable only to a definitive and separate peace. This proceeding was in itself liable to the most obvious objection. But it is more important, as an instance to show how, in the simplest part of the transaction, the untractable spirit of France discovered itself. It throws light on the subsequent part of the transaction; and shows the inconsistencies and contradictions of their successive pretensions. As to the condition then made in the passport for the first time, that the nego tiation should be for a separate peace, his Majesty declared that he had no choice between a definitive and a preliminary treaty; but as to a separate peace, his honor and good faith, with regard to his ally the Queen of Portugal, would not permit it. He, therefore, stated his unalterable determination to agree to no treaty in which Portugal should not be included; expressing, at the same time, his readiness that France should treat on the part of Holland and Spain. On this occasion, the good faith of this country prevailed. The system of violence and Passport despotism was not then ripe, and there- changed fore his Majesty's demand to treat for Portugal at once for a definitive treaty." See his Note in Parliamentary History, vol. xxxiii., page 909. The passport addressed to the officers of the French police was in the following words: "Allow to pass freely -, farnished with the full powers of his Britannic Majesty for the pur pose of negotiating, concluding, and signing a definitive and separate treaty of peace with the French Republic." Here the word separate was inserted in direct contravention of the arrangement between the two governments, and was obviously intended to make difficulty. England had agreed to negotiate for a definitive, but not for a separate treaty; she could not give up Portugal, which had long been under her protection. The French Directory plainly designed to draw Mr. Pitt into a dilemma: if he accepted the passport, and afterward undertook to treat for Portugal, the negotiation could be broken off on the ground that he went beyond the terms ests blished by the passport; if he refused the passport, it was easy to say he had broken off the negotiation wher acceded to by France. was acquiesced in by the Directory. They, at the same time, undertook to treat on their part for their allies, Holland and Spain, as well as for themselves; though in the subsequent course of the negotiation, they pretended to be without sufficient power to treat for either. (4) Use of insult ing language by the French as to the British gov ernment and emSassador. his dominions furnish, any person better qualified to do justice to his sincere and benevolent desire to promote the restoration of Peace, and his firm and unalterable determination to maintain the dignity and honor of his kingdom. the French com ample than those In spite of these obstacles and others more minute, the British plenipotentiary (5.) Exchange of at length arrived at Lisle. The full powers, those of powers were transmitted to the missioners less respective governments, and were of the English found unexceptionable; though the embassador supposed defect of these full powers is, three months after, alleged as a cause for the rupture of the negotiation! And what is more remarkable, it did so happen that the French full powers were, on the face of them, much more limited than ours; for they only enabled the commissioners of the Directory to act according to the instructions they were to receive from time to time. On this point it is not necessary now to dwell; but I desire the House to treasure it in their memory, when we come to the question of pretense for the rupture of the negotiation. Then, sir, I come to the point in which we I must here entreat the attention of the House to the next circumstance which occurred. When the firmness of his Majesty, his anxious and sincere desire to terminate the horrors of war, and his uniform moderation overcame the violence, and defeated the designs of the members of the executive government of France, they had recourse to another expedient, the most absurd, as well as the most unjustifiable. They adverted to the rupture of the former negotiation, as if that rupture was to be imputed to his Majesty; and this insinuation was accompanied with a personal reflection upon the minister who was sent by bis Majesty to treat on the part of this country. His Majesty, looking anxiously as he did to the conclusion of peace, disdained to reply otherwise than by observing that this was not a fit topic to be agitated at the moment of renew-have incurred the censure of the hon- (6.) The En ing a negotiation, and that the circumstances of orable baronet, for delivering in on our offered their the transaction were well enough known to Eu- part a project. To his opinion I do not project in rope and to the world. And the result of this subscribe, for the reasons that I stated drawn out negotiation has confirmed, what the former had before. But can there be a stronger proof of sufficiently proved, that his Majesty could not his Majesty's sincerity than his waving so many have selected, in the ample field of talents which points important in themselves, rather than suffer the negotiation to be broken off? What was our situation? We were to treat with The following are the words which charge the glish at once treaty fully Reasons for so doing (a) France de. finitive treaty. handed a de rupture of the preceding negotiation on the English: a government that had in the outset The Directory requires that it shall be established as a principle, that each English packet-boat expressed that they would treat only which shall have brought over either the plenipo- definitively, and from every part of tentiary or a courier shall not be allowed to make their conduct which preceded the meeting of any stay." "The Directory desires, at the same our plenipotentiary and their commissioners, we time, that the couriers should not be sent too fre- might have expected that they would have been quently; the frequent sending them having been one prepared to answer our project almost in twentyof the principal causes of the rupture of the preced-four hours after it was delivered. We stood ing negotiation." Nothing more frivolous could be conceived of as a reason for such a rupture. Nothing of this kind was mentioned at the time. The French minister did in one instance inquire, whether it was necessary for Lord Malmesbury to send a courier to England every time he received a communication from the Directory—a question which seems plainly to have been designed as a taunt; and his Lordship coolly replied, that he should do it "as often as the official commanications made to him required special instructions." The "personal reflection" on Lord Malmesbury was in the following words: "The Directory consents that the negotiation shall be opened by Lord Malmesbury. Another choice would, however, have appeared to the Directory to augur more favorably for a speedy conclusion of peace." This was a gratuitous insult. Lord Malmesbury was distinguished for his courteous deportment, and no complaint had been made of him by the French government. Even Belsham, who was so rabid against Mr. Pitt and his friends, that Fox once said concerning his Memoirs of the Reign of George III., "how can a man write history in this way?" admits that his Lordship "was uniformly mild and temperate, his manners polite and pleasing."-Vol. vi., page 322. It is plain the Directory meant to force Mr. Pitt, by their treatment, to break off the negotiation. enemy, but had willing to give dicament-we had nothing to ask ceive from he say ed us to make. But, sir, in this situation, what what were the sacrifices which they expectspecies of project was it that was presented by his Majesty's minister? A project the most distinct, the most particular, the most conciliatory and moderate, that ever constituted the first words spoken by any negotiator. And yet of this project what have we heard in the language of the French government? What have we seen dispersed through all Europe, by that press in France which knows no sentiments but what the French police dictates? What have we seen dispersed by that English press which knows no other use of English liberty but servilely to re tail and transcribe French opinions? We have been told that it was a project that refused to The blanks for up, were still subject to fur arately met the arms of this country by land, bu to carry the glory and prowess of the British name to a higher pitch; and to a country whose commerce is unheard of; whose navy is annihilated; whose distress, confessed by themselves (however it may be attempted to be dissembled by their panegyrists in this or any other country), is acknowledged by the sighs and groans of the people of France, and proved by the expostula tions and remonstrations occasioned by the violent measures of its executive government-such was the situation in which we stood-such the situation of the enemy when we offered to make those important concessions as the price of peace. What was the situation of the allies of France? From Spain-who, from the moment she had deserted our cause and enlisted on the part of the enemy, only added to the number of our conquests, and to her own indelible disgrace embrace the terms of negotiation! Gentlemen and defeats. To a power which had never sep have read the papers; how does that fact stand? In the original project, we agreed to give up the conquests we had made from France and her allies, with certain exceptions. For those exceptions a blank was left, in order to ascertain whether France was desirous that the exceptions should be divided between her and her allies, or whether she continued to insist upon a complete compensation, and left England to look for compensation only to her allies. France, zealous as she pretends to be for her allies, had no difficulty in authorizing her ministers to declare that she must retain every thing for herself. This blank was then filled up; and it was then sions, when filed distinctly stated how little, out of what we had, we demanded to keep. ther negotiation. In one sense, it remains a blank still: we did not attempt to preclude France from any other mode of filling it up; but while we stated the utmost extent of our own views, we left open-we made claim of one island, the island of to full explanation whatever points the government of France could desire. We called upon them, and repeatedly solicited them to state something as to the nature of the terms which they proposed, if they objected to ours. It was thus left open to modification, alteration, or concession. But this is not the place, this is not the time, in which I am to discuss whether those terms, in all given circumstances, or in the circumstances of that moment, were or were not the ultimate terms upon which peace ought to be accepted or rejected, if it was once brought to the point when an ultimatum could be judged of. I will not argue whether some greater concession might not have been made with the certainty of peace, or whether the terms proposed constituted an offer of peace upon more favorable grounds for the enemy than his Majesty's ministers could justify. I argue not the one question or the other. It would be inconsistent with the public interest and our duty, that we should here state or discuss it. All that I have to discuss is, whether the terms, upon the face of them, appear honorable, open, frank, distinct, sincere, and a pledge of moderation; and I leave it to the good sense of the House whether there can exist a difference of opinion upon this point. Sir, what was it we offered to renounce to France? In one word, all that we sions offered had taken from them. What did this by England. consist of? The valuable, and almost under all circumstances, the impregnable island of Martinique; various other West India possessions; Saint Lucia, Tobago, the French part of Saint Domingo, the settlements of Pondicherry and Chandernagore; all the French factories and means of trade in the East Indies; and the islands of Saint Pierre and Miquelon. And for what were these renunciations, to be made? For peace, and for peace only. And to whom? To a nation which had obtained from his Majes-ry to argue this point. ty's dominions in Europe nothing in the course of the war-which had never met our fleets but to add to the catalogs of cur victories, and to swell the melancholy lists of their own captures (7) Conces Trinidad-a claim not resting on the mere naked title of possession to counterbalance the general European aggrandizement of France, but as the price of something that we had to give, by making good the title to the Spanish part of Saint Domingo, which Spain had ceded without right, and which cession could not be made without our guarantee. To Holland—having in our hands the whole means of their commerce, the whole source of their wealth-we offered to return almost all that was valuable and lucrative to them, in the mere consideration of commerce. We desired, in return, to keep what to them, in a pecuniary point of view, would be only a burden [the Cape of Good Hope and the island of Ceylon]; in a political view worse than useless, because they had not the means to keep it—what (had we granted it) would have been a sacrifice, not to them, but to France-what would in fa ture have enabled her to carry on her plan of subjugation against the eastern possessions of Holland itself, as well as against those of Great Britain. All that we asked was not indemnification for what we had suffered, but the means of preserving our own possessions and the strength of our naval empire. We did this at a time when our enemy was feeling the pressure of war; and who looks at the question of peace without some regard to the relative situation of the country with which you are contending? Look, then, at their trade; look at their means; look at the posture of their affairs; look at what we hold, and at the means we have of defending ourselves, and our enemy of resisting us, and tell me whether this offer was or was not a proof of sincerity, and a pledge of moderation. Sir, I should be ashamed of arguing it. I confess I am apprehensive we may have gone too far in the first proposals we made, rather than shown any backwardness in the negotiation, but it is unnecessa The concessions offered by England were so ample that all Europe, and even Mr. Belsham pronounced them highly liberal. |