and a decree was made directing an account of all moneys | the house from their proper or usual locality without immereceived by them and the application thereof. It appeared that J. H. Clarke had not accounted for a sum of 6407. which he had received, and had become bankrupt, and the plaintiff now applied that the chief clerk, in taking the accounts, might be directed to make the defendants liable for the default of J. H. Clarke, as being their agent. Roxburgh, Q.C., and Herbert Smith, for the plaintiff. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS held that, under the deed in ques- Solicitors for the defendants: Oliver Richards; Linklater, Ilackwood, & Addison. diately substituting others of equal value. Munn became the assignee of the lease, and let the premises to the defendant Flaxman, who took out the whole of the front windows to make the shop suitable for his business. The bill prayed for a mandatory injunction against both defendants from allowing the shop to remain without plate-glass windows, and this was a motion in the terms of the prayer. Methold, for the plaintiff. Fischer, for the defendant Munn. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR directed a mandatory injunction to issue in the terms moved. Solicitors: Ley & Brocklesby; Marsden & Chubb; Edward Burrell. V.-C. J. BAYLEY V. MILES. Practice-Special Case-Absent Parties. Feb. 8. G. J. F. Cooke applied for leave to set down a special case, in the absence of parties interested in remainder under the will, upon which the opinion of the Court was sought. The plaintiff in the special case was the widow and executrix of the testator, and the defendants were the tenant for life of the real estates and the trustees. The persons interested in remainder in the real estates under the will were now resident in New Zealand, and it was sought to proceed in their absence. 12 & 13 Vict. c. 35, ss. 7, 13, 15, and 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 51, were referred to. Haddan, for the trustees, did not oppose, but wished the direction of the Court to be obtained. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR directed the case to be set down for hearing, omitting the names of the persons out of the jurisdiction In November, 1864, the directors of the London, Hamburg. and Continental Exchange Bank, in order to keep up the price of their shares, instructed Mr. Henry, the broker of the bank, to buy a "round number" of shares in the market. He accordingly bought 175 shares at the average price of 117. 1s. 4d., and paid for them out of his own money. Two of these shares were afterwards transferred into the name of one Edmands, who paid Henry for them; 60 were transferred into the names of the various directors, who also paid for them; the remaining 113 were transferred into the name of a clerk in the bank, as a trustee of the bank. After the 113 shares were so transferred, the secretary of the bank gave Henry a ticket, directing the cashier of the bank to credit his account at the bank with the amount, which was accordingly done, and Henry drew on the V.-C. J. account as he had previously done. Messrs. Zulueta had employed Henry as their broker, and placed large sums of money in his hands for investment. Henry Îent a considerable portion of these sums to the bank, which was now in course of winding-up, and Henry had obtained leave to prove against the bank for the balance due to Henry on his account with the bank. The question now was whether the balance ought not to be reduced by the sum so credited to Henry in respect of the 113 shares, it being alleged that the purchase on behalf of the bank of its own shares was ultrà vires. Jessel, Q.C., and Haynes, for Messrs. Zulueta. Roxburgh, Q.C., and Graham Hastings, for the liquidator. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS held that, assuming the transaction to be ultrà vires, it was completed by giving the credit to Henry for the price of the shares, and that the only remedy of the shareholders was against the directors personally. Solicitors: Deane & Chubb; Bothamleys & Freeman. Jan. 31. as parties. Solicitors: Young, Maples, & Co.; Nelson. Practice-Motion to vary Certificate-Time. Langley moved, on behalf of the defendant, that the chief clerk's certificate, dated the 23rd of December, 1869, might be varied. A summons to vary the certificate was taken out by the defendant on the 28th of December, and heard before the Vice-Chancellor personally in chambers on the 11th of January, 1870. The certificate was signed by the Vice-Chancellor on that day, and filed on the next day (the 12th of January). On the 11th of January, notice that the Court would be moved on Thursday, the 31st day of January, 1870," to vary the certificate, was served by the defendant. On Monday, the 31st of January, the last day of Term, and a seal day, the motion was served. Lindley, for the plaintiff, took the preliminary objection that the motion was not in time, according to Cons. Ord. xxxv. r. 52, and cited Cross v. Maltby (8 W. R. 646), where the Court, to prevent the party moving from being prejudiced by there being no seal day within the eight days, allowed notice to be given for a day not a seal day. Here the defendant might have moved on the 20th, which was a seal day. Langley contended that it was sufficient if notice of motion had Windows-been given within the eight days: Wycherley v. Barnard (Joh. 41). THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said that he could not overrule the decision of the Vice-Chancellor Kindersley in Cross v. Maltby; and declined to make any order upon this motion. Motion refused without costs. In February, 1864, E. W. Purdom, to whom a house with a shop was demised for twenty-one years, covenanted that he would not remove, inter alia, the plate-glass windows in front of Solicitors: Angell; W. Tatham & Son. BANKRUPTCY. Ex parte WILLIAMS. In re PULLEN. Feb. 2. Feb. 5. Q. B. THOMAS v. RHYMNEY RAILWAY COMPANY. Bankruptcy-Deed of Arrangement-Insufficiency of CompositionVacating Registration of Deed-Laches. This was an application by a dissentient creditor to have the registration of a deed of arrangement under s. 192 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, vacated on the ground that the amount of composition offered by the bankrupt was insufficient, and that the deed itself was tainted with fraud. It appeared that the number of creditors was five, the amount of debts 5377., and the amount of assets, on the debtor's own shewing, was 2007. The deed was registered on the 13th of May, 1869, and contained a covenant by the debtor to pay ls. in the pound. F. Knight, in support of the application. Reed, contrà, urged that the creditor was now precluded by delay from making this application. THE CHIEF JUDGE granted the application, and observed that a deed of arrangement registered under the 192nd section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, was in the nature of a record of the Court, and therefore the Court had power to cancel it. As to the question of laches, where, during the interval, nothing had been done, and no rights transferred or acquired, the delay was in itself no answer to an application of this nature. Solicitors: Hollingsworth, Tyerman, & Green; Pullen. Q. B. Common Law. Jan. 27. THE QUEEN V. THE MAYOR AND ASSESSORS OF BOLTON. Municipal Corporation — Burgess List - Notice of Objection · Description of Person objected to-5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 76, s. 17, Sched. D. No. 3. One Gooden was described in the burgess list of the borough of Bolton as follows:-" 429. Gooden, Robert. Warehouse, Bridge Street." Notice of objection to Gooden's name being retained on the burgess list was given, in which he was described as Robert Gooden, Bridge Street." At a court held by the mayor and assessors for revising the burgess lists, the notice of objection was held invalid on the ground that it did not comply with 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 76, s. 17, Sched. D. No. 3, which directs the objector "to describe the person objected to as described in the burgess list." A rule to shew cause why a mandamus should not issue commanding the mayor and assessors to hold a court and hear objections and revise the burgess lists was afterwards obtained. Holker, Q.C., and John Edwards shewed cause. Quain, Q.C., and Hutton, in support of the rule, were not heard. THE COURT (Cockburn, C.J., Blackburn, Mellor, and Lush, JJ.) held that the notice of objection required by the Statute need only contain a description of the person, and that the notice was a good notice, according to the precise form given in the Schedule; that the mayor and assessors were wrong in holding it invalid; and that the rule for the mandamus must be absolute. Attorneys for prosecution: Fawcett, Horne, & Hunter. Attorney for defendant: C. E. Abbott, for Hinnell, Bolton. The plaintiff took a ticket of the defendants, to be carried as a passenger from Caerphilly to Cardiff. At Llandaff the defendants' line joins the line of the Taff Vale Railway Company, over which the defendants have running powers from Llandaff to Cardiff on the payment of certain tolls; the whole of the traffic arrangements, &c., over the Taff Vale Line being left by the special Act in the control of the Taff Vale Company alone. After leaving Llandaff the train in which the plaintiff rode ran into a mineral train of the Taff Vale Company, and the plaintiff was injured by the collision. The plaintiff having brought an action against the defendants the defendants' servants of all negligence, and found that the for the damage caused by their negligence, the jury acquitted collision occurred owing to the negligence of the servants of the Taff Vale Company in sending on their own train without the proper tail-light, and allowing the defendants' train to proceed on the same line of rails too soon after the other train, without giving any warning to the driver of the defendants' train. On this finding the verdict was entered for the defendants, with leave to the plaintiff to move to enter the verdict for 4507., if the Court should be of opinion that, under the circumstances, the defendants were liable for the negligence of the Taff Vale Railway Company. A rule was obtained accordingly, on the authority of Great Western Railway Company v. Blake (7 H. & N. 987; 31 L. J. (Ex.) 346). Field, Q.C., and H. G. Allen shewed cause. They distinguished Blake's Case. There the two companies had an agreement to share the profits, whereas here the defendants had simply running powers over the Taff Vale Line, and had no control over the servants of that company; and the defendants were in the position of a stage-coach proprietor, who has no control over the high road. Mellor, J., in Blake's Case, expressly took this distinction. G. B. Hughes, in support of the rule:- The judgments of Cockburn, C.J., and Byles, J., went the whole length of holding the defendants liable in a case like the present; and in Buxton v. burn and Lush, JJ., made no distinction. North Eastern Railway Company (Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 549) Black THE COURT (Mellor, Lush, and Hannen, JJ.) made the rule Buxton's Case, and of some of the Court in Blake's Case, were absolute, on the ground that the expressions of the judges in wide enough to include the present case, and this Court could Mellor, J., however, expressed his opinion that the defendants not overrule them. The plaintiff must go to a court of error. were not liable, having only running powers over the Taff Vale Line, and no control over the servants of that company. Lush, J. admitted that there certainly was a distinction between this case Buxton's Case was before the Court, and he expressed a hope and Blake's Case, which was not present to his mind when that the case would be taken to a court of error. Attorneys for plaintiff: Field & Roscoe, Attorney for defendants: Roy. defendant, after demand, entered and sold the goods. On the 16th of November J. was adjudged bankrupt on his own petition of the same date. On the 11th of December the plaintiff was appointed creditors' assignee. THE COURT OF EXCHEQUER CHAMBER (Kelly, C.B., Channell, Pigott, and Cleasby, BB., Willes and Keating, JJ.) held that the defendant was bound to produce the lease or a copy; that, not having done so, he had not made a good title, and therefore that the plaintiff was at liberty to rescind the contract and recover back the deposit; and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench. Attorneys for plaintiff: Palmer, Palmer, & Bull. The plaintiff having brought an action as such assignee for the conversion of the goods and for money had and received, at the trial the above facts were proved; and in answer to the question left to them by the judge, the jury found that the bill of sale was given to the defendant as a fraudulent preference. A verdict was entered for the plaintiff for the amount of the proceeds of the sale, with leave to move to enter a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that there was no relation back (the adjudication having been upon the bankrupt's own petition) so C. P. as to entitle the plaintiff to recover. The Court of Queen's Bench (Law Rep. 4 Q. B. 481) held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover on either count, as there was no relation back so as to make the giving of the bill of sale an act of bankruptcy under s. 67 of the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106. Quain, Q.C. (Forbes with him), for the plaintiff. THE COURT OF EXCHEQUER CHAMBER (Kelly, C.B., Martin, Channell, Pigott, and Cleasby, BB., Willes and Brett, JJ.) held that the doctrine of relation did not apply to the case of fraudulent preference, and that the transaction, though valid between the parties, was voidable by the assignees of the bankrupt; that they might avoid it by demanding the goods so long as the goods remained in possession of the transferee, and they might also avoid it by demanding the money whenever those goods were converted into money, and that an action for money had and received would lie; and they reversed the judgment of the Court below. Attorneys for plaintiff: Singleton & Tattershall, for Unwin, Sheffield. Attorneys for defendant: Doyle & Edwards, for Edwin Allen, Birmingham. Vendor and Purchaser-Abstract of Title—Sale of Leaseholds— Non-production of Lease. Action to recover the sum of 4007., being the deposit paid upon the purchase of leasehold premises. The plaintiff entered into an agreement with the defendant for the purchase of a leasehold estate. An abstract of the defendant's title was sent to the plaintiff, which shewed, amongst other things, that, on the 13th of September, 1800, an indenture was made by the parties therein mentioned, which recited an indenture dated the 20th of January, 1606, made between M. and others, of the one part, and J. M. of the other part, whereby certain messuages, lands, forges, furnaces, and mills were demised and granted unto J. M., his executors, administrators, and assigns, from Michaelmas, 1599, for the term of 1000 years, at the yearly rent of 1d., payable at Michaelmas, only if demanded. Amongst the requisitions on the title sent by the plaintiff was one for the production of an attested copy of the recited lease, dated the 20th of January, 1606, and for a covenant for its production by the legal possessor. The answer stated that the production of a deed more than sixty years old could not be insisted upon, and that the term had been annihilated by the Act to render satisfied terms unnecessary (8 & 9 Vict. c. 112, s. 1); whereupon the plaintiff rescinded the contract of sale. At the trial a verdict was entered for the plaintiff, with leave reserved to the defendant to move to enter a nonsuit. The Court of Queen's Bench refused the rule. Joshua Williams, Q.C. (J. C. Mathew with him), for the plaintiff. Mellish, Q.C. (Morgan Lloyd with him), for the defendant. Jan. 29. BAILEY V. LONDON, CHATHAM, and Dover RAILWAY COMPANY. Railway Traffic Act, 1851-Motion for Injunction. and Dover Railway Company to restrain them from giving an undue preference to one Crampton over the applicant in the charges for carrying sand. The affidavits shewed that the company charged the applicant 1s. per truck-load, whereas they charged Crampton only 9. But, inasmuch as it was not shewn that any previous application on the subject of the complaint had been made to the company: Day moved for an injunction against the London, Chatham, THE COURT declined to entertain the motion-Bovill, C.J., which the Court of Queen's Bench always refused to grant where saying that it was very much like an application for a mandamas, a previous application for redress had not been made to the party complained of. Attorneys for applicant: Routh & Stacey. A building contract entered into by a burial board contained a clause that it should be lawful for the board, in case the contractor should fail in the due performance of any part of his undertaking, or should become bankrupt, &c., or should not, in the opinion and according to the determination of the architect, exercise due diligence and make such progress as would enable the works to be effectually and efficiently completed at the time and in the manner therein mentioned, to determine the contract by a notice in writing under the hand of the clerk of the burial board, and to enter upon and take possession of the works, and of the plant, tools, and materials of the contractors, and use or sell the same as the absolute property of the board. The architect having certified to them that the plaintiff was not exercising due diligence, the board gave the required notice to determine the contract, and took possession of the works, plant, &c. The certificate was given bona fide, but the delay was, in fact, occasioned by the act of the board in ordering extra work, and other wise. The Court of Common Pleas (Law Rep. 4 C. P. 755) held that the board were, notwithstanding, entitled to act as they did; their right to enter upon the works being, by the terms of the contract, dependent on the opinion and judg ment of the architect, and not upon the contractor's failure to exercise due diligence in fact. THE COURT (Kelly, C.B., Blackburn and Mellor, JJ., and Channell, B.-dissentientibus Hannen, J., and Cleasby, B.) re versed their decision. Manisty, Q.C., and R. G. Williams, for the plaintiff. Holker, Q.C., and C. Russell, for the defendants. Attorneys for plaintiff: Shaw & Tremellen, for P. & J. Watson, Bury. Attorneys for defendants: Gregory, Rowcliffes, & Rawle, for Harper & Dodds, Bury. TABLE OF CASES. Equity. PAGE 46 48 BAGLAN HALL COLLIERIES COMPANY, In re (Company-Contribu- V.-C. M. 48 V.-C. M. 47 45 48 DYERS COMPANY v. KING (Light and Air · Obstruction — In- M. R. 46 PAGE Q. B. 49 C. P. 51 POTTER V. RANKIN (Marine Insurance—Policy on chartered Freight L. J. GIFFARD. Equity. Feb. 10. In re CONSTANTINOPLE AND ALEXANDRIA HOTEL COMPANY. This was an appeal from a decision of the Master of the Rolls (Weekly Notes, 1869, p. 255). Ince, for the appellant. Bevir, for the official liquidator. THE LORD JUSTICE GIFFARD held that, as Ebbetts had attained 21 on the 8th of April, 1864, and had done no act to repudiate the shares until after the 3rd of June, 1865, when the winding-up commenced, he had no title to be relieved from the shares. Solicitors: Routh & Stacey; W. Rogers. 49 V.-C. S. 46 L. J. GIFFARD. Feb. 10. In re GENERAL PROVIDENT ASSURANCE COMPANY. Q. B. 50 Company-Contributory-Conditional Agreement to take Shares BECHER V. GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY (Railway Company Collateral Agreement. L. J. GIFFARD. Feb. 14. In re PANAMA, NEW ZEALAND, AND AUSTRALIAN ROYAL MAIL COMPANY. Debenture-holders-Charge on Property of Company. This was an appeal from an order of Vice-Chancellor Malins made in the winding-up of the above company (Weekly Notes, 1869, p. 269). The company having power to raise money by mortgages or debentures, issued debentures for the sum of 1007. each, which sum was charged "upon the undertaking and all sums of money arising therefrom, and all the estate, right, title, and interest of the company therein." The property of the company consisted principally of ships. Before the debentures became payable the company was ordered to be wound up, and a question arose between the debenture-holders and the general creditors; the latter, represented by the official liquidator, contending that the debenture-holders had a charge only upon the "undertaking," and the moneys arising therefrom, and not upon the produce of the sale of the ships. The Vice-Chancellor held that the debenture-holders had a prior charge upon the proceeds of the ships, and from this decision the official liquidator appealed. Cole, Q.C., and Lindley, for the appellant. sequently projected a company for the purchase of this and some adjoining property, and a prospectus was issued stating that the object of the company was to purchase the property which was described, and to carry on the business of a tavern. The company was registered in October, 1865. projected company for the purchase of the reversion and the An agreement was entered into by Nokes on behalf of the adjoining property. The total amount of the purchase-money was fixed at 42,000., including the interest of Nokes & Co, which was estimated at 14,000l., and which was to cover the preliminary expenses. This sum was paid to them accordingly. Nokes & Co. were stated in the prospectus to be the solicitors of the company. In 1867 the company was ordered to be wound up, and thi present bill was filed by the official liquidator. Jessel, Q.C., and Lindley, for the official liquidator. Sir R. Baggallay, Q.C., and Cottrell, for the defendants. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS held that, as the purchase was made by Nokes & Co. before the company was formed or contemplated, and before they became the company's solicitors, they could not in the circumstances of the case, and in the absence of fraud or concealment, be made liable for the profit occasioned by their subsequent sale to the company, which was sanctioned by the directors. Solicitors: Mercer & Mercer; Nokes, Carlisle, & Francis. Pearson, Q.C., and Graham Hastings, for the debenture-holders. THE LORD JUSTICE GIFFARD said that the only question in the case was as to the rights of the debenture-holders when the company was wound up and the property realised. The word "undertaking" in this case clearly meant all the property of the company both at the date of the debenture and subsequently M. R. acquired. So long as the undertaking went on, and the debenture was not due, the holder could not seize the property so as to stop the undertaking; but when the debenture became due, and the undertaking was wound up, he had a right to realise his security. The Vice-Chancellor was right, and the appeal must be dismissed with costs. Solicitors: Ashurst, Morris, & Co.; W. & W. A. Waller. L. J. GIFFARD. Feb. 15. Company-Contributory-Subscribers of Memorandum of Association-Paid-up Shares. In re BAGLAN HALL COLLIERIES COMPANY. This case came before the Court on motions by some of the subscribers of the memorandum of association, by way of appeal from a decision of Vice-Chancellor Malins (ante, p. 15) fixing them on the list of contributories. Cotton, Q.C., B. B. Rogers, and Everitt, for the appellants. Glasse, Q.C., and Caldecott, for the official liquidator, and Cottrell, for a subscriber of the memorandum, supported the order of the Vice-Chancellor. THE LORD JUSTICE GIFFARD held that the case was in substance the same as Pell's Case (Law Rep. 5 Ch. 11); and reversed the Vice-Chancellor's order. Company-Solicitor and Client-Sale to Company by their Solicitors -Liability to Account for Profit. This suit was instituted for the purpose of making W. F. Nokes and his two partners, who were solicitors, answerable for the profit made by them arising from the sale to the Masons Hall Company of certain property, on the ground of the relation of solicitor and client which subsisted between them and the company, and of alleged concealment on their part in relation to the transaction. Feb. 15. SWIFT v. WENMAN. Husband and Wife—Divorce-Wife's Interest under Settlement, The plaintiff in this suit, who had obtained a decree for dissolution of marriage in the Divorce Court against the defendant on account of adultery and bigamy, filed her bill to obtain payment of a certain trust fund to which, under her settlement, she would have become absolutely entitled on her husband's death. The plaintiff, who was entitled under her father's will to a share of his property on attaining 21, married the defendant while still an infant, and by the settlement on her marriage it was agreed that her said share should be vested in the trustees therein named upon trust for herself for life, with remainder for her husband for life, and in default of children, if her husband should die in her lifetime, for the plaintiff absolutely; but if her husband should survive, then as she should by will appoint, or, in default, to her next of kin. There were no children of the marriage. The plaintiff after attaining 21 was deserted by her husband, who married another person, whereupon the plaintiff took proceedings in the Divorce Court, and obtained a decree for dissolution. The bill was filed against the trustees of the settlement and the former husband, and prayed that the plaintiff might be declared entitled to the trust fund, and that the same might be paid to her. Roxburgh, Q.C., and T. A. Roberts, for the plaintiff. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS made a decree in the plaintiff's favour. Solicitor for the plaintiff: R. W. Roberts, agent for R. Woof, Worcester. Solicitor for the defendant: J. T. Fry. This was a special case. John Hamilton, by his will dated the 26th of April, 1862, directed his trustees to pay the income of 5000l. to his niece, In 1865 Nokes & Co. purchased the leasehold interest in the Mary Cobley, for life, for her separate use. At her death he gave property in question for 7500. They, with some others, sub-the principal "to her children who should attain 26, or leave |