moderate and equitable principles and terms which they had before proposed. Such was their declaration upon that occasion; and in the discussions which we had upon it in this House, ministers were explicit. They said that, by that negotiation, there had been given to the world what might be regarded as an unequivocal test of the sincerity and disposition of a government toward peace or against it. For those who refuse discussion show that they are disinclined to pacification; and it is therefore, they said, always to be considered as a test, that the party who refuses to negotiate is the party who is disinclined to peace. This they themselves set up as the criterion. Try them now, sir, by it. An offer is made them. They rashly, and I think rudely, refuse it. Have they, or have they not, broken their own test? a condition of treating. But they say "they have not refused all disThe restoration cussion." They have put a case. of the Bourbons They have expressed a wish for the restoration of the house of Bourbon, and have declared that to be an event which would immediately remove every obstacle to negotiation. Sir, as to the restoration of the house of Bourbon, if it shall be the wish of the people of France, I, for one, will be perfectly content to acquiesce. I think the people of France, as well as every other people, ought to have the government which they like best, and the form of that government, or the persons who hold it in their hands, should never be an obstacle with me to treat with the nation for peace, or to live with them in amity. But as an Englishman, sir, and actuated by English feelings, I surely can not wish for the restoration of the house of Bourbon to the Throne of France. I hope that I am not a man to bear heavily upon any unfortunate family. I feel for their situation; I respect their distresses; but as a friend of England, I can not wish for their restoration to the power which they abused. I can not forget that the whole history of the last century is little more than an account of the wars and the calamities arising from the restless ambition, the intrigues, and the perfidy of the house of Bourbon. Reply to Mr. Canning's ar gument from I can not discover, in any part of the labored defense which has been set up for not accepting the offer now made by the address to France, any argument to satisfy my William 111. mind that ministers have not forfeited the test which they held out as infallible in 1797. An honorable gentleman [Mr. Canning] thinks that Parliament should be eager only to approach the Throne with declarations of their readiness and resolution to support his Majesty in the further prosecution of the war without inquiry; and he is delighted with an address, which he has found upon the journals, to King William, in which they pledged themselves to support him in his efforts to resist the ambition of Louis XIV. He thinks it quite astonishing how much it is in point, and how perfectly it applies to the present occasion. One would have thought, sir, that in order to prove the application, he would have shown that an offer had been respectfully made by the Grand Monarque to King William, to treat, which he had peremptorily, and in very irritating terms, fused; and that, upon this, the House of Commons had come forward, and with one voice declared their determination to stand by him, with then lives and fortunes, in prosecuting the just and necessary war. Not a word like this; and yet the honorable gentleman finds it exactly a parallel case, and a model for the House on this day to imitate. I really think, sir, he might as well have taken any other address upon the journals, upon any other topic, as this address to King William. It would have been equally in point, and would have equally served to show the honorable gen. tleman's talent for reasoning. Remarks on Mr. Canning's Duke of Bed attack on the ford. Sir, I can not here overlook another instance of this honorable gentleman's candid style of debating, and of his respect for Parliament. He has found out, it seems, that in former periods of our history, and even in periods which have been denominated good times, intercepted letters have been published; and he reads from the gazette instances of such publication. Really, sir, if the honorable gentleman had pursued the profession to which he turned his thoughts when younger, he would have learned that it was necessary to find cases a little more apposite. And yet, full of his triumph on this notable discovery, he has chosen to indulge himself in speaking of a most respectable and a most honorable person as any that his country knows, and who is possessed of as sound an understanding as any man that I have the good fortune to be acquainted with, in terms the most offensive and disgusting, on account of words which he may be supposed to have said in another place." He has spoken of that noble person, and of his intellect, in terms which, were I disposed to retort, I might say, show himself to be possessed of an intellect which would justify me in passing over in silence any thing that comes from him. Sir, the noble person did not speak of the mere act of publishing the intercepted correspondence; and the honorable gentleman's reference to the gazettes of former periods is, therefore, not in point. The noble Duke complained of the manner in which these intercepted letters had been published, not of the fact itself of their publication; for, in the introduction and notes to those letters, the ribaldry is such, that they are not screened from the execration of every honorable mind even by their extreme stupidity. The honorable gentleman [Mr. Canning] says, that he must treat with indifference the intellect of a man who can ascribe the present scarcity of corn to the war. Sir, I think there is nothing either absurd or unjust in such an opinion. Does not the war necessarily, by its magazines, and still more by its expeditions, increase consumption? But when 21 Mr. Canning had justified the publication of the intercepted correspondence of the French from Egypt by the British government. 22 This refers to the Duke of Bedford's speech in the House of Lords. we learn that corn is at this very moment sold | nimity, he pretended to be a fiend to negotia in France for less than half the price which it bears here, is it not fair to suppose that, but for the war and its prohibitions, a part of that grain would be brought to this country, on account of the high price which it would command, and that, consequently, our scarcity would be relieved from their abundance? I speak, of course, only upon report; but I see that the prices quoted in the French markets are less, by one half, than the prices in England. There was nothing, therefore, very absurd in what fell from the noble person; and I would really advise the honorable gentleman, when he speaks of persons distinguished for every virtue, to be a little more guarded in his language. I see no reason why he and his friends should not leave to persons in another place, holding the same opinions as themselves, the task of answering what may be thrown out there. Is not the phalanx sufficient? It is no great compliment to their talents, considering their number, that they can not be left to the task of answering the few to whom they are opposed; but perhaps the honorable gentleman has too little to do in this House, and is to be sent there himself. In truth, I see no reason why even he might not be sent, as well as some others who have been raised to the peerage.2 23 But while he continues with us, I really think that the honorable gentleman will find full employment for all his talents in answering the arguments which are urged in this House, without employing them in disparaging one of the finest understandings in this kingdom. And now, sir, to return to the subject of the Motives of Mr. negotiation in 1797. It is, in my Pitt's negotia mind, extremely material to attend tion in 1797. to the account which the minister gives of his memorable negotiation of 1797, and of his motives for entering into it. In all questions of peace and war, he says, many circumstances must necessarily enter into the consideration; and that they are not to be decided upon by the extremes. The determination must be made upon a balance and a comparison of the evils or the advantages upon the one side and the other, and that one of the greatest considerations is that of finance. In 1797, the right honorable gentlemar confesses he found himself peculiarly embarrassed as to the resources for the war, if they were to be found in the old and usual way of the funding system. Now, though he thought, upon his balance and comparison of considerations, that the evils of war would be fewer than those of peace, yet they would only be so, provided that he could establish "a new and solid system of finance" in the place of the old and exhausted funding system; and to accomplish this scheme, it was necessary to have the unanimous assent and approbation. of the people. To procure una23 This sneer was founded on the fact that Mr. Pitt, being in want of the means of patronage, had raised persons to the peerage, as a reward for political services to an extent which was considered discreditable to the ministry and degrading to the House of Lords. tion, though he did not wish for the success of that negotiation, but hoped only through that means he should bring the people to agree to his new and solid system of finance. I trust I state the right honorable gentleman fairly. I am sure that I mean to do so. With these views, then, what does he do? Knowing that, contrary to his declarations in this House, the opinion of the people of England was generally for peace, he enters into a negotiation, in which, as the world believed at the time, and even until this day, he completely failed. No such thing, sir. He completely succeeded! For his object was not to gain peace. It was to gain over the people of this country to a "new and solid system of finance"—that is, to the raising a great part of the supplies within the year, to the triple assess ment, and to the tax upon income ! And how did he gain them over? By pretending to be a friend of peace, which he was not; and by opening a negotiation which he secretly wished might not succeed! The right honorable gentleman says that in all this he was honest and sincere. He negotiated fairly, and would have obtained the peace, if the French had shown a disposition correspondent to his own; but he rejoiced that their conduct was such as to convince the people of England of the necessity of concurring with him in the views which he had, and in granting him the supply which he thought essential to their posture at the time. Sir, I will not say that in all this he was not honest to his own purpose, and that he has not been honest in his declarations and confessions this night; but I can not agree that he was honest to this House, or honest to the people of this country. To this House it was not honest to make them counteract the sense of the people, as he knew it to be expressed in the petitions upon the table, nor was it honest to the country to act in a disguise, and to pursue a secret purpose unknown to them, while affecting to take the road which they point ed out. I know not whether this may not be honesty in the political ethics of the right honorable gentleman; but I know that it would be called by a very different name in the common transactions of society, and in the rules of morality established in private life. I know of nothing in the history of this country that it resembles, except, perhaps, one of the most profligate periods-the reign of Charles II., when the sale of Dunkirk might probably have been justified by the same pretense. That monarch also declared war against France, and did it to cover a negotiation by which, in his difficulties, he was to gain a "solid system of finance." display the same temper as his predecessors. If ne shall do so, then you will confirm the people of England in their opinion of the necessity of continuing the war, and you will revive all the vigor which you roused in 1797. Or will you not do this until you have a reverse of fortune? Will you never treat but when you are in a situation of distress, and when you have occasion to impose on the people? of the Bourbons lous? In duels, indeed, we have often heard of such language. Two gentlemen go out and fight, when, having discharged their pistols at one another, it is not unusual for one of them to say to the other, "Now I am satisfied. I see that you are a man of honor, and we are friends again." There is something, by-the-by, ridiculous, even here. But between nations it is more than ridiculous. It is criminal. It is a ground which no principle can justify, and which is as impracticable as it is impious. That two nations should be set on to beat one another into friendship, is too abominable even for the fiction of romance; but for a statesman seriously and gravely to lay it down as a system upon which he means to act, is monstrous. What can we say of such a test as he means to put the French government to, but that it is hopeless? It is in the nature of war to inflame animosity; to exasperate, not to soothe; to widen, not to approximate. So long as this is to be acted upon, I say, it is in vain to hope that we can have the evi in which he The right honorable gentleman, however thinks otherwise; and he points out Mr. Pitt's for four distinct possible cases, besides posible cases the re-establishment of the Bourbon would treat family, in which he would agree to parte treat with the French. with Bona (1.) "If Bonaparte shall conduct himself so as to convince him that he has abandoned the prin ciples which were objectionable in his prede. cessors, and that he will be actuated by a more moderate system." I ask you, sir, if this is likely to be ascertained in war? It is the nature of war not to allay, but to inflame the passions; and it is not by the invective and abuse which have been thrown upon him and his government, nor by the continued irritations which war is sure to give, that the virtues of moderation and forbearance are to be nourished. But you say you have not refused to treat. The restoration You have stated a case in which you is really made a will be ready immediately to enter sine qua non. into a negotiation, viz., the restoration of the house of Bourbon. But you deny that this is a sine qua non; and in your nonsensical language, which I do not understand, you talk of "limited possibilities," which may induce you to treat without the restoration of the house of Bourbon. But do you state what they are? Now, sir, I say, that if you put one case upon which you declare that you are willing to treat immediately, and say that there are other possible cases which may induce you to treat here-dence which we require. after, without mentioning what these possible cases are, you do state a sine qua non of immediate treaty. Suppose that I have an estate to sell, and I say my demand is £1000 for it. For that sum I will sell the estate immediately. To be sure, there may be other terms upon which I may be willing to part with it; but I mention nothing of them. The £1000 is the only condition that I state at the time. Will any gentleman assert that I do not make the £1000 the sine qua non of the immediate sale? Thus you say the restoration of the Bourbons is not the only possible ground; but you give no other. This is your project. Do you demand a counter project? Do you follow your own rule? Do you not do the thing of which you complained in the enemy? You seemed to be afraid of receiving another proposition; and, by confining yourselves to this one point, you make it in fact, though not (2.) "If, contrary to the expectations of minisin terms, your sine qua non. ters, the people of France shall show a disposition But the right honorable gentleman, in his to acquiesce in the government of Bonaparte." speech, does what the official note Does the right honorable gentleman mean to say, avoids. He finds there the conven- that because it is a usurpation on the part of the ient words, "experience and the ev-present chief, that therefore the people are not ble intentions by idence of facts." Upon these he likely to acquiesce in it? I have not time, sir, goes into detail; and in order to to discuss the question of this usurpation, or convince the House that new evidence is re- whether it is likely to be permanent; but I cerquired, he reverts to all the earliest acts and tainly have not so good an opinion of the French, crimes of the Revolution; to all the atrocities nor of any people, as to believe that it will be of all the governments that have passed away; short-lived, merely because it was a usurpation, and he contends that he must have experience and because it is a system of military despotism. that these foul crimes are repented of, and that Cromwell was a usurper; and in many points a purer and a better system is adopted in France, there may be found a resemblance between him by which he may be sure that they will be ca- and the present Chief Consul of France. There pable of maintaining the relations of peace and is no doubt but that, on several occasions of his amity. Sir, these are not conciliatory words; life, Cromwell's sincerity may be questioned, nor is this a practicable ground to gain experi- particularly in his self-denying ordinance, in his Does he think it possible that evidence affected piety, and other things; but would it not of a peaceable demeanor can be obtained in war? have been insanity in France and Spain to refuse What does he mean to say to the French consul? to treat with him because he was a usurper or "Until you shall, in war, behave yourself in a wanted candor? No, sir, these are not the maxpeaceable manner, I will not treat with you!" ims by which governments are actuated. They Is there not in this something extremely ridicu- | do not inquire so much into the means by which Ridiculous to look for "expe rience" of Bonaparte's peacea eeping him at war. ence. (3.) "If the allies of this country shall be less successful than they have every reason to expect they will be, in stirring up the people of France against Bonaparte, and in the further prosecution of the war." And, power may have been acquired, as into the fact the negotiation which he doos not now possess: of where the power resides. The people did Is it quite sure, that when he finds himself safe acquiesce in the government of Cromwell. But in his seat, he will treat on the same terms as a: it may be said that the splendor of his talents, present, and that you will get a better peace the vigor of his administration, the high tone some time hence than you might reasonably hope with which he spoke to foreign nations, the sucto obtain at this moment? Will he not have one cess of his arms, and the character which he interest less to do it? and do you not overlook gave to the English name, induced the nation to a favorable occasion for a chance which is exacquiesce in his usurpation; and that we must ceedingly doubtful? These are the considera. not try Bonaparte by his example. Will it be tions which I would urge to his Majesty's min said that Bonaparte is not a man of great abili-isters against the dangerous experiment of wait. ties? Will it be said that he has not, by his vic-ing for the acquiescence of the people of France tories, thrown a splendor over even the violence of the Revolution, and that he does not conciliate the French people by the high and lofty tone in which he speaks to foreign nations? Are not the French, then, as likely as the English in the case of Cromwell, to acquiesce in his government? If they should do so, the right honorable gentleman may find that this possible predicament may fail him. He may find that though one power may make war, it requires two to make peace. He may find that Bonaparte was as insincere as himself in the proposition which he made; and in his turn he may come forward and say, "I have no occasion now for concealment. It is true that, in the beginning of the year 1800, I offered to treat, not because I wished for peace, but because the people of France wished for it; and besides, my old resources being exhausted, and there being no means of carrying on the war without a new and solid system of finance,' I pretended to treat, because I wished to procure the unanimous assent of the French people to this new and solid system of finance.' Did you think I was in earnest ? You were deceived. I now throw off the mask. I have gained my point, and I reject your offers with scorn. Is it not a very possible case that he may use this language? Is it not within the right honorable gentleman's knowledge of human nature 225 But even if this should not be the case, will not the very test which you require, the acquiescence of the people of France in his government, give him an advantage-ground in 1124 24 It is a curious fact that Mr. Fox, in putting these words into the mouth of Bonaparte, hit precisely on the sentiments he entertained at this crisis. He says in his Memoirs, as dictated to Montholon, "I had then need of war; a treaty of peace which should have derogated from that of Campo Formio, and annulled the creations of Italy, would have withered every imagination. Mr. Pitt's an swer accordingly was impatiently expected. When it arrived, it filled me with a secret satisfaction. His answer could not have been more favorable! From that moment I foresaw that, with such impassioned antagonists, I would have no difficulty in reaching the highest destinies."-Vol. i., 33, 34. 25 This was a "palpable hit." A few months before, Mr. Pitt had made a descent upon Holland, which he declared, from "his knowledge of human nature," must be successful in rousing the Dutch against their French rulers. As it proved a miserable failure, he got many hints from Mr. Sheridan and Mr. Fox respecting "his knowledge of human nature." (4.) "If the pressure of the war should be heavier upon us than it would be convenient for us to continue to bear." These are the other two possible emergencies in which the right honorable gentleman would treat even with Bonaparte. Sir, I have often blamed the right honorable gentleman for being disingenuous and insincere. On the present occasion I certainly can not charge him with any such thing. He has made to-night a most honest confession. He is open and candid. He tells Bonaparte fairly what he has to expect. "I mean," says he, to do every thing in my power to raise up the people of France against you; I have engaged a number of allies, and our combined efforts shall be used to excite insurrection and civil war in France. I will strive to murder you, or to get you sent away. If I succeed, well; but if I fail, then I will treat with you. My resources being exhausted; even my 'solid system of finance' having failed to supply me with the means of keeping together my allies, and of feeding the discontents I have excited in France; then you may expect to see me renounce my high tone, my attachment to the house of Bourbon, my ab horrence of your crimes, my alarm at your principles; for then I shall be ready to own that, on the balance and comparison of circumstances, there will be less danger in concluding a peace than in the continuance of war!" Is this political language for one state to hold to another? And what sort of peace does the right honorable gentleman expect to receive in that case? Does he think that Bonaparte would grant to baffled insolence, to humiliated pride, to disappointment and to imbecility, the same terms which he would be ready to give now? The right honorable gentleman can not have forgotten what he said on another occasion, He would then have to repeat his words, but | supporting the minister in his negotiation for a with a different application. He would have to say, "All our efforts are vain. We have exhaust ed our strength. Our designs are impracticable, and we must sue to you for peace." House, that they and the waole na and not a contin war. Sir, what is the question to-night? We are Appeal to the called upon to support ministers in refusing a frank, candid, and retion desire peace, spectful offer of negotiation, and to Bance of the war. countenance them in continuing the Now I would put the question in another way. Suppose that ministers had been inclined to adopt the line of conduct which they pursued in 1796 and 1797, and that to-night, instead of a question on a war address, it had been an address to his Majesty to thank him for accepting the overture, and for opening a negotiation to treat for peace: I ask the gentlemen opposite; I appeal to the whole five hundred and fiftyeight representatives of the people, to lay their hands upon their hearts, and to say whether they would not have cordially voted for such an address. Would they, or would they not? Yes, sir, if the address had breathed a spirit of peace, your benches would have resounded with rejoicings, and with praises of a measure that was likely to bring back the blessings of tranquillity. On the present occasion, then, I ask for the vote of no gentlemen but of those who, in the secret confession of their conscience, admit, at this instant, while they hear me, that they would have cheerfully and heartily voted with the minister for an address directly the reverse of the one proposed. If every such gentleman were to vote with me, I should be this night in the greatest majority that ever I had the honor to vote with in this House. I do not know that the right honorable gentleman would find, even on the hencnes around him, a single individual who would not vote with me. I am sure he would not find many. I do not know that in this House I could single out the individual who would think himself bound by consistency to vote against the right honorable gentleman on an address for negotiation. There may be some, but they are very few. I do know, indeed, one most honorable man in another place, whose purity and integrity I respect, though I lament the opinion he has formed on this subject, who would think himself bound, from the uniform consistency of his life, to vote against an address for negotiation. Earl Fitzwilliam would, I verily believe, do so. He would feel himself bound, from the previous votes he has given, to declare his objection to all treaty. But I own I do not know more in either House of Parliament. There may be others, but I do not know them. What, then, is the House of Commons come to, when, notwithstanding their support given to the right honorable gentleman in 1796 and 1797, on his entering into negotiation; notwithstanding their inward conviction that they would vote with him this moment for the same measure; who, after solid system of finance, can now bring themselves to countenance his abandonment of the ground he took, and to support him in refusing all nego tiation! What will be said of gentlemen who shall vote in this way, and yet feel, in their consciences, that they would have, with infinitely more readiness, voted the other? terpart in martial Sir, we have heard to-night a great many most acrimonious invectives against Bo- The military des naparte, against all the course of parte lins its coun potism of Bonahis conduct, and against the un-aw as applied to principled manner in which he Ireland. seized upon the reins of government. I will not make his defense. I think all this sort of invee tive, which is used only to inflame the passions of this House and of the country, exceedingly ill timed, and very impolitic. But I say I will not make his defense. I am not sufficiently in possession of materials upon which to form an opinion on the character and conduct of this extraordinary man. On his arrival in France, he found the government in a very unsettled state, and the whole affairs of the Republic deranged, crippled, and involved. He thought it necessary to reform the government; and he did reform it, just in the way in which a military man may be expected to carry on a reform. He seized on the whole authority for himself. It will not be expected from me that I should either approve or apologize for such an act. I am certainly not for reforming governments by such expedients; but how this House can be so violently indignant at the idea of military despotism, is, I own, a little singular, when I see the composure with which they can observe it nearer home; nay, when I see them regard it as a frame of government most peculiarly suited to the exercise of free opinion, on a subject the most important of any that can engage the attention of a people. Was it not the system which was so happily and so advantageously established of late, all over Ireland, and which even now the government may, at its pleasure proclaim over the whole of that kingdom? Are not the persons and property of the people left, in many districts, at this moment, to the entire will of military commanders? and is not this held out as peculiarly proper and advantageous, at a time when the people of Ireland are freely, and with unbiased judgments, to discuss the most interesting question of a legislative union? Notwithstanding the existence of martial law, so far do we think Ireland from being enslaved, that we presume it precisely the period and the circumstances under which she may best declare her free opinion! Now, really, sir, I can not think that gentlemen, who talk in this way about Ireland, can, with a good grace, rail at military despotism in France. Charge against But, it seems, "Bonaparte has broken his oaths. He has violated his oath of fidelity to the Constitution of the third year." Sir, I am not one of those who hold that any each oaths ought ever to be exacted. They are seldom o Bonaparte, that his oaths to the he bad violated government |